INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS



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Contents

1

Origin and Growth of International Relations

In ancient times, Aristotle said: "Man by nature and necessity is a social animal." A man who can live without other beings is either a God or a beast. In modern times we can safely say that no nation or country can live in isolation. Co-existence of nations is the order of the day. No doubt, every nation is independent and sovereign, nevertheless it counts on other nations of the world in several respects. Cordial relations and understanding among nations have become an important phenomenon of modern life. International Relations have, thus, assumed great pragmatic and academic significance in present times.

Though International Relations as an academic discipline is of a recent origin yet relations among nations were as old a phenomena as history. There were inter-tribal, inter-city state and inter-kingdom relations even in ancient age. One can find incidental references to the issues of war and peace in the religious texts and epic literature of the ancient time, mostly with pacifist approach. Ancient civilisations like the Egyptian, the Sumerian, the Assyrian, the Indian, the Chinese, the Greek and the Roman had evolved a distinct code of inter-state conduct and a pattern of international relations. Out of the Fifteen Books of Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, one was devoted exclusively to diplomacy.

But in ancient world, international relations were incidental, sporadic and limited in nature. Mostly they were not global, but merely regional in character. They were actually not international relations in the true sense of the term. They can, at best, be described as parochial and occasional inter-state relations.

With the Renaissance and the Reformation, international relations assumed a new character. After the Peace of West-Phalia in 1648, statehood became an ideal unit of mankind. With this, territorial sovereign and nation-state emerged as a basic political unit and an effective actor in international relations. These sovereign states were very much aware of their independence yet they were also conscious about the reality of inter-dependence in the modern world. Modem international relations began to grow in the paradoxial situation of independence and inter-dependence; separateness and closeness; individuality and mutuality; nationalism and internationalism. They continued to develop as a process of co-operation and conflict.

There was manifold increase in the wants and needs of the various countries after the Industrial Revolution. There was considerable improvement in the means of transport and communications. Trade, transit and transactions between the nations became the order of the day. Scientific and technological revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries further brought the nations nearer and closer. All these developments made international relations more regular, more comprehensive, more valuable day by day. Their character became more and more global and broaden instead of regional and narrower.

The industrial and scientific innovations had their impact on war technology and armaments.

The trauma of the First World War, together with the demand for democratic control of foreign policy, stimulated the public urge for better understanding of foreign relations. The issues of war and peace came to the forefront. All these developments attracted people's attention towards the growing importance of international relations and provided the ground for the creation of International Relations as an academic discipline.

DEVELOPMENT AS AN ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE

Although international relations as a traditional feature of mankind is as old as the state itself yet its study as an autonomous discipline is of comparatively recent origin. This discipline is so new that it can be called as the youngest of all social sciences. As a separate subject and as an endeavour to analyze the content and nature of inter-state cooperation and conflict; coercion and persuasion, International Relations is integrally related to the First World War. Before this tragic event, in the words of Zimmern, "there was no teaching of the subject as such, and very little conscious study."[1] After the First World War, its study was initiated by the North Americans and the West Europeans.

By 1914 the History Faculties of some universities in the United States organised lecture courses on regional history of the Far East and Latin America, diplomatic history and United States foreign policy. Topics like foreign trade, international exchange and foreign investment were incidentally taught by the Departments of Economics. But there was no regular and systematic course of International Relations prior to the First World War.

The first chair of International Politics was founded in 1919 at the University College of Wales (U.K.). Several prominent historians like Alfred Zimmern, C.K. Webster, E.H. Carr etc. were the early occupants of the Chair. With this the seed of International Relations as an autonomous academic discipline was sown. In the 1920s the rise of the USA as a global power encouraged the teaching of International Relations as an independent subject there. But in the USSR it was not recognised as a separate discipline even after the Second World War. It was still a part of history in the Moscow State University right up to the mid-sixties. In Afro-Asian countries its study was gradually started by different universities after the process of decolonisation in the post-Second World War period.

An Introduction to the Study of International Relations was the earliest text book in the discipline. It was jointly written by Grant, Hughes, Greenwood, Kerr and Urguhart and published in Britain in 1916. Lord Bryce delivered a series of eight lectures in the United States in 1921. Next year these were published as *International Relations*. He observed that the subject was rather vast, which was closely connected with nearly every branch of principal human sciences—Ethics, Economics, Law and Politics.[2] He advocated that the cause of international peace could only be strengthened with the increase of popular grasp of the themes and issues of international relations. In 1922 E.A. Walsh edited a volume on *The History and Nature of International Relations* from New York. In 1925, Professor Buell, Research Director, Foreign Policy Association USA published a lengthy text on International Relations. All these earlier books helped in the growth of International Relations as an academic discipline.

Another significant development in this regard is the preparation and publication by Professor Moon of History in Columbia University (U.S.A) in 1926, a *Syllabus on International Relations*. It consisted of the following—(i) Introduction, (ii) Nationalism, Territorial Conflicts and War, (iii) Imperialism and World Politics, (iv) Militarism and Armaments, (v) History of International Relations to 1914, (vi) History of International Relations since 1914, (vii) Summary Review of Policies of Great Powers, (viii) Economic Problems, (ix) Problems of Diplomacy and (x) International Organisation, League of Nations and the World Court.

Between 1900 and 1939, the study of International Relations was gradually progressing and its different aspects were explored. As an academic discipline it received a wider recognition during the inter-war period, and each year provided additional justification for a more serious study and concern for international relations. Its development was further aided by the following factors:

Setting-up of University Chairs

(i) In 1919 University of Wales (Britain) set up separate chair on International Relations. Its first two incumbents were Sir Alfred Zimmern and Sir Charles Webster—both historians.

(ii) In the U.S.A., a School of Foreign Service came into existence at Georgetown University in 1919, and a School of International Relations at University of Southern California in 1924. By 1930 most of the American Universities had one or more courses on International Relations.

(iii) In Paris, the Institute of Advanced International Studies was founded in 1923 under the Faculty of Law. The same Institute was reorganised in 1946.

Research Bodies

(i) In U.S.A., in 1910 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was established at Washington, D.C. It organised conferences, exchange of scholars and promoted and published research papers.

(ii) The Union of Democratic Control of 1914 did the spade work in England for the exchange of International Relations as an academic discipline.

(iii) In 1918 two research bodies in New York were formed— Foreign Policy Association and the Council on Foreign Relations. The aim of both is to stimulate wider interest in international relations, policy issues confronting the United States, and encourage more participation in world affairs by the citizens. They also publish important periodicals on international relations. These are bi-monthly, *Headline Series* and quarterly, *Foreign Affairs*.

(iv) Royal Institute of International Affairs was established in 1920 in London. It had affiliated institutes in Canada, Australia, Newzealand, South Africa and Pakistan. Its annual publication, *Survey of International Affairs* and quarterly journal, *International Affairs* promoted study and research in International Relations.

(v) New Commonwealth Institute which was set up in London in 1934, was subsequently renamed as the London Institute of World Affairs. It releases a journal—*World Affairs*, and an annual volume—*The Year Book of World Affairs*.

(vi) By 1935 a research organisation by the name of the Institute of International Affairs was formed in Paris also.

(vii) India did not lag behind. A non-government organisation—Indian Council of World Affairs was established in New Delhi in 1943 for promoting interest in foreign relations and world affairs. It also publishes a journal—*India Quarterly* and other significant documents and publications.

Role of League

The League of Nations also played its role in developing International Relations as a separate subject. The League encouraged the study by its work as a forum of international discussions and

by its sponsoring a series of International Studies Conferences through its Institute of Intellectual Cooperation. The Geneva Institute of International Relations served as an intermediary between the League and the growing subject of International Relations on the level of universities.

After the Second World War

This total war once more exhibited the costly and perilous character of the institution of war, and underlined the compelling need to improve the techniques of inter-state relations for survival of the human race. During this War, the military installations in different parts of the world created the necessity to develop the regional or area studies as effective direction mark to assist the army personnel. This area study became a major breakthrough in the discipline of International Relations.

With the end of the Second World War came the nuclear technology, the U.N.O and political independence to Asia, Africa and the Latin America. Nuclear proliferation completely changed the factors governing international relations. The question of war and peace became the key issue for mankind. The political and military impacts of nuclear energy have opened up new frontiers for the study of International Relations. In fact, this study has already moved from a mere academic curiosity to the very defence of human civilisation in a nuclear age.

The creation of a universal organisation—United Nations and its specialised Agencies have given an additional stimulus to the development of the study of International Relations. The UNESCO sponsored conference of representatives of Universities in 1948 gave a call to establish chair or department for systematic teaching, study and research of International Relations. The UNESCO has also sponsored *The University Teaching of Social Sciences: International Relations*, and this international survey was edited by Professor Manning of the University of London in 1954.

Asian, African and Latin American countries gained political freedom after the Second World War. With the emergence of these new states the scope of International Relations expanded. International relations no longer remained the exclusive preserve of the Europe and the West. The domination of Europe in the last four hundred years came to an end. International relations truly assumed an international character. This horizontal expansion of international relations has led to the spread of courses and departments of International Relations in all new countries. These newly independent states had to develop foreign relations afresh and this required the development of the discipline of International Relations.

Alongwith horizontal expansion of international relations, new frontiers were discernible on the vertical side. The socio-economic and cultural-ideological aspects of inter-state relations, the problems and programmes of economic development demonstrate the vertical developments in post-Second World War international relations. Some of the international problems were: erosion of national sovereignty and the phenomenon of trans-nationality, world oligarchy and world mass; the problem of rich 'North' and poor 'South' in international society; the threat of nuclear capabilities and the problem of denuclearisation; the protection of human environment and the alternative restructuring of the international system.[3]

The tendency of revolt against the existing sovereignty and an urge for a distribution of power and authority world over, seems to have acquired a global dimension. By 1989, this tendency has even crept into the once highly regimented and centrally controlled part of the world—the Soviet Union and the East Europe. The international system has also developed natural resistance to the malaise of the political exclusivity of national sovereign powers. The working of various non-governmental, trans-national and supra-national agencies are indicative of it. The emergence of

international agencies such as the WTO (World Trade Organisation), IMF (International Monetary Fund), and the IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) has made possible a collaborative structure of world economy. These certainly show a trend from "trans-nationality" to "internationality". The proliferation of multi-national corporations (MNCs) is another evidence of the expanding trend of economic enterprise beyond national boundaries. The U.N. specialised agencies— FAO, ICAO, ILO, IUU, UPU, WHO, UNESCO etc.—are also contributing their mite to the various aspects of human life.

There is a combination of collaboration and collision in the relationship between the world oligarchy and masses, though collaboration arises out of expediency than mutual admiration. World's rich regularly attract allies from the world's poor with a view to widen their sphere of influence and to consolidate their position in the factional rivalry of the oligarchy. This they do with the help of massive economic and military aid to world's poor. The poor on their part, also choose allies among the oligarchy and, during the process, often succeed in demonstrating how ably the 'weak' can use the 'powerful' for achieving the desired goals. The small powers have more than once asserted that they require "Friends not Masters" and they want to be partners and not satellites.

Despite the collaborative nature of oligarchy—mass relationship, there certainly prevails a big gap between the rich and the poor nations. This gap is increasing day by day. Economic inequality between the rich North and the poor South became another important world issue in the seventies and eighties. Poor Third World countries of the South raised the demand of new and just international economic order (NIEO). The need for disarmament and de-nuclearisation has been felt by the world community. Several partial steps have also been taken in this direction by the UN as well as by the big powers yet the problems call for a multi-tier efforts for its solution. SALT, START and INF etc. are to be strengthened.

The larger issue of environmental protection is another aspect of the contemporary international politics which has been troubling practically every thinking person and community in the world. The environmental problem is primarily being viewed as a global concern. Similarly the World Order Models Project (WOMP) was another international trend both as an institution as well as an intellectual tradition. It was a trans-national research endeavour initially intended to explore the problems of the elimination of war as a human social institution. Later on, many distinguished scholars and thinkers from various nationalities joined it to project issues and problems of global reform—both political and non-political. In brief, the WOMP was for searching the "normative basis and the constitutive structure of the global community".[4]

STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT

International Relations as the youngest social science had its genesis in the first half of the twentieth century and attained its adulthood in the post-Second World War period passing through several trends and stages. Kenneth Thompson has summed up its development in the following four stage.[5]

In the *first stage*, which runs upto the end of the First World War, International Relations were taught by diplomatic historians who were more interested in history than in politics. Their main concern was description of past events rather than the analysis of present ones and their projection into the future. This historical approach could not develop a theoretical core for the discipline.

During the *second stage* starting after the end of First World War, only the study of current affairs was stressed. Hence this approach was also partial, inasmuch as it gave importance to the

present without much reference to the past. Thus both in the first and second stage the approach was one-sided.

Like the second period, the *third period* also began after the First World War and continued to exist throughout the inter-war years and even after. Suffered by the First World War, the prevailing scholarship adopted an essentially moralistic-legalistic approach and renounced the war. The emphasis was shifted to reformism; the objective was to establish a healthy world order free of war and conflicts. Much hope was pinned on the League of Nations which was expected to replace narrow nationalism by internationalism and to remove the threat of war. International law as well as international organisation were given importance. The statesman like President Wilson and scholars like Potter, Shotwell, Fenwick, etc. had great faith in the newly set up League of Nations. The thrust during the period was not to understand the nature of international relations but to develop legal institutions and organisational devices. In short, this approach too was not sound as it emphasised ideals and ignored the hard realities of international life.

The *fourth stage* came after the Second World War. The War and its devastation shaked people's faith in the utility of international organisations and law as instrument of peace. The emphasis shifted to making a scientific analysis of the developments in international politics. Scientific studies were undertaken on what causes war and how to avert it. Forces and influences which shape and condition the behaviour of states became the chief concern of the study. These forces and influences were: determinants of foreign policies, techniques of the conduct of foreign relations, the mode of the resolution of international conflicts and crisis management. The objective of studying international problems was not to praise or condemn them but to understand them.

In 1950s and early 60s the Realists became the prevalent school. Among the principal prophets of the political realism were E.H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau, Kenneth W. Thompson, Reinhold Niebuhr, George F. Kennan, Henry A. Kissinger. Their collective message about how world politics and international behaviour ought to be, can be described as opposite to what idealists said. According to realists, power is a means, as well as end in itself. International politics is nothing but struggle for power. Every state seeks more power to use it to have more of it and with its help fulfil other important national interests.

The development of deterrence theory in the 50s and 60s was an example of interdisciplinary collaboration that had impact on national policy particularly in the area of nuclear strategy and arms control. The new methodology of game theory figured prominently in the growth of deterrence theory.

On the other hand, during this stage, Marxist scholars retained their views about the inevitability of Communism's victory over Capitalism. From Marx and Engels to Lenin, Stalin, Mao and subsequent interpreters represented a different stream. They interpreted international politics as intraclass solidarities combined with interclass war waged both across and within state borders. The end of the cold war presents an "end of history" for communism as it was rejected by the mass of the people for whom it was designed.

Thus the thrust in and subject matter of International Relations altered in the fourth stage after the Second World. This change was the outcome of various new factors in international life, such as technological development, growing liquidation of colonialism, the rise of the new nations, the emergence of new universal values, demographic shifts, invention and expansion of nuclear technology, the emergence of multilateral enterprises, growth of international institutions and above all, the desire for seeking a theoretical order in the knowledge of international affairs.

Thompson described these four stages of the development of International Relations in the

fifties whereas so many new things have happened in the world since then and the study of International Relations has accordingly taken several new forms and contents. The following stages may be added to understand the development of the discipline up-to-date.

The *fifth stage* may be counted from mid-sixties to the seventies. In the words of Kegley and Wittkopf, "the post-realist paradigm is appropriately labelled the *behavioural* approach to the study of international relations....What ensued as this paradigm-shift occurred was an extensive and often heated debate over the principles and procedures most appropriate for investigating international phenomena."[6] The behavioural approach sought lawlike generalisations about international phenomena, that is, statements about patterns and regularities presumed to hold across time and space. Thus, the quantitative study of international relations was made by Singer (1968), Zinnes (1976), Hoole and Zinnes (1976), La Barr and Singer (1976) and Rosenau (1969 and 1971).

For sometime, the nation-state, as a unit of analysis, seemed to lose its pre-eminence and attempts were made to search out the real forces of international politics and the more relevant unit of analysis—such as small groups, trans-national organisations and bureaucracies. Non-state actors such as international organisations, institutions and multinational corporations became the subject-matter of the study—this trans-national perspective (by Keohane and Nye, 1971 and 1977; and Feld, 1979) represents a theoretical attempt to respond to the development of these global circumstances. Few years later it was realised that inspite of the intrusion of these new factors on the canvas of world politics, the nation-state continued to be an important actor, and despite arguments in support of the respective ideological international systems, the nation-states remained intact and their interests supreme.

Neoliberalism or transnationalism in the 1960s and 1970s was owing to the ongoing international economic change. Under neoliberal traditions, Keohane and Nye formulated complex interdependence that introduced transnational relations, economic interdependence, security communities, international organisations and the broader concept of international regimes.[7]

While the Cold War was the main subject of the scholarly output in international relations in the fifties and sixties and it remained pervasive throughout the sixties, detente attracted the attention of many scholars throughout the seventies. Behavioural approach was discarded and post-behavioural stepped in.

The dependency theory (neo-Marxism/radicalism) responded to many of the same international economic changes as neoliberalism but in a negative sense i.e. dependence not positive inter-dependence. The dependency theory was well received in both Latin America and the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s due to renewed attention to US intervention in the Third World.

The disparities between the world's rich and poor continues to grow and this widening problem has generated new debate on the global political agenda: the North-South conflict, which overlaps and affect other more traditional differences. The North-South conflict has been caused by the disparities in global incomes and standards of living and three-fold increase in the number of independent nation-states since the end of World War II. During this stage, the demand of the South for New International Economic Order became a subject of discussion and analysis in international relations. Other concepts used and studied were: neo-imperialism, dependence, structural aggression, political economy, inter-dependence, etc. Peace researches were also revived and some people looked to theories of arms control and to ways of balancing power with power. Peace research was one of the manifestations of a resurgence of neoliberal theorising that appeared

in this period when cold war lost its chill to detente. Peace research found much of its support and research infrastructure in Western Europe and Scandinavia. The issues of global stability, world order and control of global violence were discussed by functionalists, neo-functionalists, world federalists and integration theorists.[8] Ethically concerned futurologists came with their World Order Models Project that asked the people to contemplate different and alternative worlds for the better and peaceful future. These trends and studies were known as the *post-behavioural* era.

The *Sixth stage* runs from late seventies to the first half of eighties. During this period doubts were raised on the efficacy of the detente and the 'New Cold War' emerged. Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan and Reagan administration of US threatened the world by talking of Star War programme. Economic issues, ecological and environmental problems became the concern of the whole world. The study of International Relations was influenced by these factors.

The realism reasserted itself in the eighties in the name of neorealism and both neoliberalism and radicalism faded. Kenneth Waltz propounded neorealist theory, generated interest in it and transformed the vague principles of classical realism into a form more acceptable to the scientific mainstream of the discipline.[9] Kahler observes, "By the mid-1980s not only had neorealism claimed a central position in the study of international security, but also it had, in the form of hegemonic stability theory, claimed a central place in international political economy, which had been the primary source of alternative theoretical viewpoints within international relations."[10] Neorealism argued for managing and tempering of the New Cold War in the 1980s.

With the steady process of multi polarisation, the scholars of the West, specially the United States, gradually showed interest in Third World countries. Area studies and programmes were undertaken by the universities of the US and Britain, and for field data researchers were sent to the countries under study. In many important areas of the discipline, contemporary theorising involves conscious or subconscious rationalisation of the part played by the West, particularly the USA, in the international relations of the twentieth cenutry. But the Western perspective and the Western theories of International Relations were challenged by the intellectuals of the Third World. According to them, Western theories in many cases are irrelevant and inapplicable to the less developed countries, which constitute the two-thirds majority of the UN membership and a great majority of the human race. The inadequacies of the Western theories as well as the limitations of the Marxist-Leninist theory of international relations have been analysed by the scholars of the Third World.[11]

S.P. Verma explains the mood of Third World writers who feel that theories of International Relations "strongly favour capitalist countries and, unless extensive measures are adopted to eliminate the structures hampering development in the Third World countries, the character of international economic relations will not change. What the Third World countries ask for is that the industrialised countries give up the use of the concept of 'inter-dependence' as a smoke-screen for promoting their own selfish interests. They demand a more credible effort on the part of the capitalist countries to establish a more egalitarian world economy.[12] In this way, Third World and non-Western perspectives came to the fore. This viewpoint was put forward by the neo-Marxist authors and by the leaders of the Third World countries in international forums and writings. They have crystallised their demands into a search for a new international economic order.

During the hey day of Cold War most of the Third World countries shunned military alliances, power-struggle and strived for peaceful atmosphere by adopting and propagating non-alignment. This was their greatest contribution to International Relations.

The *seventh stage* of International Relations began in 1985 when Mikhail Gorbachev came on

the scene. International relations have passed into a qualitatively new era with the advent of Gorbachev's "new political thinking" for the world. It was a dynamic concept which continued to deepen and grow. New thinking recognised 'balance of interests' instead of balance of power, co-operation instead of confrontation, internationalisation instead of nationalisation, disarmament instead of armament and de-ideologisation of inter-state relations instead of ideologisation, detente instead of Cold War.[13] It believed in peaceful coexistence and equal security for all. Initially US was suspicious about Gorbachev's moves. But later on it realised his sincerity of purpose and started responding positively towards 'new political thinking'. It has made a positive impact upon various aspects of international relations, e.g., end of Soviet-American Cold War and revival of detente, thaw in Sino-Soviet rift, solution of regional conflicts, freedom of East Europe, improving of relations between the Soviet Union and West Europe, unification of Germany, progress towards disarmament, etc. Failure of Communism, collapse of East bloc, German unification and US success in getting Kuwait vacated from Iraq all these developments enhanced the power of the US vis-a-vis the USSR. These happenings and changes became the subject of analysis in the discipline of International Relations in late eighties and early nineties. The promised great debate among neo-liberals, radicals (dependency theorists) and neorealists did not occur. By the end of 1980s their theoretical contest was reduced to relatively narrow disagreements.

In this situation, the main line of controversy shifted from realist/liberal debate to that one between rationalists and reflectivists, the post-modern debate. Since the realist/liberal confrontation disappeared, the post-modernists moved in to fill the vacuum. In contrast to neo-realists and neo-liberals who share belief in rational (scientific) methods, reflectivists are characteristed by emphasising interpretation, the reflections of the actors as central to institutions. Norms and regimes cannot be studied positivistically but have to be seen as inter-subjective phenomena only researchable by non-positivist methods. This was known as post-positivism in the 1980s that contained, according to Malhotra and Sergounin, four main currents: (i) Critical Theory; (ii) post-modern Marxism; (iii) post-modernism, and (iv) post-modern feminism.[14]

The *eighth stage* commenced in the early nineties when discipline of International Relations witnessed another turning point with the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a super power. Republics of the USSR and Yugoslavia became independent States. On the other hand West European countries became more integrated into European Union. It seemed that the US was the only super power left and the world was becoming unipolar. Third World countries were facing worst economic crisis. These countries and the countries of the erstwhile disintegrated communist bloc were desperately seeking help from the Western nations and especially the US. The US on its part was pressurising and bullying these countries to toe its line and to accept its conditionalities. Pattern of international relations in the post-communist world was different from the previous pattern. The study of this new pattern was the main focus in this stage of development.

Post-Cold War Theories

The end of the Cold War presents International Relations as an academic discipline with a double—historical and futurological—challenge. On the one hand, it poses a number of basic questions such as why the Cold War came to an end and what the Cold War itself was? On the other hand, it encourages the discipline to describe the contours of the future international relations in the post-confrontational age. There are a number of wide-spread explanations as to why Cold War ended: the arms race, the democratic upsurge of peoples, the economic exhaustion of communism. Theorists who gave these theories/explanations are Pierre Allan, Kjell Goldmann, Fred Halliday, Francis Fukuyama etc.

As far as the question of the future of the international relations system is concerned there are

several broad, inter-related theoretical issues to which various schools address. The most important issue for the majority of the post-Cold War theories is creation of a new world order. There are several analytical approaches to the problem of building such an order. These are: Pax Americana (George Bush, Goodby and Morel); liberal democracy or Pax Democratica (James Robert Huntley, Richardson, Miles Kahler); Constitutionalism and global governance (Martin Wight, Butterfield, Linklater etc.); and International Society (Ken Booth and Smith)

One more important issue for the post-Cold War international system is that one of power in the contemporary world. A thesis on power diffusion has become popular. According to this theory, the great powers of today are less able to use their traditional power resources to achieve their purposes than in the past. On many issues, private actors and small states have become more powerful. Nye, Newmann and Halliday have written on power diffusion.

The fate of existing and future security alliances is a topic of discussion in the post-Cold War International Relations literature. Four Security models have been suggested: (i) unipolar security model like NATO; (ii) balance of power model like NATO, EU, ASEAN enlargements, CIS framework, Sino-Russian rapproachement etc. (iii) Concert of powers model like OECD, IMF, World Bank, IAEA, etc; and (iv) Universal security model like UNO.[15] The emerging post-Cold War international security/alliance system does not conform to any one of these four models.

A new International Relations debate was thrown open in the 1990s between the established traditions (realism/neo-realism, liberalism/neo-liberalism, international society and international political economy) on the one hand and new voices post-positivist methodologies and post-positivist issues—environment; gender; diffusion of power and sovereignty; changes in statehood and new security challenges; global terrorism; internal conflicts etc. on the other.[16]

Post-international Relations or World Politics or Global Relations

The *ninth stage* of International Relations co-incided with dawn of twenty-first century. By the first decade of this millenium the process of globalisation transcended the mere 'international' with its sovereign states, making their boundaries irrelevant and their governments weak in a post-Cold War era of victorious global capitalism. A term though lacking exactness yet closely associated with globalization and globalism is 'global governance' that denotes different methods of formal and informal global regulation that range from the United Nations and its many agencies to bodies such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the organizations of Multi-National Corporations (MNCs). In a wider sense global governance also includes a number of NGOs as well as diffuse social movements and normative regimes such as the international human rights regime. Lawson writes: "Both globalization as a process, and global governance as a set of formally and informally institutionalized practices, may therefore be seen to have absorbed or subsumed the 'international' within a larger framework denoted by the all-encompassing 'global'."[17]

Modern state is no longer the only actor at international level and many activities are not centred on it and operate quite independently of it. Non-state organizations are increasing and acting as international actors in their own way in diverse fields—environment, human rights, religion, peace, economics and finance. Their activities have great impact on world politics and in a way out-dated the concept of International Relations. A stage of 'post-international politics' has been reached as suggested by James Rosenau. In his own words: "Post-international politics is an appropriate designation because it clearly suggests the decline of long-standing patterns.... It reminds us that 'international' matters may no longer be the dominant dimension of global life, or

atleast that other dimensions have emerged to challenge or offset the interactions of nation-states."[18]

Lawson further suggests that not only the stage of postinternational politics but 'Postinternational Relations' has been reached in terms of how the field of study is itself constructed. Walker also talks of transition 'From International Relations to world politics'[19] from a broadly postmodern perspective and suggests alternative understandings that are not circumscribed by the bounded territorial spaces occupied by the modern state.

In the ninth stage, William R. Thompson and his associates also preferred to use the nomenclature 'World Politics' and evolved an evolutionary approach to International Relations. They describe how states, ideologies and other areas of analysis evolve, conquer others, or disappear entirely. Variation and selection play important role in evolutionary process. For example nation-states have been selected over city-states. Liberal democracy has been selected over fascism and communism. Evolutionary paradigm/perspective endeavours to examine this level of change at world level.[20]

CONCLUSION

The origin, growth and development of the subject of International Relations can be traced to the twentieth century. It is therefore a comparatively new discipline. During this short span the subject has passed through different phases and stages. Every phase is marked by its own perspective and approach. With the change of international relations there was corresponding change in its study and emphasis. Despite this growth the discipline is still young and it may pass through several more stages of development in the years ahead. It is being studied as a part of political science, history, economics and at the same time as an autonomous academic discipline.

This discipline began after the First World War and grew rapidly after the Second World War. In the post-world war II period, the factors that contributed towards its development can be summarised as: the fear of total war, technological development, establishment of UNO, emergence of new states after decolonisation, coming on the scene of trans-national and supra-national agencies, economic inequality between North and South, concern for environmental protection, nuclearisation and de-nuclearisation, bipolarisation and multi-polarisation, cold war and detente, ideologisation and de-ideologisation, desire for theoretical framework, concern for peace and new world order etc.

The discipline further developed in the Post-Cold War period because of reasons mentioned above. In the globalized world of twenty-first century and subsequent developments that marked Post-international Relations, a new nomenclature of the discipline, namely, — World Politics or Global Relations, has been suggested.

International Relations is inter-disciplinary, iconoclastic and of recent origin. It developed from normative theory to causal theory, from idealism to realism, from realism to behaviouralism and scienticism, neoliberalism to radicalism/neo-Marxism, neorealism to post-positivism and so on. Though it is neither well-organised nor fully scientific nor having complete conceptual framework yet it has developed itself from allied branch of political science and history to an autonomous discipline.

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Nature, Scope and Purpose of International Relations

To define the meaning and nature of international relations is a ticklish job. It has been a complex work owing to many reasons. *First*, the terms international politics and international relations were and still are used inter-changeably and loosely. For many years scholars remained confused over the contents of these terms. They were not clear as to what should be included in international politics and what in international relations? Works of many authors' title was on International Relations whereas inside they discussed international politics only. On the contrary, many titles on international politics discussed international relations indiscriminately. *Second*, world community is so dynamic and international environment changes so rapidly that what one studied few years ago with keen interest becomes hackneyed and obsolete today. With this alters its approach and perspective. New developments at global level bring new actors to international stage. *Third*, many scholars put forward such definitions as explained the essence of the subject rather than its main areas of inquiry. This caused further disagreement and confusion among writers as no one could give with precision and authority the definition of a discipline whose scope is ever changing and growing. *Fourth*, newness of the subject also creates many difficulties in defining it. If definitions of old social sciences like political science and economics are still in the melting pot then how can one take any definition of this young discipline as a last word.

MEANING AND NATURE

Notwithstanding ambiguity and disagreement over the definitions of international relations we seek to analyze and classify some of the important definitions given by prominent scholars of the discipline. These definitions can be broadly divided into the following three categories:

Traditional View—International Politics

It is a state-dominated view inasmuch as definitions under this category lay emphasis on the study of politics and relations among the nation states. It considers nation-states as chief actors of international politics and focuses on their political and official relations. In other words, these were the definitions of international politics and not international relations. From the initial years of the beginning of the discipline upto 1950s, it was mainly known and studied as international politics. Most prevalent definitions in this category are:

Schleicher includes all inter-state relations in international politics, although he concedes that all the inter-state relations are not political.[1] Padelford and Lincoln define international politics as the interaction of state policies within the changing patterns of power relationship.[2] In their later work, they defined it as "the interaction of individual nation states in their pursuit of their perceived national interests and goals."[3] Morgenthau's definition deals mainly with political relations and the problem of power and peace. According to him, international politics is a struggle for, and use of, power among nations.[4] Burton regards it as a system of peaceful communication whereby states consciously and in their own interest would like to avoid conflict

because the costs of conflict are too high.[5] To Frankel international politics "embraces the foreign policies of all the...states in their mutual interaction as well as in their interaction with the international system as a whole, with international organisations, and with social groups other than states, the operation of the international system; and also the domestic politics of all the states."[6] It is a comprehensive definition as it includes not only the interaction among states but also their interactions with international system, organisations, social groups and so on. He further clarifies that the foreign policies of different states are difficult to deal with comparatively because they cannot be studied singly and then compared, as domestic politics can, one can study them in interaction with the foreign policies of other states as well as with other elements of the international system.[7] Harold and Margaret Sprout define international politics as, "those aspects of interactions and relations of independent political communities in which some element of opposition, resistance or conflict of purpose or interest is present."[8] According to Thompson, "International Politics is the study of rivalry among nations and the conditions and institutions which ameliorate or exacerbate these relationship."[9] Defect of these two definitions is that they include only the conflictual and oppositional interactions between the states and not the cooperative and friendly one.

"International Politics", according to Quincy Wright is "the art of influencing, manipulating or controlling major groups, so as to advance the purposes of some against the opposition of others."[10] It is the process by which power is acquired, maintained and expanded. He further explains, "As a discipline, it includes expositions instructing in the practice of this art, predicting the consequences of its application, evaluating it, and narrating its history."[11]

In this way the essence and explanation of international politics vary from author to author. Indian scholars have not lagged behind in this respect. An eminent scholar Mahendra Kumar who is one of the few pioneer Indian scholars has analysed the theoretical aspects of international politics and presented his own definition. In his words, international politics is "a process in which nations try to serve their national interests, which may be in conflict with those of other nations, by means of their policies and action."[12] According to him this definition can be applied to international politics in any period of the twentieth century.

Another Indian author R.T. Jangam describes the nature of international politics in the following manner: the existence of nations; friendly or unfriendly relations; struggle for acquisition, retention and extension of power and other stakes; instrument of accomplishing other principal stakes; and the limitations on the use of power—are broadly characterised international politics throughout the ages.[13] Baral suggests "that the three principal components in international politics are the international system, the state and the individual. Any foreign policy decision is likely to reflect the systematic interactions, the interests and strategies of the state and the motives and personalities of individual actors. Further the interest groups, bureaucratic organisations and some other groups do play some role in foreign policy-making."[14] Thus international politics must study the role of all concerned actors and employ all three levels of analysis—system, state and individual.

Politics in relation to nations is international politics. It is a process of adjustment of relationship among nations in favour of a nation or a group of nations by means of power. Three important things relevant to international politics are *national interest, conflict* and *power*. The first is the objective, the second is the condition, and the third is the means of international politics. It, therefore, can be described as a set of those aspects of relations among independent states in which some elements of conflict of interest are prevalent. But at times interests of some nations may be

identical also. In this way, international politics involves conflict as well as cooperation. It is a phenomenon of recurring pattern of conflict and harmony. But cooperation is feasible only through control of conflict. Conflict can be regulated towards a desired direction. Thus international politics deals with the control of conflict and achievement of cooperation. By and large nature of international politics is conflictual.

Modern View—International Relations

From 1960s onward another trend became popular.

This trend made extensive use of the term international relations in preference to international politics as it encompassed all the relevant actors, contents and relationships. No doubt, some of the definitions under the above category also cover areas other than mere politics among nations. But the following definitions are more comprehensive as they include state, international system, international organisations, other trans-national and supra-national agencies, non-state entities, groups and relevant individuals as actors and basic unit of analysis. At the same time they also cover larger areas of relationship— both conflictual and cooperative, friendly and unfriendly, power relationship and peace relationship, governmental and people-to-people relationship etc. The contents and forms of relations among the different actors are varied such as political, economic, social, cultural, educational, scientific and technological, etc. All these are part of international relations. Scholars of international relations have also used comparatively sophisticated and scientific tools of investigation. The use of the term international relations is considered appropriate as it covers all those essentials included in international politics and over and above many other current trends and terms that make it more broad and relevant.

Some of the well-known definitions in this category are listed below:

In the words of Quincy Wright, "It is not only the nations which international relations seek to relate. Varied types of groups—nations, states, governments, peoples, regions, alliances, confederations, international organisations, even industrial organisations, cultural organisations, religious organisations—must be dealt within the study of international relations, if the treatment is to be realistic."[15] To Quincy Wright even the use of the term international relations is too narrow. He coined another term "relations between powerful nations" and yet preferred to use the prevailing term international relations. He is also of the opinion that for a proper understanding of international relations one has to include such partial studies as international politics, international law, international organisation, international economics, international ethics, the psychology and sociology of international relations, world history, political geography, political demography and technolo$_{6}$y.[16]

In sum, he defines international relations "to designate the relations between groups of major importance in the life of the world at any period of history, and particularly relations among territorially organised nation states which today are of such importance... ...to designate the studies or disciplines describing, explaining, evaluating, or assisting in the conduct of those relations."[17]

The above definition considerably broadens the scope of international relations to such an extent that it becomes unmanageable and unwieldy. Hoffmann and Adi H. Doctor endeavour to remove these drawbacks of the definition. Hoffmann presents a purely operational definition: "The discipline of international relations is concerned with the factors and the activities which affect the external policies and the power of the basic units into which the world is divided."[18] He further suggests that it is concerned, for example, "with the United Nations, but not necessarily with the World Meteorological Organisation; or that we should deal with private groups such as the United Fruit Company or the Socialist Internationale, but not necessarily with a group such as

International Political Science Association."[19] Adi H. Doctor is also of the same opinion. In his own words, its study "will be primarily of nation-states, because of all the interacting entities in International Politics, the sovereign State is, by all standards, the most important; but shall also include within the field of its study other important groups (race, private or cultural bodies, regional organisations like NATO) to the extent that they influence interaction among the major groups, i.e. the sovereign States"[20]. The study of inter-state relations primarily include power or oppositional relations and to some extent certain cooperative relations.

Palmer and Perkins say, "It encompasses much more than the relations among nation-states and international organisations and groups. It includes a great variety of transitional relationships, at various levels, above and below the level of the nation-state, still the main actor in the international community."[21] They believe that its study must include new and old elements. The emphasis is still on nation-state system and inter-state relations yet the actions and interactions of various organisations and groups and of many underground forces and variables are to be considered.

Previously Frankel defined international politics and titled his book[22] as such. After ten years, he in his other work used the term international relations. In it he defines: "This new discipline is more than a combination of the studies of the foreign affairs of the various countries and of international history—it includes also the study of international society as a whole and of its institutions and processes. It is increasingly concerned not only with the states and their interactions but also with the web of trans-national politics."[23] Though his previous definition of international politics was also broad, but this one is broader than that. Moreover, he goes one step further by suggesting that the term World Politics "describes its contents more truthfully than the traditional name International Relations."[24] Few years back scholars were reluctant to use the term world politics but many like Rosenau, Calvocoressi, Kegley, Wittkopf, William R. Thompson, Walker, Baylis and Smith etc. are adopting it now. Rosenau maintains that world politics comprises primarily the nation-states as the prime-actors. With all other actors essentially subordinated to the requirements of the nation-state system. Rosenau, however, acknowledges the fact that these nations consistently demonstrate inter-dependence and inter-penetration and that sub-national, trans-national and even supra-national (e.g. EU) groups characterised greater impact on the course of events.[25] According to Trygve Mathiesen, international relations embraces "all kinds of relations traversing state boundaries, no matter whether they are of an economic, legal, political, or any other character, whether they be private or official", and "all human behaviour originating on one side of state boundary and affecting human behaviour on the other side of the boundary.[26] This definition also enlarges the horizon of international relations. Similarly Holsti defines, "As distinct from international politics and foreign policy, the term *international relations* may refer to *all* forms of interaction between the members of separate societies, whether government—sponsored or not. The study of international relations includes the analyses of foreign policies or political processes between nations; however, with its interest in *all* facets of relations between distinct societies; it would include as well studies of international trade unions, the International Red Cross, tourism, international trade, transportation, communication, and the development of international values and ethics."[27]

The essence of above definitions can be summed up in the following words: International relations is mainly the study of nation-states—their political and non-political relations, their foreign affairs and policies, their interaction with each other and with various other political and non-political groups— alliances, regional and international organisations, sub-national, trans-national and supra-national agencies. It also includes, to some extent, the study of international

history, international law, international society and other psychological, cultural and strategical factors that influence the interactions and relations among states and groups.

International Politics and International Relations

Both these terms are used loosely and interchangeably by scholars. But of late a distinction is made between the two. The differences among them can be enumerated as follows:

1. International politics is concerned with the politics of the international community in a rather narrow sense, focusing on diplomacy and the relations among states and other political units, whereas international relations consist of the totality of the relations among peoples and groups in the world society. The former describes political relations only whereas the latter describes all types of relations between countries and peoples—political or non-political, peaceful or warlike, legal or cultural, economic or geographic, official or non-official, formal or informal. Merely the political aspect of international relations is international politics.

2. International politics lay emphasis on official relations between the states and their governments and officials. On the other hand, international relations also include non-official, informal and private relations among groups and peoples. It encompasses all human behaviour on one side of national boundary affecting human behaviour on the other side of the boundary. One is interested in state-to-state relations and other goes beyond it and covers people-to-people relations as well.

3. International relations is a wider and international politics a narrower concept. The scope of former is broader than the latter. When states cooperate with one another to maintain postal or transport services, or to prevent the spread of epidemics or suppress the traffic in drugs, these activities are described as non-political. But as soon as an issue arises which involves, or is thought to involve, the power of one state in relation to another, the matter at once becomes political. Thus international politics includes only those aspects of international relations in which some conflict of purpose or interest is involved.

4. Methodology to study them are different. The study of international relations is being enriched by the wider and more versatile and scientific approaches and methods whereas international politics was mainly studied with historical, descriptive and analytical methods.

5. Adi H. Doctor distinguishes them from another angle. According to him, "Those interested in oppositional relations label their study 'International Politics'; those who also include cooperative relations name their study as 'International Relations.'"[28]

Thus the current nomenclature—International Relations— covers a wider form of relationship between states, groups, institutions and individuals across the respective national boundaries. Yet it has to be admitted that political relations still over-ride in this field of study.

Current Post-International View —World Politics or International Studies or Global Relations

International Relations has close relationship with other social sciences such as history, law, sociology, geography, defence studies, social philosophy, economics, psychology etc. As its study has been becoming increasingly inter-disciplinary, a doubt is raised on the continuity of its independent identity and amalgamation of its major concerns and subject-matter with the more general and upcoming discipline of 'world politics' or 'international studies.' Baylis and Smith like many other prominent scholars Rosenau, Calvocoressi, Kegley, Wittkopf, William Thompson,

Walker, Lawson etc. have preferred to use the former because their interest is "in politics and political patterns in the world, and not only those between nation-states"[29] (as connoted by the world 'international'). Their concern is to study relations between organizations that may or may not be states, for example, multinational companies, terrorist groups or non-government organizations (NGOs) such as those that deal with international human rights issues and environmental pollution.

The nomenclature 'international studies' has also been employed for quite some time. It is more interdisciplinary than 'world politics.' It combines subject-matter of almost all humanities and social sciences without incorporating these to a specifically political study of the world. International studies usually contains history of international affairs, international law, international organizations, foreign policy analysis, defence studies, international economics and area studies (e.g. European studies, South Asian studies, African studies, Latin American studies etc.). Further these area studies also includes languages, religions, cultures, cross-cultural relations, history, geography and so on. No doubt these studies are quite important for contemporary international relations yet do not mainly lie at the core of its concerns, which are concentrated on international or world political concerns and relations.

It has been observed recently that learned specialists use the term 'world politics' while dealing with the general subject-matter of contemporary International Relations whereas others employ 'international studies' while discussing contents mainly of interdisciplinary nature.

In the age of globalized world when the process of 'globalizing the international' is going on, where scholars are talking of 'post-International Relations', it may be re-named as Global Politics or Global Relations.

Whatever may be the current debate regarding nomenclature of this discipline, it cannot be denied that the term International Relations continues to be widely used and accepted. Irrespective of influence of the forces of globalization, concern for global issues, talk of global governance, rise of non-state actors and organisations, nation-state continues to survive. Despite the fact that its sovereignty has been dented to some extent still it dominates and regulates other spheres of life—economic, cultural, religious, social etc. As long as political sphere dominates and focus is on international relations or world political issues it will by and large, be called International Relations.

SCOPE AND SUBJECT-MATTER

Sometime back scholars of international relations thought that its scope was not yet delimited. One cannot settle once and for all the subject matter of a discipline, as it tends to vary with the passing of time and with the emergence of new conditions and factors. But there must be a separate core of the discipline to qualify itself as an autonomous discipline. To this extent its scope has been settled. Moreover, in the previous chapter its development as an autonomous discipline has been traced. Since World War I and specially after Second World War different scholars, universities, academic organisations and institutions endeavoured to carve out a specific area of study for international relations. Some of them have put forward a limited list and others exhaustive list of contents. It gave rise to wide controversy among scholars. Rather than discussing their viewpoints individually and in detail, an attempt is being made in the following paragraphs to enlist commonly agreed points. It cannot be maintained conclusively that scope is fully decided because the international situation as well as this discipline is in a state of flux. But it can be safely

said that by and large its scope and main areas of study have been distinctly demarcated. At the same time prospects of its enlargement in future are there alongwith changes in world conditions.

State System. The study of international relations begins with the state system. One can see a great impact of the state system on international scene since last three centuries. The individuals organise themselves in sovereign states and through them strive to fulfil their interests. The incompatible interests of these sovereign states cause conflict, and international politics is, thus, the natural outcome of the conflict of sovereign states. Not all states assume similar importance to every other national state. Some are significant because of their neighbourhood, some owing to their military or economic power, whereas some others due to the racial or cultural links. In brief, interstate relations are the result of sovereign state and International Relations studies these relations.

Relations in Conflict and Cooperation. International relations studies relations between two or more states, which are very often complex and influenced by a variety of geopolitical, historical, social, religious, ideological, strategic and leadership factors. Broadly speaking, these relationship have taken the form of cooperation and conflict. Cooperation and conflict are two sides of the same coin. Inspite of the fact that there were more conflict in international history than cooperation, both co-existed throughout the various periods of history. International relations is primarily a study of both conflictual and cooperative inter-state relations.

General and Diplomatic History. In the initial years of the beginning of the discipline, its studies were mainly historical. International relations was considered identical with international or diplomatic history for quite a long time. Under this tradition, certain major events were taken up for analysis against a historical perspective. After some time, historical approach was replaced by many new and better approaches yet historical facts and events have not lost their relevance for international relations. For example, to study the present Indo-Pak relations one has to go back into the past to know their historical background. The study of general and specially the diplomatic history cannot be separated from international relations.

Power. In the post Second World War period power became the central theme in the study of international relations. According to Morgenthau, international politics is nothing else but 'power politics' and can be realistically understood only if viewed as "the concept of interest defined in terms of power"[30] of a national state. Power has practical as well as theoretical relevance. It is a major determinant of the policies of the leading states of the world and of international relations generally. In international relations one studies the nature, elements and measurement of national power; balance of power; power equations and limitations on national power. Major limitations on power which are being studied are: international law, international morality, world public opinion, balance of power, collective security and international organisations.

International Law. As mentioned above, international law acts as restriction on national power and state action. Thus it is accepted as a very important aspect of the study of international relations. International law contains a set of rules, which regulates and determines the inter-state behaviour pattern both in time of peace and war. Therefore, a sound knowledge of international law is must for understanding international relations.

International Organisations. The United Nations, the most comprehensive of all international organisations, regional arrangements such as NATO, OAS, EU, and SAARC, and other organisations of international or regional character have assumed significant role in the present world. These international institutions provide forums for cooperation and conflict-resolution and are governed by their own rules. These organisations came into existence to enhance economic, military,

technological or cultural cooperation among member states. Since all these organisations and institutions have bearings on inter-state relations, they become a subject-matter of international relations to that extent.

International Systems. The study of international relations has also been undertaken in terms of international systems. It involves the application of system theories to a wide variety of international phenomena, as well as the development of typology of systems in the international community. International systems have been studied historically or from the point of view of present world. Ancient China, classical Greece, imperial Rome, Renaissance Italy, Mughal India, or nineteenth-century Europe are the example of old international systems. Contemporary international systems have been built on the basis of unipolarity, bipolarity and multipolarity, or on regions such as continents or geographic areas of greater or lesser extent. Various regions are studied as international subsystems or as subordinate state systems.

Integration and Community Approach. A working international system requires a high degree of integration, and is most effective if it is supported by a community structure. Integration is one of the focus points in the interdisciplinary approach to international relations. Studies of past and present tendencies towards integration as well as towards conflict in the international community may suggest factors that have an important bearing on contemporary diplomacy and political behaviour. Certainly the question of integration in the international community deserves thorough study and analysis.

Geopolitics. According to Hessler, "Geopolitics...is the science of the relationship between space and politics which attempts to put geographical knowledge at the service of political leaders. It is more than political geography, which is descriptive. It springs from national aspirations, searches out facts and principles which can serve national ends."[31] Anything which serves the national ends and interest comes closer to international relations. Geopolitics analysis can throw much light upon some of the major problems and attitudes to be prevalent in contemporary relations. Geopolitics is quite useful for the proper understanding of international relations. Palmer and Perkins are right when they say: "Undoubtedly 'the struggle for space and power' over the vast land and sea regions of the world, and perhaps in outer space as well, will be a central theme in the international relations of the future."[32]

Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution. Much of international relations involves conflict, its management and resolution. Their study becomes significant subject matter of international relations. Behavioural sciences with quantitative methods have successfully dealt with these topics. Conflict management is a term that suggests various techniques for the control, if not always the resolution of international conflicts. Various international organisations and peace research institutes have been studying conflict management and resolution. Several journals, such as, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, have been published on this issue and attempts are made to quantitatively analyse the factors that create conflict situations at international level and the techniques to resolve such conflicts.

War and Peace. It is the problem of war and peace around which almost all the studies of international relations revolve. It is no less a problem than of human survival. Conflict of interests and struggle for supremacy among nations often lead to warfare between two or more nations or their groups. War is as old a phenomenon as the state itself and is essentially followed by some sort of peace activity and settlement. War and peace activities are now studied more systematically. In this sphere, the study of international relations is of great importance for all the mankind and requires interdisciplinary approach and analysis.

Ideologies. The twentieth century was also marked by the rise of rival ideologies such as communism, socialism, capitalism, nazism, fascism, totalitarianism, liberalism etc. With conflict between political, economic and social systems, ideological issues came to the forefront on international scene. Since First World War many of the international problems had ideological overtones which further complicated inter-state relations. No doubt for the last few years there is the talk of 'end of ideology' and 'de-ideologisation of international relations' yet ideological elements cannot be ignored in the study of international relations. To understand the contemporary international relations the process of both the ideologisation and de-ideologisation has to be taken into account.

Nationalism, Colonialism and Imperialism. Nationalism is an important factor of modern state system and of the rise of non-Western perspective of international relations. It has changed not only the classical nature of international relations but is also responsible for decolonisation and the shifting of emphasis from Europe to Asia and Africa. Nationalism has also caused the demise of traditional imperialism and colonialism. But new types of imperialism have also made their presence felt e.g. communist imperialism or red imperialism, economic imperialism or neo-colonialism. All these 'isms' are the subject- matter of international relations.

Foreign Policy. The sovereign states conduct their foreign relations and interact with each other through their foreign policies and, thus foreign policy in international politics is like a charter containing national interests showing the areas of agreement and disagreement. It explains the ideals with which the state would exert its influence and the limit of its total effectiveness. Though foreign policies are not the be-all and end-all of international relations yet they constitute a significant part of its study.

National Interest. National interests are the objectives of sovereign states which they pursue with the help of power and through the instrument of foreign policy. In a way national interests are the pivot around which international relations clusters. Hartmann correctly says that international relations as a field of study is focussed upon the processes by which states adjust their national interests to those of other states.[33] Thus the concept of national interest becomes central to the conduct of national policies. The study of national interest has become useful in analysing the history and conduct of a nation's foreign policy.

Policy-Making. Of late there has been a tendency among the scholars of international relations to study not only the contents of foreign policy but also the process of foreign policy-making. Decisions are taken at various levels and in different manner in different political and international systems, nation-states or international agencies. Study of the total political process, on a national, international or comparative basis has been undertaken by many scholars specially of the USA. Such studies provide a broader setting for a detailed analysis of decision-making and policy formulation.

National Character. National character is another subject of study. Through it one endeavours to analyze the distinctive attributes of peoples and social groups, especially those that compose the national units of modern international society. While it is cumbersome to generalize about a complex thing as national character, it is an essential venture for those who are concerned with the mainsprings of thought and behaviour of nation-states. Notwithstanding the absence of precise and reliable tests and standards, useful work is being done in studying national character by employing various methods.

Psychological Factors. Social psychology provided new approaches and methods for the study

and research of international relations through personality and background analysis of key leaders, involved in the conduct of international relations. Social psychology also opened up new channels for the study of individual and group behaviour pattern, as well as the role of public opinion in war and peace. Such studies, for instance, explain the reactions and policies of the Soviet Union and why the Russians behave like Russians and not like Americans or Japanese. These studies provide a useful extension of research in individual and international arena.

Military-Strategic Factors. Much of international relations are concerned with problems of national security and defence as preparation for and protection against wars, bilateral and multilateral security arrangements, alliance diplomacy, military pacts, arms control and disarmament measures, it is natural that many studies in the discipline give special emphasis on military-political-strategic analyses. Study of war and strategy is beneficial for understanding international relations, as foreign policy and military policy became integrally related to each other with the passage of time.

Alliances and Groupings. No doubt, most of the major multilateral alliances, including NATO, the Warsaw Pact, SEATO, CENTO etc. which flourished in the fifties and early sixties have now lost their relevance yet alliance politics became an important area of study in the postwar international relations. The study of international relations focussed on the factors that contribute to the growth of such military alliances, the degree of their unity and their impact on the balance of power situation among the states concerned. There are also groupings other than military alliances such as communist countries, the free world, the Islamic world, non-aligned countries, the Arab world, African countries etc. They function unitedly on many common issues inside and outside the UN. The uniting factors, the degree of their unity as well as their conflicts with other groups, form the subject matter of international relations.

Arms Control and Disarmament. Devastating nature of the war in the nuclear age has compelled many statesmen to do something for arms control and disarmament. Lengthy deliberations have been taking place on these subjects inside and outside the U.N. Related problems are the peaceful uses of atomic energy, with which the International Atomic Energy Agency and most governments are deeply concerned. The enforcement of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Non-Proliferation Treaty, SALT-I and SALT-II, I.N.F. and START etc. On all these issues there is a vast documentation and a great deal of scholarly studies and investigation.

Demographic Factors. The population explosion is the most significant phenomena of the contemporary world and with whom are associated many problems of humanity. The question of population control is of great importance today. Centers and programs of demographic studies exist in many countries, and frequent conferences discuss population problems and their possible solution. Thus, demographic factors must be incorporated in any balanced course in international relations.

Economic Factors. Economic interests, like defence interests, play role in political transaction among states and thus they assume importance in inter-state relations. No one can ignore in international relations the economic factors such as food problem, economic planning and development, rates of exchange, tariffs, exchange controls, commodity agreements, international trade, balance of payments, foreign aid, disparities between developed and under-developed economies, demand for New International Economic Order, international investment, multinational corporations, international economic agencies such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund and many other UN agencies and regional economic agencies. There have been liberal international political economy (IPE) and realist IPE responses explaining the relationship between economics and politics in international relations. The Marxist approach to and neo-Marxist critique of international relations lay stress purely on economic factors and many non-communist theories also recognize the role of economic elements in international life. Economic factors are within the scope of international relations to the extent they influence inter-state relations.

Area and Regional Studies. The Second World War necessitated interest in the area or regional study aiming at the intensive study in history, language, sociology, anthropology, politics and economics of selected areas. This area programme was extremely helpful in providing appropriate knowledge to army personnel of allied forces in different areas. It was equally helpful to conduct military government in occupied areas. This war-time development became so popular that it was accepted as a major aspect of the post-war study of international relations. Two reasons that have encouraged area studies in the US in the post-war period were: first, there was genuine quest for knowing the developing and third world countries which were still shrouded in academic darkness; second, area studies were obviously in response to the requirements of the Cold War. Field studies were, in some cases, designed to gather vital information which the guest country—especially the US—could utilize in its rivalry against the Soviet Union and its allies. Area and regional studies, thus become part and parcel of the contents of international relations.

New Agenda of International Relations. Despite several changes and developments at world level issues of war and peace have not totally faded away. On the other hand many new policy issues have cropped up that form the 'new agenda' of this discipline. This 'new agenda' changed the old Cold War spectrum and broadened the subject-matter of international relations in the 21st century. This 'new agenda' consists of: gender issues; challenges to state sovereignty; changes in statehood; global environmental concerns including nuclear issues; sanctions; humanitarian intervention; refugee and asylum issues; legal and illegal migration; the gap between the North and the South; democratization and concern for human rights; reform of the United Nations and its agencies; the extension of international law and the prosecution of crimes against humanity, whether involving terrorism, religious fundamentalism or international organized criminal activities that range from drug production and trafficking to money laundering and the smuggling of all kinds of goods; ethnic conflicts and internal conflicts; shift from state security to human security etc.

PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE

Like any other discipline, international relations has its own importance, purpose and value. It has both theoretical as well as practical utility. It provides valuable assistance to general, leadership, professional and research education. This discipline is useful for the college teacher, professional-school teacher, graduate-school teacher; the journalist and commentator; the statesman, diplomat and international official; the lawyer, economist, civil servant, statesman and politician; the scholar and research worker in the field. Its utility "in general education, in practical action and in scholarly research" is well explained by Quincy Wright as follows:[34]

General Education. A discipline of International Relations has a broad utility in international relations inasmuch as it emphasizes the general facts of world geography, the general trends of history, the philosophical analysis of values and the scientific analysis of international relations. It cannot ignore the various interpretations which each country having a distinct culture and value system, is giving to its generalisations. Notwithstanding its scientific nature, the presentation of the discipline of international relations would have to be adapted for use in general education in each community and each country. Topics of international relations are included in the paper of general education or general knowledge of almost all universities and competitive examinations.

Practical Importance. Apart from the education of persons before taking practical assignment, a general discipline of international relations might contribute much to the day by day conduct of international affairs, whether by national or international officials. It assists in the practical activity of military officials, diplomats, colonial and overseas administrators, statesmen, politicians, international lawyers, international financiers, international propagandists, international educators, journalists, and media men. No doubt these activities differ greatly from one another, and specialised disciplines for each are essential, but they share with one another and with all the practical arts and professions, not only the need for skill derived from experience, but the necessity (a) to define situations sought to be tackled, (b) to obtain relevant information, (c) to frame the goals, and (d) to make decisions initiating action. The art of statesmanship, the art of diplomacy and the art of conducting foreign relations are inseparable from the discipline of international relations.

Research Purpose. Research like statesmanship, seeks new ways of looking at situations, but a discipline serving as a logical catalogue of what is known indicates gaps to be filled, hypotheses to be verified, shortcomings to be overcome. Advancement of the science of international relations is also one of the purposes of the discipline. This discipline serves, on the one hand, to make men aware of their participation in the universal society and of the direction in which that society is moving, and on the other, to mention shortcomings in knowledge, both theoretical and political, challenging further research. Both these services, would contribute to peace, if it is assumed that men want to survive and to enjoy life, and that action is most likely to contribute to those ends if based on an accurate estimate of its possible outcome.

The purpose and utility of the discipline as observed by Palmer and Perkins are supplemented below.[35]

Human Survival and Progress. The discipline explains how men and nations tend to act in given circumstances and so tells us what conditions should be encouraged and what conditions discouraged, if we are to promote international harmony and well-being. Through it one learns that war deferred is a kind of peace, perhaps the only peace that nations will ever know. One also gains a sense of realism—a realisation that the road to a better order is filled with complex hurdles, that it can be overcome only by men who see the horizon ahead and the soil below.

Understanding and Controlling Problems. If the study of international relations cannot solve all the problems of international life it can atleast help us in grappling with and controlling those problems. Many of the problems of international relations are unsolvable under present conditions. Not all of these problems, however, constitute major threats to peace and security, and those which are unsolvable and dangerous may take on a different shape and decline in importance with the passage of time, even if they are never really solved. For example, the problem of war may never be solved, but there is the possibility of keeping it under control and that total war in the atomic age, with all of its frightful consequences, can be avoided. The only feasible way in some cases may be to keep the problems under control as much as possible, to do everything that can be done within the range of practicable alternatives to deal with them, and to understand and worry along with them as circumstances allow. Controlling of conflict and the related problems and striving for peace are the main purposes of international relations.

Objectivity, Balance and Perspective. Study of international relations aims at objectivity, balance and perspective. The study has to be carried out in face of obstacles of prejudice, ignorance, emotionalism, and vested interest—often including scholar's own. The world is its laboratory and a mix of approaches—realism and idealism, science and art—is its way of exploring. Its students must beware of simple solutions to complex problems, and they must also renounce the thesis of

the "inevitability' of war, the "wave of future" approach, and all such paths to dooms day. The discipline teaches to understand the world as it is, and at the same time to keep an eye on the world as it should be. It cautions that never mistake the ideal for the actual, or conclude that what "must" be will in fact occur.

On the value and purpose of the study Adi H. Doctor has remarked.[36]

Understanding the Role of Subjectivity. The study of international relations is very beneficial in understanding the part played by subjectivity in judging human behaviour in the international field. Every nation in judging international events is conditioned by its own national interest. Every nation speaks of justice and fair play, yet we see much conflict between nations claiming to speak in the name of justice. This happens because nations tend to judge problems subjectively or in terms of national interest. It teaches that so long as the various nations try to look at international problems subjectively, conflicts are bound to rise. Terms like justice, fair play, equality, peace, non-interference, non-violence, friendship etc. are interpreted by nations differently. Nations preach these values and at the same time in actual conduct they act contrary to these values. Many a time endeavours towards world peace are conditioned by subjectivity which must be replaced by an objective outlook.

Internationalism alongwith Nationalism. The study of international relations assist in developing a better perspective on nationalism. Nationalism is not an unmixed blessing. There are certain evils of nationalism such as exclusiveness and narrowness, intolerance and hatred towards the people of other nationalities etc. No doubt nationalism teaches us loyalty and gives security in an otherwise unsecure world, yet its abused and exaggerated form can become a major obstacle to world peace. Through this discipline one learns that the traditional concept of sovereignty and nationalism are inapplicable today, and they need modifications in some respects.

A Better World. The last but not the least purpose of the discipline is the attainment of a better world. It imparts knowledge of the concepts and instruments such as international organisations; international morality and law; world public opinion; collective security; balance of power and balance of interests; peaceful coexistence and cooperation; pacific settlements of international disputes; arms control, disarmament and denuclearisation; North-South dialogue etc., that help in building a new and better world order. Inspite of the difficulties that a student faces, he after its study has to be a part of the carvan that is marching ahead steadily towards a better and just world order.

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14

Foreign Policy: Choices and Types

A nation formulates its foreign policy keeping in view its various national interests and objectives. In this formulation general, internal and external determinants also play varying degree of role. These were discussed in detail in the previous chapter. Under the influence of these factors foreign policy takes different forms and shapes in different countries. In other words different countries have different approaches and inclinations towards international relations. Accordingly, they make different foreign policy choices. For example, some states participate in international relations more actively whereas others prefer to be inert or isolated owing to their internal problems or other reasons. Few may choose to pursue a neutral path in foreign affairs while others may prefer to be non-aligned. Several ambitious states may have an inclination towards expansion or empire building whereas others may be contented with the status quo. Some aggressive states may adopt a policy of confrontation, while peace-loving states may go in for a policy of peaceful co-existence. At times, powerful states choose a nationalistic universal policy. Various types or kinds of foreign policy are the outcome of these choices. In this chapter these choices and types are examined.

1. Policy of Imperialism

Many powerful and ambitious nations tend to dominate and rule over others. For long, imperialism has remained a powerful instrument of pursuing and promoting national interest. Imperialism has long been employed as a foreign policy choice by several European powers and in a novel and indirect form it is still the choice of many powerful nations. Human history reveals that the tendency to dominate over others has been manifested in one form or the other in different periods. Alexander the great, Napolean, Bismark, Hitler etc. had endeavoured for empire building and thus adopted a policy of expansion.

Meaning. The term imperialism has been used in a subjective and arbitrary manner. The use of the term is so arbitrary that it does not relate to its real nature (whether the policy of a country is imperialist or not) but any type of foreign policy followed by its opponents is sometimes dubbed as 'imperialist.' The communist called the foreign policy of the Western Powers as imperialistic, anti-communists gave the same name to communists, while uncommitted nations termed both communists and capitalists as imperialists.

Different scholars have defined imperialism differently in their own ways. That is why Palmer and Perkins observed: "Imperialism can be discussed, denounced, defended, and died for, but it cannot be defined in any generally acceptable way."[1] However some of its important definitions are as follows:

"Imperialism is a policy which aims at creating, organising, and maintaining an empire...", says Moritz Julius Bonn. In the words of Charles A. Beard, "Imperialism is... employment of the engines of government and diplomacy to acquire territories, protectorates, and/or spheres of influence occupied usually by other races or peoples, and to promote industrial, trade, and investment opportunities." On the other hand Parker T. Moon observes, "Imperialism means domination of non-European native races by totally dissimilar European nations." Morgenthau defined it altogether in terms of the expansion of a state's power beyond its borders. Marxists like Lenin hold imperialism purely in economic terms and regarded it as a highest stage of capitalism.[2] Imperialism is closely related with colonialism. Both terms refer to superior-inferior or rulers-ruled relationship.

Motives. The motives of imperialism are economic gains such as control of competition-free markets, sources of raw material and capital investment in virgin lands. Another motive is the enhancement of national prestige and glory by acquiring vast colonial empire. It also serves the purpose of extreme nationalism and national defence. Colonies were also conquered to settle surplus population there. The policy of imperialism was also pursued to spread a particular religion, culture or ideology. Advanced Western societies attributed another motive to imperialism i.e. the upliftment of less fortunate and poor yellow man's Asia and black man's Africa. They contended that it was "white man's burden" to carry the good things of their own religion and civilisation to "backward" peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Methods. Several methods were employed to successfully implement the policy of imperialism such as military intervention and wars; economic methods like exploring the foreign markets for sale of finished products and purchase of raw materials and cheap labour. Means of economic investment and economic assistance are also employed these days. Through cultural methods imperial states conquer the minds of men of other nations and are able to impose their religion, culture or political ideology. This method is regarded far more superior to military victory or economic mastery. Christian missionaries and Soviet and Chinese communists employed this method.

Imperialism in practice. It was Great Britain that pursued this policy in letter and spirit for a long period. British imperialism had its world wide tentacles that it was usually said "Sun never sets over the British empire." By 1914, the British empire, despite the fact that it suffered many set backs it continued to be the world's largest and the richest empire. France was the second largest empire in Africa and South East Asia. Germany under Bismarck between 1884-90 acquired Togoland Cameroons, South West Africa, German East Africa, the lease hold of Kaichow and extensive economic rights in Shantung peninsula in China and scattered groups of islands in the pacific. Like Germany, Italy was also a late comer. Though not much strong she occupied three colonies in Africa, Eriteria on the Red Sea, Italian Somaliland and Libya in North Africa. Japan began her career as imperialist in 1894. She annexed Formosa and the Ryukn islands from China, absorbed Korea in 1910. She also acquired after defeating Russia in 1905 Southern Sakhlin, a lease hold in Port Arthur and eliminated Russian influence from Korea and Southern Manchuria. Russian imperialism had its own characteristics. It represented the spreading out over contiguous territory of a land hungry aggressive population. She wanted absorption of new area but not permanent colony. Her sphere of influence was in Persia, Manchuria and Mongolia. Spain, Holland and Portugal also had their colonies in Latin America, Africa and Asia respectively. It is worth mentioning that whereas British, French, German, Dutch imperialism decayed, the imperialism of the Soviet Union expanded after the Second World War to whole of the East Europe and parts of Asia.

The US imperialism is divided into three parts: continental expansion, overseas expansion and intervention. Her continental imperialism was short lived. Most of the acquired territories were purchased, followed by political equality. The overseas expansion was made through various

processes. Alaska and Virgin islands were purchased. The Hawaii islands and the Canal Zone were acquired almost voluntarily; Puerto Rico, and the Philippines etc., were conquered in 1898. The Panama Canal Zone was leased for building a canal to her defence and commerce. Except Philippines all are still political subordinate. Her intervention in Western hemisphere is regarded as defence imperialism. The Monroe Doctrine (1823) and Truman Doctrine (1946) were its examples.

Critical Evaluation. Imperialism had its merits and demerits. Those who speak in favour of it assert that it has been a boon inasmuch as it proved to be of mutual benefit to both the master countries and the colonies. For example, it promoted political unity, economic development, training for self-government, spread of general and technical education, creation of infra-structure and promotion of internationalism. Its opponents condemn it by highlighting its evils. For example it is the symbol of political subjugation, economic exploitation and racial discrimination. It destroyed the native culture and social values of the colonial people. It also provoked international wars and rivalries. By mid-twentieth century the policy of imperialism was universally looked down upon and earned notoriety. By the end of nineteenth century and the beginning of twentieth spirit of nationalism overtook the colonies and masses militated against it. After the Second World War European Imperial powers lost their grip over their colonies because of their exhaustion in five-year long war. Immediately after the Second World War the process of decolonisation started resulting in the decline of imperialism. Decolonisation, its causes and impacts are being discussed in detail in a subsequent chapter. At present there is no inclination towards empire building and the policy of imperialism has lost its relevance.

2. Policy of Neo-Colonialism

The place of imperialism has been now taken over by neo-colonialism. With the death of old or classical imperialism neo-colonialism was born in the second half of the twentieth century. It is also known as 'economic imperialism' or 'Dollar imperialism' or 'Red imperialism'. The time of military or political imperialism and direct control or rule has gone and in its place covert or indirect imperialism has emerged. Various powerful and developed countries are now adopting the policy of new-colonialism instead of 'imperialism'. Economic imperialism is that form of imperialism in which a country though free from the direct control of an imperialist country, indirectly dances to its tunes. The USA and the then Soviet Union by giving economic aid to under developed countries indirectly exercise their influence upon them. The USA by providing 'Dollar' that is economic aid to backward and small countries wields considerable influence upon them and this is named as 'Dollar imperialism'. Some of the Communist China's expansionist and aggressive policies, particularly along its borders were dubbed by critics as "Red imperialism".

At present most of the nations of Asia and Africa are politically free and sovereign. Apparently, they may be free, but actually they are still the victims of big powers' tentacles. The so-called independent nations are actually not independent but dependent This latest type of imperialism is called as neo-colonialism. In the words of Palmer and Perkins, "Thus 'neo-colonialism' is regarded as a new and more insidious form of imperialism, widely prevalent and particularly pernicious and dangerous."[3] It is the continuation of exploitation by other means. It prevails in the form of bloc system or satellite system, economic shackles, sphere of influence and ideological subversion. The chief objective of neo-colonialism is to maintain the flow of imperialist profits from former colonial territories after the grant of political independence. Its aim is to have economic dominance in place of political and military dominance. Thus, "trade and aid" in the words of late President Nasser, "a veil to dominate the resources of nations and to exhaust them for the benefit of exploiters."[4]

4

Concept of Power

Power is the crux of politics—local, national and international. Since the beginning of humanity power has been occupying the central position in human relations. In order to comprehend international politics and relations the study of the concept of power is a must. The relation between the state and power is very close. In the words of Hartmann, power "lurks in the background of all relations between sovereign states." In this way, all inter-state relations are ultimately relations of power politics. Politics is nothing other than the pursuit and exercise of power and that political relations are mainly power-relations. Study of international relations reveals that power has been the most crucial means for achieving national interests. That is why every nation wants to attain, maintain and utilise power. It is both an end as well as means of international politics. The position of a state in the comity of nations is determined not by its civilisation or culture or literary contribution, but by its power. Every state possesses power though in different amount and kind. Thus, one cannot ignore power while studying international relations.

MEANING AND NATURE OF POWER

Power, Force, Influence and Authority

Power, influence, authority and capability are related terms and often used interchangeably and loosely. Such a use creates a conceptual confusion. An attempt has been made to remove this confusion by defining each term separately in the following paragraphs.

The master of statecraft in ancient India—Kautilya wrote about power in the fourth century B.C. as the "possession of strength" (an *attribute)* derived from three elements: knowledge, military and valor.[2] Twenty three centuries later, Hans Morgenthau following Kautilya's realistic line preferred to define power as *relationship* between two political actors in which actor A has the ability to control the mind and actions of actor B. Thus, power, in the words of Morgenthau "may comprise anything that establishes and maintains control of man over man (and it) covers all social relationship which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another."[3] Power is viewed both as a set of *attributes* of a given actor as well as a *relationship* between two actors. The simple way to understand the concept of power is to see it as a relationship of independent entities. Similarly, the best way to operationalise and measure a state's capacity to exercise power is to look on its specific attributes and elements which can be easily measured.

Schwarzenberger defines it as the "capacity to impose one's will on others by reliance on effective sanctions in case of non-compliance."[4] He distinguished it from both *influence* and *force* by regarding it as containing a threat not present in influence and yet stopping short of the actual use of force.

While defining power, Schleicher also makes a distinction between *power* and *influence.* Power is the ability to make others do what they otherwise would not do by rewarding or promising to reward or by depriving or threatening to deprive them of something they value. But influence means to change the behaviour of others through their consent by persuasion rather than through the exercise of coercion. In his own words, "Power relationship is marked clearly by the occurrence of threats, influence relationship is manifested without the presence of threatened sanctions."[5]

To Dahl power is "ability to shift the probability of outcomes." According to him, "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do."[6] Hartmann observes that *power* mainfests itself along the line of *influence* beginning with latent or unintended use of power (that is to say, persuasion), through conscious but regulated *power* (that is to say, pressure) and reaching up to its final gradation (that is to say, use of *force*).[7] In brief, Duchacek defines it as "the capacity to produce intended effects—to realize one's will."[8] Thus, power is the ability to control the behaviour of others in accordance with one's own intentions and interests.

Couloumbis and Wolfe define "*power* as an umbrella concept that denotes anything that establishes and maintains the control of Actor A over Actor B. Power, in turn, can be seen as having three important ingredients. The first ingredient is *force*, which can be defined as the explicit threat or the use of military, economic, and other instruments, of coercion by Actor A against Actor B in pursuit of A's political objectives. The second ingredient is *influence*, which we define as the use of instruments of persuasion—short of force—by Actor A in order to maintain or alter the behaviour of Actor B in a fashion, suitable to the preferences of Actor A. The third ingredient of power is *authority*, which we will define as Actor B's voluntary compliance with directives (prescriptions, orders) issued by Actor A, nurtured by B's perceptions regarding A—such as respect, solidarity, affection, affinity, leadership, knowledge, expertise."[9] They thus clarify the meaning not only of power but also of influence, force and authority. They also depict umbrella concept of power as follows:



Capability

Some scholars like Lerche and Said have used the term *capability* instead of power because the latter lays over emphasis on coercion which they don't like. According to them, "capability is always the ability to do something, to act purposefully in an actual situation."[10] Power also implies this and popularly power often becomes a status to which states aspire and which a few achieve. Scholars sometimes think of a powerful state in the abstract, without considering how much that state can actually do in immediate action situation. "Capability preserves the necessary nexus with policy and action that a careless use of 'power' often overlooks."[11] For these reasons they use the former term to refer to the over-all action competent of states. On the other hand, Couloumbis and Wolfe "prefer to interpret capability as the tangible and intangible attributes of nation-states that permit these actors to exercise various degrees of power in their contacts with other actors."[12] Technically the term power is distinct from the term capability. Most of the scholars prefer to use the term power. Respecting this preference we will adhere to the term power in subsequent paragraphs.

Greene and Elffers write: "the world is like a giant scheming court and we are trapped inside it, there is no use in trying to opt out of the game. That will only render you powerless, and powerlessness will made you miserable."[13] The game of power is thus inevitable. Greene and Elffers further advise: "Instead of struggling against the inevitable, instead of arguing and whining and feeling guilty, it is far better to excel at power."[14] In fact, the better one is at mastering the power, the better friend, lover, husband, wife, person and nation one becomes.

National Power

Power possessed by a nation-state is known as national power. In the words of Padelford and Lincoln, "National power is the sum total of the strength and capabilities of state harnessed and applied to the advancement of its national interests and the attainment of its national objectives."[15] In a formal sense, national power has been defined by Hartmann as "the strength or capacity that a sovereign state can use to achieve its national interests.[16] This power alone enables a state to defend its interests in the long run and to produce desired results. It is an indicator to the ability to influence opinion, human behaviour, and course of events outside its own frontiers.

National power, according to Anam Jaitly, is "a capacity to influence people domestically and other nations externally, toward certain desired national preferences and induce a favourable response from these sectors for accomplishing these preferences."[17] It has an instrumental value for understanding higher national objectives in a competitive world. In the opinion of another Indian scholar Jangam, "national power is the wherewithal or means of conducting nations' foreign policies or the pursuit of national goals." He defined it as "the capacity of nations for the pursuit of different stakes—territorial, political, economic, social, cultural and those relating to prestige and goodwill. National power taken in this sense is constituted by a number of elements, constituents or factors."[18] Ebenstein also defines national power in terms of its attributes and elements. According to him, "National power is more than the sum total of population, raw material and quantitative factors. The alliance potential of a nation, its civic-devotion, the flexibility of its institutions, its technical know-how, its capacity to endure privation these are but a few quantitative elements that determine the total strength of a nation."[19] These elements and attributes of national power will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

Discussion on the nature and importance of power can be summed up in the words of Organski, "Power, then, is the ability to influence the behaviour of others in accordance with one's own ends. Unless a nation can do this she may be large, she may be wealthy, she may even be great but she is not powerful."[20]

KINDS OF POWER

There are three types of power which are explained below:

1. Physical Power

Military strength of a state is known as physical power. Both USA and Russia are top ranking power owing to their military might. Government of a state enjoys political power because of the subordination of the military to the political authority. Whenever this subordination is disturbed military leadership or commander snatch political power. It is exactly in this way that various *coup d'etat* take place in the world and political power changes hands. As a result of the rapid technological development, the physical power of the state is divided among its different wings such as the armed force, the air force, the navy and of late, the nuclear force with its missiles. Separation of military power among different wings has provided some safeguard to political

authority from usurpation of power by military leadership. It is also the cause of not providing any unified command of the three wings in India. There is no harm in increasing and consolidating military strength as it further enhances a nation's power. But at the same time concrete steps must be taken to make military subordinate to political authority. Military should not be allowed to indulge in political affairs and activities.

2. Psychological Power

It is a power over-public opinion. It consists of symbolic devices that are utilised to appeal to the emotions of men. This power is identical with that of propaganda. It is an endeavour to regulate thoughts and actions of others through propaganda. Propaganda is motivated and could be for good or evil. Power over opinion is essential for boosting the morale of the people at home, carrying on the psychological warfare abroad, and for acquiring moral leadership everywhere.

Psychological power is used very tactfully. In India, the Republic Day Parade of the local made tanks and weapons is meant to impress upon the other nations its growing military power. The Kremlin's display of rockets and tanks on the occasion of the anniversary of the October Revolution was also a use of psychological power. The governments use propaganda techniques to expand psychological power among the population of the rival states, many of which have their special broadcasting services for overseas people. For example, All India Radio has external services in Russian, Chinese, Hindi, Bengali, Urdu, Pushtu, Nepali, English etc. The BBC, Voice of America and Tashkent Radio have an extensive overseas service in foreign languages. Psychological power is usually employed to weaken the opponent countries by spreading disloyalty among their people and instigating them against their governments.

3. Economic Power

Economic power is the ability to control the behaviour of other nations by having greater control over economic goods and services. A highly industrialised and economically sound country can influence the behaviour of the needy nations by giving them economic aid and rewards and offering them capital and technical assistance. Economic development enhances the capacity of a nation to influence others through persuasion and also enables it to resist persuasion and punishment by others and both of them are the important methods of power.

Economically prosperous state possesses the ability to buy and the ability to sell and both are used to increase a nation's power through international trade. A state's foreign trade is meant to increase, economic dependence of another country upon ones own. Nepal and Bhutan are dependent upon India for their trade. The US multinational companies control the economies of the Latin American countries and nearly two-thirds of their foreign trade is with United States. A large share of the foreign trade of Western Europe and Japan has been with the US and thus the economy of these countries has been made dependent upon smooth political ties with the US. The developed countries follow what has been propagated as economic aid policy towards the developing countries. This aid policy has created a large stock pile of credit of the developed Western countries among the developing countries but is proving to be of dubious political advantage.

METHODS OF EXERCISING POWER

The question arises how can Nation A influence Nation B? How can it exercise power? There are five means and methods by which one nation can influence or control other as per its own desire. These are:

1. Persuasion

It is the most common and widely used way of exercising power. In this method what Nation A does is to influence Nation B by way of arguments or superior logic or to redefine the whole situation so that Nation B changes its mind about what it ought to do. Most of the delegates of international organisations employ this method and persuade each other. Small nations largely rely on this less expensive method because they lack power and means to coerce.

2. Rewards

Nation A can regulate Nation B for doing what Nation A wants by offering its various rewards. Rewards for compliance may include psychological manipulation, material support, economic aid, military assistance and political support. A diplomat may alter his stand to win the appreciation of his fellow diplomats from other nations. The rewards can be material in the shape of territory, military aid, weapons, troops and training facilities. The rewards may be economic in the form of aid, loans, grants, capital supply, technical assistance etc. Political rewards consist of support for another nation's viewpoint in international conferences and forums.

3. Punishment

Reward and punishment have close relationship. The most effective punishment is to withhold reward. Punishment may also include hostile activities like unfriendly propaganda, diplomatic opposition and aid to the enemy of the state concerned. It, however, should be threatened in advance and not actually carried out. The most effective punishment is rarely meted out because the very threat of it succeeds in preventing the action which the punisher disapproves. As a last resort if it is to be carried out, it should be given in such a way that it can be withdrawn at once when the offending party changes and subscribes to the way shown by the punishing party.

4. Force

Punishment is usually threatened as a preventive measure but when it is actually carried out, it becomes the use of force. Thus, punishment and force are not strictly separated from each other through some distinction from the viewpoint of prevention and actuality; and the intensity of hostility, between these two is made for the purpose of analysis. The most extreme form of the use of force is war. Force is always used as the last resort when the above three methods prove futile.

It can be said again for the sake of clarification that the first two methods—persuasion and reward—constitute *influence* while the last two punishment and force—form *power*. The analysis of these four means reveals that what distinguishes power from influence is coercion or force.

5. Skills

Greene and Elffers have pointed out certain basic skills that are required to ably play the game of power. In brief, these skills are: the ability to master one's emotions; control of anger, love and affection; alertness in calculating every possible permutation and pitfall; ability to look in both directions at once (like Janus, the double-faced Roman deity—one face looking continuously to the future and the other to the past); mastering arts of deception that is the most potent weapon in the game of power; practicing patience which is the supreme virtue of gods; ability to see circumstances rather than good or evil; do not judge opponents by their intentions but by the effect of their actions; judge all things by what they cost—never waste valuable time or mental peace of mind on the affairs of others—that is too high a price to pay; be a master psychologist for understanding of people's hidden motives; never trust anyone completely and study everyone, including friends and loved ones; take the indirect route to power and disguise your cunning; make appearance like the paragon of decency and act like the consummate manipulator.[21]

DIMENSIONS OF POWER

Deutsch gives three dimensions of power that can be easily measured and that allow analysis to quantify and rank the actual and projected capabilities of nation-states.[22] In brief these dimensions are as follows:

1. Domain of Power

Domain answers the question, over whom power is exercised. Power is often exercised over people, territory and wealth. Domain can be divided into internal domain and external domain. In the context of international relations only the external domain is relevant. It means the ability of nation-states to exercise their power outside their territorial limits. For instance, the external domain of the US would comprise all other members of the NATO, ANZUS Treaty and OAS, and some other states which have entered into bilateral defence pacts or understanding with the US. Like the concept of external domain, Rosenau has propounded the concept of "penetration" which he defines as a process in which "members of one polity serve as participants in the political process of another."[23] Some of the pointers to penetration are the number of bases and facilities a country maintains in other states, the size of military missions in other states and the quantity of foreign aid given etc. Penetration manifests itself in colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism and dependency.

2. Range of Power

Deutsch defines range as "the difference between the highest reward (or indulgence) and the worst punishment (or deprivation) which a power-holder can bestow (or inflict) upon some person in his domain."[24] Range has also internal and external components. Within its territory a state may control its people by benign and tyrannical measures. Governments can exercise power over their subjects both through rewards as well as punishment. The rewards include welfare measures, democratic rights, facilities etc. Punishment can be given to those who disobey the government. In the external range, colonialism and neo-colonialism could be regarded as the external analogue of tyranny. On the other hand, a mutually beneficial alliance or an equitable structure for economic cooperation among nation-states is more akin to a just and benign national government. A powerful state can punish directly or indirectly a weak country if the latter does not follow the former's line. Such punishment may stretch from hostile propaganda to military intervention. On the other hand, the reward can be in the form of economic, military and diplomatic help.

3. Scope of Power

The scope of power, in the words of Deutsch, is "the set or collection of all the particular kinds of classes of behaviour, relations and affairs that are effectively subjected to governmental power."[25] This 'set of collection'—embraces all the types of activities a government seeks to control, domestic as well as foreign. Technological revolution has substantially increased the internal and external scope of power. In the present times the external control has taken various forms and become subtle and complex. A powerful state can now exercise power over the other state without firing a single shot.

For example most of the Latin American countries are economically and politically controlled by the US albeit they are not its formal colonies. Multinational corporations play a role in this machination of dependency and interdependency. Today, countries are dependent on one another for such important things as technologies; energy materials such as oil, uranium, and natural gas;

investment capital; managerial personnel; unskilled labour; military equipment; and information-processing systems.

ROLE AND USE OF POWER

Power in international relations may be used by a nation for various purposes, the chief among them are:

National Security

Defence of its territory and sovereignty is the main purpose of any modern state. National security is the vital national interest as well as major determinant of foreign policy of every nation. Power plays a significant role in achieving this purpose and vital interest. Every nation has a department or ministry in charge of the defence of the country. This shows how all states feel that military or physical power must be possessed in the interest of national security. Many nations have fought defensive wars. A defensive war may be pre-emptive or preventive. A pre-emptive war is one initiated by a defensive power in order to forestall an attack believed to be imminent. Military might and preparedness is essential to deter the interferences of opponents, or, if they do occur to stop them. During cold war days the USA justified her large nuclear stock pile on the ground that it is necessary as a 'deterrent power.' The US sought to deter the Soviet Union by making it known that her nuclear striking force is capable of surviving a surprise attack and capable of taking equally destructive retaliatory step. During Gulf War (1991) the US not only protected its vital interests but also compelled Iraq's forces to vacate Kuwait with the help of its superior and sophisticated defence forces.

Preserving Status Quo

The policy of status quo aims at preserving the distribution of power prevalent at any time in history. The moment in history taken as a reference for pursuing the status quo policy is, often, the termination of war. After the end of a war peace- treaty is signed indicating the new shift in power. Nations following the policy of status quo utilise power to preserve the new shift in the balance of power. For example from 1815 to 1848, certain European governments pursued a policy of status quo, using their power to defend the Peace Settlement of 1815. US's Monroe Doctrine (1823) and Truman Doctrine (1946) are other examples of using power for maintaining the status quo in the American hemisphere and West Europe respectively. The policy of status quo permits minor changes. But a major change altering the supreme position of the nation pursuing the policy will not be tolerated by it.

Changing Status Quo

Nations also use power to change status quo in their favour or pursue a policy of imperialism. Any effort to change the existing distribution of power in its favour means that state is following a policy of imperialism. The most open and crude type of imperialism is military imperialism. Today, it is replaced by other more covert forms of imperial policy, such as economic and cultural imperialism. Alexander, Napoleon, Hitler and more recently Saddam Hussain used military power for their expansion. At times even nations claiming to fight defensive wars, as the allies in World Wars, may be tempted to have a treaty which not merely restores the pre-war balance but a new balance in its favour; for instance, the Treaty of Versailles which endeavoured to keep Germany permanently weak. At times, existence of power vacuum or weak neighbours may tempt powerful states to take interest in those areas. Military adventure as a method of using power is a gamble. It may succeed or may be lost.

Economic imperialism or neo-colonialism is less obtrusive. Economic expansion may be in the form of controlling foreign markets, exporting capital, providing economic aid and loans; and operating multinational corporations. Another subtle way of changing status quo is cultural imperialism. It does not indulge in the conquest of territory and its forcible retention, nor in economic penetration, instead it endeavours to change the existing balance of power by conquering the minds of people. This is achieved through propaganda. Just as nations find it necessary to be armed and ready to meet any military aggression, so also do they make use of their power to counter economic and cultural expansion.

Use in Diplomacy

Power is also utilised by a nation's diplomats. Diplomats of a powerful country act more confidently in their diplomatic activities than diplomats of the less powerful states. Power helps nations at the negotiation table. It enables a nation to advance its particular claims or to resist the claims of other nations. The Chinese leader Mao Tse-tung once wrote: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Likewise it can be said that diplomatic strength comes out of political power. If a country is powerful its diplomats can effectively employ the means of persuasion and reward and their threat of punishment and use of force will carry more weight during diplomatic negotiations and manoeuvring.

Enhancing Prestige

Power is used by various states to enhance their prestige in the world. Enhancement is related with the show and demonstration of power. For this reason nations occasionally display power and strength before the other nations of the world in various ways. Military demonstrations on such occasions as the Independence Day or Republic Day, where dignitaries and diplomats are watching, serve to impress on them the military preparedness of the inviting country. When the USA tested the atom bombs in the Pacific in 1946 she invited a large number of foreign dignitaries to see the fact that the USA was bombing a group of ships larger than many of the world's navies. Another frequently employed method of demonstrating power and at the same time solidarity or friendship with another nation is the exchange of fleets or visits of armed ships to the harbours of friendly countries. The timing of such visits or exchanges is also significant. If just before the outbreak of hostilities or when a country is being threatened, the visits are meant to show to the potential enemy that he will have to face the combined force of two nations. On all other occasions such exchanges serve to show the world that the country is interested in the affairs of the region and has power which it will use when necessary. Finally, a nation may exhibit its power and will to use it by calling for partial or total mobilisation. A nation when it feels threatened by an enemy seeks to do this in order to convince the enemy and the rest of the world that it means to defend itself and that it has adequate man-power for this purpose. Thus, the prestige or reputation for military might and preparedness is used by countries to their advantage. But at the sametime there should not be wide gap between the apparent prestige and real power. To follow a policy of falsehood is perilous "while to neglect prestige is to lose the opportunity to put to full use the power at one's disposal."[26]

Serving National Interests

Power is used not only to fulfil vital national interests such as national security and independence, preserving status quo and prestige etc. but also to accomplish other national interests. These may be geographical, political, economic, social, educational, scientific, technical, strategic, cultural and so on. Each country may have its own national interests according to its specific needs and conditions. Power alone can help achieve all these interests. More powerful a country is more easy

will it be for it to achieve them than the other nations. Power is thus the main tool used by nations to fulfil their various national interests.

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Elements of National Power

National power can be equated with the entirety of a state's effectiveness in international politics. The content of national power relies on the combination of so many elements and relative factors that it is very difficult to find out any accurate and final list at any given period of time. Despite this difficulty there has been some agreement about certain elements of power, and even about their classification into stable and unstable, tangible and intangible, human and non-human etc. Mere possession of these elements do not determine a nation's power hence they should not be termed as the determinants of power as many scholars call them. What determines power is the proper and efficient utilisation of these elements. At best they can be called as elements or factors or components of national power.

Before discussing these elements in detail one should consider and assume certain facts regarding them. *First*, all elements are interrelated and interdependent. *Second*, these cannot be measured with a high degree of accuracy. These can simply be estimated. *Third*, even a precise estimate of these elements is not always possible as they are undergoing constant structural and relative changes due to natural and technological reasons. *Fourth*, national power is never based on any single factor, but on a combination of all these elements under a set of circumstances. *Fifth*, these can be broadly classified on the basis of their nature such as stable and unstable, tangible and intangible.

Noted authors of international relations have classified these elements differently. Morgenthau has divided them into two categories—permanent and changeable. Relatively stable elements are geography and natural resources whereas elements subject to constant change are military preparedness, population, national character and morale, diplomacy and government.[1] Organski classified them into natural and social determinants. The natural determinants are geography, natural resources and population; social determinants are economic development, political structure and national morale.[2] Carr gave three categories: military power, economic power and power over opinion.[3] Mahendra Kumar broadly divided them into three categories: natural, social and ideational. First covers the elements of geography, resources and population, while the second includes economic development, political structure and national morale. The third category consists of ideals, intelligence and wisdom of leadership.[4] Palmer and Perkins divided them into tangible and intangible. Geography, raw material, natural resources and population are tangible whereas morale and ideology are intangible.[5] Many other scholars have also preferred to classify them into tangible and intangible elements. These scholars are Lerche and Said[6], Couloumbis and Wolfe[7], Adi H. Doctor,[8] Anam Jaitly[9] etc.

But in the following paragraphs these elements will be comprehensively divided into five categories. These are:

I. *Natural Elements.* Geography, natural resources and population.

II. *Scientific and Technological Elements.* Technology and industrial capacity, agricultural capacity and military strength.
III. *Political Elements.* Type of government, bureaucratic organisation and efficiency, wisdom of leadership and quality of diplomacy.
IV. *Social and Ideological Elements.* Ideologies, national morale, national character, social structure and social cohesiveness.
V. *External and other Elements.* Reputation and image, foreign support, international strategic position and intelligence.

The above elements are examined in detail as below.

Natural Elements

They are so called because they are endowed by nature and not man made. These elements are:

1. *Geography.* Since time immemorial the most stable element upon which a nation's power depends is geography. Geographical factors such as climate, topography, location and size influence the power potential of a nation. *Climate*, for example, acts as one of the determinants of the culture and economy of a country. If the climate is good, there would be a better work culture leading to more productivity. Great powers of modern times have been situated in those regions blessed with a temperate climate. *Topography* plays an important role in the defence of nations. Topographical features such as mountains, valleys, rivers may determine natural boundaries between nations and set limits to their natural expansion. Mountains like Himalayas, the Alps and the Pyrenees and rivers like the Rhine, the Rio Grande, Dunube and Yale served as guards on the boundaries between nations. The Chinese aggression on India in 1962 shattered this belief and necessitated a rethinking on the question whether topography is important as natural guard or not. *Location* determines the extent of a country's vulnerability to invasion. It is a major determinant of whether a country is a sea-power or a land-power. The achievements of England and Japan on the seas have been owing to the fact of their being islands. Land-locked countries like Austria, Hungary, Nepal, Bhutan etc. are at a disadvantage when compared to states having outlets to sea. States that are located far away from the friction zones of power can pursue an independent or neutral policy in world affairs, but the same is not true with those states who are close to the epicentre of world politics. *Size* is yet another natural and tangible factor of power though it is the most deceptive of the physical foundations of power. A large territory—if hospitable and fertile can accommodate more people and give more natural resources. In the past, the vast size of the territory of a state was of great help to its security. It was difficult for the enemy to win and occupy a large territory. But size matters very little now-a-days. Japan, for instance, even though comparatively small, defeated China and Russia. Moreover, utility of larger territories has also diminished due to the technological revolution and the invention of Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles.

A new discipline has emerged that enables us to understand the application of the knowledge of political geography to statecraft. It is known as Geopolitics. It is the study of geography as it may influence foreign policy and political phenomena.

2. *Natural Resources.* Natural as well as quantifiable and stable element of power is natural resources which include raw materials, agricultural products like food and fibre, forests, minerals, waterfall, fertility of soil etc. It is evident that the possession of resources such as coal, iron, uranium, oil, rubber, bauxite, manganese, other ferrous and non-ferrous metals, non-metallic minerals and natural gas is essential to industrial and defence production in nation-states. More recently, it has been proved that the availability of petroleum at reasonable prices is important to

the good economic health of industrial nations. The contemporary prosperity of many Arab countries is due to the availability of plenty of oil there. However, it may be said that the mere possession of natural resources does not automatically generate power. Their proper utilisation through advanced technology is also essential. Secondly, previously the rigid raw material theory of international politics was very popular but now its popularity is on decline. Invention of synthetics, other new industrial processes, and the unexpectedly high capacity of emi ıttled populations to endure chronic shortages have "all served to liberate states from the more abs utes of the theory."[10] Despite these limitations natural resources and raw materials continue to s e a nation in its economic and military development.

3. *Population.* It seems a large population is an asset for the state. But it is not really so. For example, China with the largest population in the world is not as powerful as the United States. On the other hand Israel, Japan and Germany are powerful inspite of their small population. That is why quality of population is as important as its quantity. From quantity's point of view it is a tangible element whereas it is intangible qualitatively. Thus population can serve both as an asset and as a liability. If the people are well-fed, educated and properly trained, they are a great source of power. But if they are ignorant, poor and illiterate, they are a big burden on the state. Many qualities of population, such as unity, literacy, loyalty, character and spirit of love, sacrifice nd duty are crucial for making a country powerful but they are difficult to measure. A good population serves as good military personnel, civilians, workers, producers and consumers.

Manpower according to Lerche and Said, is more useful notion for purposes of national pov r. It is that part of the population available for broadly defined foreign policy objectives. ll individuals who are politically useless, as well as those needed simply to keep the so y functional (such as food producers), must be subtracted from the gross total. The remaining i ıe manpower quotient that, with proper direction, leadership and administration, can be utilise to contribute to the defence, productive, administrative, diplomatic and political strength of the state.[11]

Scientific and Technological Elements

As stated above industrial capacity, agricultural capacity and military capacity of a nation depend on the one hand on the availability of natural resources and raw materials and on the other hand on the scientific and technological development. Elements related with scientific and technological advancement of a country are as follows:

I. *Industrial Capacity.* Technology may be said to be a nation's capacity to convert the endowed resources into actual power. It can be applied in the economic and industrial sphere which means better machines and better and abundant products. No nation in the present world can become a great power unless it has the capacity to produce tremendous quantities of goods and services. If a country does not have the technology, industry and markets to process natural resources efficiently, it is reduced to the position of a weak raw-material exporting state. On the contrary, a country with developed technology but without natural resources is greatly dependent on the import of raw materials from other countries. For example, many Western countries, with the exception of the US, are critically dependent upon the supply of Middle East oil. They do not have any firm control over its supply and price fluctuations. It can be safely said that those countries which have both important raw materials and developed technologies for processing are fully developed and powerful countries.

Technology helps a nation to have stronger economy, stronger industrial base, stronger

- Economic development

system of transport and communication, stronger military, greater capacity to win war and influence nations during peace. Industrial capacity contributes towards the production of weapons that are required for modern warfare. It provides international rewards in the form of consumer goods and in the shape of markets for foreign goods. It enables a nation to persuade other nations by providing technical and economic assistance in the name of soft loans, aid, grants etc. Industrial capacity of a nation, thus is a great source of wealth and power.

2. *Agricultural Capacity.* Agriculture is a crucial component of national power. It is more relevant for developing countries where agriculture tends to be the major sector of national economy. In the words of Couloumbis and Wolfe, "This is also a tangible element of power. Countries that can feed themselves, especially over the course of a long war will be relatively more powerful than countries that are not selfsufficient."[12] International trade of a developing country heavily depends upon agricultural products and products manufactured with agricultural contents (e.g. jute, cloth and sugar) as these become goods for export and these facilitate import of machinery and raw material for industrial sector.

India being an industrially less advanced country, relies greatly on agriculture and allied products. Agriculture and allied activities contribute about 29.15 per cent of the GDP and provides livelihood to about three-fourth of the population.[13] In 1950 India was faced with the food problem and suffered from agricultural backwardness. For food it was depending on Western nations and particularly the US which through PL 480 pressurised India off and on. But with the help of modern technology India succeeded in Green Revolution and became self-sufficient in food. With this its dependence on the US for food ended and it became more self-confident in diplomatic activities. Scientific and technological methods can thus help in increasing the agricultural capacity of a nation that further enhances a nation's power.

3. *Military Strength.* Scientific and technological development is the sustaining factor for the armed forces without which the military strength cannot be dependable and self-reliant. Indigenuous capacity to produce different kinds of modern and sophisticated weapons is necessary, otherwise the nation cannot sustain prolonged warfare. Consequently, notwithstanding their technological backwardness, many countries have acquired military strength by buying weapons from the advanced countries which has contributed to their military might. In the beginning, most of the states increase their strength in this way and later on build up their technological capability for defence production and forces.

Military strength is relevant both in war and peace. No one can win a war without a strong military base. In peacetime also, diplomacy is significantly affected by the leverages that rivals wield owing to their respective military might. Military strength involves two main things—armed forces and weapons. To analyse their role in national power one has to take into consideration the following:

The *size* and *number* of armed forces are of great importance. Even the age of space battles and push-button warfare has not undermined the general importance of number. Therefore, a country with a large size of defence forces will be always relatively in a better position. Equally important is the weapons and equipments supplied to them. A state with a small armed force, but armed with *sophisticated weapons and quality equipment* can easily defeat another state which has a much larger armed force using old weapons. Thus the quality of the army and arms-ammunition is also very crucial alongwith their quantity. The *quality* of forces depends on the nature of the training, the physical endurance and the morale of troops. Next is the question of *mobility* and *deployment*.

It stands for the ability of a state to deploy its armed might in locations inside and outside its territory. The chief indicator of mobility is a state's ability to transport and effectively support military operations on land, sea and air. *Military leadership* also plays a great role in the actual military operations during a war. By their skill military commanders can jolt a superior enemy and turn the defeat into victory. *Morale* of forces i.e. their willingness to sacrifice for nation is no less a factor in contributing to military strength. The military *alliances* and *bases* also contribute important aspect of the military element. A state with a number of such alliances and bases is potentially stronger. Lastly, military component of national power is dependent upon the *financial resources* of nation as well as its technological, industrial and economic development.

Political Elements

Political elements which are important parts of the political system of a state and contribute to its power are:

1. *Type of Government.* States formulate and conduct their foreign policy through their governments. If a government's foreign policy is unified, specific, representative of the popular will, stable, and at the same time flexible, it can do wonders for the nation, and its power position. Government also regulates social discipline, which is based on the coordination of all efforts in its community. Good rapport between the government and people bring greater allegiance of people towards the country. Such an allegiance is a prime factor in the development of national power.

It is not easy to say which type of government is the most powerful. The issue of relationship between type of government and national power has not been resolved since Aristotle's times. There are various forms of government in the present world such as communist, democratic, authoritarian etc. Past international relations prove that both democratic and authoritarian types of governments have been successful in effectively regulating the behaviour of other states, and, therefore, to that extent both of them have been powerful nations. Authoritarian regimes can make swift and flexible foreign- policy decision as their decision makers are few and relatively unaccountable. But we should think whether quick decisions by unaccountable decision makers are necessarily wise decisions. The features of checks and balances of democratic governments subject decisions to greater scrutiny and presumably guard against whimsical and hasty decisions. The yardstick to measure superiority of a type of government can be its efficiency to achieve set national goals and ability to mobilise people's support. Democratic and constitutional government is based on consensus of fundamentals, it is likely to operate with a sustained popular support. In this way, it will be in a better position to impose greater discipline and persuade people to make sacrifices for achieving national objectives and national growth.

2. *Bureaucratic Efficiency.* If the bureaucracy is impartial, honest, clean and efficient, it will generate more power for a nation. Corruption and inefficiency will always cost a nation much both in peace and war. In peace, it will stall development and progress. In war, it will set at naught all coordinated efforts and prepare the ground for eventual capitulation. Rich, well-armed, and even wisely governed countries cannot work effectively unless they have efficient bureaucracies with which to execute their policies. There are four views regarding the proper role, method of operation, and adequate functioning of bureaucracies. *First*, communist states believe in large-scale bureaucratisation not only in political but also in economic and social sectors. But by now it has been realised that over bureaucratisation in communist countries has proved counterproductive. *Second*, democratic—competitive countries seek to encourage private initiative and limit the role of governmental bureaucracies to defence, taxation, and other regulatory functions. *Third*, there are those who argue for the complete detachment of politics from professional bureaucracies.

Fourth, few people are interested to have political control over the bureaucracies, plug leaks, and ensure that political decisions are carried out faithfully by the professional bureaucrats. Each of these theories has its own advantages and disadvantages, we do not intend discussing them here. But it can be realised that to assess the exact impact of a given bureaucratic theory upon the power of a state is an uphill task.

3. Leadership. Leadership is of great significance to any analysis of national power because it is leadership that utilises the national resources to build up power. Morale of the people also revolves around leadership. There can be no integrated technology sans leadership. It is important for many reasons. *First*, leadership utilises the other components of national power like geography, resources, population, industrial capacity, technology etc. and this it does with the qualities that it possesses. *Second*, it coordinates other elements of national power. *Third*, it allocates resources between military and civilian programmes. *Fourth*, it decides the nature of relations with other states and declares war and peace. Decisions and actions of leaders have a direct bearing on the power of the state. Couloumbis and Wolfe rightly observe: "Undoubtedly, greatness or incompetence, wisdom or irrationality, effectiveness or impotence in leadership considerably affects the power that a country has. Leaders such as Napoleon, Hitler, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, Mao, Gandhi, Kennedy, de Gaulle, Khrushchev, and Nixon have made a deep impact on world history."[14] An able leadership serves as a source of great inspiration to a people. Such an inspiration is crucial both in the realisation of national development programmes and in the assumption of initiative in foreign affairs.

4. Quality of Diplomacy. Another significant component of national power is the quality of diplomacy. It embraces all the power resources of a nation to bear in such a way as to make the most of them, rattling the sabre here, offering rewards there, bringing forth arguments at another point, timing actions and concessions in such a way as to persuade one's enemies and allies to act as one wishes them to act. Of all the elements that play role in gaining national power, the most important, though unstable and intangible, is the quality of diplomacy. All other elements are like raw materials, and the state having them may be a potentially great power. However, it becomes an actual power when it follows an effective foreign policy towards this end through diplomacy. According to Morgenthau, "The conduct of a nation's foreign affairs by its diplomats is for national power in peace what military strategy and tactics by its military leaders are for national power in war"[15] If morale is the soul of national power then diplomacy is its brain.

In the 18th and 19th centuries, France and Britain were proud of their diplomatic skill. It was the art of diplomacy that gave to Britain the relative consistancy of power from Henry VIII to the First World War. During inter-war period the USA was politically very strong but played insignificant part in world politics as her diplomacy was weak. It was only after the Second World War that the US pursued a great power policy, shouldered commensurate economic, military and diplomatic responsibilities and transformed the potential into actual. There are also some diplomats in the third world countries who have earned a name for their negotiating ability.

New factors such as the rapid increase in the means of transport and communication, increasing appreciation of the importance of public opinion and the practice of open diplomacy have greatly affected the character of diplomacy and contributed towards its decline. But it is not fully correct. Though it may have suffered a few setbacks yet a high quality of diplomacy still plays an indispensable role for the power of a nation. It is the only peaceful alternative to protect and accomplish national interests. In the last one must remember that a high quality diplomacy must also possess the element of consistency.

Social and Ideological Elements

Social environment of a nation influences its power-making. These elements are concerned with society's ideals, ideas, attitudes, sentiments, slogans, morale, character, social traditions and customs. All these are parts of the social system and structure of a nation. These are explained as below:

1. Ideology. Ideology has remained a very vital aspect in the power of a nation especially in the twentieth century. An ideology is a body of ideas and beliefs concerning certain values and usually suggesting a certain political and economic order in order to accomplish these values. Richard Snyder and Hubert Wilson present a comprehensive definition of ideology. In their own words, it "is a cluster of ideas about life, society or government, which originate in most cases as consciously advocated or dogmatically asserted social, political or religious slogans or battle cries and..., which become the characteristic beliefs or dogmas of a particular group, party or nationality."[16] Ideologies can be of different types—social, political, economic, religious, racial and so on. Morgenthau has given three main types: (i) ideologies of status quo; (ii) ideology of imperialism and (iii) ambiguous ideologies (e.g. self-determination). Other important ideologies are: liberalism, constitutionalism, nazism, fascism, communism, socialism, nationalism, internationalism etc.

Experience reveals that in the past ideologies have provided a tremendous philosophical, psychological and moral power for the policies and programmes of men. They have gradually been a guiding force for policy goals and activities of nations. Often nation have utilised ideologies as a source of moral justification for the pursuit of their policy goals. As an element of national power, these can boost people's morale. An ideology if it is followed by a majority of citizens or is indoctrinated into them can act as a powerful factor making for unity and power. It can be used either to reconcile man to his conditions or to stimulate him to improve them. Ideology is thus a significant element strengthening the power-base of a state as also its foreign policy.

Ideologies have their own merits as well as demerits. They give strength to worthy causes, unity to nation and a sense of common interest to peoples in many parts of the world. The objective of human brotherhood and world peace can be realised by ideological motivation.[17] On the other hand, experience demonstrates a good part of the evils and miseries characterising international relations is brought into existence by ideologies as initiators and determinants of nation's policies and efforts. Ideologies sometime act as part of national egoes and lead various nations into confrontation and wars. Different nations pursuing conflicting ideologies have tended to add to the tensions of the modern world particularly before and after the Second World War. The task of peace-makers is generally made difficult by the opposing ideologies.

The impact of ideology on international relations is fastly diminishing especially after the advent of Gorbachevian phenomenon and the subsequent collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and East Europe. With the end of communism the talk of 'End of Ideology' by a few scholars in 1950s stood vindicated. It belongs now to the past as the fire of ideology once burning in Europe seems to have extinguished as new ideas and feelings are being accepted to suit the changing times. Ideology, in fact, is not the end for which the states resort to war, instead an instrument for concealing the interests of the states. It is either used to attract people and gain their support or convince them with the superiority of the state's ideals. In this sense it is still relevant as an element of national power.

2. National Morale. National morale and national character are the historical-psychological-sociological element of national power. These are unstable, intangible and cannot be measured easily. Lerche and Said used this term "to describe the mass state of mind in action, with particular

reference to the extent to which the society feels itself committed to the government's policy."[18] In the words of Morgenthau, "National morale is the degree of determination with which a nation supports the foreign policies of its government in peace or war. It permeates all activities of a nation, its agricultural and industrial production as well as its military establishment and diplomatic service. In the form of public opinion, it provides an intangible factor without whose support no government, democratic or autocratic, is able to pursue its policies with full effectiveness, if it is able to pursue them at all."[19]

Palmer and Perkins define it as "a thing of the spirit made up of loyalty, courage, faith, the impulse to the preservation of personality and dignity.... It can make men and women work harder, sacrifice more, and fight harder."[20] Mahendra Kumar observes that 'willingness to sacrifice' is the core of national morale of the armed forces as well as the people at large. In his own words, "the sum total of the individual qualities of men in a nation in the form of their willingness to put the nation's welfare above their own personal welfare."[21] A high national morale or willingness to sacrifice contributes towards the building of national power in peace time, in national crisis and in wars. It has a direct impact on the vigor and human dynamics with which government mobilise and utilise the other tangible elements of power.

National morale is significantly influenced by national character and the cultural background of the individuals. For instance, the German character can be said to impart efficiency and thoroughness to the morale of German soldiers; the Russian character provided doggedness and endurance to the morale of Russian soldiers; while the American character gave inventiveness and resourcefulness to the morale of American soldiers. The morale of an advanced nation is likely to be higher than the morale of a backward nation due to the difference of cultural background.

National morale is never permanent and static. It changes with time and conditions. Sometime, there comes a point when it breaks. Generation and maintenance of morale often depend upon technological advance, the development of the means of transport and communication, the flow of information and ideas and the exposure of the people to them and so on. It can also be stimulated by the techniques of propaganda and qualities of leadership.

3. *National Character.* National character is the trait of people towards all the walks of national life. It is the outcome of evolutionary process and the attitude of the previous generations which is transmitted to the next generations. Each nation has a distinct character. It is also a product of a specific social environment. National character determine the attitude of a people to international trends and events, as well as the resolution with which they will back up foreign policy in peace or in war. The national character consists of intellectual and moral qualities of the people which leave their imprint on a nation's foreign policy. Nicolson rightly observed: "...national policy is coloured and even governed by national character; and I would say that unless we understand that character we cannot understand the policy."[22]

The people of a nation, thus, have some common traits and features with which the sociologists generally identify them. As we generally percieve Chinese in terms of cosmic unchangeability, of the Germans in terms of thoroughness and discipline, of the Russians in terms of relentless persistence and tenacity, of the English in terms of undogmatic common sense, of the Americans in terms of pragmatism and informality, of all Latins in terms of esthetic instinct and volatility and the Indians in terms of detachment on the verge of indifference.

The relationship between national morale and character is positive but at the sametime ambiguous. Jointly, both of them demonstrate the national will to further the national cause in a particular situation or time. As an element of national power, national character is broader than

morale. Their relationship can be summed up in the words of Palmer and Perkins: "National character may be thought of as climate, morale as weather."[23]

4. *Social System and Cohesiveness.* This social element is also unstable as well as intangible. If the society is integrated and coordinated then it will be capable of unified effort that will further consolidate its power. On the other hand if it is disintegrated and suffers from internal dissensions it will dilute nation's power and prestige. Lerche rightly observes: "that social system is best for power purposes which is the most homogenous and united behind the political leadership of the country and which embodies the minimum amount of stress and strain."[24] A society stricken with communal tension, rural-urban tension, or with dissatisfied minorities, will have a low morale and will adversely affect the power status of the nation. Many scholars believe that internally unified nations are strong whereas divided ones are weak. The reasons for disunity or unity can vary from ethnic, linguistic, racial, and religious diversity all the way to economic, political, ideological and foreign-inspired divisions. Some plausible indicators of disunity are terrorism, number of political prisoners, riots, demonstrations, paralysing strikes, media censorship, insurgency, and even civil war.[25] The most recent example of this factor is the erstwhile Soviet Union which has been a victim of internal tensions, disunity and ethnic problem. All these factors have adversely affected its power position in the world. India too has been riddled with communal tensions, terrorism, casteism, riots, strikes, violence for the last many years. That stood in its way to become a powerful nation.

5. *Accidents.* Sometimes accidents and unforeseen events also put spoke in the wheel of power. For instance, "the sudden death of a great leader, an earthquake, a famine, an epidemic of a dread disease such as the plague, a misunderstanding or a breakdown in communication during a crisis, and many other unforeseen events may deeply affect the power relationship of nation-states. Since accidents cannot be predicted in any other but aggregate statistical sense, they remain at the summit of the pyramid of intangibility."[26] African countries ravaged by drought and cyclone prone Bangla Desh cannot think of becoming powerful.

External Elements

Most of the political scientists have laid stress on different internal factors discussed above, ignoring external elements completely. These external factors are in no way less significant than the internal ones in determining a nation's power. Couloumbis and Wolfe;[27] Lerche and Said[28] have, however, discussed the same in their works.

1. *Image and Reputation.* If a state has a favourable image, its voice would be heard at the international level. For example, India under Nehru had a good image albeit its backwardness and military weakness. It enjoyed a good prestige owing to Gandhian heritage, policy of non-alignment and Nehru's dynamic leadership. Both the super-powers tried to befriend it. Many third world countries sought its guidance on important international issues. After Nehru, there was some setback to this image.

Similarly reputation of a state also matters. If some state has the reputation of being a good fighter, the rival would think hundred times before attacking it. Reputation acts as a deterrent and enables a state to achieve some power position. In various wars Israel has subdued Arabs and won the reputation of a tough fighter. This reputation deters potential Arab invaders and is a strong diplomatic card for Israel vis-a-vis Arabs. Couloumbis and Wolfe rightly say, "Power, therefore, should be evaluated not only in terms of each country's ability and willingness to *use* its capabilities when challenged, but also in terms of its reputation for action in response to previous challenges."[29]

2. *Foreign Support and Dependency.* Another element which is not being touched upon by scholars is foreign support and dependency. This factor comprises of international connections such as alliances, foreign economic and military aid, the leasing or granting of strategic bases to the great powers, and participation in regional and universal international organisation and action. To overlook these aspects would leave us measuring the power of Syria and Israel, for example, without considering Russian and American aid and commitments to these two countries. Too much support from outside render a country totally dependent. When this happens, the sovereignty and strategic flexibility of the dependent nation-state vis-a-vis its supporter become seriously limited. In this way, foreign support and dependency remains a crucial, although intangible element.

3. *International Strategic Position.* If the state apprehends great and constant danger, it will naturally channelise its available power to defend its territory leaving a limited role for the world stage. Any revision in a state's assessment of the dangers it faces automatically affects its power in other spheres. An estimation that the threat has diminished enables the state for more free action elsewhere; if the threat is colossal, adequate responsive action requires contraction of activity at other points. Lerche and Said aptly remarked, "In a familiar and paradoxial way, the very objectives a state selects for itself, and the way it interprets the situation in which it must operate, have a major influence on its capability to achieve those objectives and to function in the situation. A state's international strategic position is to a large measure determined by itself; a state is to a great extent the architect of its own capability."[30]

4. *Intelligence.* Intelligence in this context implies complete knowledge of the strength and weakness of external foes and friends. Different nations employ various secret agencies and spies to obtain this knowledge. Sherman Kent explains, the idea is to produce "the kind of knowledge our states must possess regarding other states in order to assure itself that its cause will not suffer nor its undertakings fail because its statesmen and soldiers plan and act in ignorance."[31] This knowledge and information serves the purpose of power. Such an information can be useful both in times of war and peace. In war advance information about the strength and strategy of the enemy greatly helps to effectively deal with the eventuality. During peace time, prior knowledge about the other party's plus and minus points enables a country to extract maximum benefit to itself on the bargaining table. Keeping in view the significance of this element different nations have their own network of intelligence agencies and spies such as USA's CIA, Russia's KGB and India's RAW.

MEASUREMENT OF NATIONAL POWER

National Power cannot be measured or weighed physically in terms of metres, litres, kilograms, tonnes etc. No measuring tape or balancing scale or barometer has since been invented to measure the power of one nation vis-a-vis another. The problem of measurement lies both in the subjective limitations of the analysis and in the very characteristics of the elements themselves. The subjectivity, values and prejudices of the analyst may distort the true picture of the national power. Besides the very nature of the elements is such as to make this measurement all the more difficult. Some of these elements are stable while others are unstable; some are tangible (e.g. geography, population, natural resources, industrial capacity, military strength) whereas others are intangible (such as national morale, national character, social cohesiveness, intelligence, reputation etc.). It has been admitted by the noted scholars of international relations such as Morgenthau, Palmer and Perkins, Hartmann, Organski etc. that national power cannot be measured precisely owing to reasons mentioned below.

Relativity of Power

An evaluator may ignore the relativity of power by erecting the power of one particular nation into an absolute. France after 1919 and Germany after 1936 were considered as absolute power, but subsequent history established the falsity of this opinion. Power is never absolute. In international relations power is relative and essentially relational as it cannot be measured in a vacuum. A state is more or less powerful relative to some other state. Palmer and Perkins elaborate, "Fifty divisions, three hundred war vessels, two thousand planes—all these may represent overwhelming might against one opponent and miserable inadequacy against another."[32] Its relativity has been further increased by the development of nuclear energy and emergence of the power of the weak. In the contemporary world of nuclear deterrence, the national power is to be assessed not in terms of the capacity of first attack but in terms of the capacity of surviving retaliatory strength. The power of the weak is linked with the emergence of new nations that restrict the dominant nature of power and makes it further relative.[33]

Changing Nature of Power

Morgenthau points out, "The second typical error impairing the evaluation of national power.... singles out a particular power factor or power relation, basing the estimate upon the assumption that this factor or relation is immune to change."[34] While evaluating power, one must bear in mind the changing nature of power. One cannot take for granted the permanency of a certain factor that has played a decisive role in the past, thus neglecting the dynamic change. The Soviet Union was treated as inherently powerless between 1917 and 1943, but the epic of Stalingrad repudiated this version. Similarly at the beginning of the First World War Britain was the mistress of the sea but at the close of the Second World War she was reduced to a second grade power, as the significance of sea war-fare had diminished. Some geopoliticians have wrongly erected the element of geography into an absolute. Take the example of Heartland theory which is now exploded. Thus for many reasons, a nation's political and economic status and power may change basically over a period of time. Rise and fall of nations is a common phenomenon in history.

Single Factor Determinism

The third typical error according to Morgenthau, in measuring the national power is giving to one single factor a decisive role to the disregard of all other factors. Sometimes an evaluation is made on the basis of geopolitics or nationalism or militarism.[35] One should avoid any single factor determinism. No one factor is an absolute. One state may have a very good geographical features and other may have a strong military but is lacking in other elements. If the assessment of both these states are based on single factor i.e. geography and military respectively then this assessment is going to be proved wrong and erroneous.

Moreover, all factors are not of equal importance. In the opinion of Organski, national morale, resources and geography are of comparatively less importance than population, political structure and economic productivity.[36] Simple possession of rich resources is not a major element in the absence of high rate of economic productivity. India can be cited an example of this. Similarly, with the development of nuclear weapons and inventions of different kinds of means of delivery, geography's importance has declined. Modernisation of political structure and industrialisation can enhance power. By regular economic development, efficiency of government and by joining political alliances a nation can gain more power.

The Estimate and Reality of Power

The gap between the estimate and reality of power also makes measurement difficult. The possibility of the underestimation or overestimation of one's power and that of the opponent is

always there. It is correct that a nation's power relies not merely on its genuine ability to influence the behaviour of other states but also on the estimation of its ability as also on the estimation of its power as made by other nations. For instance, during 1930s Italy was not so great as was generally estimated and French fear of Germany was based on overestimation. Thus, the underestimation or overestimation of one's ownself or of others reveals lack of an exact evaluation of power. Underestimation of one's own power and overestimation of that of others result in policies of peace and *status quo*, while overestimation of one's own power and underestimation of that of others pave the way for policies of war and change.

Actual and Potential Power

While calculating power an observer must be aware of the actual and potential power of the states. The potential power of the state is the possibility it possesses of developing into a powerful state on the basis of natural resources, etc. Evaluation of potential power helps in chalking out long-term plans involving commitment of power. The actual power is power that a state really has. The measurement of this power is useful in forecasting short-term developments and in making immediate commitments of power. If a state has adequate immediate power to press for an advantageous decision, it will do so, before the rival can mobilise his greater potential superiority. Germany did this twice. But in 1917 and 1941 she miscalculated the swiftness with which the USA could arm herself. It is evident that a state with lesser potential but which keeps a larger part of it in readiness all the time may prove effective and be able to supply greater pressure in a given situation, than a state with a larger potential but which it is reluctant or unable to utilise.

The organisation and military elements are very significant in transforming a potential power into an actual power. Without proper organisation and leadership and military equipment, the national power may not develop at all and express itself in any positive manner.

Specificity of Power

The problem of a proper evaluation of power is intimately linked with the problem of the credibility of power. A threat which is not credible has no meaning in the game of power. But the problem of the credibility of power is further linked with the specificity of power. That is to say, that no particular type of power can be such that it can be applied in any form and in any condition. Even the huge stock of nuclear weapons will be meaningless deterrent if the rival thinks that those weapons will not be used, while less destructive weapons can be proved fearful for opponent if it considers that those weapons will be used against it. If all the above errors are sought to be avoided assiduously even then national power cannot be measured exactly. At the best, it remains a matter of conjecture.

LIMITATIONS ON NATIONAL POWER

Howsoever powerful a country may be and be in possession of as many elements of power as possible, it cannot act in an arbitrary and authoritative manner at international level. National power operates within certain limitations. These act as restrictions on state action. The major limitations of national power are as follows:

International Morality

Though many thinkers like Machiavelli and Hobbes deny the existence of international morality, yet many others, accept the existence of international morality. Men do profess to follow certain moral rules whether they act as individuals or as statesmen and seldom make any

distinction atleast in principle about the nature of these binding rules. But in reality they do draw such distinction. For example, when they work as statesmen they do claim exemption for certain acts on ground of necessity which they would never justify in their private capacity. Therefore, in fact, there exists a contradiction between moral command and the requirement of successful action.

Meaning. International morality or ethics is the combination of the standards, norms and values which nation-states and international organisations think they should observe in their relations with each other. These norms or values may originate from desires and attitudes, from social customs and traditions; they are regularly influenced by the developments in the sphere of science and technology. One of the most crucial and clearly understood item in this code is the obligation not to harm others or inflict unnecessary suffering on other human beings except for some higher objective which is held, rightly or wrongly, to justify a derogation from this general obligation.[37]

Operation of International Morality. Had the struggle for power taken independent course it would have converted the world into the Hobbesian 'state of war' and 'might would have been the right.' In practice, moral norms operate in the civilised world and in their presence power struggle cannot go unbridled. To preserve society, in the words of Morgenthau, certain moral precepts have been put forward which the "statesmen and diplomats ought to take to heart in order to make relations between nations more peaceful and less anarchic, such as the keeping of promises, trust in other's words, fair dealing, respect for international law, protection of minorities, repudiation of war as an instrument of national policy."[38]

Morgenthau further explains the ways through which international morality operates to protect human life and to check the occurrence of war. *First*, international morality *protects human life in peace* by renouncing the policy of assassination of the leaders of the opponent countries, technique of giving poison, treachery, etc. Such policies may be still desirable and possible but morally these are rebuked and difficult to execute. "Moral limitations of the same kind protect in times of peace the lives not only of outstanding individuals but also of large groups, even of whole nations whose destruction would be both politically desirable and feasible."[39] *Second*, similar moral limitations operate *in times of war*. They protect civilians and those combatants who are unable or unwilling to fight. Both statesmen and army leaders admit that, as only the armed forces participate in combat activities, it is undesirable to make civilian population major target of their attack. If the army commanders isolate this moral principle of not attacking civilian population unnecessarily or beyond reasonable limits and indulge in ruthless civilian killings, they have to face a condemnation at home and abroad. Similarly morality prohibits that those who were no longer engaged in actual warfare because of sickness, wounds, disability, or because they have become prisoners of war should not be harmed. Such a humanitarian approach towards the prisoners of war and disabled soldiers was developed during the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries in Europe and culminated in adopting certain treaties in this respect by many states in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. The Geneva Convention of 1864, 1906, 1929 and 1949 as well as the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 laid down certain specific conditions regarding the treatment of the sick and wounded soldiers by the other side. *Third* and *final*, there is *moral condemnation of war* in the present century. War as an instrument of foreign policy has been repudiated on moral grounds and all nations are keen to avoid it as far as possible. The eschewing of war itself has become an aim of statecraft only in the later half of the twentieth century. The two Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, the League of Nations of 1919, the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 and the United Nations in the present times all have the avoidance of war itself as their final goal. After Second World War also many powerful states avoided war even at the huge cost

of their political and military advantage. The desire to eschew war outweighed all other considerations of national policy. The attempts of all the great powers to confine the Korean War to the Korean peninsula and thus prevent it from developing into a third world war, and the self-restraint practised by all of them during many international crises (e.g. Cuba, Suez, Kuwait crises etc.,) since the end of Second World War, are striking example of a basic change in the attitude toward war. Morgenthau sums up: 'Thus, while the moral limitations upon killing in times of peace remain intact, the moral limitations upon killing in war have proved to be largely ineffective."[40]

Sanctions. Moral precepts act as restraint owing to the following reasons or sanctions as explained by Frankel. The *first* is found in the sanctions imposed for violating the internationally accepted moral standards of conduct which is in *social disapproval.* All countries, however powerful, are sensitive to the dangers of losing the reputation and prestige of acting morally. All countries are expected to abide by the generally accepted standards of conduct, and are fully aware of the disrepute arising if they are not obeyed. Since all political actions come under public scrutiny and is nearly always morally evaluated, the moral principles frequently professed as veil for selfish national policy assume a momentum of their own; in order to avoid the unwelcome reputation of hypocrisy and duplicity, however insincere they may have been in their protestations, statesmen usually find it more convenient to obey the professed norms than to violate them. In other words, domestic as well as world public opinion compel leaders to follow certain ethical standards in their international dealings.

The *Second* sanction behind restraint can be found in the moral sentiments and *consciences of the statesmen* or *ruling elites* themselves. Both Great Britain and the United States in the nineteenth century enjoyed an unequalled 'moral opportunity' by being exceptionally secure; moreover, international moral rules closely approximated their domestic moral codes internalised by their statesmen. These statesmen preferred to act morally rather than otherwise, unless, of course, a really vital national interest appeared to be at stake. Similarly, although to a lesser extent, it can be said about statesmen in other times and places.

Finally, moral restraint operates much more effectively in the relations among friends and allies than among rivals and enemies. This can be explained by the principle of *reciprocity*—good behaviour which is expected to be reciprocated is not only good in moral terms but is also beneficial to all concerned.[41]

Thus international morality limits the use of power a country possesses to achieve the desired goals. States do not pursue certain ends and use certain means because of moral limitations. But as Frankel says, "Even an extreme idealist would not assert that moral restraints actually prevail over what states consider to be their vital interest."[42]

World Public Opinion

The nations' policies or activities directed to the pursuit of their objectives can be influenced, modified, or even halted under the pressure of world public opinion. No nation can generally dare to use the power at its disposal to achieve selfish ends in violation of the world public opinion. But as a concept it is more elusive and lacks analytical precision.

World public opinion was considered to be the force behind the League of Nations. International law, the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the Briand-Kellogg Pact etc. were to be executed through world public opinion. "The great weapon we rely upon is world public opinion... and if we are wrong about it, then the whole thing is wrong,"[43] declared Lord Robert Cecil in the House of Commons on July 21,1919. Before the beginning of the Second World War,

Cordell Hull then American Secretary of State, said that "a public opinion, the most potent of all forces of peace, is more strongly developing throughout the world."[44]

The United Nations is an important instrument of the world public opinion and vice versa. The General Assembly of the United Nations is declared to be "the open conscience of the world."[45]

Meaning. In order to understand world public opinion we will first define the term public opinion. According to Bryce, "This term is commonly used to denote the aggregate of the views men hold regarding matters that affect or interest the community. Thus understood, it is a congeries of all sorts of discrepant notions, beliefs, fancies, prejudices, aspirations."[46] On the other hand, Lowell defines it by saying that, "Public opinion to be worthy of the name, to be the proper motive force in democracy, must be really public. A majority is not enough and unanimity is not required, but the opinion must be such that, while the minority may not share it, they feel bound, by conviction and not by fear to accept it and if democracy is complete, the submission of the minority must be given ungrudgingly."[47]

In the words of Morgenthau, "World public opinion is obviously a public opinion that transcends national boundaries and that unites members of different nations in a consensus with regard to atleast certain fundamental international issues. This consensus makes itself felt in spontaneous reactions throughout the world against whatever move on the chessboard of international politics is disapproved by that consensus."[48] Whenever a state acts against the mankind or do a wrong thing, humanity will react, regardless of national affiliations, and at least try to mend it through spontaneous sanctions upon the erring state. In this way, international society will either compel it to abide by its standard or shut it out from society for its erring behaviour.

Existence and Operation. Whether world public opinion really does exist and operate or not, there are two different views on it. One is *negative* and emphatically denies its existence. The other *positive* one admits its existence and effectiveness. Notwithstanding the existence of world public opinion, it could not operate as restraint in the following instances, according to the negative viewpoint supported by Morgenthau. These instances are—the Japanese aggressions against China in the thirties; the German foreign policies since 1935; the Italian attack against Ethopia in 1936; the Russian suppression of the Hungarian revolution in 1956, Czechoslovakian revolution in 1968 and intervention in Afghanistan in 1980; China's annexation of Tibet in 1959; Iraq's annexation of Kuwait in 1990 etc.

Morgenthau has made mention of some developments which give rise to a myth regarding the existence of world public opinion whereas in fact there is no such thing. *First* is the *psychological unity of the world.* Today, all human beings want to have security, liberty, freedom, peace and order.

These are some of the minimum set of standards, which all human beings seek. Morgenthau remarks, "Any violation of the standards of this world public opinion, against and by whomever committed, would call forth spontaneous reactions on the part of humanity; for, in view of the hypothetical similarity of all conditions, all men would fear that what happens to one group might happen to any group."[49] But in actual life these set standards have different meanings in different environments and countries. Peace, liberty, justice, democracy etc. are interpreted differently by different nations. An action condemned by one group as immoral and unjust is appreciated by another as the opposite. Thus Morgenthau observes, "the contrast between the community of psychological traits and elemental aspirations, on the one hand, and the absence of shared experiences, universal moral convictions, and common political aspirations, on the other, far from

providing evidence for the existence of a world public opinion, rather demonstrates its impossibility, as humanity is constituted in our age."[50]

Second, in the modern age, the *technological unification of the world* has also created an impression of world public opinion, if it has not actually created it. A world public opinion tends to develop because of the extension of the radius and rapidity of communication by inventions in ocean, land and air transportation and in the press, postal service, telecommunication and satellite communication system. Quincy Wright observes, "that animals are guided mainly by instinct; primitive man by custom; civilised man by conscience and modern man, in the age of abundant communication by public opinion. With more and more means of international communication between governments and between people, a world public opinion tends to develop and influence government actions."[51] But Morgenthau points out that "even if we lived in a world actually unified by modern technology with men, news, and ideas moving freely regardless of national boundaries, we would not have a world public opinion."[52]

Third is the *barrier of nationalism* and *national bias*. The particular nationalism, moulds and directs the minds of men, that infused their particular meanings into the good words of democracy, freedom, security and peace; paints them with their particular colour and makes them symbols of their particular aspirations. In such a situation how world public opinion can exist and operate effectively? It is often noticed that the same issue agitates public mind in many countries but public opinion formed about them in different countries is not the same. It is mainly due to the national bias of different peoples. For example, public opinion in various capitals on Indo-Pak war in 1971 was not similar. The US and China supported Pakistan whereas the USSR was with India.

But at times on some burning issue different countries of the world express similar public opinion in one voice albeit national bias and national conditioning. One such example is of Vietnamese War when large scale destruction of life and property by the US involvement aroused strong public opinion against the US and ultimately she had to retreat from Vietnam. These two examples of the Indo-Pak war and the Vietnam war reveal the ambiguity and the complexity of world public opinion in certain circumstances as well as its uniformity in many other "situations". If the issue is very serious and the attitude of a particular power is clearly unjust and provocative, it does arouse world public opinion in favour of the victims and influences foreign policies in various capitals to some extent. Despite the national bias, it would be incorrect to deny its existence altogether like Morgenthau. It has played a crucial role in shaping policies in the countries where the press and other organs of mass media are free compared to those countries where they are government controlled.

International Law

International morality and world public opinion have been discussed in detail as above. The other limitations on national power such as international law, balance of power, international organisations and disarmament are being touched upon here briefly.

International laws are rules that regulate the conduct of nations at international level. Most nations endeavour to be known in the eyes of the world as law-abiding nations; and in achieving this goal they accept the obligations of limitation entailed by international law. If each nation uses its power in unlimited ways against her rivals, the world society would perish. There would be no peace or stability. It would be perpetual state of war. To avoid this a code of conduct in the nature of international law is essential to limit the national power. Strictly speaking, international law is not a true law as it suffers from many shortcomings such as the absence of a common law making, law enforcing or law adjudicating body. Its execution is dependent upon the will and convenience

of the states. The execution of these laws by consent or use of external force restricts the scope of use of national power by any state.

The Balance of Power

The balance of power implies containing power with power. Like checks and balances in domestic politics, in the sphere of international politics also the power of one nation or a group of nations is used to prevent a particular nation from imposing its will upon others. When a state has preponderance of power it must be balanced or checked by the combined power of other states. The common patterns of balance of power are direct opposition to the other state with a view to preserving *status quo*. In the second one, two nations compete with each other to establish control over the third nation. The other common methods used to maintain the balance of power are 'divide-and rule', compensation and acquisitions, armaments and intervention, alliances and counter alliances and buffer state formation.

International Organisations

The coming into existence of international organisations like the League of Nations and the United Nations has also kept the power of the states within limits. At present, the member-states are expected to act in accordance with the principles enshrined in UN Charter. It is correct that the United Nations cannot intervene in the internal affairs of any state except when they pose a threat to the peace, but it certainly acts as a check on the unfair and unlimited use of power by the states and hence is a limitation on power. Chapter VII of the UN Charter incorporates the theory of collective security which also has a deterrent effect on the power ambitions of the states. Since its formation, UN has done remarkable work not only in preserving peace but also in limiting the ambitions of the super powers.

Disarmament

Disarmament efforts in and outside the UN have also restricted the national power. The steps towards disarmament have acquired much significance in our times. An effort has been made through several agreements, treaties and conventions to control the use of nuclear and conventional weapons that have the potentialities to destroy the entire world. To some extent this also helps in the reduction of power.

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7

Balance of Power

Balance of power is one of the oldest concepts of international relations. It at once provides an answer to the problem of war and peace in international history. It is also regarded as a universal law of political behaviour, a basic principle of foreign policy of every state through the ages and therefore, a description of a significant pattern of political action in international field. Before the present inquiry into a general theory of international relations, the balance of power was regarded as the only tenable theory of international relations especially from fifteenth to the nineteenth century.

Broadly speaking, it refers to a relative power position of states as actors in international relations. With its emphasis on the cultivation of power and the utilisation of power for resolving the problem of power, it appears to he a sensible way of action in an international society where nations are governed by their national interests and prejudices. Balance of power is part and parcel of a system of power politics. Its strength and life will always be determined by the latter.

Thus the theory of balance of power is widely held. It is an overused theory in international relations. It means different things to different scholars. Claude has aptly remarked that it is an "ambiguous concept" as it has so many meanings.[1] Similarly Schleicher observes, "it is virtually meaningless."[2] Wight says, "the notion of the balance of power is notoriously full of confusions."[3] It is used as a policy, as a system, as a status and as a symbol. It is also used at times as propaganda ploy. Therefore, it becomes a tough task to precisely explain the meaning of the term, which will be universally acknowledged at any given time. Despite this difficulty an attempt has been made in the following paragraphs to describe the meaning and nature of the concept with the help of prominent scholars of international relations.

MEANING AND NATURE

To know the meaning of balance of power one may take the analogy of a balancer with a pair of scales. If the weights in the two scales are equal, there is balance. The same thing can be applied to international relations. The two states or two coalitions of states are in balance if they are equally powerful. In a world where a large number of nations with different degree of power exist and in which each nation endeavours to maximise its power, there is a tendency for the entire system to be in a balance. In other words, different nations manipulate and group themselves in such a way that no single nation or group of nations is strong enough to dominate others because its power is balanced by that of a rival group. It is believed that so long as this kind of balance is established, there is peace and the independence of small nations is protected.

Definitions

How different scholars have endeavoured to define this concept is mentioned as under. Mostly it is defined as a state of dynamic *equilibrium* characterising relations among nations. It is the process of matching powers of some nations against those of other nations so that there is no

upheaval or chaos in the relations among nations. For example Castlereagh defined balance of power as "the maintenance of such a just equilibrium between the members of the family of nations as should prevent any of them becoming sufficiently strong to impose its will upon the rest."[4] Similarly, Fay defines it as "just equilibrium in power among the members of the family of nations as will prevent any one of them from becoming sufficiently strong to enforce its will upon the others."[5] Besides, many other scholars have also explained the concept of balance of power in terms of equilibrium. In practice, however, nations have mostly desired preponderance, not equilibrium of power. Spykman observes, "the truth of the matter is that states are interested only in a balance which is in their favour.... The balance desired is the one which neutralizes other states, leaving the home state free to be the deciding force and the deciding voice."[6] Thus another usage of balance of power refers to a situation in which competing powers prefer a condition of disequilibrium, and not of equilibrium. In this way, balance of power sometimes means equilibrium and sometimes disequilibrium.

Dickinson also explains the two usages of the term — "It means, on the one hand, an equality, as of the two sides when an account is balanced, and on the other hand, an inequality as when one has a 'balance' to one's credit at the bank."[7] He further says this "theory professes the former, but pursues the latter."[8] Dyke explains, ".... the prime object of the balancing of power is to establish or maintain such a distribution of power among states as will prevent any one of them from imposing its will upon another by the threat or use of violence."[9] Similarly Palmer and Perkins observe: "The concept of power assumes that through shifting alliances and countervailing pressures no one power or combination of powers will be allowed to grow so strong as to threaten the security of the rest."[10]

Thus as a *status* or *condition* the balance of power has meant three things namely, (i) an equality or equilibrium of power among states resulting in balance, (ii) a distribution of power in which some states, are stronger than other, and (iii) any distribution of power among states.

Thompson and Morgenthau have identified it as a *policy*. Thus it is held that in a multi-state system, the only policy which can check the erring behaviour of other states is that of confronting power with countervailing power."[11]

Balance of power is also known as a *system* of international politics. According to this meaning balance of power is a certain kind of arrangement for the working of international relations in a multi-state world. Martin Wight, A.J.P. Taylor and Charles Lerche have used this term as a system.

Many other scholars have used it not as a concept but merely as a *symbol* of realism in international relations. This usage is based on the idea that balance of power is nothing but a corollary of power factor in international relations. The acceptance of power factor gives way to foreign policies based on balance of power. Louis Halle, John Morton Blum and Reinhold Niebuhr have all treated balance of power as a symbol of the realist philosophy.

Morgenthau has used the term in four different ways: (1) as a policy aimed at a certain state of affairs, (2) as an actual state of affairs, (3) as an approximately equal distribution of power, and (4) as any distribution of power.[12] Haas pointed out that the concept had been utilised extensively in atleast eight mutually exclusive meanings: (1) equilibrium resulting from *equal* distribution of power among nation-states; (2) equilibrium resulting from *unequal* distribution of power among nation-states; (3) equilibrium resulting from the dominance of one nation-state (the balancer); (4) a system providing for relative stability and peace; (5) a system characterised by instability and

war; (6) another way of saying power politics; (7) a universal law of history; and (8) a guide for policy makers.[13]

Likewise Schleicher has discussed three, Zinnes seven and Wight nine meanings of the balance of power.[14] Despite the multiple, imprecise and ambiguous nature, balance of power is near the very core of international politics.

Pre-requisites

Couloumbis and Wolfe have summed up four pre-requisites for the existence of a balance of power system which are explained as under:

1. A multiplicity of sovereign political actors which results in the absence of a single centralised, legitimate and strong authority over these sovereign actors.
2. Relatively unequal distribution of power (i.e. states, wealth, size, military capability) among the political actors that make up the system. This permits the differentiation of states into atleast three categories; great powers, intermediate powers, and smaller nation-states.
3. Continuous but controlled competition and conflict among sovereign political actors for what are perceived as scarce world resources and other values.
4. An implicit understanding among the rulers of the great powers that the perpetuation of the existing power distribution benefits them mutually.[15]

Assumptions

There are certain assumptions of balance of power that also operate as conditions affecting the stability of the balance. Quincy Wright has given five major assumptions which are as follows:[16]

1. States are committed to *protect their vital interests* by all possible means including war, though it is up to each state to decide for itself as to which of its rights and interests are vital and which method should it adopt to protect them.
2. The *vital interests* of states are or may be *threatened*. If the *vital interests* are not threatened, then there should be no need for a state to try to protect them.
3. The *balance of power helps the protection* of the *vital interests* either by threatening other states with committing aggression or by enabling the victim to achieve victory in case an aggression occurs. This assumption means that states are not generally likely to commit aggression unless they have superiority of power.
4. The Relative *power position* of various states can be *measured* to a great degree of accuracy and that this measurement can be utilised in balancing the world forces in one's own favour.
5. Statesmen make their *foreign policy* decisions on the basis of an intelligent *understanding of power* considerations.
6. One more assumption may be added to the list presented by Wright. The balance of power assumes that there will be *one balancer* maintaining a splendid isolation and ready to join the side of the scale which becomes higher at any given period. Such a state always works on the advice of Palmerstone that it can have no permanent enemies and permanent allies in the world. Its only permanent interest is to maintain the balance of power itself.

CHARACTERISTICS

The chief characteristics of the balance of power system can be enumerated as under:

1. Equilibrium

The term equilibrium suggests, an equal distribution of power. When this equilibrium is lost, the balance of power fails. Balance is not a permanent feature of international politics as occasional disequilibrium is not ruled out in the system. Thus, the concept is concerned with equilibrium as well as disequilibrium.

2. Temporary

The balance of power is always temporary and unstable. With the change of time and conditions it also changes and gives way to another system of balance of power. Neither a balance of power system nor its original contending powers can live long.

3. Active Intervention

Balance of power is not "a gift of the gods" but an outcome of the active intervention of the man. Whenever a state apprehends that the balance is being tilted against it, it has to quickly counter it. It must be prepared to take necessary steps, including risking a war, if it is determined to safeguard its vital interests which would be in danger if it remains passive. Thus, balance of power is the result of diplomatic activity, not of natural happening.

4. Status Quo

Balance of power normally favours the status quo. Therefore, those who are benefitted by it generally favour it and it is opposed by those who see a loss to their own position. History has witnessed many wars owing to these contrary motivations of the states.

5. Difficult to Determine Existence

It is not easy to say when a balance of power has been accomplished. A real balance of power can never exist, and it probably would not be recognised as such if it did exist. "The only real test, presumably, is that of war, and resorting to war not only upsets the balance but also creates the very conditions which a balance of power policy is supposedly designed to prevent."[17]

6. Subjective and Objective Approaches

It offers both a subjective and an objective approach. Historians take the objective view while the statesmen take the subjective view. In the opinion of the historian, there is balance between two states if they are equally powerful. Being more realistic, the statesman aims at not only equilibrium but a preponderance or imbalance in its favour.

7. Conflicting Aims

Primarily its aim is to preserve peace. At times it has achieved this aim in particular areas or in the state system as a whole. At other times it has also tended to increase tensions between nations and to encourage wars.

8. Big-Power Game

It is mainly a big power game. Big powers are neither interested in peace nor in stability but in their own security. Small powers are usually victims or at best spectators, rather than players. They are used as mere weights in the scales. They are objects rather than subjects.

9. Unsuitable for Democracies

Unless geographical, political, military and other considerations are peculiarly favourable, a democracy is never interested in this game. It is interested in power politics only in times of crisis. A dictatorship, on the other hand, is mostly inclined to dominate the contest and to gather all the rewards.

10. The Balancer

It admits of the existence of some balancer state/states or an organisation. The balancer state is not a small, insignificant power, but in its own right it is a powerful one and the other contending powers try to cultivate such balancer. Britain was such a balancer during the nineteenth century. During the post-war period, when the distribution of power had become largely bipolar, the UNO tried to function as a balancer.

11. Operation Questionable

Many scholars point out that the balance of power is largely inoperative and irrelevant under present conditions. According to them it worked well only when it was confined to the European state system, and that with the expansion of the state system to an international scale, it is impossible for any nation or international organisation to play the role of balancer or for the system to operate along its traditional lines. The nuclear and space age has further relegated its relevance. There is truth in these contentions, yet the fact is that this game continues to be played, with nation-states as the chief actors. Palmer and Perkins rightly observe: "Certainly new forces and patterns are developing, and though still in their formative stages, they may make former preoccupation with balance of power seem inconsequential indeed."[18]

TYPES OF THE BALANCE OF POWER

The balance of power has the following forms:

Simple Balance

If power is concentrated in two states or in two opposing camps, the balance of power is said to be simple. The chief characteristics of this type is that states or group of states are divided into two camps like the two scales of the balance. In simple balance the power distribution between two opposing camps is almost equal. The United States and the Soviet Union individually, and the Eastern and the Western bloc collectively, were the examples of the simple balance in the post-war period of bipolarism.

Multiple Balance

When there is a wide dispersal of power among states and a number of states or groups of states balance each other, the balance is called multiple or complex. In the multiple system there need not be a single system, instead there may be many sub-systems or local balances of power within a system. The multiple balance can be compared to a chandelier. A complex balance may or may not have a balancer. A simple balance may turn into a multiple or complex balance and *vice versa*.

Local, Regional and Global

Balances may, in terms of their geographical coverage, be spoken of as local, regional and global. The balance is local, if it is at local level, like we may speak of the balance of power between India and Pakistan. It is regional, if an area or a continent, say Europe or Asia, is involved. It is

global or worldwide, if all the countries are participating in it through a network of alliances and counter-alliances.

Flexible and Rigid

Sometimes, balances have also been known as rigid or flexible. In the monarchical days when princes could make sudden and radical shifts in their alliances, the balance was generally flexible. With the coming of ideologies and greater economic interdependence, patterns of balance of power have tended to become rigid.

DEVICES AND METHODS

With the passage of time the balance of power has developed certain means and methods, techniques and devices through which it can be achieved and maintained. The same are as follows:

1. Armament and Disarmament

The main device of achieving balance is to arm. Whenever one nation increases its strength, its rival has no other alternative but to enter an arms' race. If the first nation can preserve its strength, the balance of power will be upset, but if its opponents can also consolidate their power through arming themselves, the balance of power is preserved. Armament race between the United States and the Soviet Union in the post-war period was perhaps the greatest of all armament races. To maintain local balance of power India and Pakistan also indulge in arms race.

Like armaments, disarmament can destroy or restore a balance of power. The states concerned may agree on proportionate reduction in their arms so that balance of power among them may be stabilised. But in practice, disarmament is sparingly utilised, except on defeated powers on the conclusion of a general war. Though at times it is resorted to by victor powers to maintain a favourable balance of power yet its overall role has been disappointing. However, after 1987 and especially after the end of the cold war, the US and Russia have taken certain disarmament measures.

2. Alliances and Counter-Alliances

The balance of power has often been maintained by the method of alliances and counter-alliances. Alliances have been the most convenient institutional device to increase one's insufficient power. Nations have always endeavoured to make, abandon and remake alliances depending upon their interests. Several security pacts are clearly designed to improve the military power position. Alliances can be offensive as well as defensive. Offensive alliances, however, must be condemned as they breed counter coalitions and the outcome is generally war. The triple alliance of 1882 was countered by the Triple Entente in 1907. Similarly the Axis formed in 1936 was a counterweight against the alliance between France and East European nations. The strange Alliance of the Second World War was a reaction against the Axis powers. It was, however, formed with a defensive purpose. In the post Second World War era, the US with its allies formed NATO, SEATO, CENTO etc. and the USSR countered them with the Warsaw Pact.

3. Compensation and Partition

A state enhances its power by acquiring new territories and thus tilts balance in its favour. When such thing happens the other side also takes immediate steps to increase its own power in compensation in order to preserve the balance. When some powerful nations occupies the territories of small nations, the powerful rival nations cannot tolerate this act. They place a

condition either to share its prey with them or to allow them to compensate themselves elsewhere. Under such conditions the powerful rival nations divide small nations and swallow their share of the prey. The partition of Poland and later on its division between Russia, Prussia and Austria is a well known example of compensation and partition. After the Second World War, Germany, Korea and Vietnam were partitioned in a similar way. This method involves the redistribution of territory in such a way that international balance of power is not affected. Each Great Power becomes a beneficiary and a weak state their victim. Generally the question of such redistribution arises at the conclusion of war yet it may also be needed during the peace time.

4. Intervention and Non-Intervention

Intervention is another commonly used device of keeping balance. It is quite possible that the allies may shift their loyalty from one side to another. Under such circumstances, it is quite usual for a big nation to regain a lost ally by intervening in its domestic affairs and establishing a friendly government there. Non-intervention suggests neutrality or guarantee of neutrality for certain states, or efforts to localise war or to protect the rights of neutrals in time of war. At times neutrality also plays the role of keeping the balance of power.

Before the end of World War II, Britain intervened in Greece to see that it did not fall into the hands of local communists. After World War II, the United States intervened in Guatemala, Cuba, Lebanon, Laos, Kuwait etc. and the Soviet Union in North Korea, North Vietnam, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan etc.

5. Divide and Rule

It is a time honoured policy as well as technique. This method keeps the competitors weak by dividing them or keeping them divided, and thereby maintain a balance of power. It was adopted by the Romans to keep their control over scattered peoples. Britain often used it to keep her large empire under control. She has been a notorious practitioner of this policy. It has been her cardinal policy towards Europe. Now this policy has become a device of the balance of power. Both the super powers had endeavoured to create divisions in the opposite camp. If the Soviet Union was interested in the disintegration of Western Europe, the USA was interested in creating rift in the East European camp led by the Soviet Union.

6. Buffer States

The setting up of a buffer state has also operated as another device of the balance of power. Such a state is usually a weak one. It is situated between two powerful neighbours. It always keeps them safely apart, and thereby contributes to the peace and stability, and maintains the balance of power. There have been various instances of buffer states in history. Afghanistan had been a traditional buffer state between the Imperial Russia and British India, as Tibet was a buffer state between the Imperial China and the British India. In Europe, Belgium and Holland had served as buffer states between France and Germany. In the post-Second World War period, various lines, as the 38th Parallel in Korea or the 17th Parallel in Vietnam, on partitioned countries, and the cease-fire zones are indirectly serving the cause of buffer states in a new world situation. They are also designed to prevent a direct confrontation of Super powers, and thereby preserve a balance of power.

7. Domestic Methods

If a state feels that the balance has been tilted in favour of the rival, it will also like to become more powerful. It can do so only by improving elements of power domestically. The state concerned would try not merely to acquire more powerful weapons, but also to develop related industries and other aspects of science and economy whose total effect would make it stronger and help it in restoring the balance. Domestic measures needed for this purpose may also entail introduction of compulsory military training and allotment of more money in the defence budget. It may also include development of indigenous capability to manufacture sophisticated weapons and related military hardware including ICBMs.

BALANCE OF POWER IN THE PAST

The concept of balance of power can be found in some form or the other in ancient time, especially among the states of India, China, the Greek and the Roman states. It is one of the oldest term in international relations theory. David Hume in his *Essays and Treatise on Several Subjects* has maintained the Greek politics game a distinct expression to the notion of the balance of power. The Roman period saw a decline in the notion and operational aspects of the balance of power as Rome virtually demonstrated monopolistic power over the world. Similarly, it did not flourish during the entire range of the middle ages.[19]

However, the development of the doctrine of balance of power and its large-scale practice became feasible from the fifteenth century onwards. The theoretical contribution to the formulation and enunciation of the doctrine was made by Bernado Rucellai and Machiavelli. In the words of Morgenthau, "the alliances Francis I concluded with Henry VIII and the Turks in order to prevent Charles V of Hapsburg from stabilising and expanding his empire are the first modern example on a grand scale of the balance of power."[20]

The sixteenth century facilitated an identifiable process of balance of power. In this v century England held balance between France and the Holy 'Roman Empire'.

The seventeenth century, and during it, the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) provides, among other points of analysis, a perceptible analytical point about the balance of power. With the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and the establishment of the nation-states system, the concept became more practicable than ever before. The period between 1648 (the Peace of Westphalia) and 1789 (the French Revolution) is regarded as the first golden age of classical balance of power both in theory and practice.

The eighteenth century formally recognised the balance of power in legal process. The phrase 'ad conservandum in Europea equilibrium' adopted under the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) provisions illustrates this. The concept found expressions in the works of Edmund Burke and David Hume during this period. The three partitions of Poland (1772,1793,1795) provide an example of application of the balance of power.

The nineteenth century (1815-1914) can be considered as the second golden age of the classical balance of power. Napoleon Bonaparte confronted Britain and the other European nations during this century and it was after successive wars spread over years, that Britain and her allies finally restored the balance of power. The Congress of Vienna (1815) sought to establish a new balance of power resting on the principle of legitimacy and possibly the preservation of the status quo. Subsequently, Britain acted as a balancer in the politics of Europe by virtue of her pioneering leadership arising out of the industrial revolution and her overall leadership on the basis of her developed navy and world trade. The balance of power prevented seven wars between 1871 and 1914. It maintained peace for a long time in this century.

In the twentieth century Europe was divided into two camps with the completion of the Triple Entente (1902) in opposition to the Triple Alliance (1882). When the delicate balance in the Balkans was disturbed it led to the First World War. In the inter-war period the doctrine was still followed,

though in theory it was incompatible with the concept of collective security. But finally it proved stronger than collective security embodied in the League of Nations. As a result it provoked a series of alliances and counter alliances thereby leading to the Second World War. The post-war trends reveal that the balance of power, in both its theoretical and practical aspects, has ceased to perform its traditional role that it played in the Euro-centric world order.

However, this does not mean that the balance of power was completely not in existence since 1945. The existence of regional type of balance of power such as NATO, SEATO, the Warsaw Pact etc. did reveal their existence. Moreover, the superpowers had created such equilibrium in practically all major areas of tension and conflict that if the USA had built up Pakistan to match India in the politics of the Indian subcontinent, the USSR had hobnobbed with India. There are so many similar examples.

According to Soviet viewpoint the balance of power was inconceivable prior to twentieth century, in a situation where relations among the nations were rigidly hierarchical and the dominance of imperialist power had no parallel anywhere. It is only with the emergence and consolidation of a rival socialist system, the Soviet Communists argued, that the real balance of power came into being and countered the designs of capitalism and its highest stage of development—imperialism.[21]

BALANCE OF POWER TODAY— IS IT RELEVANT?

Today, balance of power has witnessed a number of significant changes. Keeping in view the rapidly changing world conditions it is being questioned whether balance of power is relevant or valid or it has become obsolete and out-dated. It seems that the theory of balance of power cannot be applied in the present circumstances in the classical sense of the term. There are two different opinions in this respect. According to one view the existing world conditions are least favourable for the existence or relevance of balance of power. The other view holds that its validity is still relevant. Both the views are discussed in detail as under:

Obsolete and Irrelevant

The factors or unfavourable conditions or changes in the world that rendered the concept irrelevant and outdated are mentioned below:

1. *New Forces.* The balance of power operated well in those times of modern history when in Europe a number of states of approximately equal strength existed. Later on, when the European balance of power turned into a world balance of power, conditions became unfavourable for the successful working of balance of power. The effect of new forces like nationalism, industrialism, new methods and techniques of warfare, developments in international organisation and law, growing economic inter-dependence of nations, mass education, the end of colonial frontiers and the rise of many new nations have greatly changed the nature of contemporary world politics. All these forces and changes have made the balance of power too naive and too complex a phenomenon.

2. *Numerical Reduction of Powers.* Before the Second World War there were seven Great Powers. After this war the USA and the USSR were the only two Great Powers left. Since the disintegration of the USSR, the USA has emerged as the only super power. In previous periods the balance of power operated by way of coalitions among a number of nations. The principal actors, though differing in power, were still of the same order of magnitude. The greater the number of Great Powers, the greater the number of possible combinations that will actually oppose and balance each other. The numerical reduction of Great Power in the post-war period that are able to play a

major role in international politics has actually created unfavourable conditions for the working of balance of power system.

3. *Bi-polarism.* As balance of power presupposes the presence of three or more states of roughly equal power and because the rise of a bipolar world system after the Second World War went against this requirement, the balance of power became outmoded. All the major states were committed after the Second World War to one camp or another, and no single nation was strong enough to tip the balance between the two Super Powers. The disparity in power between the Super Powers and other powers was so wide that each was mightier than any other power or possible grouping of these powers. As a consequence, the major powers had not only lost their ability to tip the scales but they had lost the freedom of movement to switch sides. The wishes of the small powers were meaningless. The will of the Super Powers and other compelling circumstances determined their alignments. Gone are the days of ever shifting alliances.

It was also contended that the bipolar system was itself a guarantee of peace. The super powers in this system would not use the weapons of total destruction but those weapons would be an effective deterrent against other countries. Later on bi-polarism gave way to multi-polarism and this factor lost its significance.

4. *Lack of Balancer.* There is no power now to play the role of a balancer which was successfully performed by Britain in the yesteryears. Britain no longer holds so decisive a position as to determine the balance. Its role as balancer has ceased after the Second World War. The Great Powers are powerful enough to determine the position of the scale with their preponderance alone that third power has no place to hold the balance.

5. *Nuclear Weapons.* The impact of nuclear weapons have made the classical assumptions of the balance of power invalid. The changed character of modern warfare would shudder even the most ruthless supporter of the balance of power from taking the risk of encouraging a global conflict to right the balance. The threat of war is of limited utility in the nuclear age due to the nuclear stalemate.

6. *Ideological Factor.* The ideological considerations in the world politics became so potent that it overshadowed nationalism. The ideologies are cutting across national boundaries and thus undermining the balance of power concept. When the foreign policy of a nation is guided by ideology, it loses its interest in the balance of power and lacks the essential means to follow it.

7. *Disparities in the Power.* The inequalities in the power of states are increasing. Wide disparities can be seen among nations in the sphere of political, economic and military power. While the super powers are becoming more and more powerful, the lesser states are becoming weaker. Such a condition is contrary to the requirements of a working system of balance of power.

8. *Collective Security.* The emerging importance of collective security, international law and international organisations like United Nations has further relegated the balance of power to the background. Many contemporary scholars believe that law and its enforcement should depend more on moral consensus of nations, public opinion, the United Nations and collective security than on a mechanism of balance of power. They also consider that collective security and international organisations can better maintain world peace in the present circumstances.

9. *Decline of Alliances.* Decline in the relevance of the alliance system which is the cornerstone of the balance of power, has further made it obsolete. It is very difficult now for a state to observe any strict adherence to an alliance in an exclusive manner. It is becoming more and more clear that

each nation has areas of both amity and enmity with every other nation. This trend is slowly leading to the rise of an almost universal system of bilateral, as against multilateral alliances.

Valid and Relevant

Although the concept of balance of power has lost much of its significance in the conditions prevailing after the Second World War yet its operation is still relevant. It is incorrect to say that it is fully obsolete or irrelevant or that it has no future at all. The notion of its supposed irrelevance is based on an appreciation of the impact of values like peace and internationalism and of the changes in the international society. Those who consider that it is irrelevant and obsolete do so because they do not reckon with certain important factors. The factors that testify the relevance and existence of balance of power even today are:

1. *Reality of Power.* The change in the international society has removed those conditions in which the balance of power functioned in the past, yet it has not eliminated the reality of power. As the balance of power is a technique of the management of power, it can be denounced as irrelevant only after some other method of managing power has been found out. Otherwise, the balance of power is still relevant although its relevance would depend on how far its mechanism is modified to suit the changed conditions.

2. *Objective Factors.* There were two other objective factors of the international reality that proved the existence of balance of power even in the days of bipolarism. *One* was the role of the uncommitted nations in maintaining an equilibrium between the two super powers. These countries had been behaving like what Richard Rosecrance calls "the multipolar buffer."[22] This shows that the concept of buffer which has been so significant in the past is not completely wiped out today. The *other* is the role of the super powers in maintaining an equilibrium between the countries directly involved in a crisis situation. The example of the former is the relaxation in the cold war brought about by the uncommitted nations and the example of the latter is the attempts made by both the US and Russia to keep a balance in the Indian subcontinent and in West Asia.

3. *Nation-State System.* As long as the multi nation-state system exists, balance of power politics will continue to be followed in practice by the nations. Palmer and Perkins observe: "... in its heyday it was a basic feature of the nation-state system .... As long as the nation-state system is the prevailing pattern of international society, balance of power policies will be followed in practice, however, roundly they are damned in theory. In all probability they will continue to operate, even if effective supra-national groupings, on a regional or world level, are formed."[23]

4. *Rise of Multipolarism.* Bipolarism remained the feature of international politics for almost two decades after the Second World War. It was argued above that owing to bipolarisation the balance of power became obsolete. Since the early sixties the bipolarism has been declining and multipolarism again rising. Britain, France, Germany, Japan, China etc. have regained their lost power. Many middle class or second grade powers have also come on the scene. Thus the unfavourable conditions for balance of power created by the numerical reduction of Great Powers have now been removed to a great extent.

5. *End of Ideology.* Though ideological considerations played a significant role in the recent past but for the last few years its influence has been on the wane. By late eighties communism collapsed in the Soviet Union as well as in East Europe, communist bloc disintegrated and ideological struggle lost its edge. Consequently, ideology as a negating factor of balance of power has disappeared.

6. *Balancer Exists.* After the collapse of Soviet power in the early nineties and the success of the United States in liberating Kuwait from Iraq, Afghanistan from Talibans, and Iraq from Saddam Hussain it is commonly believed that the only Super Power left in the world is the United States. Militarily and economically it is matchless. Thus in the present world USA can be regarded as a balancer as the Great Britain was in the pre-World War I period.

7. *Relevance of Balance of Power in the 21st century.* The balance of power has not lost relevance even after the end of the Cold War. Four powers are likely to redefine the emerging pattern of the balance of power in the twenty-first century. These are: the United States, China, Russia and Europe. The likely scenarios are: (i) a loose alliance among Europe, America and Russia for the containment of China; (ii) an alignment between rising China and the Islamic World, which in turn push Russia, Europe and the US closer together; (iii) Russia, China and India to challenge US-Europe alliance; and (iv) an agreement between the US and China to check ambitions of Russia and India.

In this way the above factors and developments prove that the balance of power is still relevant, valid and meaningful although in a different context.

CRITICAL EVALUATION

The theory and practice of the balance of power has been a subject of great debate and discussion. There is disagreement among scholars on the point of its ultimate value and advantage. It has been defended as well as criticised. Its advocates and critics have put forward various arguments *for* and *against* the balance of power. The same are discussed below:

Purpose, Utility and Merits

The advocates of the balance of power believe in its utility and give the following arguments in favour of it.

1. *Guarantees Peace.* Balance of power is the only guarantee of peace in the absence of the universal acceptance of the principles of collective security. When security continues to be a national obligation, it can never be ensured except by a balance of power. The prerequisite of security and order among sovereign states is that force be checked by counter force within a balance of power. It has always served the cause of peace and order in history. If balance is preserved neither will there be aggression nor war, and therefore, peace would automatically be achieved.

2. *Discourages War.* The balance of power prevents or discourages the resort to war. As a state cannot hope to win a war, it will not initiate one if its power is in equilibrium with a potential victim. Most of the wars of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were due to imperial rivalries whereas the balances were maintained in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that helped to contain struggles between European powers. Whenever peace reigned in Europe it owed its existence to balance of power.

3. *Curbs Imperialism.* Balance of power makes it difficult for any power to become so powerful as to overwhelm the rest. Indeed, the absence of a stable equilibrium creates an opportunity for the emergence of Powers of lesser calibre to positions of dominance. Thus, the balance of power helps in containing hegemony and universal imperialism.

4. *Meets Justice.* In the absence of a supreme international authority, capable of enforcing justice, the balance of power enables international law to command respect. This mutuality between the balance of power and the rule of law in international society was clearly mentioned

by Vattel in 1758. The balance of power acts as deterrent to grandiose ambition, and thus meets the cause of justice.

5. *Maintains International Law.* The balance of power is essential to the maintenance of international law. Oppenheim, for example, supports this argument by observing: "Balance of power is an indispensable condition to the very existence of international law." He further says that a law of nations can exist only if there be "an equilibrium, a balance of power, between the members of the family of nations."[24] Several other authors of international law also agree with this argument.

6. *Preserves Independence.* The balance of power has also proved useful in preserving the independence of small states. It prevents the destruction of any particular state, because in their own interests, other states will not allow this to happen. The balance of power is designed to preserve the independence of each state by preventing any one state from so increasing its power as to threaten the others.

7. *Preserves State System.* The balance of power preserves the multi-state system. It does so by preserving the identity of individual states. It helps in the preservation of a multiple nature of international society and its stability. It serves as a means of maintaining a community of states. Thus, it has served the cause of peace, justice, law and independence, and thereby preserved the community of states through the ages.

Defects, Criticism and Demerits

Morgenthau has criticised the balance of power on three counts— its uncertainty, its unreality, and its inadequacy.[25] Its other defects and demerits can be explained as follows:

1. *Does Not Bring Peace.* The balance of power does not bring peace. On the contrary, it encourages war. Many believe that nations will fight only when the two are equally matched. But if the preponderance of power is on one side, the stronger nation may not fight to get what it requires, while the weaker nation would be foolish to begin war for what it wants. In periods which were called the golden age of the balance of power, there were actually constant wars. Moreover, the balance of power, by pursuing the policy of preventive war and intervention, may directly serve the cause of war.

2. *Divides the World.* Through the operation of the technique of alliances and counter alliances, it divides the world into rival camps, inflicted by mistrust and suspicion. Therefore, any local conflict will have the tendency to become a big or world war. If it prevents small wars, it instigates the big one having more devastating affect.

3. *No Real Security.* As statesmen never accept a real equilibrium of forces, but always look ahead to a favourable balance in terms of the bank balance, they are regularly engaged in a struggle to improve their power position. Thus instead of security it intensifies the struggle for power.

4. *Does Not Increase Power.* Nations are not static units. They enhance their power through military aggression, seizing territory and alliances. They employ certain domestic and foreign, internal and external means for this purpose. They can consolidate their power from within by improving social and economic organisation. So the traditional method of the balance of power is not the only cause responsible for increase of power.

5. *Does Not Meet Justice.* Balance of power never aims at concluding of treaties upon principles of justice. It aims merely at preventing the supposed preponderance of one power over another or acquiring preponderance of one power over another. It acts on the basis of expediency and immediate gains. Once these are realised, the system of alliances breaks down, and the world is once again sent back to mutual animosity and hostility.

6. *Wrong Assumption.* Balance of power rests on idea of power or physical force. Its underlying assumption is that if one nation possesses the ability to attack another it will utilise that ability sooner or later. It assumes that states are naturally hostile political entities. It accepts the condition of enemity between states as normal relations. But it is difficult to accept such assumptions today. Such assumptions take for granted that nothing other than power drives and urge for power dominate states. But states are interested in many things other than power; many are genuinely interested in peace. Most civilised states accept the fact that there are ethical norms which must be given precedence over mere power considerations. Peace also depends on the moral conscience of nations and on the restraining influences of ethical norms.

7. *Unrealistic.* Balance of power is after all a mechanical concept. To attempt to appropriate a law of statics and convert it into a principle to be applied in a dynamic world is at bottom unrealistic. Balance of power entails many factors such as population, territory, resources, armaments, allies etc. These are not static. Thus, it is very difficult to calculate precisely and pursue rationally a policy of balance of power over a considerable period of time.

8. *Big Power Game.* It believes that the equilibrium among great powers would ensure world peace. In it small countries matter little. They are required to play to the tune of the great powers. Thus the balance of power theory favours big powers and ignores smaller ones.

Inspite of the above defects and criticism, the balance of power is still a valid concept in international politics. As a matter of fact, the impact of new forces that shaped our contemporary world have prevented the balance from operating appropriately. In the conclusion it can be said that the balance of power is difficult to be applied in practice. Even then it has acted as a universal pattern of political action of states in history. It did something to preserve the independence of a nation and to prevent any nation from becoming over powerful. It has survived not only the passage of time but also the League of Nations or United Nations and the nuclear age. The balancing process will continue in the future as well alongwith the struggle for advantage and power in international relations.

It is wrong to ignore its current relevance as the long spell of peace at the centre or global level is mainly caused by balance and deterrence. Notwithstanding the disturbance in local balance, super powers always endeavour that such disturbance in the peripheral balance does not lead to the tilting in the central balance. Thus, in future, central balance will be generally maintained while periodic disturbances can occur in local balances.

POWER VACUUM

As stated above the concept of balance of power has undergone a sea-change especially in the second half of twentieth century. This period witnessed the emergence of two Super Powers who strived to create their own spheres of influence in different parts of the world and devised new techniques of balancing each other. One of the techniques was filling the power vacuum. Under the pretext of filling the power vacuum each Super Power endeavoured to increase its own power and contain or balance the power of the opponent.

The term power vacuum was coined by the United States during the cold war days. The

declining imperial powers—Great Britain, Germany, France, Spain, Portugal, Holland etc. in the post World War II granted independence to their erstwhile colonies. After the decolonisation, the newly independent countries found themselves very weak politically, economically and militarily needing crutches of some outside powers. This is an illustration of what power vacuum implies. This afforded golden opportunity to the newly emerged Super Powers—the USA and the USSR—to provide them the necessary props in the form of political support, economic and military aid. In this way Super Powers filled the power vacuum in different weak countries after the withdrawal of declining imperial or smaller powers. Super Powers vied with each other to woo these countries to their side. For instance the Soviet Union filled the power vacuum in East Europe, North Korea, Vietnam and other decolonised Third World countries. The USA also took prompt action to counter the move of the Soviet Union by spreading its tentacles to these very countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America on the plea of containing the communist hegemony.

The concept of power vacuum was given a definite shape by the United States in the wake of British decision to withdraw East of Suez. United States invoked this theory with a view to justifying its naval presence in the Indian Ocean. It argued that a complete withdrawal from the Indian Ocean would lead to dangerous power vacuum over a vast and vulnerable area which the US and Britain's other allies would find extremely difficult to fill, a vacuum that would serve neither Britain's long-term interests nor its stake in world peace and stability.

The Americans argued that if they did not move into the Indian Ocean, the vacuum would be filled by the Russians. In brief, over the pretext of vacuum theory, the US justified its entry into the region.

The vacuum theory was vehemently rejected by India and other major littoral states of the region. For instance, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, India's then Prime Minister, during her visit to some South-East Asian countries in May 1966 said that the withdrawal by the British did not create any vacuum, and if at all it did so, she asserted it should be filled by local powers and not by outside powers. Even the US Congress did not approve the power vacuum theory. However, despite this the US Defence Department continued to increase its naval presence in the region. In fact the US defence department had been insisting on the need for a permanent military presence in the Indian Ocean since early sixties.

By the early seventies the US had established control over all the main gates to the Indian Ocean. Thus it had established hold on Simonstown, at the entrance of the Atlantic Ocean; on Masirah which served as an approach to the Persian Gulf; on Diego Garcia which commanded central position in the Indian Ocean; and Malacca Straits which was the most important route from the Pacific through their political proximity to the ASEAN countries. In sum, the US made the Indian Ocean an American lake. The Soviet Union countered and balanced the America by entering into a friendship treaty with India in 1971 and by consolidating its hold in the Vietnam.

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COLLECTIVE SECURITY

As pacific settlement can neither always succeed nor always be feasible, coercive mechanism of collective security was devised and made popular in the twentieth century. It is a device of collective military action to maintain peace and order and to deter aggression. It is a method usually employed when disputes have deteriorated/aggravated to the extent of armed conflict or war. The concept of collective security is evolved as an alternative to world government which is not feasible in the near future. According to Claude, "Collective security has generally been regarded as a half-way house between the terminal points of international anarchy and world government."[8] Because the former has become intolerable and the latter remains unattainable. On the one hand collective security assures the continuance of multi-state character of the international society and on the other, guarantees peace and security of each individual nation thus discouraging the isolationist policy of armaments or the collaborationist policy of alliances and military pacts.

During the nineteenth century nations sought to preserve peace by the balance of power policy. The goal of balance of power was usually achieved by defensive combinations against any nation threatening to upset the equilibrium. However, the policy of balance of power and counter balance degenerated with a system of opposing alliances which finally divided Europe into two armed camps. The balance of power system ultimately failed to maintain peace and order for long time. Thus after First World War collective security was adopted and tried first through League of Nations and then through UNO. It is considered better than the balance of power for maintaining international peace, for the latter involves alliances, counter-alliances, burdensome armaments, shady territorial deals, rivalries and instability often resulting in war.

The Theory of Collective Security

Though the theory of collective security was the product of the twentieth century yet it was not unknown in the past. According to some experts certain aspects of the Amphictyonic Council of ancient Greece, of the Truce of God of the Middle Ages and Osnabruck Treaty of seventeenth century could be regarded as limited collective security systems. A number of philosophers discussed in chapter 29, suggested methods of controlling conflict that might reasonably be called collective security measures. But in the real sense the concept was accepted at the international level in 1919 when League of Nations was created. The League failed in successfully and effectively executing the idea. With the outbreak of Second World War the League system collapsed. The formation of the U.N.O. was again based on the theory of collective security.

The concept of collective security may be explained in the words of Claude: "it is the principle that, in the relations of states, everyone is his brother's keeper; .... it is the proposition that aggressive and unlawful use of force by any nation against any nation will be met by the combined force of all other nations."[9] Under this system all nations agree to take collective military action against the aggressor, the defeat of the aggressor being sure and the peace is certain because no nation can take courage to defy the collective might of all other nations.

Morgenthau defines, "In a working system of collective security, the problem of security is no longer the concern of the individual nation .... Security becomes the concern of all nations, which will take care collectively of the security of each of them as though their own security were at stake. If A threatens B's security, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J and K will take measures on behalf of B and against A as though A threatened them as well as B, and vice-versa. One for all and all for one is the watchword of collective security."[10] Thus, it is fundamentally 'a mutual insurance plan.' The collective security may be defined in the words of Schwarzenberger "as a machinery for joint action in order to prevent or counter any attack against an established international order'.[11]

In the opinion of Mehrish, an Indian scholar of international organisation: "The collective security is the technique used by inter-governmental organisations to restrain the use of force among the members. It provides the norms and procedures for dealing with acts of aggression. Collective security also comprises the organisation's own ability to use force against a member if pacific settlement fails."[12]

Thus in brief, *security* is the end; *collective* is the means and *system* is the institution device to make the means serve the end.

The collective security system is based on certain *basic assumptions*. These are:

(i) the collective system must have adequate and overwhelming power to deter any potential aggressor or coalition of aggressors from disturbing the order defended by the collective system;
(ii) there must be unanimity among nations on security and defence policies and consensus on the identification of aggressor state;
(iii) participating nations should be ready to give up their conflicting political interests for the success of collective security system;
(iv) maintenance of status quo should be the national interest of all nations;
(v) possibility of aggression or war is always in the world and the same ought to be prevented;
(vi) the aggressor state or states may be prevented by the deterrent effect of overwhelming power of the collective system;
(vii) the ideal of international peace, security and order may be attained by reformation of international policy in the form of collective security without resorting to revolutionary changes in the structure of the international system; and
(viii) the system is not for the elimination of power but for the management of power in such a way as to deter the prospective aggressors.

Features* and *implications of the collective security are the following:

(1) The collective security is not an alliance projected against any definite power or a group of powers. It is much more open and universal in content than the traditional system of alliances. It always implies a general universal and all-embracing alliance which eliminates the pattern of competitive alignments of the balance of power model. In this sense the collective security system is distinguished from the alliance system of balance of power on the one hand and regional collective-defence arrangements such as NATO on the other.
(2) The collective security does not involve the abolition of the independent existence of states. It only demands from the participant states the surrender of national egotism and not sovereignty in formulating positive international policies. That is why it is called a half-way house between international anarchy and world government.
(3) The collective security tends to patronize and maintain the status quo in international relations.
(4) It never abrogates the right of self-defence of the member-states.
(5) The success of the system depends on the existence of certain conditions and fulfilment of certain requirements such as all for one attitude, mutual confidence among members, favourable distribution of power, overwhelming strength to deal with any combination of powers, consensus on security issues, disarmament and universal membership. The universality of membership is all the more essential because more the committed members less the likelihood of challenge to the system.

(6) The idea of collective security is not at all a complex one. Yet it assumes complex character as soon as it reaches the realm of enforcement.

Collective Security under UN: Charter Provisions

Article 1 of the UN Charter calls for effective collective measures for the prevention of aggression and removal of threats to the peace. Chapter VII (Article 38 to 51) is devoted to collective security. It is entitled "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." To understand these provisions one can divide them into the following four parts.

(i) *Determination of basis of action.* Article 39 has authorised the Security Council to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and make recommendations or decide what measures should be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security.

(ii) *Provisional Measures.* According to Article 40, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the collective security measures call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it may deem necessary or desirable. Its most frequently employed step in this direction has been to call for a 'cease-fire' when hostilities have actually occurred. For instance this step was taken in Indonesia in 1947-1948, in the Palestine fighting in 1948 and at the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950.

(iii) *Enforcement Measures.* The Charter (Article 41-42) authorises the Security Council to take both non-forcible and forcible measures to maintain or restore international peace and security. As per the Article 41 the Security Council can call upon the members of the UN to apply measures like complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42 stipulates that if the above measures are considered inadequate, the Security Council can take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstration, blockade, and other military operations by forces of UN members.

(iv) *Armed Forces and Military Staff Committee.* It is also provided in the Charter (Articles 43 to 50) for the making of armed forces available by the member-states to the United Nations for use in an emergency and for their unified direction or command under a Military Staff committee consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives.

Article 51 provides, "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter ...."

The Collective Security in Practice

Korean War. The collective security system of UN was put into practice in 1950 when the North Korea invaded South Korea. It was during the *Korean crisis* that the UN took collective military action for the first and so far the last time. In all subsequent breaches of peace or aggressions the UN could never take collective security measures in toto. The Security Council in the absence of

the Soviet Union decided on June 25 and 27, 1950 to take enforcement action against North Korea. It called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel. However, North Korea's non-compliance with these directives paved the way for UN police action to repel the attack and restore international peace and security in the area. Sixteen member-states offered armed forces—land, naval or air which were placed under the unified command of the United States pursuant to the UN assistance to the Republic of Korea (South) in repelling armed attack against it. The UN command with headquarters at Tokyo, successfully completed its mission of pushing back North Korean-Chinese forces to the 38th parallel under the leadership of General Mac Arthur of the USA.

"The early phase of the collective military action in Korea under the banner of the United Nations produced among its participants and supporters a sense of involvement in an unprecedented effort to give effect to the principle of collective security," observes Mehrish.[13] But this spirit and sense of involvement was short-lived affair.

The coming back of the Soviet representative to the Council on August 1, 1950, sealed the fate of any further agreement on the basic issues in Korea. At the behest of the United States, the General Assembly enlarged its sphere of authority and action while adopting the *Uniting for Peace Resolution* on November 3, 1950. The most crucial provision of the resolution is the agreement for calling an emergency special session of the General Assembly within twenty-four hours by any nine members of the Security Council or by a majority of the UN members whenever the Security Council is deadlocked due to misuse of veto power and "fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression." According to the resolution, member states are expected to designate and train armed forces units for United Nations service on the call of either the Security Council or the General Assembly.

Peace-Keeping Innovations and Operations

The General Assembly was unable to call for collective military action in pursuance of the *Uniting for Peace Resolution* but innovated peacekeeping technique in 1956 that was frequently used in a number of crises with a sufficient degree of success. The preventive diplomacy and United Nations presence were the other popular terms associated with the process of peacekeeping.

The principles of peacekeeping are quite different from the principles of collective security. In the words of Bennett, "Peace keeping may be compared with collective security only in the respect that each may involve the deployment of military forces. In all other attributes the two processes are different."[14] The differences are: (i) The collective security emphasised checking aggression through collective enforcement. The peace-keeping, on the other hand, emphasised non-coercive activities aimed at re-establishing and maintaining peaceful international intercourse. (ii) The peacekeeping was especially designed to forestall the competitive intrusion of the super powers into a potentially explosive situation.[15] Whereas collective security measures cannot be undertaken without support of one or more superpowers. (iii) In peacekeeping operations the purpose is not to fight or defeat an aggressor but to prevent fighting, act as a buffer, keep order or maintain a cease-fire. (iv) Unlike collective security's enforcement measures and military action the mission is to keep the peace using measures short of armed force, a role more closely resembling that of police than of military. (v) The peacekeeping forces maintain an attitude of neutrality and impartiality regarding the adversaries which is not possible under collective security measures. (vi) Furthermore, in the words of Bennett, "the peacekeepers must be present with the consent of the disputing parties, or at least the consent of one of them and the toleration of the other. One or all disputants must have invited the peacekeeping force since there is no international territory on

which they can be stationed, and sovereignty requires consent for their presence on national soil. This consent indicates a desire by the disputants to avoid conflict."[16]

Peacekeeping in Practice. In reality peacekeeping operations have been of two types: armed-forces type operations and observer operations. In the first category seven operations involving multinational armed forces were:

(1) The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in Egypt from 1956-1967 in the wake of Suez crisis.
(2) The United Nations Congo Operation (ONUC) to avoid clashes between Congo and Belgium (1960-64).
(3) The United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964.
(4) The UNEF-II dispatched to the Middle East in 1973 and terminated in 1979.
(5) The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) created in 1978.
(6) A United Nations Security Force (UNSF) composed primarily of Pakistan troops also served as the military arm of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) in West Irian in 1962-63.
(7) The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was placed on the Golan Heights as a buffer between Israel and Syria.

Some of the observer type missions were:

(1) The United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOM) established in 1947 to investigate the Greek border situation.
(2) The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), operating since 1949 to report on cease-fire and armistice violations by Israel and its neighbours.
(3) The United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI), charged with observing cease-fires and with aiding negotiations for Indonesian independence in 1949.
(4) The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), responsible since 1949 for patrolling the cease-fire line in Kashmir.
(5) The United Nations Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), dispatched to Lebanon in 1958 to check allegations of infiltration across Lebanese borders.
(6) The United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM), charged with supervising the disengagement of military forces during 1962-64 in the civil war in Yemen.
(7) The United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM), established to patrol the border between India and Pakistan during and immediately after the 1965 war between these countries.
(8) The UNTSO-Suez Canal observer group under the UNTSO direction but stationed in the Suez Canal area after the June 1967 war.[17]

Between 1967 and 1987, the UN had to respond to conflicts between Israel and its Arab-Palestinian neighbours, fighting between India and Pakistan, between Iraq and Iran, and civil wars in Afghanistan, El Salvador, Namibia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Somalia, Lebanon, Kuwait and Bosnia. In the post-cold war period, the United Nations has assumed new and important responsibilities. The traditional UN role of peace-keeping has broadened, with emphasis on peace-making and peace-building to sustain peace and long term economic development. In 1988, a total of seven peace missions were underway, while in 1994, the UN has deployed a record number of 17 peacekeeping operations involving some 70,000 personnel world wide.[18]

Bitter experiences in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia have led to a general reluctance by the Security Council to authorize new peacekeeping operations, despite situations

of compelling need. Development of a rapid troop deployment capacity, provided by certain member States, coupled with a clear-strategy for the withdrawal of forces is among the measures. Mr. Annan has promoted to raise the effectiveness of peacekeeping efforts, and rebuilding confidence in this vital instrument for maintaining peace.

The Secretary-General undertook initiatives in 1997 to revive the peace process in a number of intractable conflicts, including Western Sahara—where the Secretary-General's Special Envoy, former United States Secretary of State James Baker, has succeeded in breaking new ground—East Timor, Cyprus, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Angola. Secretary-General Annan visited Angola in March and convinced the opposition group, UNITA, to fulfil its commitment to participate in a new government of national unity. In November, the Secretary-General took steps to help defuse the dangerous stalemate with Iraq over weapons inspections, and recommended the renewal of the oil-for-food programme in that country to offset the humanitarian crisis caused by sanctions.

UN peacekeeping operations successfully monitored elections in Liberia and in the Eastern Slavonia region of Croatia, where in January the UN completed the handing over of its administrative responsibilities to the new local authorities. The UN also completed its peacekeeping operation in Haiti, where a small contingent of police advisers remains as part of the international community's assistance to the country's new democratic institutions.[19]

Critical Evaluation of Peacekeeping. By and large the UN peacekeeping has played a highly constructive role in maintaining international peace and security, evidenced dramatically by the award in 1988 of the Nobel Peace Prize to UN peacekeeping forces. Apart from the above achievements Sorabjee criticizes: "It is difficult to subscribe to this assessment especially after its failure in Bosnia Herzegovina, Somalia and Rwanda. Besides, certain problems have dogged the UN peacekeepers, one of them being the fundamental disagreement over the allocation of authority under the Charter for peacekeeping among the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Secretariat, represented by the Secretary-General."[20]

The lack of any clear and coherent policy is another problem in the way of peacekeeping operations. Any proposed UN peacekeeping mission should have clear objectives, identify and ensure who will participate in the mission, and present a realistic assessment of what it will cost and who will be asked to pay for it. The delays by members of the United Nations to pay their dues are very long. The problem is that demands made upon the United Nations are not being matched by the resources to do the job.

Preventive Diplomacy

One of the most vital roles played by the Secretary-General is the use of his "good offices"—drawing upon the Secretary-General's stature and impartiality—in the interest of `preventive diplomacy'. This refers to steps taken by the Secretary-General, publicly and in private, to prevent international disputes from arising, escalating or spreading.

The second Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold (1953-1961) propounded the principles of preventive diplomacy, a term that has since become virtually synonymous with UN peacekeeping. The term *United Nations presence* refers to all the peacekeeping operations, but in addition refers to the use of personal representatives of the Secretary-General in the settling of controversies such as the border disputes between Cambodia and Thailand in 1958-59 and in 1962-64. The term *United Nations presence* has also been applied to United Nations mediators and their staff, commissions of good offices or conciliation, smaller groups of military observers such as the one sent to the Dominican Republic in 1965, and other similar groups dispatched to the scene of a conflict by the authority of either the Security Council or the General Assembly. Preventive diplomacy encompasses

all aspects of peacekeeping and the related activities stated above. The technique of preventive diplomacy is based upon the assumption that it is better to forestall conflict than to allow it to spread. All peacekeeping and related techniques serve the same purpose.

The device of preventive diplomacy owes its invention to the following factors: (i) the cold war competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, (ii) the threat that competition posed for the entire world because of the destructiveness of modern weapons, (iii) the increase in the number of non-aligned developing nations whose interests and objectives are not necessarily the same as those of the superpowers, and (iv) secretary-general Hammarskjold's frustration with the UN's legal structure, especially the inability of the Security Council to perform adequately its major function of maintaining peace. As a result, he expanded the role of the executive organ of the United Nations by using his "good offices" to moderate international disputes before they escalated into war, by mediating conflicts between contending parties, and by enlisting the UN's administrative support for peacekeeping operations. The UNEF-I (1956) and the Congo operation (1960) were the most spectacular endeavours under Hammarskjold's preventive diplomacy.

The third secretary-general U-Thant of Burma, adopted a low profile on security issues and followed a much less activist role. Next secretary-general Kurt Waldheim continued U-Thant's policy.

The seventh Secretary-General, Kofi Annan has made dynamic use of his good offices to revive the peace process in a number of long-standing disputes, including Afghanistan, Angola, Cyprus, East Timor, Tajikistan and Western Sahara. A recent example of preventive diplomacy was defusing the dangerous stalemate with Iraq over weapons inspection in 1997-98. In February 1998 Kofi Annan went to Baghdad amidst a stand-off between the Security Council and Iraq over weapons inspections, and returned with an arrangement that prevented a conflict that could have led to large-scale death and destruction and which could have had catastrophic political consequence.

Critical Evaluation of Collective Security under UN

The collective security system of the United Nations is flawed and full of shortcomings and weaknesses. These are:

(1) *Decisions not binding*. Decisions of the United Nations are not binding upon members as it is a voluntary organisation of sovereign states. "In short, sovereignty reigns supreme. The United Nations is a concession to the independence of states; it was not designed to supersede them by placing supranational controls on national initiatives," criticises Kegley and Wittkopf.[21]

(2) *Unworkable and unrealistic*. Bennett comments: "Given the world situation .... the principle of collective security is probably unworkable and unrealistic. The strength of nationalism and the safeguarding of sovereignty preclude automatic collective responses by states whose interests are not directly promoted by stopping aggression wherever it may occur. National rivalries and competitive alliance systems prevent universal responses to threats to international peace."[22] Due to the lack of unanimity among the UN members, the Chapter VII in general and its Article 43 in particular have proved to be impracticable and unworkable.

(3) *No permanent military force*. The UN has no permanent military or police force under its command in the barracks that may be rapidly deployed or sent for thwarting the aggression. In this regard it is completely depended upon the wishes of sovereign member-states.

(4) *The Korean action not a true collective security*. "The Korean police action provided a glimmer of hope, but that brief interlude in global responsibility for world peace was so coloured by unusual circumstances that it was never a harbinger of things to come; nor, indeed, was it a true

collective security,"[23] observes Kegley and Wittkopf. The UN military action in Korea was not a test of collective security at all but an instrument of the American policy of containing communism in the Far East. Only 16 out of 60 members sent armed forces of any kind in this operation. This way Korean action was primarily an American affair.

(5) *At the mercy of powerful states.* The basic principle of collective security is that all the states should have equal say in arriving at collective decisions. In fact the small states should have more say in collective security as they are more dependent on collective security than on their individual action. No doubt, the success or failure of collective security efforts is more dependent on the support of powerful states. They are usually hesitant to put their power behind an effort which is not in accordance with their national interests.

(6) *Cannot be used against big powers.* UN machinery of collective security cannot be used against big powers who are usually responsible for many breaches of peace. The adoption of the principle of great power unanimity in the Security Council "clearly reflected a deliberate decision not to attempt to institute a system of collective security applicable to the great powers — the very states which possess the greatest capacity to threaten the security of other states,"[24] observers Claude. By using veto power in the Security Council any one of the Big Five can unilaterally block measures taken in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII. Military action in Korean war became possible only due to the boycott of Security Council meetings by the Soviet Union on the issue of China's membership.

(7) *Cold war made it ineffective.* The cold war belied the hopes of the proponents of collective security. Immediately after the formation of the United Nations in 1945, the world was divided into two opposing blocs led by the United States and the Soviet Union. In this bipolar world armed peace, balance of terror, cold war and nuclear deterrence became order of the day. The system of collective security could not grow properly as in the early days of its existence the UN had to work in an atmosphere of suspicion, hatred and tension. Even after the end of the cold war in 1991 the prospects of collective security system becoming effective are not very bright.

(8) *Lengthy Procedure.* Sometimes it becomes very difficult to decide who is 'aggressor'. And if it is decided then enforcement measures take much time. Defining aggression, pinpointing specific aggressors, and devising ways to execute collective economic and military sanctions have proved to be lengthy and time consuming exercises.

In the end it can be said that the UN machinery for maintaining international peace and security is flawed and weak. Despite its shortcomings, it has played significant role in managing global conflicts and in preventing breaches of peace. Bennett rightly says, "In the face of collective security stalemate, the United Nations has devised new methods for dealing with a limited range of threatening situations."[25] These new devices are preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, United Nations presence and back door approach. The United Nations' *peacekeeping* record is more promising and spectacular than its *peacemaking* and collective security achievements. Moreover, it could not improve its effectiveness even after the end of the cold war. On the other hand it has an impressive success story in functional spheres—social, economic, cultural, scientific, technical etc.

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24

Disarmament and Arms Control

The Bible suggests, those who live by the sword tend to die by the sword. That is why this great work prescribes that nations should beat their swords into plowshares. These eternal suggestions are very much relevant in the present world situation that is characterised by conflicts, arms race and arms trade. Similarly, George Bernard Shaw advises that the world as a whole will be benefitted if nitrogen is to be used to manufacture fertiliser rather than explosives.

In the previous chapter it has been examined in detail how arms race is the source of potential war and a perpetual danger to world peace. It encourages arms trade diverting the scarce resources of the countries from economic development and social welfare activities to stockpiling of arms. Destructive character of nuclear weapons has also been discussed. Arms race also has its adverse socio-economic effects on Third World countries. Hence need for disarmament. It is considered to be one of the most important measures to maintain peace and check war. Through it humans can attain better security, quick development, a higher standard of living and greater prestige.

Step to control or abolish the use of weapons are as old as war itself, and they have been endeavouring to limit both the ends sought through war and the means of violence. No doubt, the notion that war can be contained by eliminating the instruments of warfare is not new, even if it has assumed a new urgency today, one of the few regularities in the changing international system has been the repetition with which disarmament has been simultaneously proposed but sidelined in practice. To talk of disarmament, is to discuss an idea largely lacking empirical execution. This also indicates one of the chief contradictions of international relations—simultaneous going of an arms race and arms control.

Regarding attempts at disarmament in the period after Second World War, it can be said that the issue of disarmament has acquired great importance and urgency as never before in the wake of nuclear proliferation; the prospects of bacteriological, chemical and thermo-nuclear warfare; and the possibility of destruction of humanity on global scale. Because of the fear of global destruction peoples of most nations in the world have become aware of the problem of disarmament and are making efforts in this direction.

DEFINITIONS AND NATURE

The term disarmament is quite inclusive. It implies anything from the banning of all military arsenals and establishments, to the banning of particular weapons in the interest of the "humanisation" of war, to the implementation of specific agreements aimed at preventing the accidental outbreak of war. *Disarmament*—the reduction of armaments, if not their abolition—can be usefully distinguished from a related term— *arms control*.

Disarmament in its absolute sense calls for the global destruction of weaponry and abandoning of all armed forces. According to Morgenthau, *disarmament* implies reduction or elimination of armaments whereas *arms control* envisages regulating the armaments race for the purposes of creating a measure of military stability.[1]

Arms Control, in the words of Kegley and Wittkopf, refers to "cooperative agreements between states designed to regulate arms levels either by limiting their growth or by placing restrictions on how they might be used. Arms control is less ambitious than disarmament, since it seeks not to eliminate weapons but to regulate their use or moderate the pace at which they are developed."[2] Efforts to control arms have been more successful than have efforts to disarm because the former puts limitations and the latter aims at total elimination. This is the reason that many nations opt for arms control as foreign policy goal. Arms control, a relative concept, envisages the limitation of certain types of weaponry or the reduction of armaments level. The possibility of total disarmament is so remote that its protagonists are often dismissed as utopians or propagandists. On the contrary, arms control frequently becomes a goal of nation's policy and a topic of discussion in international relations.

According to Schleicher, arms control is used to "include any kind of cooperation with respect to armament which could curtail the arms race, reduce the probability of war, or limit its scope and violence"[3]. In the words of Edwards, "Arms control is generally defined to include unilateral and multilateral measures that are designed to restrain the military establishment of a nation or nations through national interaction. Unilateral measures involve only one nation; multilateral measures involve more than one nation".[4] Edwards also gives the following five features of arms control:

> Each nation will be exerting control over its own military establishment.
>
> The military establishments of the adversaries will affect each other.
>
> Arms control measures will be concerned with military matters.
>
> Arms control measures will have a restraining effect.
>
> Arms control measures will, in some way, be "institutionalised" into control provisions that may, but do not need to be multinational.[5]

Whereas disarmament implies an idealistic goal of an once-for-all solution—whether it be a disarmed world or one in which there is some kind of military 'balance of prudence'— arms control is an aspect of military and foreign policy in which conflict of interest is accepted as a fact of life, but one in which potential recourse to conflict and violence can be kept under control by conscious recourse to adjustment of military forces and policies in common interest of restraining the scope of violence.

Couloumbis and Wolfe divided arms control into the following two categories:[6]

Arms reduction (or *partial disarmament)* implies a mutually agreed-upon set of arms levels for the nation-states involved. The arms-reduction formula may apply either on world wide or on a regional basis. An example of a regional arrangement is the Rush-Bagot agreement (1817) between the United States and Great Britain, which led to the eventual demilitarisation of Great Lakes. The most ambitious of the regional understanding is the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (1967) through which twenty-two governments of Central and South America strive to ban nuclear weaponry from their homelands. Argentina, Brazil and Chile have, however attached conditions, so far unfulfilled, to their implementation of the treaty.

Arms limitation entails the wide variety of international accords designed to limit the impact of war and to prevent its accidental outbreak. Thus, under arms limitation we can list the installation of fail-safe devices designed to detonate nuclear missiles in midair should they be fired accidentally, hot lines to keep key decision-makers in constant contact during crises, moratoriums on specific types of nuclear testing, and agreements between two or more countries restricting the sale of arms and the transfer of military technology to third countries. Arms limitation also embraces the conventional rules of international law, whose purpose is to limit the scope and destructiveness of warfare within the confines set by the doctrine of military necessity. There are so many examples of arms limitation. They vary from the 1907 Hague Conference declaration forbidding the firing of projectiles from balloons to the 1949 Geneva Conventions establishing certain protective guarantees for prisoners of war and the wounded.[7]

Arms control measures may vary in many respects, the most important, according to Edwards are the following:

(1) *Comprehensiveness* (singular or compound measures); (2) *nature* (provisions regarding the control of such things as weapons, men, budgets, deployment—positioning of men and weapons, usage; (3) *change* (reduction, increase, alteration); (4) *scale* (large, small); (5) *generality* (unilateral measures which are sufficient for the one nation involved, unilateral measures which induce other nations to undertake similar measures, measures which involve only two nations are bilateral and measures involving more than two nations are multilateral); (6) *publicity* (implied or clearly stated, open or secret); (7) *objectives* (no war, reduced war, non war side-effects); (8) *elements* (administration, inspections, verification, control, interpretation of the agreement in cases of uncertainty or dispute, approval, specification and elaboration, alteration, extension and termination, and others).[8]

Objectives of Arms Control

1. Arms control policy can serve the international political objectives of national foreign policy and perhaps such domestic objectives as strengthening democracy and the economy.
2. It can deal with present and future problems that obstruct the attainment of objectives such as international order and national security. Such problems would include the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, the increasing capabilities and instruments, and the risk of war by accident and by arms races.
3. Objectives of arms control measures can be more constructive, creating and exploiting opportunities for cooperation and international stabilisation.
4. Another objective is encouraging further agreement. Just as agreements in general might be made because they create precedents rather than because of their substantive advantages, so arms control agreements might be undertaken because they encourage further, substantively desired, agreements.
5. Most general national objectives—usually stated in such broad terms as "welfare", "justice" "national liberty", "personal freedom", and "equality"—could be served only *indirectly* by arms control measures.
6. Peace, however, is one such general goal that might benefit *directly* from arms control. This objective is traditionally described as "reducing the risk of war."
7. One possibility—which is often overlooked because military affairs are primarily concerned with adversaries—is the effect upon allies. But arms control measures might also be undertaken for the more purely political objectives of rewarding and punishing allies.

8. There may be internal objectives for advocating or accepting arms control agreements, such as the political fear of military control of the state; disapproval of the economic cost, dislocation, and international financial imbalances that occur when a nation arms; or the social fear of the militarisation of society and the moral disapproval of production of all or some weapons or of the threat or use of force.
9. There may be the objective of improving the nation's international position by making false proposals for purpose of propaganda, prestige, favour, or other gains—an objective which many would argue has characterised all or most arms control discussions since the invention of arms or the beginning of conferences.[9]

Types of Disarmament

There are certain kinds of disarmament which are as follows:

1. *Voluntary and Compulsory.* Disarmament may be brought about voluntarily or compulsorily. The post-War II attempts at disarmament may be said to be voluntary because the nations involved are free to accept or reject a given programme of disarmament; often the Soviet Union has rejected the disarmament proposals of the United States and vice versa. On the other hand, in a number of cases disarmament programmes may be said to be almost compulsory, that is, certain nations are forced to disarm or have to undertake disarmament against their will. For instance, under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles (1918) the victor nations of World War I, particularly France sought to impose a number of crippling restrictions on the size of the German army, navy and equipment. Compulsory disarmament is not always so obviously compulsory; it is often imposed on unwilling nations cleverly and indirectly. For example, through the Washington Treaty of 1922, Japan was forced by the US and Britain to adopt the disarmament programme compulsorily.
2. *Qualitative and Quantitative.* Qualitative disarmament is concerned with the reduction or abolition of only certain special types of armaments (e.g. the goal of SALT pursued by the superpowers, Partial Test Ban Treaty, NPT etc.). This type of disarmament relates to the weapons of crucial and strategic importance or other ordinary and non-strategic importance. Thus it is a disarmament relating to certain qualities or types of weapons as different from disarmament relating to weapons of all qualities or types. The quantitative disarmament aims at an overall reduction of armaments of most or all types (the goal of most nations represented at the world Disarmament Conference).
3. *Local and General.* Disarmament may be spoken of in the context of some nations or all nations. When it involves few nations it is local whereas general embraces all nations. The Rush-Bagon Agreement of 1817 which concerned only the United States and Canada may be said to be an example of local disarmament. The kind of disarmament the United Nations has been seeking to achieve since World War II may be said to be a general disarmament because almost all the nations in the world are called upon to adopt the programme of disarmament.
4. *Comprehensive or Total.* There is another distinction between general disarmament and comprehensive disarmament. The former is one in which all or most of the great powers participate but not necessarily with a commitment to do away with all types of weapons, while the latter entails the control or prohibition of all armaments of all categories. Comprehensive disarmament implies the ultimate achievement of a world order in which all human and material means of warfare will have been abolished.

After comprehensive or total disarmament world would be free from armies and weapons of all kinds.

5. *Formal, Informal and Self-imposed.* When nations after thorough discussion and deliberations conclude an agreement or treaty for reducing or limiting weapons, it is called formal disarmament. Partial Test Ban Treaty, NPT, SALT-I & II, INF, START, CTBT etc. are examples of formal disarmament. Holsti points out, "the tendency to equate arms control with formal international agreements may, however, lead to overly pessimistic conclusions about the feasibility of placing limits on the procurement or deployment of arms. Self-imposed limits on violence are some times more enduring than those found in treaties, and have even survived wars. Whether from fear of reprisal, military impracticality, or unwillingness to bear the onus for initiating its use, neither the Allies nor the Axis powers used poison gas during World War II."[10] During Korean War (1950-53) both the adversaries exercised utmost restraint in the use of even conventional weapons. The recent example of self-imposed restraint is Gulf War (1991) although the danger of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq and nuclear weapons by the US loomed large yet better sense prevailed on both sides and the world was saved from another holocaust. In addition to the above examples there do exist several other instances. Moreover, informal and tacit cooperation on arms control measures may take place as has happened between the two big powers in the recent past.

NEED AND REASON FOR DISARMAMENT

The supporters of disarmament and arms control normally plead their case with some or all of the following arguments.

1. *To Avoid War.* Arms race can itself be cause of bloody and costly wars. The possession of warheads definitely increases the probability that they will be used. As a result, an arms race increases the psychological insecurity of states rather than providing them with a sense of security against attack. Holsti rightly observes, "..the fear of national, if not global, annihilation provides unprecedented incentives to stabilise deterrence by measures to reduce the fear of surprise attack, arrest the diffusion of nuclear weapons, minimise the probabilities and effects of technological breakthroughs, and diminish the likelihood of unintended war through accident or escalation".[11] Disarmament, thus, is considered to be the most effective means of preventing war and maintaining peace.

2. *To Reduce the Destructiveness of War.* Disarmament is also needed as it reduces the sufferings and destructiveness of wars. This is perhaps the reason that some states have ratified agreements banning the use in war of destructive kind of weapons, e.g. chemical and bacteriological weapons; and this is why the destruction and banning of nuclear weapons have been proposed.

3. *Survival of Elites.* The unbridled growth of military-industrial complexes in the major countries may give rise to foreign policy elites bound together by a common belief that their political and economic survival is synonymous with the national interest, and that matters cannot be otherwise in an anarchic and warlike international system.

4. *Frankenstein Syndrome.* The so-called Frankenstein syndrome, wherein machines developed to augment human capabilities escape from control and run rampant. The increasing technological sophistication of modern warfare may serve, for example, to insulate electronically controlled weaponry from political monitoring in a crisis situation. To achieve the condition of "fail-safe",

systems analysts have developed a variety of safeguards. Nevertheless, the advocates of nuclear-arms control view that grave dangers remain.[12]

5. *Moral Reasons.* Philosophically most solid argument is that war is morally wrong, and, by extrapolation, so is the preparation of war. One can cite numerous examples from history of war preparations and attendant arms race culminating in war. One such instance is the European arms race preceding World War I. The Quakers, peace researchers and the Gandhites are also against armaments on moral grounds. Lewis Mumford believes in the ethical foundation of disarmament, while others like Bertrand Russell, Stephen King-Hall and C. Wright Mills are opposed to thermo nuclear war on pragmatic grounds. These philosophers suggest that unilateral disarmament can help to reduce international tensions.

6. *Economic Reasons.* A reduction in a states' armaments saves sizeable funds, which could be diverted to programmes designed to improve the general welfare of the states' citizens. In the timeless dilemma of choosing between "guns and butter", the protagonists of arms reduction favours the latter. It is argued that even if a small portion of millions of Dollars now spent on armament everyday is transferred to peaceful purposes the world would be entirely different industrially and economically.

7. *Social Reasons.* The economic reason for disarmament is closely linked with the social reason. Military expenditures also have profound social consequences. The problem of poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, housing and that of raising standard of living is not only confined to the developing countries. Military expenditure absorb resources which would otherwise be released for providing social services. Nuclear tests and explosions are having their polluting effects on the physical environment and thus bring environmental hazards.

8. *Political Reasons.* Political differences become pronounced by the fear and suspicion which the arms race generates. Armaments which are supposed to provide security, in fact, provoke the political difference. War is not an answer to any of man's imminent problems. The spirit of militarism is opposed to the spirit of democracy and peaceful progress in the world.

9. *Psychological Reason.* A world in which violence has become a commonplace and which is stocked with sufficient lethal power to wipe out entire mankind has created a psychological background of uncertainty, fear and anxiety. The arms race and the nuclear holocaust have developed a belief in the younger generation that world is an irrational place in which the improvement of society is a hopeless cause.[13]

10. *To Win a Public Opinion.* Another reason for disarmament is to win public opinion to one's side. The common assumption is that world public in general favours disarmament. It is, therefore, assumed that people at home and abroad will be inclined to give sympathy and support to a government that proposes disarmament. World public opinion usually goes against a state that indulges in excessive arms race.

DIFFICULTIES AND OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF DISARMAMENT

The task of disarmament and arms control is fraught with many difficulties, problems and obstacles which are enumerated below.

1. *Fear and Insecurity.* There is an inverse relationship between disarmament and security and nations have always preferred security. Until some system can be evolved whereby nations will actually be more secure with less arms, disarmament will remain a far cry. Every nation, big or small, is busy in military preparedness. What prompted these nations towards this preparedness

is the fear. It seems impossible to reach any agreement of disarmament in face of fear of insecurity which every nation feels. Nations are, in the words of Kegley and Wittkopf, "caught in a vicious circle of fear and insecurity: other's arms provoke fear, fear stimulates the desire to arm for defense, armament in turn encourages the enemy to increase its arms, and so it goes in a never ending spiral. The chain is difficult to break, and efforts to do so have failed whenever the underlying fear has persisted".[14]

There remains a controversy over whether disarmament or security should come first. Advocates of "direct approach" urged that reduction and elimination of arms would itself increase the security of nations by reducing the capacity and readiness of states to attack one another. Propounders of the "indirect approach" countered that states would not disarm unless in place of arms they gave up or agreed not to produce, they could depend upon other states to give them equivalent or greater security. Thus, firmly knit alliances or a functioning collective security system is a pre-requisite to any sound disarmament.

2. *Mutual Distrust.* Every state views with suspicion the disarmament proposals put forth by others. Every country feels suspicious about the intentions of other nations that while it may effect a reduction in its armaments, others may not do so. This mistrust is double edged—*first*, it hinders initial agreement and *second*, it might lead to the collapse should a disarmament scheme be put into operation. Proposals for effective international inspection and control were made in different disarmament commissions and conferences. The Soviet Union and the United States had also agreed upon the forms of inspections. Yet, when one tries to find out a definition of these inspections, it becomes impossible to get a clear answer. In fact, the Soviet Union and the United States viewed these inspections as a cover for espionage. In the atmosphere of mistrust, disarmament seems to be a dream. Prof. Schleicher points out: "If there were perfect trust between nations, arms would be unnecessary and disarmament would not be the problem".[15] Thus, the crisis of faith is another difficulty that prevents effective international control over arms manufacturing and testing activities.

3. *Political Issues and Disputes.* The greatest problem facing disarmament efforts are not technical, but political. Once political rivalry for supremacy begins, arms race among such states follows and past disarmament commitment breaks down. Bilgrami rightly observes, "the major block to disarmament has been the insistence of key nations on setting controversial international political issues to their satisfaction before they would accept limitation on their arms".[16] Nations think that their rivalry cannot be eliminated in the foreseeable future, they fear that limitation on armaments will wrap them in a rigid strait jacket which will not allow them to adjust rapidly to technological progress and to retain the relative strength which they possessed before accepting the obligation. It can be said that arms control rests on the prior ability of nations to settle their political disputes successfully, something they have not always done. Resolving political conflicts without violence may be the key to arms control. As arms, after all, may be less causes of war than they are symptoms of political tension. Arms may be the fruits, not the seeds, of war. Nations do not indulge in war because they have arms. They have arms because they think it essential to fight. From this viewpoint arms control cannot be brought about without resolving the political issues and disputes.

4. *Super-Power Conflicts.* The strained relations between the Superpowers served as a stumbling block in the way of disarmament. As long as cold war persisted between them the process of disarmament could not make much headway. However, it received an added boost when the process of detente overtook them. The evolution of arms talks have been linked with the complications of the Soviet-American competition in other areas. Kegley and Wittkopf rightly observe: "Arms control and detente are symbiotic—the former assists the development of the latter, and the latter fosters the former. Deterioration of East-West relations in non-military areas can therefore jeopardise prospects for arms control, and an escalating arms race reduces considerably the probability of improved Soviet-American political relationship... the inability of the two states to reach accommodation in areas not directly related to arms control will nonetheless constitute an obstacle to the negotiation of meaningful arms control agreements."[17]

5. *Advancement of Military Technology.* Military technology has been making progressive strides day in and day out. This advancement enhances arms race in two way: there is always a race among states to possess qualitatively superior weapons and there is a race to improve the quality of their own weapons. There are atleast about half a dozen nations having nuclear weapons and twice this number is capable of producing the same. All this encourages other nations to join nuclear race. Although the possibility of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the nuclear powers had constantly increased their stockpile of nuclear weapons and missiles in the post-World War II period. The problem of nuclear disarmament, thus became doubly difficult. Advancement in military technology especially of the super powers results in the rise of ever new military doctrines and strategies which collectively obstruct the efforts toward disarmament and arms control. New weapons and weapon systems tend to be used as "bargaining chips" into disarmament talks, if these momentarily fail to achieve results, these weapons are further developed and even deployed sometimes to heighten the arms race. Military strength and capability, in particular, the possession of a nuclear capacity still seems to confer prestige and esteem on nations. This lures even many developing countries to indulge in arms race.

6. *Lobby of Arms Industry.* Lobby of big arms industry seems to influence the policy options of the ruling elite and prevents any concession arising out of their policy-planning and execution. The armament industry is one of the most lucrative and best developed industries in countries like the United States, France, Britain, Russia, etc. The nations producing weapons dictate prices, earn huge profits and also bestow political favours by supplying modern weapons. The manufacture and sale of weapons have become the most profitable business and unless measures are adopted to reduce the armament industry in size, the disarmament measures may not prove effective.

7. *National Interest—Take Much and Give Little.* No nation overtly speaks against disarmament as such, but it views any disarmament plan from the viewpoint of its national interest. During arms control talks such conditions are put forth by some of the participants, which are not acceptable to others. Consequently, disarmament conferences fail. It is a hard fact that meaningful agreements have been very difficult to achieve. Arms bargaining is a game of give and take, but all negotiating nations "typically want to take much and give little because security is dear and fear is strong".[18]

8. *The Ratio.* The main difficulty of disarmament is the ratio. When the states endeavoured to reach an agreement on disarmament, they faced a serious problem as to what should be the ratio of arms reduction for various states. Should each state be equal in armaments, or should one be superior to another or vice versa, and if so, to what extent. Every state wants to be superior in armaments to others. This issue is always the first on the agenda of disarmament conferences and commissions as to what should be the ratio among the armaments of different nations, and within that ratio how various kinds and quantities of armaments are to be allotted to different states.

The fast technological developments have further complicated the problem of stable arms-control ratios. Technology can on the one hand make weapon system outdated which have been banned yet at the same time can inspire states to make qualitative refinements of their existing weapon systems. The possibilities of such developments aggravate the excessive difficulties of

comparing the relative military strengths of parties to an agreement. "What are equivalent weapons?" is a question on which few observers are in agreement. Thus, achieving agreement on ratio of strength constitutes, as Henry Kissinger often remarked, a formidable political problem, not just a technical one. Manipulating arms negotiations to keep them in balance with political negotiations in other areas, and convincing public and pressure groups that the benefits of an agreement outweigh the costs, require great skill and efficient diplomacy.

9. *Standards of Allocation.* If the problem of ratio is resolved, the question of standards of allocation of different types and quantities of armaments to be allotted to various nations comes up. Like the question of ratio, this one is also beset with the problems of comparison of qualitatively different types of weapons. Such difficulties of assessment confronted the Soviet and American negotiators at the SALT talks. The World Disarmament Conference in 1932, where Germany and France were working at cross-purposes also failed owing to this problem. 'Thus" observes Prof. Morgenthau, "whether the issue is one of the over-all ratio of the armaments of different nations or whether the issue is the standard for allocating different types and quantities of arms, these issues are incapable of solution in their own terms, so long as the conflicts of powers from which they have arisen remain unsolved".[19]

10. *Insincerity.* Obstacles in the way of disarmament are not merely technical or those arising from power rivalries; they are also caused by the insincerity of the leaders. Statesmen often find it safer to contribute to armament than disarmament measures. Many of them are insincere, to the cause of disarmament and do not like to be accused of being fooled by the enemy. Insincerity of the nuclear powers was evident from the manner in which the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was drafted. This treaty does not prohibit nuclear powers from possessing nuclear weapons but it stops the possession of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear states. It is discriminatory, monopolistic and deceptive.

11. *A Utopia.* The notion that a disarmed world would be a more secure world does not have any sound historical background, whereas the idea that military preparedness enhances security does. According to many critics, peace through disarmament and arms control is a utopian dream. The idea that arms control brings peace is a theory for the control of violence that has not as yet been successfully executed. 'Thus, because we have no actual contemporary experience of politics among nations in a disarmed world, we have no way of knowing whether a disarmed world would indeed be a peaceful world. A disarmed world might actually have more political troubles, even if it would have fewer military expressions of them,"[20] warn Kegley and Wittkopf. Like political realists, opponents of the disarmament and arms control argue that weapons are not the causes but rather results of conflictive relationship. Moreover, a historical survey of arms races in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries indicates that this kind of international competition frequently terminates with the recognition of the military superiority of one side or the other.[21]

12. *Basic Questions.* There are certain basic questions which arise out of the disarmament efforts and that are yet to be answered and posed further problems in the way of disarmament. These are as follows:

(i) If some nations have reached agreement on certain disarmament proposals, how to ensure that they would not violate their treaty obligations?
(ii) Assuming that the signatories to a disarmament treaty are willing to be controlled by some mechanism or agency, what should be the nature, powers and the composition of such an agency?
(iii) If agreement is obtained between the signatories on the establishment of a controlling agency, should such an agency *'verify'* and *'inspect'* whether the treaty is rejected before its violation takes place? Or should it inspect only on the suspicion, that the treaty violation had taken place?
(iv) Granting that inspection is conducted by an agency either after or before the violation of treaty, what should be the method of such inspection i.e., should the inspection be conducted on the exact site of the signatory country, or through air/space or through some other surveillance system?
(v) If the actual violation of the treaty is definitely established, what punitive action should be taken against the defaulter and by whom?

These questions and problems by and large prevented the progress of disarmament talks.

Another problem cropped up after the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a superpower. Though the nuclear button was with the Russian President Yeltsin but nuclear installations were scattered in three other republics—Belorussia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. How these republics would be involved in any future arms control talks, was yet to be seen.

STEPS TOWARDS DISARMAMENTS

History of efforts towards disarmament and arms control dates back to 1139, when the Second Lateran Council disallowed the use of crossbows in fighting. In recent times, it was in the late nineteenth century that first attempt was made in Hague Conference (1899) for arms control. This Conference outlawed certain weapons, including expanding (dumdum) bullets. Next came the 1907 Hague Conference's prohibition against firing projectiles from balloons and the agreement among the United States, Britain, Japan, France and Italy at the Washington Naval Conference (1921-1922) adjusting the relative tonnage of their fleets. Another successful step was the 1925 protocol prohibiting the use of poison gas and bacteriological agents in warfare, a proscription in international law that has been observed in subsequent armed conflicts. An unsuccessful example is found in the 1921 League of Nations effort to realise an arms production moratorium, a proposal which culminated in 1933 in the League of Nations abortive World Disarmament Conference. In this way efforts during the interwar years to limit either naval or land forces were unsuccessful, and even the Washington Naval Convention (1922) and World Disarmament Conference (1932) failed before the arms race of the 1930s.

In the era after Second World War, a variety of arms-control proposals were put forth. The Baruch Plan (1946) suggested the setting up of a United Nations Atomic Development Authority which would have placed nuclear energy under international control. The suggestion was never executed. A few days after the Baruch Plan, Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister Gromyko presented a counter plan to the UN Atomic Energy Commission. *The Gromyko Plan* was diametrically opposed to the Baruch Plan and that is why could not appeal to the West. President Eisenhower made his "open skies" proposal for inspection by air of Soviet and American territory, but that proposal, offered at the Geneva Summit Conference of 1955, failed to culminate in an agreement. So, too, did the *Rapacki Plan* of 1957, which would have prevented the deployment of nuclear weapons in Central Europe. American and Soviet scientists also have met informally since 1957 at the so-called Pugwash Conferences to discuss problems regarding the control of nuclear weapons. Postwar efforts have not been without their successes yet attempts to control the development and use of nuclear weapons, however, have not been as successful.

Thus endeavours were made both inside and outside the League of Nations and later in the United Nations and outside it. Several commissions were appointed and conferences held.

Besides leaders of important nations also put forward their own plans and proposals like Baruch Plan, Gromyko Plan, Rapacki Plan etc. But all these measures were not crowned with success. The period subsequent to end of the Second World War did not witness any worthwhile headway towards disarmament owing to the cold war. The first breakthrough in this respect was made in 1959 with the signing of Antarctic Treaty. Subsequent thereto positive developments appeared in the form of multilateral and bilateral agreements on arms control. Of these the successful ones are being discussed below.

Multilateral Agreements

Since World War II, efforts towards arms control and disarmament have produced a variety of multilateral agreements—a treaty demilitarising the Antarctic (signed in 1959 and came into force in 1961); the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963); prohibitions on the use of outer space (1967) and the sea bed (1972) for weapons of mass destruction; the Treaty of Tlatelolco, prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America (1967); the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968); a convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons (1972); Environmental Modification Convention (1975); and a treaty between the heads of State and Government of the NATO and Warsaw Pact for reducing their conventional arsenals (1990). The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was signed in January 1993. It was the most ambitious arms control accord to date. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was cleared by the majority in the UN General Assembly in 1996.

Bilateral Agreements

Since 1963 the United States and the Soviet Union have entered into a number of bilateral agreements on subjects ranging from the establishment of direct communication links (the "Hot Line" agreement of 1963) to limitations on ABM systems (1972) and ceilings on offensive strategic forces (1972 and 1974). It is also known as SALT-I (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty-I). The SALT-II agreement of 1979 substantially revised the quantitative restrictions of SALT-I and began as well to place certain qualitative constraints on the superpowers' strategic arsenals. Another important bilateral intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) agreement was signed in 1987 to eliminate 1,000 intermediate-range nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. Then came the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) signed in 1991 to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals by about 30 per cent. In 1993, START-II was signed between presidents Geroge Bush and Boris Yeltsin. Under its terms the nuclear arsenals of both parties will be reduced to no more than 3,500 warheads each by the end of 2007. Thus it was to slash their nuclear weapons by 2/3 in the next ten years. These bilateral agreements are listed below.

TABLE

Bilateral Arms Control Agreements Between the United States and the Soviet Union—Russia

Agreement	*Date Signed*
"Hot Line" Agreement	6/20/1963
Improved "Hot Line" Agreement	9/30/1971
Nuclear Accidents Agreement	9/30/1971
ABM Treaty	5/26/1972
Interim Agreement on Offensive Strategic Arms	5/26/1972

Agreement	*Date Signed*
Standing Consultative Commission for SALT	12/21/1972
Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms	6/21 /1973
Threshold Test Ban Treaty with Protocol	7/3/1974
Protocol to the ABM Treaty	7/3/1974
Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Explosions for Peaceful Purposes	5/28/1976
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques	5/18/1977
Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms	6/18/1979
Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms	6/18/1979
I.N.F. Treaty	12/8/1987
Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Arms in Europe	7/3/1990
START	7/31/1991
Bush-Yeltsin Agreement on Arms Reduction	6/17/1992
START - II	January 1993
Agreement to deal with redundant nuclear warhead material	May 1995

Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control 1978* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 75; *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1980* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1980), pp. 469-478. Table updated by the present author.

Tacit Understanding

To the above might be added an indeterminate number of tacit understanding about the level and use of weapons that the two powers seem to have agreed to, understandings which have not achieved the status of formal treaties but which the two superpowers have nonetheless observed. For instance, the superpowers' commitment to refrain from the non-defensive use of their nuclear arsenals, as indicated by President Carter's pledge that the United States would not be the first country to use nuclear weapons in war and President Brezhnev's promise in 1980 that Soviet nuclear weapons would never be used against a non-nuclear nation.

Unilateral Reductions

The first unilateral US decision in the field of disarmament was made by President George Bush in September 1991. He announced a sweeping unilateral reduction in US nuclear arsenal and

invited the Soviet Union to match its bold initiatives with "equally bold steps". President Bush announced that he was directing that the United States eliminate its entire worldwide inventory of ground-launched short-range nuclear weapons, bring home and destroy all of its nuclear artillery shells and short range ballistic missile warheads. Bush said the United States would also withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from its surface ships, attack submarines as well as those nuclear weapons associated with land-based naval aircraft. He was also directing that all US strategic bombers immediately stand down from their alert posture.

President Gorbachev also announced sweeping cuts in tactical nuclear weapons on land and sea to match reductions declared by US President Bush. Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union would liquidate all nuclear artillery and nuclear warheads from tactical missiles, move nuclear-tipped zenith missiles to a central base and destroy some of them, remove all tactical nuclear weapons from ships and from multi-purpose submarines. He also suggested to the US to fully liquidate, on a bilateral basis, all tactical nuclear weapons of the Navy.

Nuclear disarmament took a stride on January 29, 1992 with US President Bush announcing massive unilateral nuclear arms cuts and Russia matching the US step by substantial reduction in former Soviet Union's strategic arsenal and an offer of a joint global defence system. The 50-billion dollar US arms cut, which made further cuts conditional on Russian reciprocity, President Bush outlined a plan that would, among other things, stop production of the controversial B-2 "Stealth" bombers after completing 20 of them, cancel the small ICBM programme, cease production of new warheads for the sea-based ballistic missiles and stop new production of the peace keeper missiles and purchase of any more advanced cruise missiles. But at the same time, warning against complacency about peace, and stressing the need to protect America from limited nuclear missile attack, President Bush asked Congress to approve the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) programme.

TABLE

Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements

To Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons—

Antarctic Treaty, 1959 — **26 states[1]**

Bans any military uses of Antarctica and specifically prohibits nuclear tests and nuclear waste.

Outer Space Treaty, 1967 — **83 states[1]**

Bans nuclear weapons in earth orbit and their stationing in outer space

Latin American Nuclear - Free Zone Treaty, 1967 — **22 states[1]**

Bans testing, possession, deployment of nuclear weapons and requires safeguards on facilities. All Latin American states except Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, are parties to the treaty.

Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968 — **185 States[1]**

The NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995 Bans transfer of weapons or weapons technology to non-nuclear - weapons states. Requires safeguards on their facilities. Commits nuclear - weapon states to negotiations to halt the arms race.

Seabed Treaty, 1971 — **71 States[1]**

Bans nuclear weapons on the seabed beyond a 12 - mile coastal limit.

To Reduce the Risk of Nuclear War—

Hot Line and Modernisation Agreements, 1963 — **US - USSR**

Establishes direct radio and wire-telegraph links between Moscow and Washington to ensure communication between heads of government in times of crisis. A second agreement in 1971 provided for satellite communications circuits.

Accidents measures Agreement, 1971 — **US - USSR**

Pledges US and USSR to improve safeguards against accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons.

Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement, 1973 — **US - USSR**

Requires consultation between the two countries if there is a danger of nuclear war.

To Limit Nuclear Testing

Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963 — **111 States[1]**

Bans nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, outer space, or underwater. Bans underground explosions which cause release of radioactive debris beyond the state's borders.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 1974 — **US - USSR[2]**

Bans underground tests having a yield above 150 kilotons (150,000 tons of TNT equivalent).

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, 1974 — **US - USSR[2]**

Bans "group explosions" with aggregate yield over 1,500 kilotons and requires on-site observers of group explosions with yield over 150 kilotons.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 1996 — **158 states voted in favour**

This zero-yield CTBT is a truly comprehensive test ban and will prohibit any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. In short, bans all types of tests.

To Limit Nuclear Weapons—

ABM Treaty (SALT-I) and Protocol, 1972 — **US-USSR**

Limits anti-ballistic missile systems to *two* deployment areas on each side. Subsequently, in Protocol of 1974, each side restricted to one deployment area.

SALT I Interim Agreement 1972 — **US-USSR**

Freezes the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers, and permits an increase in SLBM launches up to an agreed level only with equivalent dismantling of older ICBM launchers.

SALT II,1979 — **US-USSR**

Limits numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, launchers of MIRV'd missiles bombers with long-range cruise missiles, warheads on existing ICBMs, etc. Bans testing or deploying new ICBM's.

INF Treaty, 1987 — **US-USSR**

Eliminates over 1,000 intermediate-range nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. Eliminates all missiles systems in specific range (500 Km to 5000 Km.) and prohibits further production.

START, 1991 — **US-USSR**

Reduces about 30 percent long range strategic nuclear weapons such as SNDVs, ICBMs, SLBMs.

START II 1993 — **US-RUSSIA**

Reduces strategic arsenals still further to 3000 (Russia) and 3,500 (the USA) strategic warheads; eliminates altogether MIRVed and ICBMs forces. With this 70 per cent cut in both super pow rs' nuclear arsenals achieved.

START III 2010

It replaces the 1991 START-I that expired in December 2009 and will cut strategic nuclear arsenal deployed by the former Cold War rivals by 30 per cent within seven years.

To Prohibit use of Gas—

Geneva Protocol, 1925, — **118 States**

Bans the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare.

To Prohibit Biological weapons—

Biological Weapons Convention, 1972 — **139 States**

Bans the development, production, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons; requires the destruction of stocks.

To Prohibit Techniques Changing the Environment—

Environmental Modification Convention, 1977 — **36 States**

Bans military or other hostile use of techniques to

change weather or climate patterns, ocean currents, ozone layer, or ecological balance.	**Conventional Arms in Europe, 1990,**
To Control Use of Inhumane Weapons—	Drastically reduces conventional arsenals of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries for the first time since World War II.
Inhumane 1981 Weapons Convention **22 States**	*To Prohibit Chemical Weapons*
Bans use of fragmentation bombs not detectable in the human body, bans use against civilians of mines, body traps, and incendiary weapons, requires record-keeping on mines.	**Chemical Weapons Convention, 1993** **95 states**
To Reduce Conventional Weapons—	Forbids all types of chemical weapons, provides for inspections, control organisations and penalties to punish non-participants.
Treaty on the Reduction of **27 states**	

1. Number of accessions and ratifications. Source, Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures, 1983* (Washington, D.C. World Priorities, 1983), p. 28. Updated by the present author.

Declaring that the Russian Federation was taking over all the obligations of the former Soviet Union, President Boris Yeltsin announced on the same day that 600 International Ballistic Missiles were being taken off alert and several programmes for modernisation and development of strategic weapons were being shelved. Yeltsin, responding to US President Bush's disarmament offer, said his country was willing to cut defence spending by another 10 per cent on a bilateral basis, in addition to the 20 per cent cut agreed to in 1991 between Bush and former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. President Yeltsin said about 1250 nuclear charges had been removed from stand-by alert and that manufacture of long distance cruise missiles and heavy bombers were ended. He also urged the US to abandon its Star War programme and told the US of the Russian readiness for a US-Russian global defence system as a substitute and suggested an international agency to ensure nuclear arms reduction.

In a dramatic reversal of the Gorbachev policy and his own earlier statements, Yeltsin told reporters after Camp David on February 1, 1992 that in the then international situation it was necessary for the US and Russia to keep some nuclear weapons—he put the need at 2,500 for each side. He also made a bold proposal to have a global defence against missiles of all nations to be undertaken by the US and Russia in place of the strategic defence initiative or the limited global defence capability the US was trying to build, with other nuclear weapons powers being free to join if they wish. However, the US was not prepared to go that far at that time with Russia. The US was still waiting and watching to see whether Yeltsin would be able to build Russia as a democratic state and free market economy overcoming the present horrendous economic difficulties.

Major landmark agreements or treaties in the sphere of disarmament are discussed in some detail below.

THE PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY

After prolong negotiations for over four years a partial test ban treaty was signed at Moscow in 1963. Its original members were the USA, Britain and the Soviet Union. It has five articles. The preamble acknowledges the fact that nuclear test contaminates man's environment by radio activity. Article 1 prohibits every member to launch any nuclear test under its jurisdiction and control-atmosphere, outer space and underwater or high seas. Underground tests, however, are not prohibited as their detection is not easy. The treaty also refrains signatory states from

encouraging either directly or indirectly the non-signatory states from carrying out nuclear tests. Non-signatories can become parties to it by means of accession. India has already acceded to it. This treaty is for unlimited duration. But under extraordinary conditions one can withdraw as per Article 4.

It was a significant step towards lasting peace and disarmament, a breakthrough, a new era in international relations. It reduces the dangers of radio-active fall-out by restricting nuclear test to underground. Another advantage was a convention on the "ecological" effects. And, at the same time, the criticism of those who attributed the source of many problems to these atmospheric experiments an increase in the number of leukaemia cases no longer had any reason to do so. This treaty also accorded to the super-powers a major role without asking them to play with their sovereignty. Another gain from this treaty was indirect non-proliferation. The powers not in possession of nuclear weapons, being signatory to this treaty, were in practice unable to become a member of the nuclear club. This remained so long as it was obligatory to conduct atmospheric experiments.

This treaty is partial for two reasons. *First*, it does not prohibit underground nuclear tests. In fact both the Soviet Union and the United States conducted numerous underground tests ever since the Treaty was signed. The reason for this drawback in the Test Ban Treaty could be explained in terms of inadequate scientific knowledge to detect underground nuclear test accurately. The Test Ban Treaty is also partial because over hundred nations subscribed to the treaty, two nuclear powers—France and China refused to sign it. The treaty made no provision for control through posts, spot inspection or international bodies. It merely prohibited those tests which could be detected and made no effort to reduce the nuclear stockpiles. Despite these shortcomings, the Treaty was a major disarmament breakthrough.

The technical procedure of monitoring has become more and more reliable, the two superpowers no longer need to undertake significant underground experiments that led to the signing of a new treaty between the USA and the USSR in July 1974— the TTBT (Threshold Test Ban Treaty). This was a purely bilateral treaty this time which banned all underground nuclear tests going beyond the "threshold" of 150 kilotons after 31 March 1976. Inspite of these treaties testing of nuclear weapons continued. The six nuclear states are known to have made 1,221 nuclear explosions between 1945 and 1979: India 1; China, 25; U.K. 30; France, 86; The Soviet Union, 426; and the US, 653. This pace was not slowed by the partial test ban treaty of 1963 as it did not stop underground explosions. In fact 60 per cent of these explosions have taken place since the 1963 partial test ban treaty.[22]

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

After about three years of negotiations the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was voted by the General Assembly in June 1968. The NPT was, finally signed on 1 July, 1968 and came into force on 5 March, 1970; when 44 non-nuclear and 3 nuclear powers completed the process of ratification. Later on the number of signatories rose to about 187 states, making it the most widely adhered to arms control agreement in world history. It aims at ruling out any possibility of the further spread of the nuclear weapons. The main provisions of the Treaty are:

(i) It obliged all the countries possessing nuclear weapons not to disseminate nuclear knowledge, and transfer manufactured nuclear weapons to the non-nuclear countries.
(ii) Nuclear countries agreed to give preferential treatment to non-nuclear countries who signed NPT in supplying information and material aid in nuclear field, not for purposes of manufacturing nuclear weapons, but for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

(iii) Nuclear countries undertook to give immediate assistance to the non-nuclear countries if they were attacked or threatened to be attacked by any other country.
(iv) Non-nuclear countries should accept the verification and safeguard control set up by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to prevent the transfer of nuclear energy from peaceful to military purposes.
(v) It expresses the determination of the parties that the treaty should lead to further progress in comprehensive arms control and nuclear disarmament measures.
(vi) This treaty is valid for a term of 25 years (i.e. upto 1995) with a five yearly conference for the purpose of verifying its usefulness.

At the fifth NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995, states parties agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely and without conditions.

The NPT fulfils two related objectives. *First*, the countries already possessing nuclear weapons agree not to transfer, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons or their control to a country not in possession of them. Any form of incitement to possess them is also prohibited. *Second*, those nations not in possession of nuclear weapons undertake neither to accept their transfer, nor to manufacture them, nor seek any aid to procure them.

This treaty is also not free from criticism as it suffers from many drawbacks. Owing to these snags, countries like France, China, India, Israel, Pakistan, Spain, Brazil, Argentina and the Republic of South Africa refused to sign it. With the change in world's security environment after the end of the cold war South Africa (1991), China (1992), France (1992) Belarus (1993), Ukraine (1994), Kazakhastan, Argentina and Brazil signed and joined this treaty between 1991 and 1997. After 1998 only four countries (India, Israel, Pakistan and Cuba) are outside this cornerstone of non-proliferation efforts. They dub it as monopolistic and discriminatory. It monopolises the right of the existing nuclear powers to manufacture weapons and possess them, while the non-nuclear countries not only cannot manufacture and possess the nuclear weapons, but cannot even obtain nuclear knowledge for peaceful purposes. Its discriminatory nature enables the already existing nuclear powers to carry out nuclear tests without any restraint. Thus it creates imbalance between the nuclear and non-nuclear states. This imbalance is further accentuated by the fact that by signing the NPT, the countries belonging to the second group agree to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor their internal nuclear activities. This results in an international control only for the countries of the second group, whereas the nations already owning nuclear weapons are freely allowed to increase their warheads in quantity as well as in quality.

This treaty lays down the limits of nuclear proliferation yet it does not forbid its dissemination. The signatory nuclear powers remain free to place their weapons in friendly or allied countries provided these countries do not have the "use of the keys", i.e. the power to decide the use of these weapons. Their territory can only be used as a repository; the original country remains in sole control of the nuclear game.

The big five members of the nuclear club believed that they had a limitless right to hoodwink the less privileged signatories to the NPT by renewing their "unequivocal commitment" to eliminate nuclear weapons during the sixth Review Conference in 2000. The Big-5 are allowed to retain nuclear weapons. Even 30 years after the signing of the NPT, the nuke club is not evolving a fixed time frame for eliminating weapons of mass destruction.

Some signatory states have also specified that under certain circumstances they would denounce it. One reason most frequently alluded to is a desire to have access to nuclear weapons of a power

in a particular region. Countries like Libya and Iran have reserved their right to withdraw in certain conditions classified as "extraordinary events." With these weaknesses, the NPT remained only a limited disarmament measure. No doubt, this treaty is biased in favour of nuclear powers and is therefore unequal and patently discriminatory, yet it is an important landmark on the long road to disarmament.

Except four (India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba) all other countries of the world have joined and accepted it. It is not a small thing.

Biological Weapons Convention

The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) bans the development, production, stockpiling, or acquisition of bacteriological and toxin weapons. The United States—which had unilaterally renounced biological and toxin weapons in 1969 — submitted its instruments of ratification to the convention in March 1975. There are currently some 139 states parties to the convention with an additional 18 countries who have signed the pact but not ratified it.

Three BWC review conferences have been held since 1972. At the second review conference in 1986, the parties agreed on a set of confidence building measures (CBMs,) including the exchange of data on biological research laboratories that meet very high safety standards, sharing information on all outbreaks of infectious diseases caused by toxins which deviate from the normal, encouraging publication of results of biological defense research in scientific journals, and promoting scientific contact.

At the third review conference in 1991 states parties strengthened the existing CBMs and added two new ones: declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes, and declaration of vaccine production facilities. In addition, an Ad Hoc Group, open to all states parties, was created to consider appropriate measures to strengthen the convention and draft proposals in a legally binding instrument.

SALT-I

Most outstanding of the arms control measures adopted by the superpowers are the so-called SALT agreements. In the sphere of disarmament both the superpowers opened talks to limit strategic arms. These negotiations came to be known as Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Strategic weapons in the modern military language are those with which the super powers can directly hit each others home land. The SALT negotiations centred around those strategic weapon systems especially the offensive types. The origin of these negotiations can be found in an exchange of letters in 1967 between US President L. Johnson and the Soviet Prime Minister A. Kosygin at a time when the two countries were developing their anti-missile systems entailing heavy expenditure and also serving to undermine the balance of terror. Negotiations began in 1969 at Helsinki and continued till 1971, sometimes in Vienna and sometimes in Helsinki. Nixon's visit to Moscow paved the way for signing the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty-I (SALT-I) with Brezhnev on 26 May, 1972.

SALT-I consisted of (1) a treaty which restricted the deployment of antiballistic missile (ABM) defence systems by the United States and the Soviet Union to equal and very low level. The SALT I allows each super-power to construct only two defensive networks—one within a radius of 150 kms around the capital of either country and the other within a radius of 150 kms around the zone where the silos protecting intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) are placed.[23] This agreement was for an unlimited period.

(2) A five-year interim agreement on strategic offensive arms, which restricted the number of ICBM (inter continental ballistic missiles) and SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missiles) launchers each side was permitted to have. The strength of ICBMs for the Soviet Union and the USA was fixed at 1618 and 1054 respectively viz., on the basis of their actual strength on 1 July 1972. The two powers undertook not to convert their land based launchers into light ICBMs. Each member may monitor this by satellite, but each party is agreed not to scramble the information thus obtained. Once again, the proposal of an on-the-spot inspection was rejected. The information received through a satellite was considered adequately reliable. An agreement regarding the procedure of agreement was also reached between the two powers.

The agreement on offensive weapons merely deals with long-range ballistic missiles, not the medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM), for these would be used in case of a nuclear conflict in Europe. Martin observes: "The SALT-I agreements in no way constitute a progress towards nuclear disarmament. It is mainly a simple accord of quantitative arms limitations. Since both super-powers possess sufficient quantities of weapons to enable one to destroy the other a dozen of times, it serves no purpose to add to the amount of missiles. But this, in no way, prevents race for qualitative armaments".[24]

In July, 1974, the Soviets and the Americans signed a draft treaty on anti-missiles at Vladivostok. The draft reduced the number of permitted networks from two to one. But critics alleged that this is of little significance in so far as it is technically impossible to protect everything. In every country, besides capital, several major cities are a likely target. The protection of the missiles is guaranteed by the existence of several sub-marines. Thus, this treaty is not of much use.

To promote implementation of the treaty's provisions, the parties established the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), which meets at least twice a year. A review of the treaty is conducted every five years. The fourth review of the ABM Treaty, held in 1993, reaffirmed the participants' commitment to the pact and advocated efforts to strengthen it.

At the Helsinki Summit in March 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that the six missile defense systems aimed at protecting soldiers on the ground, which are currently being developed by the United States as part of the theater missile defense programme, are permitted by the treaty, though final technical details are still to be worked out.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the question of treaty succession arouse. On May 14, 1997, the U.S. Senate unanimously approved an amendment to the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty that included an unrelated, Republican-backed provision requiring the president to seek Senate approval, as a formal amendment to the ABM Treaty, for an agreement to extend the parties of the treaty to include Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, the successor states of the former Soviet Union.

The US administration maintains that it is premature to speculate on whether or when it might be necessary to negotiate changes to the ABM treaty should a future U.S. decision be taken to deploy a national missile defense..

In the year 2000 when the US endeavoured to change the ABM Treaty to develop the so-called National Missile Defence (NMD) system, Russia reacted angrily threatening to revive the cold war if the USA went ahead with decision to change the original format of the ABM Treaty.

SALT -II

After more than five years of complex and prolong negotiations between the USA and the USSR, the US President Carter and the Soviet President Brezhnev signed SALT-II Treaty on 18 June, 1979 at Vienna. This agreement anticipate quantitative as well as qualitative limitations of arms. The main provisions of SALT-II, although perhaps the most extensive and complicated arms control agreement ever negotiated, are nevertheless quite simple. *First*, the agreement called for placing an overall ceiling of 2,400 (to be reduced to 2,250 by the end of 1981) on the number of ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and ASBMs (air-to-surface ballistic missiles with ranges over 600 kilometers) each side is permitted to maintain. Within this overall ceiling, several sub-ceilings specified additional restrictions on particular types of nuclear systems. The first sub-ceiling limited each superpower to 1,320 launchers equipped with MIRVs (multiple independently targettable re-entry vehicles) plus heavy bombers equipped with long-range cruise missiles. The second sub-ceiling limited the total number of launchers of MIRVed ballistic missiles to 1,200 and the third sub-ceiling restricted each nation to the deployment of no more than 820 MIRVed ICBMs.

Besides above numerical limits, SALT II put other restrictions on the superpowers. For instance, the accord banned construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers and increase in the number of fixed heavy ICBM launchers. It also limited the number of warheads permitted on ICBMs and ASBMs to ten, and the number permitted on SLBMs to fourteen. This restriction, unlike any in SALT I, would have the effect of inhibiting qualitative improvements in the payload delivery capabilities of the superpowers' missiles. At the time of signing of SALT II, the US State Department estimated that the total number of strategic nuclear weapons possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union would be perhaps as many as 8,500 fewer by 1985 that the two sides would have possessed in the absence of SALT II. The number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles would also be somewhat smaller than otherwise anticipated, which as a practical matters means that the Soviet Union would not be permitted to deploy as many delivery vehicles as American defense planners believe it otherwise would deploy.[25] This treaty was to remain in force for five years.

These SALT II agreements were not ratified by the United States owing to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Despite the absence of ratification, the two superpowers tacitly observed the conditions of the treaty after being conscious of the fact that it was in their mutual interest to do so.

The SALT II accord drew criticism for the following reasons. (i) The treaty ignored the nuclear-strike capability of third powers, especially the People's Republic of China. Talk in the United States of playing the "China Card" tended to make the Soviet leadership increasingly apprehensive over Chinese Intermediate-range missile (IRBMs). (ii) The agreement limited the number of missile launchers available to each signatory, but the subject of warheads received little attention. Technological breakthroughs enabling intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to carry additional warheads would weaken the restraining power of the treaty. (iii) SALT II failed to address the problem of growing members of IRBMs in Central Europe— an omission which strained the relations of the principal members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. (iv) The agreement specifically allowed each side to test and deploy one new "light" ICBM system. This gave the United States free hand to develop a new, mobile land-based missile system, which, significantly, the Carter administration announced it was going to develop even before SALT II had been signed. Known as MX, the new missile system was initially projected to cost more than $ 30 billion. Estimates have increased progressively since

then. Notwithstanding these criticisms, SALT II represented a high point in the contemporary history of arms-control negotiations.

INF TREATY

Talks between the USA and the USSR on limiting and reducing intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) began in Geneva on December 1, 1981. The Russians walked out in 1982. The talks were resumed in March, 1985. The agreement, which, after two unsuccessful summits in Geneva (1985) and Reykjavik (1986) between Reagan and Gorbachev, looked an impossible goal to reach was ultimately signed on December 8, 1987 at Washington during the third summit. Main features of this historic treaty are as follows:

(i) The treaty eliminates over 1,000 intermediate-range nuclear weapons stationed in Europe as a major step towards the distant goal of ridding the world of the menace of a nuclear war.

(ii) It eliminates all missile systems in the specific range (500 kms. to 5000 kms.) and prohibits further production. Both sides are to destroy all their land-based medium-range nuclear missiles capable of travelling between 500 and 5000 kms.

(iii) Missile related facilities would be eliminated within three years. For the USA the agreement meant destroying of the Pershing missiles stationed in West Germany and the Tomahawk cruise missiles in Britain, West Germany, Italy and Belgium. On its side, the Soviet Union was to eliminate silo-based SS-4 rockets and the SS-20, SS-12 and SS-23 missiles. The main Soviet missiles, the SS-20, carries three warheads each of which has a destructive force equivalent to 150 kilotons of TNT. The American missiles carry one warhead each.

(iv) Treaty defines systems and prohibits possession and further production. Complete data was provided as of November 1, 1987.

(v) Production of launchers and flight testing is also prohibited.

(vi) The treaty includes an agreement under which the two sides will be able to verify the implementation of their accord. That includes posting of officials in each other's territory. A system of resident inspectors will monitor the treaty provisions in each others territory.

The INF treaty opens the way to a less armed and safer world. Then UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar said the INF Treaty marked the first time an agreement had been reached that would "actually reduce the awesome stocks of nuclear weapons" in the world.[26] This treaty is a definite step towards global disarmament. The treaty has triggered off "a genuine process of transition towards a less confrontational and more secure world", the Indian analysts say.[27] Unlike all previous attempts which were geared towards arms control, the INF treaty assumes significance as a concrete step towards actual elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons. Inspite of the scepticism that only 4 per cent of the US and Soviet arsenals are affected by the treaty, the long-term political implication of the agreement far outweighs its short-term military significance. It firmly establishes the principle that nuclear weapons are not at all important for security. The treaty came into force on June 1, 1988 and was *fully implemented* by June 1, 1991.

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), was formed in 1987 by the United States, Britain, Canada, Japan, then West Germany, Italy and France. Today there are 28 member nations, and an increasing number of countries are unilaterally observing MTCR guidelines.

The purpose of the MTCR is to restrict the proliferation of missiles, unmanned air vehicles, and related technology for systems capable of carrying a 500 kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers, as well as systems designed to deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The regime originally focused only on nuclear capable delivery systems, but in January 1993 the partners extended the guidelines to cover delivery systems for all WMD (nuclear, chemical, and biological).

The MTCR is *neither a treaty* nor an *international agreement* but is a voluntary arrangement among countries which share a common interest in halting missile proliferation. The regime consists of common export policy applied to a common list of controlled items. Each member implements its commitments in the context of its own national export laws.

At their 11th Plenary Meeting in October 1996, MTCR partners built on earlier meetings on the regional aspects of missile proliferation and transshipment issues and agreed to continue to exchange views on the role of the regime in dealing with missile-related aspects of regional tensions. Partners also noted with satisfaction a continuing readiness by non-member countries to observe MTCR guidelines.

TREATY ON THE REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE)

November 19,1990 will go down as a landmark in modern European history because on that day at Paris the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries signed a treaty which drastically reduces their conventional arsenals for the first time since World War II. It marked the formal end of the cold war and start of an era of peace, free from the frantic race for armaments. The treaty, described as the most comprehensive and far-reaching arms reduction accord ever negotiated, was signed by US President Bush, Soviet President Gorbachev, French President Mitterand, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, British Prime Minister Mrs. Thatcher and other leaders of 22 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The summit host, President Mitterand, described the treaty as a historic accord which is an important contribution to stability and peace in Europe and in the entire world. The treaty eliminated the threat of surprise attack and established parity of conventional weapons in Europe by reducing five categories of conventional weapons to equal levels for each alliance grouping. The members of NATO and Warsaw Pact declared for the first time that they were adversaries no more. The growing detente between the US and the Soviet Union gave the initial impetus for the negotiations on the reduction of conventional arms in Europe. The Treaty came into force on July 17, 1992.

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (START-I)

On July, 31,1991, Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush signed the historic Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals by about 30 per cent and hailed it as a signal dispelling five decades of mutual mistrust. The Treaty came into force on December 5, 1994. This treaty was the result of nearly a decades efforts and it effected the first real cuts in long-range nuclear weapons. The Soviets will end up with a 35 per cent cut in their strategic warheads, from around 11,000 to 7,000 and the US with a 25 per cent reduction from about 12,000 to 9,000. The treaty limits the strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) to 1,600 each. The SNDVs comprise deployed ICBMs and their launchers, deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and their launchers and heavy bombers.

Both sides have agreed to give the other side a politically-binding declaration on long-range (more than 600 Kms) nuclear sea—launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). It includes nuclear-armed air launched cruise missiles with a range of over 600 Kms.

Since the Soviets had their warheads on their land-based ballistic missiles, considered by the US as most threatening to it, they would have to make deeper cuts than the Americans. The US gets away with relatively smaller cuts since it keeps more of its strategic nuclear force in submarines and on bombers rather than ballistic missiles.

The treaty does not cover sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). The Soviets were insisting on their inclusion in the START ambit but gave up following persistent US refusal. Even with the proposed cut, the two sides will have 4,900 ballistic missiles each.[28]

The great achievement of this treaty is that verification will be much less of a problem in reaching arms control in future. Although START has ended a nine-year long quest for a reduction of the nuclear arsenal on a happy note, it is the greatly improved prospects as a result of the Gorbachev revolution of an early end to the politics of deadly confrontation that holds out the promise of an end to the nuclear nightmare. After all, the US and the Soviet Union will still have a formidable array of nuclear warheads. START reduces the strategic weapons by only 30 per cent. The remainder has the potential many times over to devastate the planet.[29]

In June 1992 President George Bush had asked the Senate to approve changes in the still-unratified strategic arms reduction treaty.

On May 23, 1992 the US, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine sign the Lisbon (Portugal) START Protocol under which all five countries become parties to START and the CIS states agree to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.

The Lok Sabha of India welcomed the START and appealed for early multilateral negotiations for a new treaty "eliminating all nuclear and other weapons within a time bound framework". Endorsing India's position on the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, the resolution called upon the government to pursue the various proposals and initiatives for ushering in "a nuclear weapons free world".[30] The START is a strong reminder that the superpowers consider as farfetched India's three-phase arms control proposal under which nuclear threshold states would undertake not to go nuclear if the nuclear weapons states cut the size of their arsenals, end nuclear testing and production of weapon usable materials, and agree to work towards complete nuclear disarmament by 2010. The Indian proposal was presented to the United Nations with the support of the six-nation, five continent peace initiative. Shortcomings of this treaty are discussed in subsequent part.

TREATY ON OPEN SKIES

The Open Skies Treaty—signed in March 1992 in Helsinki, Finland—promotes openness and transparency in military activities through reciprocal, unarmed observation overflights. Designed to enhance security confidence, the treaty gives each signatory the right to gather information about the military forces and activities of other signatories.

First proposed to the Soviet Union in 1955 by President Eisenhower, the concept lay dormant until proposed again by President Bush in 1989. Negotiations began that year between member states of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. Today, the treaty has been signed by 27 countries.

The Open Skies Treaty will enter into force 60 days after ratification by 20 signatories, which must include all those subject to eight or more overflights each year after full entry into force. These are Belarus, Russia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States. The treaty was ratified by the United States in November 1993. Of the above signatories, only Belarus, Russia and Ukraine have yet to ratify the treaty as of July 1997.

Signatories must submit their overflight requests for each coming year to all other signatories and to the Open Skies Consultative Commission, the organisation established by the treaty to facilitate implementation. The treaty specifies the maximum number of overflights that each signatory must accept annually. After full implementation, the Untied States is obliged to accept 42 overflights per year.

BUSH-YELTSIN AGREEMENT ON ARMS REDUCTION

Presidents George Bush and Boris Yeltsin on June 17, 1992 agreed on dramatic two-thirds reductions in strategic nuclear arms by the year 2000 and complete elimination of multiple warhead land-based missiles on both sides by the year 2003. The two sides also agreed to work for a joint ballistic missile defence for the whole world, as proposed by the Russian President. Both countries would cut their nuclear warheads to no more than 3,000 to 3,500 each.

If the START signed by Bush and the ex-Soviet President' Gorbachev, envisaged a hefty reduction in the number of nuclear warheads in the two countries' possession from over 22,000 to 8,500 by the year 2000, this US-Russian agreement aims at a further slashing of the warheads to 6,500 by 2000 or 2003.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)—which was signed on January 13, 1993 and entered into force on April 29, 1997, shortly after ratification by the U.S. Senate—is a global treaty that bans an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. As of June 11, 1997, 95 nations, including the US had ratified the Convention.

Under the CWC, each state party undertakes never, under any circumstances, to: develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone; use chemical weapons; engage in any military preparation to use chemical weapons; and assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a state party under the convention.

In addition, each state party undertakes to: destroy the chemical weapons it owns or possesses or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control; destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another state party; and destroy any chemical weapons production facilities it owns or possesses or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control.

The CWC helps to combat two of the gravest security challenges of the post-Cold War era—the spread of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. The treaty goes further than any other arms control agreement to date in applying pressure to those outside. Nations who refuse to join the convention will find themselves unable to trade in many chemicals that can be used to make poison gas. By restricting the flow of chemicals that can be used to make poison gas, the CWC makes it more difficult and more costly for terrorists to acquire or use chemical weapons.

The first session of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, created in The Hague to implement the convention, was held in May 1997. The states parties to the CWC will review its progress in the sixth and eleventh years following entry into force.

The CWC signed in January 1993 is, in the words of Gallagher, "most ambitious arms control accord to date: it completely forbids an entire category of weapons, provides for intrusive inspections and array of other transparency measures, entrusts significant decision-making authority

to the international control organisations, and contains automatic penalties to punish non-participants."[31] Observers like Floweree saw the CWC as a "security milestone" on the road to a more cooperative post-Cold War security system.[32]

START-II

The US and Russia signed the START-II Treaty on January 3, 1993 to further reduce inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) by eliminating MIRVed (multiple independently targettable re-entry vehicle) ICBMs and cutting the number of overall warheads for each side to between 3,000 and 3,500. MIRVed ICBMs were seen to pose the single greatest threat to strategic stability during the cold war. It also includes detailed verification measures, including provision for on-site inspection.

The treaty's overall limits of 3,000-3,500 deployed strategic warheads dramatically downsizes arsenals from the 10,000-12,000 warheads deployed by each side at the end of the 1980s to roughly the levels possessed by the United States in 1962 and the Soviet Union in 1976. Additionally, the treaty's ban on the deployment of MIRVs on land-based ICBMs a long-sought US goal, eliminates the destabilising threat of pre-emptive attack on or the early use of such missiles in crisis. As a result, the treaty substantially improve the overall stability of the US-Russia strategic nuclear relationship.[33]

The United States ratified the Start-II in January 1996 and Russia in April 2000. The Russian Duma delayed the ratification owing to (i) the expensive restructuring of Russian strategic forces that would be required to comply with the terms of the agreement, (ii) to have time to evaluate the impact of NATO expansion and the US missile defense programmes on Russian security interests.[34] After the ratification by Russia in 2000 now the world looked, forward to negotiations on START-III, which contribute further reductions in nuclear weapons stocks. According to a 1997 agreement, START-III negotiations are to begin once START-II comes into force.

START (2010)

The US President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a landmark disarmament treaty on April 8, 2010, they hoped would herald better bilateral ties and raise pressure on countries seeking nuclear arms to renounce such ambitions. The agreement—which replaces the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I) which expired in December 2009—will cut strategic nuclear arsenal deployed by the former Cold War foes by 30 per cent within seven years but leave each with enough to destroy the other several times over. But the move at least paves the way for still greater reduction. This huge stockpile—some 2,600 warheads with Russia and 2,252 by the US—had accumulated mainly because of deep-rooted suspicions. At one stage, they had nearly four times and many till the first START in 1991 barred them from deploying over 6,000 nuclear warheads. Even now the number is pretty large. True disarmament would come about when it is cut still further drastically. This treaty will put greater pressure on countries having nuclear ambitions, who have all along been accusing these two nuclear powers, which together have 90 per cent of the world's nuclear weapons, of hypocrisy.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which bans all nuclear explosions, was negotiated in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) between January 1994 and August 1996 and opened for signature at the United Nations on September 24, 1996. President Clinton was the first to sign the treaty. As of July 8, 1997, 144 countries had signed, including all five nuclear weapons states.

The CTBT will enter into force six months after the articles of ratification by 44 nations—named in the treaty as having nuclear power or nuclear research reactors—are deposited with the United Nations, but in no case earlier than two years after the treaty was opened for signature. To date, three of the 44—India, Pakistan and North Korean— have not signed. So far, only four nations have deposited their instruments of ratification.

The treaty states that each signatory has the basic obligation "not to carry out any nuclear-weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control." Each CTBT party also is obliged "to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear-weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion."

In Article I, each party to the CTBT undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere and for all time. Thus it bans all explosions including those conducted underground.

While praising the CTBT, John D. Holum says, "So for the Nuclear Weapon States, the CTBT will rule out new qualitative advances in nuclear weaponry..... new types of nuclear weapons will be out of the question, given the real uncertainties they would confront without the ability to conduct nuclear explosive tests. In short, under the CTBT the 'vertical proliferation' associated with the pursuit by the five nuclear states of new and advanced nuclear weapons should end and the current generation of nuclear weapons should be the last."[35] This way, the CTBT will facilitate further reductions in nuclear arsenals and move the world toward the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

So far India has refused to sign the CTBT on the ground of the following objections: (i) it is neither comprehensive nor one that bans all types of testing such as sub-critical (non-nuclear explosives) and computer/laboratory simulations; (ii) it ignored India's security scenario, with two unfriendly neighbours—Pakistan and China. Both are nuclear weapons states. In such a security scenario India wanted to retain its strategic flexibility; (iii) it is discriminatory as it favours the five nuclear powers. It allowed the Big-5 to keep their nuclear arsenals. India insists that the treaty should be a part of a time-bound global nuclear disarmament plan, and; (iv) the coming into force provision was a breach of Indian sovereignty, as it enforced obligations on India without its consent.

The Clinton administration who was vehement supporter of the CTBT could not get it ratified from the US Senate. The Senate refused to ratify the CTBT in October 1999. The Russian State Duma and upper house Federation Council ratified it in April and May 2000 respectively paving the way for President Vladmir Putin to sign it into law.

FISSILE MATERIAL PRODUCTION CUTOFF TREATY

A Fissile Material Production Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would prohibit the five nuclear weapons states (as well as all the other parties to the treaty) from producing fissile material for nuclear explosives or outside of international safeguards. President Clinton, in his September 24, 1996 address to the U.N. General Assembly, called on the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to take up "immediately" the challenge of negotiating such a treaty.

Clinton had first called for cutoff negotiations in his 1993 address to the U.N. General Assembly, and in December 1993 the UNGA passed a consensus resolution calling for the negotiation of a "nondiscriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive

devices." In March 1995, the CD agreed by consensus to establish an Ad Hoc Committee with a mandate to negotiate a cutoff treaty based on the 1993 UNGA Resolution.

However, despite widespread international support for an FMCT, formal negotiations on cutoff have not yet begun in the CD. The CD can only approve decisions by consensus, and since the summer of 1995, the insistence of a few states to link FMCT negotiations to other nuclear disarmament issues has brought progress on the cutoff treaty there to a standstill. The United States continues to seek the initiation of FMCT negotiations at the CD on terms consistent with the March 1995 mandate.

THE GLOBAL ELIMINATION OF APL

On May 16, 1996 President Clinton announced US anti-personnel landmine (APL) policy, calling for a worldwide ban on production, transfer and use of anti-personnel landmines as these claim more then 25,000 casualties each year, obstruct economic development and keep displaced persons and refugees from returning home. Mines pose great threat to civilian population. Since January 17, 1997 the US pursues a comprehensive, global ban on APL through the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva and a permanent ban on APL export and transfer, as well as establish a stockpile cap at current inventory levels. The CD approved a proposal on June 26, 1997 to appoint a special coordinator who will seek to develop mandate for negotiations on anti-personnel landmines and named Australian Ambassador John Campbell to the post.

SUMMIT ON N-MATERIAL SECURITY

The Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) held in Washington DC (April 12-13, 2010) has brought into sharp focus the urgent need for securing the world from nuclear terrorism. The leaders representing 47 countries (the major, minor and wannabe nuclear powers) went beyond underlining the need for "strong nuclear security measures" so that it was rendered impossible for "terrorists, criminals or other unauthorised actors" to acquire the ultimatum weapon to annihilate the world or a part of it. The world leaders set a clear-cut target of achieving their objective in four years, which showed how serious they were in meeting the challenge posed by non-state actors. In their customary joint statement, the leaders admitted that "nuclear terrorism is one of the most challenging threats to international security," the view India has been expressing for a long time. The Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) was brainchild of US President Barack Obama. His achievement lied in the assembled leaders' appreciation of his unprecedented "call to secure all vulnerable nuclear material" in a time-bound manner. However, the task is not as easy to accomplish as it appears.

CRITICAL EVALUATION

The efforts to lessen international tension by limiting and reducing armaments have been many. The record of achievements in arms control is rather spectacular, indicating that limitations on the number and destructiveness of weapons have been, and remain, feasible. But these accomplishments covertly hint at many of the drawbacks and the lack of meaningful controls of armaments in many other areas. Actually, these gains might even enhance, rather than remove, the dangers posed by contemporary weapons. Critics have remarked, for instance, that arms control measures may give a false sense of security by encouraging us to think that the arms race is being meaningfully controlled when, in reality, it is not.

Critics further point to a long record of arms-control agreements breached on the plea of expediency and the defence of vital interests. Arms control treaties do not significantly check the

arms race as they often deal with secondary problems and require signatories to make only nominal concessions, which are usually rendered meaningless by subsequent advances in technology. For instance, the United States and the Soviet Union competed to be the first to introduce laser weapon capable of destroying an incoming missile. Such a defence weapon would be lawful, yet it would have the result of invalidating part of the SALT-I agreement. "The labyrinth of disarmament negotiations since World War II and the charges of violations of SALT I appear to lend credence to a pessimistic view of arms control, yet the effort to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction must continue if humankind is to survive".[36]

As nations still believe that security is the by-product of arms accumulation, and that the gains from arms limitation are very few, it may be argued that they have preserved those cherished notions by only controlling those armaments which they had little intention of, or incentive for, developing. The "threat" system of armaments was not seriously challenged, for instance, by the elimination of nuclear weapons from Antarctica or Latin America, where the incentives for their deployment were not great. But where the leading nations have perceived their vital interests to be a stake, they have been disinterested to moderate their desire to acquire ever more potent weapons systems. "The cynic might argue", according to Kegley and Wittkopf, "that control has been largely a fraud devised to disguise the continuation of preparations for war, or even a conspiracy conducted (cooperatively) by the great powers to spread complacency in the public mind and thereby preserve the unquenchable thirsts of their military establishments for more money and arms".[37]

Another realistic charge is that arms control achievements rarely put meaningful controls, and that, rather than containing arms races, they simply stabilise, legitimise and provide orderly rules for the smooth going of arms race. The SALT agreements, for instance, were widely regarded as significant pauses in the ever expensive Soviet-American arms race, and they were projected before the American and Soviet peoples as significant steps toward the control of arms. But critics have questioned whether they accomplished either task. Noteworthy, for example, is that during the five years covered by the SALT I agreement (1972-77), the combined military spending of the two superpowers exceeded $ I trillion. This is a rate of spending greater than that of the quarter century between the end of World War II and the signing of the SALT I agreement, when total spending was $2.3 trillion. This works out to about 9 per cent of the total United States GNP produced since the end of the war, and about a quarter of the Soviet Union. The SALT agreements, in brief, fail to curtail the military propensities of either superpower.

The SALT agreements also fail to impose significant restrictions. SALT I, for example, froze the number of strategic launchers in operation or in the process of construction at the time of the agreement, but it failed to cover strategic bombers or to prevent the kinds of qualitative improvements that can make quantitative thresholds irrelevant. One such improvement was in the number of strategic warheads a single missile could launch against an enemy (MIRVs). And in fact the number of independently targettable warheads deployed on missiles by the superpowers in 1977 was four times greater than when the SALT talks began—even though SALT I froze the number of delivery vehicles at the superpowers' disposal. Perhaps this was the kind of situation Herbert Scoville, Jr., a former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, had in mind when he noted at the time of the signing of SALT I: "Arms control negotiations are rapidly becoming the best excuse for escalating rather than toning down the arms race".[38]

But the critics should not overlook the fact that had these measures not been taken the scale of arms race would have assumed horrible magnitude. The latest measures like INF Treaty, Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Forces in Europe, (CFE), START and START-II, CTBT and

unilateral reductions by the US President Bush are more positive and improved than the previous ones as they provide for the elimination and reduction of medium and long-range nuclear weapons beside their limitation. Efforts in this direction must continue.

Commentators like Brahma Chellaney has found serious fault even with the latest agreements on arms control.[39] No arms-control measure has sizeably lessened the threat or results of nuclear confrontation or stopped the continued modernisation and expansion of nuclear arsenals. Indeed, the latest agreement, START, helps to underline that comprehensive disarmament even in stages is a Utopian idea and that the very concept of disarmament remains unacceptable to superpower strategic planners. START points out that the superpowers see the primary aim of arms control is not disarmament, but regulating the nuclear arms race and making deterrence less risky and more stable. Since deterrence strategies of the nuclear weapons states are based on assured and massive retaliation to first strike, weapons that are vulnerable to a first strike are seen as "destabilising" and their removal is viewed as necessary to enhance stability. These weapons include heavy and silo-based missile systems, which are seen as "sitting ducks". Multiple independently-targettable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) systems with multiple warheads are also considered 'bad" because they allow a first-strike force to inflict very heavy damage and this capability weakens deterrence. It is precisely such weapons that START seeks to reduce. But sophisticated submarine-based weapons, which are least vulnerable to energy attack, or modern cruise missiles and strategic bombers, whose first-strike offensive capabilities are limited because they travel slowly, are "good" and "stabilising" weapons and START sanctions their continued production and modernisation.

It should be mentioned that START requires merely outdated weapons to be eliminated or reduced. Many of the weapons covered by START were in any case to be retired, and the treaty will only hasten their removal a few years ahead of schedule. The no-destruction requirement allows the superpowers to recycle old weapons as new weapons. Some of the warheads eliminated under INF have been repackaged into new weapons by the United States, and the continued recycling of retired warheads and launchers was discussed at length during the START negotiations. It may happen again that obsolescent weapons are retreated and rebuilt as sophisticated, lightweight, high yield weapons pack more fissile material per unit than older designs or if the same MIRVed system are "downloaded" and redeployed with fewer warheads. Almost evidently, START encourages the superpowers to technologically upgrade their arsenals.

More significantly, START permits the deployment of a new generation of long-distance weapons still in the pipeline and some kinds of strategic systems covered by the treaty are actually projected to carry more warheads than they do now. By late nineties, nuclear weapons on strategic bombers will rise from 2,608 to 2,736 in the case of the United States and from 616 to 960 in the Soviet case. The treaty also permits the Soviet Union to increase its sea-launched cruise missiles by a whopping 780 per cent and its air-launched cruise missiles by 81 per cent, while allowing 140 per cent and 19 per cent increases to the United States in similar weapons".[40]

Instead of making the world safer, START institutionalises and legitimises the nuclear arms race. Like two other more recent arms control agreements—INF and the Reduction of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)—it seeks to respond to and ratify previous or emerging political and security changes. CFE, for instance, seeks to make virtue out of necessity by providing a legal framework to the destruction of redundant pieces of equipment and Soviet pull out from eastern Europe which had already commenced before the treaty was signed. START, in comparison, however, is clearly an inadequate response to previous changes, permitting more long-range nuclear weapons after the cold war than what had been proposed during the height of superpower

tensions. In fact, it merely acknowledges the *status quo* because the superpowers had long ago readjusted their strategic modernisation plans in anticipation of the treaty.

With its elaborate and intrusive verification regime, START could be a model for more far-reaching nuclear arms agreements in future. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there is no immediate Soviet threat to the US for the time being. Thus START may be regarded as the last major arms control pact directly between the superpowers.

Russia took seven years to ratify the START-II that delayed its entering into force. Under START-II, the permitted level of 3,500 warheads is clearly excessive. Force level should be brought down by atleast another 50 per cent — and could go even lower — to better reflect the limited utility and unlikely need for nuclear weapons.

Arms control must also address the problems of securing non-deployed warheads and excess fissile material. At present, no treaty calls for the actual destruction of warheads taken out of services. For this the verifiable disarmament of a specific number of warheads on each side, perhaps equivalent to that reduced under START-II, and the monitored storage of the fissile material from the weapons are required.

Missiles defenses are another potentials threat to arms control. Because missile defenses under cut confidence in deterrent ability of strategic offences nuclear forces, steep strategic force reductions and large-scale national missile defenses are incompatible. National Missile Defence (NMD) programme of the U.S. is already causing problems between American-Russian arms control talks.

FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL

In future, arms control may follow the following ways:

1. Containment of the global diffusion of advanced technology, especially to major Third World countries pursuing independent military programmes.
2. Pressure on regional rivals in burning areas of the world like South Asia and West Asia to adopt arms control and confidence-building mechanisms to deter military build-ups and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
3. Improvement of political and physical control of nuclear weapons in the nuclear-weapons states.
4. Persuade India, Israel and Pakistan to join the NPT and the CTBT.
5. As Russia ratified the START-II after seven years in 2000 now it is time to move promptly to negotiate START-III with lower levels to reduce further US and Russian nuclear forces. Both countries should be able to agree to scale down their inventories over the next decade by another 50 per cent to around 1,000-1,250 warheads. The START-III will be the first strategic arms control agreement to include measures related to the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads.
6. Conclude a global fissile material cut off treaty (FMCT).
7. Pursue a comprehensive global ban on anti-personnel landmines (APL).

Forthcoming arms control efforts are not going to centre around weapons reductions among the present members of the nuclear club. And even when the nuclear powers agree to cut arsenals, they will try to eliminate only worn-out and outdated weapons.

In the near future, no power or a coalition of powers can pose a serious threat to the United States, but this has only reinforced its determination to remain the global military leader by developing new advanced technologies and modernising its nuclear and conventional forces. If the United States agreed to a total test ban or a halt to the fresh production of just one bomb material tritium, it would be great step towards arms control. Britain and France, which can hardly remain world powers without their nuclear weapons, also continue to expand their arsenals. Even China is currently engaged in a costly programme to double the size of its nuclear arsenal even though its current armoury is already larger than the combined British and French arsenals. No weapons state is ready to adopt the concept of minimum nuclear deterrence. In these circumstances, the idea of comprehensive disarmament in stages, as propounded by Jawahar Lal Nehru, Bertrand Russel and American scientists like Jerome B. Wiesner is still a distant goal.

A great deal still remains undone on the arms control agenda. With the notable exception of the NPT, which was indefinitely extended in 1995, major multilateral non-proliferation agreements are either unfinished (the BWC verification protocol), unstarted (the FMCT, START-III), unlikely to come into force for some time (the CTBT), or yet to be ratified by the US (the CTBT).[41]

By quoting John D. Holum, it can be concluded "While we still have a long way to go, a consensus has been reached that the trend toward an ever smaller role for nuclear weapons should be reinforced and that work toward their ultimate elimination should be continued."[42] Hope nuclear weapon states will realise what Robert A. Manning said a few years ago, "Nuclear weapons are *de facto* being devalued as the currency of power.[43]

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8

Theories and Approaches of International Politics

THE IMPORTANCE OF THEORY

International relations is far behind other social sciences in the development of theories. It is quite natural as this discipline is of recent origin. Notwithstanding this limitation, some remarkable developments have already taken place in the sphere of theory building. The works of William Fox, Stanley Hoffmann, Klaus Knorr, Sydney Verba, Horace Harrison, James Rosenau, Morton Kaplan, J.W. Burton, Hans J. Morgenthau, J. David Singer etc. have endeavoured to develop a theoretical perspective of this discipline. Efforts to propound a general theory of international relations are inspired by a number of factors. First of all, they are impressed and encouraged by the achievement of the natural sciences in precision and predictability. A theory is very useful in bringing about an order in a mass of data. It may work as a guide to action in international life. It is a crucial tool for understanding that gives meaning to mass of phenomena. It would make international relations a real policy science that would be of great help to statesmen and decision-makers. It is also useful for further creative research. Thus, the significance of theoretical speculation and perspective in international relations cannot be ignored.

Meaning of Theory and Approach

The word theory itself is full of ambiguity and confusion. The word theory derives from the Greek '*theoro*' which means "to look at." It is often used as a synonym for a thought, conjecture or idea. Some people mean by theory an interpretation or a point of view, whereas others would view it as the consummation of explanation. However, mostly people agree that the chief function of theory is explanation. But the problem especially in international politics is that there is no clear agreement on the question as to what should be explained and what can be explained. For scholars never agree on the nature or scope of international politics. For example, some authors identify international relations as the interaction of foreign policies. Thus their criterion of collecting data for study would be determined by this consideration. This is a matter of approach. But when this approach is employed in the study of foreign policy, a kind of a theory emerges as an explanation of foreign policy as it is made and executed in each country. A theory coming out of this way may be known merely as a theory of foreign policy and, therefore, only a partial theory of international relations by an outsider. But one who views international politics as the interaction of foreign policies would regard this theory of foreign policy as a theory of international politics. In this way, the nature of the theory is determined by the approach and the two are not easily separable. Because any theory of international relations is largely in accordance with the particular view about international politics and that is essentially a matter of approach. The terms 'approach' and 'theory' represent two different steps in the study of international politics, the former can be understood only in the context of the latter. For although scholars give their theories clearly, their approach can be known by a critical analysis of their theories. If there is a difference in theories it is owing to the divergence of approach behind those theories.[1] But for a scholar or researcher

approach comes first and theory is the outcome of the study undertaken with a particular approach or viewpoint.

Definitions of Theory of International Relations

Both traditional and modern-behavioural scholars have given their definitions of theory of international relations. Stanley Hoffmann, a scholar of the former school, has defined contemporary theory of international relations as "a systematic study of observable phenomena that tries to discover the principal variables, to explain behavior, and to reveal the characteristic types of relations among national units."[2] But Hoffmann points out that within the general limits of the scope of international relations theory one should also incorporate the works of normative thinkers and of policy-scientists. The former scholars with a philosophical orientation deal mainly with the *evaluation* of political reality and with the generation of *prescriptions or remedies* leading toward a better political life. The latter in the style of engineers attempt to go beyond description and explanation and endeavour to make policy (applied theory) which will serve the interest of a given political entity.

J. David Singer, a scientifically oriented scholar, has given a brief definition. Theory is "a body of internally consistent empirical generalisations of descriptive, predictive, and explanatory power."[3] For Singer, these generalisations should best be expressed in the form of hypotheses and propositions that are testable, verifiable, falsifiable and quantifiable. The traditional and behavioural definitions encroach upon each other. Both agree that the generalisations must be empirically derived, logically sound, and have the capability to describe, explain and predict. It may be noted, however, that Singer denies a theoretical role to ' prescription.' He argues that normative or prescriptive thinkers and policy scientists may well benefit from scientific theory, but that their prescriptive maxims are not part of theory.

CATEGORIES OF APPROACHES AND THEORIES

In international relations a number of approaches and theories have been developed in the twentieth century. The same can be grouped under four broad categories as under:

The Traditional School

The traditional or classical approach is based primarily on philosophy, history, ethics and law. It holds that general propositions cannot be accorded more than tentative and inconclusive status. Most of the traditionalists believe that international relations is the study of patterns of action and reaction among sovereign states as represented by their governing elites. It focussed attention on the activities of the diplomats and soldiers who carry out the foreign policies of their respective national governments. For this school, international relations is nothing but "diplomacy and strategy" and "cooperation and conflict." In simple words it is the study of peace and war.

It is assumed by the traditionalists that a number of factors or variables affect the behaviour of diplomats and soldiers as executors of state policy. These variables are: the climate conditions, geographic location, population density, literacy rates, historical and cultural traditions, economic conditions and commercial interests, religious and ideological maxims of a given nation-state as well as the capricious quirks of national leaders and their supportive elites. But an effort to find the reasons behind the actions of a given government to a hierarchical order among these variables is a futile activity; at best, it can produce only subtle hypotheses. Therefore, the traditionalists regard the observed behaviour of governments as most significant, which they explain in terms of concepts such as the 'balance of power', the 'pursuit of national interest', the quest for 'world order', and the diplomacy of 'prudence'.

Both idealist and realist theories come under this category. But the realist theories predominate in traditional school. The chief contributors to this school are Raymond Aron, Stanley Hoffmann, Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr and Arnold Wolfers. Representative of this school is the realistic theory propounded by Hans Morgenthau. The same will be subsequently discussed in detail.

In short, the traditionalists have presented some general propositions about international politics that serve to explain and, to a limited degree, predict the responses of foreign policy elites in crisis situations. Traditionalists generally regard international relations to be a sub-field of political science and philosophy, but a sub-field with characteristics that give it a separate status. Unlike political science which they believe is mainly the study of the governance of established political communities, traditionalists regard international relations as the study of the nearly anarchic relations existent among sovereign political entities. In this way, whereas traditionalists view entities as the analysis of "order" in the distribution of political goods in relatively stabilised and advanced political systems, they treat international relations as the study of 'disorder' in a nearly primitive and inegalitarian international system.

The Scientific or Behavioural School

It is on the question of the identity of the discipline that the scientific or behavioural school of thought first denounced the traditionalists—for the scientists generally consider international relations to be too broad and complex a field to be embraced by political science or any other single discipline. Most advocates of the scientific approach believe international relations to be an interdisciplinary field and to rely not only on political science and history, but also on other social and natural sciences. It should be clarified that both the traditionalists and the scientific schools are to some extent inter-disciplinary. "The distinction between the two", explain Couloumbis and Wolfe, "lies primarily in the effort of the latter to overcome the alleged imprecision of the former by employing quantitative techniques and model building. According to the scientifically oriented scholars, international relations has reached a traditionalist plateau, and a new set of methodological tools must now be employed if the heights of theory are to be ascended."[4]

The traditionalist theories have been criticised by scientists on the ground that they were too vague and inclusive to furnish useful explanation of international political behaviour, or too impressionistic and flexible to withstand the rigorous scientific test of verification. Scientific scholars believe in the empirical method, inductive reasoning, and comprehensive testing of hypotheses; explicit rules that must always be confirmed by repeated observation and testing. Scientific scholars emphasised the need for "operationalisation" of concepts by the precise measurement of variables. Operationalisation is a process by which one uses detailed rules for definition and coding to turn relevant facts into data which is quantifiable and, therefore, measurable. This paves the way for other independent observers to repeat the observations and check their accuracy.

According to their criteria, scientists believe that time has not yet come to advance general theories of international relations. There are various variables that affect the behaviour of the international system that it is not feasible to put them together scientifically. Therefore, most scientists concentrate on intermediate-level projects that link and relate a few selected variables at a time. Step by step they expect to achieve a consistent set of partial or middle-range theories that will stand the test of empirical verification.

Some scientific scholars have constructed conceptual frameworks and partial models of the international system. Others such as Deutsch[5], Kaplan[6] and Rosenau[7], have given tentative

hypotheses that provide sweeping analogues of political behaviour in an international environment, but for the most part their colleagues- e.g. J. David Singer and Melvin Small[8] and Ole Holsti[9]—have concentrated on middle-range or narrower, more tangible projects—despite occasional criticism that they are indulging in insignificant studies.

So far, the scientific school has produced "more promise than performance", to quote Singer, and more process analysis than substantive experimentation.[10] Its main achievement is in the sphere of methodology. "The application of the scientific method to international relations has brought to the field", say Couloumbis and Wolfe "not only concepts and sophisticated research tools from other social sciences, but also a body of 'pretheory' that lends itself to testing and verification procedures. Although the scientists have thus far offered the political science community few fully substantiated theoretical propositions, the 'promise' of their endeavours is worth awaiting, for its fulfilment will mean that theorists in international relations will be able to predict accurately and, by implication, to control the behavior of actors on the international scene."[11]

Post-Behavioural School

The controversy between traditionalists and behaviouralists waned in the 1970s. In the 1980s both schools of thought have ceased putting arguments such as "politics cannot be studied scientifically" or that "political science without quantification and value freedom is not very useful." The trend was towards eclectically oriented studies which was also known as post-behavioural orientation. It combined elements of the scientific approach with clear value objectives such as the control of nuclear weapons, the substitution of peaceful methods for war for dispute settlement, the control of population, the protection of environment, the eradication of poverty, disease and human alienation and quest for just international economic order.

Professor Rummel's study can be cited as a fine example of the latest post-behavioural eclectic approach. In his study Rummel, a known follower of the behavioural-scientific orientation, using well-developed statistical methods to process his data, presented evidence confirming some of the earliest nineteenth century liberal-theory hypotheses regarding the "causes" of war. Contrary to early behaviouralists, Rummel stated in his article that he saw nothing incompatible between proposing normative or even ideologically oriented hypotheses provided they are subjected to scientific testing designed to verify or falsify these hypotheses.[12]

The late seventies and eighties saw the emergence of at least two new schools of thought within the post-behavioural approach involving scholars who have been challenging earlier paradigms[13] of international relations. These two schools emphasised global dependency (radicalism/globalism) and interdependency (neoliberalism or transnationalism) respectively. The *interdependency* school (neoliberalism) deals with "world order." Both groups of scholars have questioned the studies of traditionalists as well as behaviouralists as they concentrate only on nation-states, their governments, their capabilities, and their interactions—diplomacy, non-military competition, and military conflict. In this way, they view the world in a state-centric fashion and ignore non-state actors and entities. They have oversimplified the complexity of the international situation and badly distorted reality. World-order theorists have pointed out the increasing role of non-state actors, such as multi-national corporations, regional and global international organisations, and terrorist organisations and movements. Any analysis that ignores these new actors will be insufficient and incomplete.

Dependency theorists (radicalists or globalists) taking inspiration from Marxist premises argue that *class* is a much better unit of analysis than *state;* that an understanding of the international political economy and the dependencies of the poor peripheries on the rich centres of economic

power explains more clearly the global phenomena than has been in the past. In this way, both dependency and interdependency/world-order theorists strive for the growth of a well-organised world community regulating itself with effective global institutions that have the capacity to contain the power of national governments. In a way these schools are "contemporary incarnations" of the idealism.[14]

In the early eighties in the wake of new Cold War *neorealism* took the place of neoliberalism/transnationalism and radicalism/globalism. In the late eighties *Post-positivism* dominated in international relations theory stressing that norms and regimes cannot be studied positivistically but by non-positivist methods.

Post-Cold War School

The post-Cold War theories also came to fore in the nineties and tried to explain the following issues: end of the cold war, creation of a new world order, place of power in the contemporary world or power diffusion, future security alliances or models, nature and type of emerging international system etc. These theories were discussed in brief in the first chapter.

It will be pertinent to discuss in some detail major theories of international relations as follows:

IDEALIST THEORY

The devastating First World War in 1914 stimulated the quest for knowledge that could address contemporary world problems in general and war in particular. A theoretical perspective with sustainable generalisations about the conditions under which war might be avoided and peace maintained was urgently needed. For that purpose a theory was required that could foresee incoming wars reliably and that could suggest policy-makers the ways to prevent their outbreak.

The diplomatic-historical perspective prevailed in the years after the First World War. Marxist-Leninist theory after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia also made a place for itself. But dominant theory between the two world wars in the Western World was political idealism. Its main advocates were Condorcet, Woodrow Wilson, Butterfield and Bertrand Russell. According to idealist theory the society and state are the outcome of evolution. This process of evolution is leading us towards the perfection from imperfection. At this stage peace and justice can be established in the society. Through the establishment of a family of nations, war, violence and immorality can be curbed.

Idealism emerged in the eighteenth century and is regarded as the major source of inspiration behind the American and French Revolutions. Condorcet's work[15] of 1795 had everything which is considered as the essential basis of idealism in international relations. He was for a world order sans war, sans inequality and sans tyranny. The world of this kind would be marked by constant progress in human welfare brought about by the use of reason, education and science. The theoretical premise of this is the result of the liberal outlook of the Condorcet type. Idealism envisions the future international society based on the idea of reformed international system free from power politics, immorality and violence. The idealist theory promises to bring about a better world with the help of morality, education and international organisation. The idealists are of the opinion that political conflict in the past were not for power but between inconsistent principles and ideals. Idealists present different viewpoints about world politics.

Basic Assumptions

Kegley, Jr. and Wittkopf observe: "What transformed their movement into a cohesive paradigm among Western scholars were the assumptions about reality they shared and the homogeneity of the conclusions their perspective elicited."[16] According to them, idealists projected a world view usually resting upon the following axioms: (1) human nature is essentially 'good' and capable of altruism, mutual aid and collaboration; (2) the fundamental instinct of humans for the welfare of others makes progress possible; (3) bad human behaviour is the product not of evil people but of evil institutions and structural arrangements that create incentives for people to act selfishly and to harm others including making war; (4) wars represent the worst feature of the international system; (5) war is not inevitable and can be eliminated by doing away with the institutional arrangements that encourage it; (6) war is an international problem that requires global rather than national efforts to eliminate it; and therefore (7) international society has to reorganise itself to eliminate the institutions that make war likely.[17]

To be clear, not all idealists subscribe to each of these tenets with equal emphasis. Many of them would probably disagree with some of them. Nevertheless, these tenets jointly explain the basic assumptions articulated in one way or another by the statesmen and theorists whose orientation toward world affairs captivated the discussion of world politics in the inter-war period. This discussion embraced ideals like moralism, optimism and internationalism.

Suggestions for Reform

The idealists offered the following remedies for solving international problems.

1. Moral nations should act according to *moral principles* in their international behaviour, eschew all kinds of traditional power politics, and follow policies of non-partisanship. Behaving this way may gradually minimise the bad effects of power politics.

2. Attempts should be made to create *supranational institutions* to replace the competitive and war-prone system of territorial states. Setting up of the League of Nations and an insistence on international cooperation in social matters as approaches to peace were symptomatic of idealists' institutional solutions to the problem of war. Many idealists went further in suggesting that power politics could only be abolished by instituting a world government. Thus in the ultimate analysis this theory aspires for the ideal of *world federation* or one world.

3. The *legal control* of war was also suggested. It called for new transnational norms to check the initiation of war and, should it occur, its destructiveness. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which 'outlawed' war as an instrument of national policy, represent the high point of legal approach. They also advocated more faithful adherence to international law.

4. Another way suggested by idealists was to *eliminate weapons*. The attempts towards global disarmament and arms control (the Washington naval conference of the 1920s, for example) were symbolic of this path to peace.

5. The efforts should be made to see that the *totalitarian forces* cease to exist, as the idealists believe that the struggles so far have been between democratic and totalitarian states. Totalitarianism is one of the main causes of war and it must be eliminated.

6. Some idealists saw the way to peace and welfare in the restructuring of the international *monetary system* and in the elimination of barriers of international trade. Still others saw in the principle of self-determination the possibility to redraw the world's political map under the conviction that a world so arranged would be a peaceful world.

Critical Evaluation

Idealist theory can be criticised on many counts. Most of the assumptions on which it is based are only partially correct. Though full of ideals and norms, yet it is far from reality. No wonder it is dubbed as imaginary, impracticable and thus utopian. Suggestions given by it to reform the international situation are difficult to be implemented. For example, at international level nations seldom bother to follow moral precepts nor do they strictly adhere to international law and treaties. Despite several serious attempts towards disarmament no spectacular achievement has been made in this field. It is impossible to eliminate totalitarianism altogether. World government or world federation is nowhere in sight. Kegley and Wittkopf rightly remarked: "Much of the idealist program for reform was never tried, and even less of it was ever achieved."[18] Thus idealists have enriched the thoughts of man, their ideas command respect but the same cannot be realised or executed in international relations.

Criticism apart, the theory has its importance insofar as no science, atleast no social science can exist without a normative aspect. It was also realised about international politics by writers like Reinhold Niebuhr, Herbert Butterfield and E.H. Carr. The theory offers solutions to many international problems. If they cannot be followed the fault lies not in the theory but in nations and their leaders who are unable or constrained to put them into practice.

Idealism was reincarnated in the late eighties in the form of reflectivism. The reflectivists put emphasis on interpretation, the reflection of the actors as central to institutions. Norms and regimes can be studied only subjectively and by non-positivist methods.

REALIST THEORY

The realist approach unlike the idealist approach regards power politics as the be-all and end-all of international relations. Of all the approaches, the one that was widely debated by the students and scholars was the power or realist approach. The theory of realism is an old theory which was in existence even in the eighteenth and nineteenth century and revived after the Second World War. The credit of being "the first noted realist" of twentieth century is usually given to N.J. Spykman who sometime in late thirties insisted in his book, *America's Strategy in World Politics*, that the "preservation and improvement of its power-position in relation to other states" must be the "primary objective" of a state. The contribution of reviving the theory in a more coherent way after the Second World War goes to Hans J. Morgenthau. He is regarded as the most persuasive advocate of this theory in the post-war era. Among the other principal prophets of this world view were EH. Carr (1939) from the United Kingdom, and those writing in the United States including Morgenthau (1948), Kenneth W. Thompson (1958, 1960), Reinhold Niebuhr (1947), George Kennan (1954 and 1967) and later Henry A. Kissinger (1957 and 1964). Scholars like Harold Lasswell, Quincy Wright, Martin Wight, George Schwarzenberger, Raymond Aron, Stanley Hoffmann and Arnold Wolfers have either supported or critically analysed this theory.

Meaning and Explanation

In international relations realism does not mean either the Platonic doctrine which attributes reality to abstract ideas, or the political doctrine of expediency with which Machiavelli is so often associated or the philosophic doctrine of empiricism given by John Locke. Its meaning revolves around security and power factors. These notions are the outcome of individual's belief that others are always trying to destroy him and hence he must be constantly ready to kill others in order to protect himself.[19] The realists assume that rivalry, strife and struggle for power continue among nations in some form or the other and it cannot be controlled by international law or government.

Therefore, the main job of diplomacy and statesmanship is to check the contest for power and the means to be adopted for it is new balance of power. As struggle for power is a permanent phenomenon realism is indifferent to the question of relationship between means and ends in international politics.

The realist theory explains international politics in terms of the concept of interest defined in terms of power. Interest guides the statesman more than anything else and that it is useless to try and understand his actions in terms of "his motives" or "his ideology." In fact, ideology is only a cloak for power politics. Statesmen think and act only in terms of national interest.

Realists put the moral significance of politics in a different way. To them, morality means weighing the consequences of political action. They do not believe in an ethics which lays down abstract universal principles and judge all actions by its conformity with such principles. Most realists express awareness of other standard of judgement, viz. the moral or legal, but argue that both history and experience prove that it has paid only to follow the "political standard," namely national interest, moderated by legal and moral considerations. Thus, they give first place to the political standard, that is, judging by the consequences of political action.[20]

Tenets and Assumptions

Kegley and Wittkopf sum up what many realists want to convey in the form of the following assumptions and tenets:

(1) A reading of history teaches that humanity is by nature sinful and wicked; (2) of all of man's evil ways, no sin is more prevalent or more dangerous than his instinctive lust for power his desire to dominate his fellowmen; (3) if this inexorable and inevitable human characteristic is acknowledged, realism forces dismissal of the possibility of progress in the sense of ever hoping to eradicate the instinct for power ; (4) under such conditions, international politics is a struggle for power, a war of all against all; (5) the primary obligation of every state in this environment—the goal to which all other national objectives should be subordinate—is to promote the national self-interest, defined in terms of the acquisition of power; (6) national self-interest is best served by doing anything necessary to ensure self-preservation; (7) the fundamental characteristic of international politics requires each state to trust no other, but above all never to entrust self-protection to international organisation or to international law; (8) the national interest necessitates self-promotion, especially through the acquisition of military capabilities sufficient to deter attack by potential enemies; (9) the capacity for self-defense might also be augmented by acquiring allies, provided they are not relied upon for protection; and (10) if all states search for power, peace and stability will result through the operation of a balance of power propelled by self-interest and lubricated by fluid alliance systems.[21]

Political realism seemed relevant in the world where suspicion of the motives of others was the rule and where prospects for peace were not bright. The development of super power rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and its expansion at global level in the name of cold war between East and West blocs, the proliferation of nuclear weapons of mass destruction, the seemingly continuous turmoil around the world—all these symptoms testify the realist theory. To many, the opinion that, in a threatening international environment, foreign policy takes precedence over domestic problems and policies was also relevant. Thus in the post-Second World War period the picture of the world depicted by the political realists obsessed the minds of many scholars.

"To fill the mind of sb. continually
so that they can think of nothing else

Six Principles of Morgenthau's Realism

Morgenthau in his famous book—*Politics Among Nations* has developed Realist theory in the form of six principles of political realism. The same are explained in brief as under:

1. *Objective Laws of Human Nature.* Political realism believes that politics is governed by the objective laws that have their roots in human nature. The laws by which man moves in social world are eternal. He cannot get rid of those laws because they are eternal and permanent. Man is a mixture of good and bad, selfishness and altruism, loving and quarrelsome traits and possessive and sacrificial qualities. His is the story of struggle for survival. Human nature has not changed, and it explains constancy and repetitious nature of political conduct. The complexity of international politics can best be understood only with the help of these objective laws. If one desires to appraise the nature of foreign policy it can be done only when one examines the activities of the statesmen, who always act in a manner that safeguard their country's interests.

2. *Interest in terms of power.* Concept of interest is defined in terms of power. National interests are the motivating force of a state's activity in the sphere of international politics. The state meets these interests with the help of power. That is why every nation wants to acquire more and more power. In this way, international politics is a struggle for power. The theory of realism does not bother about what is desirable or immoral. It cares only for the national interests which are desirable under the concrete circumstances, time and place. In other words, this theory preaches that states should not be led by ideologies; ethics or motives, as they do not govern the field of international politics. In short, the main function of a state and its statesman is to protect national interests with the help of power.

3. *Interests are dynamic.* The meaning attached to interest and power is not static and fixed once for all. National interests are changed and shaped by the circumstances. If the circumstances make the state a powerful one, its national interests become different from what they had been when the state was a weaker one. Not only interests are dynamic, but the power position of most countries also varies with time. The content and manner of the use of power are themselves determined by political and cultural circumstances.

4. *Universal moral principles inapplicable.* Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulations. They must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place. Prudence is the supreme virtue in politics, and political ethics judges action ultimately by its political consequences. An individual may sacrifice his interests to safeguard the abstract or moral value but the state cannot and should not sacrifice its interests. On the contrary, the states generally sacrifice the abstract or moral laws for the sake of national interest.

5. *Moral Aspirations of Nations.* Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the nation. This theory considers the nations as actors of international relations which strive to pursue and achieve their national interest with the help of power. The actions of the states can only be interpreted with this principle. The moral laws that govern the universe do not apply to states. Realism seeks to distinguish between truth and idolatry. Each state is tempted to identify its particular aspirations and actions in terms of universal moral principles.

6. *The autonomy of political sphere.* Realism declares the autonomy of political sphere. The difference between political realism and other schools of thought is real and profound. A political realist thinks in terms of interest defined as power, as an economist thinks in terms of utility, a lawyer in terms of conformity of conduct with legal rules and a moralist of such conformity with

moral principles. He is exclusively concerned about the relevance of a particular policy to the national power. Although this theory is aware of thoughts which are other than political, it regards and puts them subordinate to political science.[22]

Critical Evaluation

Inspite of its wide acceptability, the realist theory suffers from many weaknesses and limitations. It has been criticised by many scholars on the ground that it is an incomplete theory.

Benno Wasserman said that no scientific progress can be made in the study of international politics so long as Morgenthau's realist theory continues to have influence.[23] Robert Tucker criticised Morgenthau's theory because it is inconsistent both with itself and with reality.[24] According to Hoffmann this theory is full cf anomalies and ambiguities and ignores the discussion of ends.[25] Sprout objects to Morgenthau's theory because it neglects the objectives of national policy.[26] Quincy Wright criticises this theory for not having considered the impact of values on national policy.[27] Aron objects to this theory for having ignored the relation between ideologies and policies.[28] Thus various arguments against this theory can be summed up as under:

1. *Power—not the only motivation.* Man is seldom motivated only by power consideration. There are other drives and urges, like the drive for participation and community. Man is not merely a political being interested only in the control of actions of others. Realism suffers from the same defect as utopianism. If utopianism wrongly assumes that conditions for permanent harmony already exist, realism erroneously assumes the permanence of power-politics.

2. *Leads to continuous war.* Morgenthau believes that all nations seek power and persistently struggle for it. This generalisation would mean that the states should be in a continuous state of war. The peace era is just a deviation from it. Morgenthau, in order to prove his hypotheses, looks into the reality, while he should have done just the opposite.

3. *The element of 'should'.* When Morgenthau states that all states seek power, he actually means that all states should seek power. The element of 'should' takes Morgenthau's theory away from realism and near to idealism or to a position where it is not a dependable description of either the human nature or of the reality of international politics. The element of 'should' converts this theory into a normative theory. That is why Tucker[29] and Waltz[30] have found it difficult to accept this theory as realist.

4. *Wrong concept of human nature.* Morgenthau's concept of human nature is beset by a number of difficulties. *First,* he takes a very deterministic and pessimistic view about the human nature. *Second,* in a general sense, human nature is responsible for all human actions. Therefore, to say that international behaviour comes out of human nature does not mean anything. His version of human nature is unscientific because science consists of theories or hypotheses whose truth or validity has to be established by critical experiment or testing. But this theory is based not on such hypotheses but on what Benno Wasserman calls absolute and unverifiable essentialist law.[31]

5. *Full of contradictions.* Morgenthau contradicts his own views when he revives his faith in the honesty of man, by saying that there is the possibility of establishing peace through diplomacy. The high hopes he has pinned on diplomacy are unrealistic. He suggests that the foreign policy must be shaped by the statesman on the basis of national interest and the political scene, viewed by other nations. These are contradictory ideals totally divorced from logical relationship between themselves. Morgenthau believes that diplomacy can be successfully carried out by able statesmen. These able statesmen are rare. They cannot be produced by education or by anything else. Only

the will of God can produce some able statesmen in society. Here he becomes somewhat religious which again is in contradiction with his theory of realism.

6. *Objective interest questionable.* The idea of an objective national interest is also debatable. It makes sense only in the earlier periods in which the survival of the units of international politics is rarely at stake and in which units pursue limited ends with limited means. But in the present world society's survival is always at stake. As such the concept of national interest is of no use in this unstable period because various courses of action can be suggested as valid choice for survival. In such circumstances the concept of national interest becomes subjective. Thus in the making of national policies there is greater emphasis on subjective elements of survival than objective factors because it is impossible to examine the objective factors.

7. *Ignores non-political relations.* Kaplan rightly observed that Morgenthau's conception of power would hardly exclude any relationship (not even the relationship in families and business) that does not involve power and is not political.[32] But there are certain non-political relationship and activities. Thus the international sports events, circulation of books and other reading matter, private letters and telegrams etc. are not political activities. However, Morgenthau does not suggest any criterion by which political activities may be detached from non-political activities.

8. *One-sided theory.* This theory over-emphasises one single factor i.e. power. That is why Hoffmann calls it "power monism" that does not account for all politics. According to this theory the world is a static field in which power remains the perpetual goal of every nation for all times and places. Actually, international relations change their character from time to time, the static qualities of this theory lead to confusion. As such it is quite logical to assume that Morgenthau's theory can be stated not for all times and places, but instead for different parts of the world and for different historical periods. Moreover, power is, after all an instrument, and therefore, it should not be given a key position and sole importance.

9. *Politics not autonomous.* Morgenthau reiterates the autonomy of political sphere. But he is not clear in his mind as to what type of an autonomy he had been talking about. Political sphere cannot be fully autonomous. A man is economic, religious, moral and political man at the same time. All these fields and aspects of life are interrelated. Aristotle, long ago, had suggested that the study of politics should integrate all the facets of human nature. Behaviouralist in the modern age also believes in interdisciplinary approach. No single aspect should be over-emphasised and no single discipline can work in isolation.

10. *Raise new questions.* According to Kegley and Wittkopf this theory raises many more questions than it could answer. For example were alliances a force for peace or a factor for destabilisation? Was the United Nations merely another stage for the push and show that was believed to characterise world politics or a tool for reforming national instincts for pure self-advantage? Did arms contribute to security or encourage costly arms races that ultimately counter the efforts for security? Were the Cold War and the policies that sustained it a blessing or a curse? Did an ideological contest serve or undermine the national interest.[33]

11. *Lacks methodology.* Above questions are empirical ones. They can be answered only through empirical methods. Political realism fails in this respect. Having a distinctive perspective on international affairs but lacking in methodology for resolving competing claims, the realist theory lacked criteria for determining which data would count as significant information and which rules would be followed in interpreting the data.

But inspite of all this criticism, realist theory is pioneer toward the development of international theory. Morgenthau's theory is the starting point for providing us theoretical orientation to the study of international politics. Morgenthau can be regarded as a great theoretician and a forerunner in the field of international politics in post-War period. No doubt it is a partial theory of international relations yet it interpreted the outcome of Second World War which had given a serious jolt to the idealist theory. Its importance and relevance lies in the fact that much of the world continues to think about international politics in terms of this viewpoint. Its intellectual contributions cannot be ignored. On the one hand its deficiencies and limitations and on the other emergence of new behavioural theories in the sixties made this theory somewhat obsolete. This theory was revived in the early eighties by Waltz, Gilpin, Axelrod, Bull, Keohane with the name of *Neorealism.*

SYSTEMS THEORY

The concept of systems is considered useful for both theoretical and practical analysis. Political scientists like David Easton, Gabriel Almond and Morton Kaplan have developed the Systems Theory or General Systems Theory. Easton and Almond propounded this theory in the sphere of national politics and Kaplan and McClelland in the field of international politics. It includes general system theory and the concept of international systems, subsystems and subordinate state system, past or present. Prominent scholar of international systems, James Rosenau, "has suggested that systemic research be pursued not only in terms of local, national and international systems—that is, actors and their relational pattern as a focal point—but also in terms of issue areas."[34]

Before its application by political scientists, the Systems Theory was developed in biology, physics, anthropology, sociology and ecological studies. Later on, it was applied to behavioural and social sciences. It is a significant development of the behavioural sciences today. The general conception of an international system, and of international systems also became a part of many studies in international relations especially undertaken by Morton Kaplan, Karl Deutsch, Raymond Aron and McClelland.

Assumptions

The theory assumes the existence of an international system at the global level. Aron explains, there "has never been an international system including the whole of the planet," but the postwar period, when "for the first time humanity is living one and the same history," has witnessed the emergence of a kind of global system.[35] But at the same time it must be admitted that such a system suffers from great hetrogeneity and is perhaps too loose to be properly designated a system. An international system, in the words of Hoffmann, "is a pattern of relations between the basic units of world politics, which is characterised by the scope of the objectives pursued by these units and of the tasks performed among them, as well as by the means used in order to achieve those goals and perform those tasks."[36]

Actors on international scene, according to Kaplan, are of two types: national actors or supra-national actors. National actors are the nation-states like the USA, Russia, India etc. The supra-national actors are such international actors as the NATO, EU, the UNO etc.

This theory also assumes that a theory of international politics normally cannot be expected to predict individual actions because the interaction problem is too complex and because there are too many free variables. It can be expected, however, "to predict characteristic or model behaviour within a particular kind of international system."[37] Thus, this theory analyses international behaviour of a state from an empirical investigation of political facts, classified and arranged in appropriate categories.

Kaplan's Six Models

Mortan Kaplan is the main propounder of the system theory, it was he who has most comprehensive and successful characterisation of international politics in the frame of reference of system analysis. International system, according to him, can be divided into six models on the basis of functions and stability. Kaplan defines a system of action as "a set of variables so related in contra distinction to its environment, that desirable behavioural regularities characterise the internal relationship of the variables to each other and the external relationship of the set of individual variables to combinations of external variables."[38] All models of Kaplan are based on this definition of a system of action. His six models are: (i) the balance of power system, (ii) the loose bipolar system. (iii) the tight bipolar system, (iv) the universal system, (v) the hierarchical system in its directive and non-directive forms, and (vi) the unit veto system.[39] Each system has its separate rules and principles of operation. These models serve as useful framework for the classification and analysis of regularities of international behaviour pattern of states in proper levels in order to formulate a coherent body of timeless propositions.

In a situation where too many actors influence international relations, it becomes difficult to strike a perfect *balance of power* position and a *loose bipolar* system develops. The universal international system grows when the *universal actor*, like the UN, takes over many of the functions of powerful units in a loose bipolar system. In such a system the universal actor becomes powerful enough to prevent war among nations, but national actors retain their individuality. In the *hierarchical* international system, the universal actor becomes too powerful and the international community becomes a sort of world-state. The *unit veto* system develops as a result of weapons development. When too many national states develop a highly destructive capacity, they create a system of one-level actors, each of whom possesses a sort of veto power by virtue of his devastating capability. In a loose bipolar system, a few nations possess such destructive weapons; in a *tight bipolar* system only two nations possess such destructive weapons and immense economic power. The non-aligned nations become irrelevant in this condition.

A system has an identity over time. Its description can be given in its successive states. The state of a system designates a description of the variables of a system. Proper examination of all variables will ensure the formulation of predictable laws of the particular system. Moreover, systems may operate under larger systems or they may also have their own sub systems. Haas has described twenty international sub systems, ten in Europe (divided chronologically from 1649 to 1963), six in Asia (covering the years 1689 to 1964), and five in Hawaii (between 1738 and 1898).[40] Rosencrance has given a complete volume on nine European subsystems, over the period 1740 to 1960, in one of the well-known studies of international systems.[41] Brecher has looked at Southern Asia as a "subordinate state system," and Binder has taken a similar approach to the Middle East as a "subordinate international system.[42]

Post-Cold War International System

The end of the cold war has ushered in a new international system. After going through a variety of literature on the state of post-cold war politics, Professor Robert E. Harkavy deduces seven distinct images, models or paradigms regarding the emerging international system.[43] These seven models are:

1. *The Three-Bloc Geoeconomics Model.* This model is visualised by Walter Russell Mead, Jeffrey Garten, Edward Luttwak, Lester Thurow etc. The world is evolving into three neo-mercantilist competitive economic blocs including (i) a Japan-led Pacific Rim region including Korea, Southeast Asia and presumably China; (ii) a US-led Western Hemisphere bloc and (iii) a German-centered European bloc including Russia and other ex-Soviet states. The less-developed states of Africa, Middle East and South Asia are relegated to the status of neocolonial resource zones to be exploited by the three major blocs.

2. *The Revitalised Balance of Power Model.* The end of the cold war makes a return to multipolarity and balance of power almost inevitable. This model argued that four powers were likely to define the emerging pattern of the twenty-first century: the United States, China, Russia and Europe. The most likely scenario is a loose alliance among Europe, America and Russia for the containment of China. A second likely scenario is an alignment between rising China and the Islamic world, which would in turn push Russia and Europe closer together. A third scenario that of Russia, China and India to challenge US-Europe alliance may be added. Kissinger's views are closer to this model.[44]

3. *The Clash of Civilisations Model.* Huntington defines civilisation as "the highest cultural grouping and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species,"[45] and identifies seven or eight major civilisations today: Western, Confucian (Sinic), Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly the African. Stating that "fault lines between civilisations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the cold war as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed," Huntington focuses particularly on cultural lines of demarcation between Western Christianity and Orthodox Christianity in Europe, and between the latter and Islam.[46]

4. *The Unipolar Model.* Charles Krauthammer argued that the end of the cold war had left the United States in the position of sole super power. Thus post-cold war international system is unipolar.[47]

5. *Zones of Peace or Turmoil.* Singer and Wildavsky say "the key to understanding the real world is to separate the world into two parts," one part of which, the zone of "peace, wealth and democracy," includes Western Europe, the US, Canada, Japan and the Antipodes, and other the zone of "turmoil, war and development," includes the lands of the former Soviet Empire, and most of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.[48]

6. *The Global Village.* According to this viewpoint, the coming age will be the one in which unity—the global village—is finally realised. This model identifies the ongoing advances in telecommunications and data processing as the strongest forces in world affairs. It heralds the Internet, stresses global interdependence, not only in matters of trade, investment, and raw materials but with regard to such global issues as environmental pollution, water shortages, weather, and population movements—solutions to which can only be found through global competition and by evolving global regimes.

7. *Incipient Bipolar System.* Despite the current talk of unipolar and multipolar world the eventual possibility of a return to bipolarity cannot be ruled out. A new US-Russian conflict may take place in future after regaining power by Russia. Moreover, a bipolar bloc system may well evolve from the current or anticipated multipolar one as a China-Russia bloc faces against a US-Europe combination, or an all-Asia bloc confronts a US-Europe-Russian one, thus belying hopes of global villagers.

Critical Evaluation

Kaplan's system theory has been severely criticised by many authors. His typology of international relations into six systems has been *arbitrary* and one can minimise or maximise such categories in another analytical framework. Out of his six models, only first two were in actual operation. The

balance of power existed mostly in the eighteenth and nineteenth century and the loose bipolar system became workable in the late fifties and sixties of the twentieth century. Now again there is multipolar world. The other four systems never worked at any time in history. He simply predicts the future possibility which is a most tough task in a theoretical analysis. Thus this theory is *inoperative* and *impracticable*.

According to Kaplan the loose bipolar system was to be converted into tight bipolar system in which there would be no non-aligned nations. But we witnessed in previous decades that non-aligned nations became more and more stable when many new nations started following non-aligned policy. So loose bipolar system could not be transformed into tight bipolar system.

It is an *inadequate* theory as it ignores many concepts which are necessary for the completeness of the system theory. Kaplan never explained the forces and factors that determine the behaviour of states.

Hoffmann criticizes it as "a huge misstep in the right direction—the direction of systematic empirical analysis."[49] He observes that this theory endeavours to make universal scientific laws of international political behaviour at the expense of our understanding of the field of political science. What one can aspire utmost in this discipline is a statement of trends. Too much discussion on methodology and building of models are activities in futility.

The seven latest models given by Harkavy differ radically, but are *not mutually* exclusive. The forces and tendencies stressed by these models coexist. For example, there is some overlap between the three-bloc economic model and that positing zones of peace and turmoil. Moreover there is no contradiction between the balance of power multipolarity model and the clash of civilisations. Some of these seven models are difficult to realise. The global village and balance of power models provide altogether different interpretations of the emerging system, since they posit diametrically opposed predictions about the role of the nation-state. The global village and clash of civilisation models assign totally different importance to cultural divides and the power of technology to erase those divides. The zone of peace / zone of turmoil model presents the demise of balance of power politics in the developed states, but may allow for the continuation of balance of power politics in regional contexts such as the Middle East and Africa. Thus these new models are *neither exclusive nor fool-proof nor practicable*.

The systems theory does not predict what will actually happen, but it only forecasts what would happen if certain conditions develop, which rarely, if ever, develop exactly as envisaged.[50] The hypotheses cannot be tested correctly on the basis of empirical observation. Therefore, the *models* appear to be too *far away from reality* to be testable. They are based on postulates about the behaviour of the included variable, "which are either too arbitrary or too general; the choice here is between perversion and platitude."[51] Besides, this theory neglects the domestic determinants of the national actors and Kaplan's model ignores the forces of change operating within or across the actors.

Inspite of severe criticism, Kaplan will always be remembered for his contribution to international relations in the form of a highly systematic and comprehensive theory. Through a fairly comprehensive explanation of historical illustrations, Kaplan believes that this perspective will provide a useful guide to the development of a general international theory.

DECISION-MAKING THEORY

This theory was developed especially in the sphere of foreign policy-making. It concentrates on the persons who shape international events rather than on the international situation as such. The makers of foreign policies are examined and national policies and international situation are viewed from this perspective. This theory was initiated in 1954 by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin.[52] It examines international politics through the analysis of the complex determinants of state behaviour.

Meaning and Explanation

The decision-making approach lay emphasis on the question as to how and why a nation acts in international politics. As the state of knowledge about international politics is not perfect, the choice of decision-making as a focus is wise. A good way to study is where decisions are made because much of the process of international politics revolves there.

The best way to understand international politics lies in knowing the processes in which the official decision-maker makes his final choice of a policy out of a series of alternatives. It seeks to identify some of the important variables— psychological (individual) and sociological (group or organisation)—that determine national responses to concrete situations. It synthesises insights and conceptual guides from sociology and social psychology.

Decision-making is a "process which results in the selection from a socially defined, limited number of problematical, alternative projects of one project to bring about the particular future state of affairs envisaged by the decision-makers."[53] It results in certain actions and sequence of activities. Final choice involves valuation and evaluation in terms of a frame of reference. Priorities are given to alternative projects. The action of decision-makers can be described in terms of three basic determinants: sphere of competence; communication and information; and motivation.

The foreign policy is examined and the following factors are studied: (i) Purpose of the foreign policy; (ii) Decision- makers; (iii) Principles of decision-making; (iv) Process of decision-making and policy planning; (v) Means of decision-making and policy planning; (vi) Internal situations of the state; and (vii) External factors.

Assumptions

This approach assumes that activities are more or less explicitly motivated and behaviour is not at random. It is based on the assumption that the analysis of international politics should be centered, in part, on the behaviour of those where action is the action of the state viz; the decision-makers. It conceives of state action as resulting from the way the identifiable official decision-makers define the situation of action. It seeks "to determine why decision is made at all and why a particular decision is made rather than some other."[54]

It considers all the elements and factors that enter into the consideration of a decision-maker such as the internal setting, external setting and the decision-making process. This official decision-maker takes action in the name of the state. Therefore, his definition of the situation, his expectations, perception, his personality and final choice as well as the various agencies and processes involved in decision-making are taken into consideration.

Critical Evaluation

This approach too has many deficiencies. *First*, Hoffmann is doubtful if politics is ever really made of conscious moves and choices, that can be examined in terms of neat categories. Yet it is the chief assumption of this theory. *Second*, it neglects all those things that are not the mere addition of separate decisions made by various units. It may be correct for foreign policy analysis, but it is too weak for the rest of International Relations.[55] *Third*, this theory gives only post hoc explanations and historical reconstruction of particular decisions. Its conceptual elements fail to

make predictions of future foreign policy making. It has been proved useful only in analysing *past major decisions* and not in developing a general international theory. But exponents of this theory like Snyder hope that the analysis of past occurrences will be the stepping stone towards the building of a predictive theory.[56] *Fourth*, this theory is based on the principle of *indetermination* and fails to suggest which one of the numerous elements that go into the many sides of the box is really relevant. *Fifth*, the theory goes ahead with a *value-free* approach, inasmuch as it merely endeavours to analyze the various decisions taken in the realm of foreign affairs without caring for as to which decisions are right and which are wrong. *Sixth*, whatever the circumstances, the *focus* of decision-making is often *obscure* as the man in authority may delegate most of his foreign policy powers to a subordinate or, especially in a weak government, a subordinate may actively take the initiative, a line of action that may be legitimised by the legal authority. *Seventh*, causes may sometimes dominate, and man may be compelled to make a certain decision because otherwise he would face personal risks he dare not take.

In the end, it can be said that this theory has contributed a great deal to the understanding of the process of foreign policy-making, which all other theories have ignored. This theory successfully analyses deeper roots of behaviour pattern of states. In fact, it is a great improvement on institutional approach. Instead of simply describing interaction of states it provides an explanation of diverse patterns of interaction.

Marxian Theory

Though Karl Marx has written extensively throughout his life and produced numerous works that recognised him as a great philosopher and theorist of the modern times, yet he has not put forward any theory of international relations as Morgenthau, Kaplan, Snyder etc. did. Thus he is not a theorist of international relations in the sense Morgenthau, Kaplan, Snyder etc. are. There is mention in his various works, here and there, of wars between states, proletarian internationalism, world change, world revolution etc. His utterances about world politics and struggles between states lie scattered in his different works and hence there is no basic text or treatise on international relations by Marx.

However, later on, his followers like Lenin, Stalin, Mao and many other scholars and leaders endeavoured to update his views according to changing world scenario and explained the phenomenon of international relations with the help of principles founded by Marx. For example, Lenin through his *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* attempted to present a coherent theory of international politics. Scattered views of Marx on international politics and subsequent attempts by his followers towards theorisation have been grouped together to be known as Marxian or Marxist theory of international relations. Despite the constraint mentioned above, in subsequent paragraphs this theory is being explained.

Basic Assumptions and Tenets

These can be described in brief as follows:

1. Economic factors play decisive role in international relations. They have been the root cause of many struggles and wars at international level in the past.

2. Class instead of Nation-states is the basic unit in international relations. The 'national interest' is first of all the interest of master-class which changes with rise and fall of classes.

3. Capitalism culminates into imperialism. That divides the world into imperial powers and colonies i.e. haves and have-nots.

4. Wars break out when capitalist nations clash with each other to build their colonies in different parts of the world to serve as markets for their products.

5. Proletariat or working classes do not belong to any other particular nation. So they unite at global level to fight out exploitation. Proletariat internationalism would lead towards world revolution.

6. With the passage of time, imperialism, which is the highest stage of capitalism, world suffer from three contradictions. *First*, there would be contradictions and conflicts among capitalists for occupying more and more colonies resulting in world wars among them. *Second*, class conflict between capitalists and workers. Working class would demand more rights and facilities. *Third*, struggle between imperialists and the people of colonies. Colonial people fight for their independence. These three contradictions would lead the world to the brink of revolution causing imperialism to collapse.

7. The goal is not balance of power or equilibrium but international disequilibrium in order to achieve the goal of changing the world to establish world socialism.

8. Lasting peace can only be established after world revolution. With world revolution imperialism would collapse, there would be no classes and no states. In such a classless and stateless society there will be no irritant left for struggles and wars. Such a society will be an ideal world.

9. It may take a long time for world revolution to be successful at global level. In the meantime the principles of national self-determination and peaceful co-existence will continue to occupy an important place.

Four Seminal Theories

Arun Bose firmly believes that "there is a Marxian analytical framework for analysing situations of international political conflicts, which serves as a 'guide to action', i.e. to work out Marxist strategies."[57] According to him this framework comprises of "four seminal theories" about international politics in modern era, which contain ideas that overlap to some extent and which may be regarded as off shoots of the primal theory of proletarian internationalism. The four Marxian theories described by Bose are as follows:[58]

Proletarian Internationalism. This term was coined by Lenin in his Preliminary Theses on the national and colonial questions, submitted to the Communist International in 1920. But the basic ideas were formulated by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels in the *Communist Manifesto* and adopted by the First International in 1847. These ideas are: (i) "the world proletariat have a common interest, independent of all nationality...", (ii) "working men have no country; ... since the proletariat of each country must first acquire political supremacy... must first constitute itself the nation.. .it is itself national...", (iii) "united action (by the proletariat) is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat," (iv) "in proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will come to an end."[59]

Anti-imperialism. According to Lenin, imperialism is the final stage of capitalism. This famous dictum became the basis of his critique of capitalist imperialism as a world system, his prediction of a successful October Revolution, his reformulation and amplification of the Marxian theory of national self-determination, and of the Marxian theory of proletarian internationalism. In *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Lenin defined imperialism as the "monopoly stage of capitalism" and listed its five basic features: (1) the concentration of production and capital develops to such

a high stage that it creates monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life; (2) bank capital merges with industrial capital and this results in the creation of 'finance capital'; a capital of the financial oligarchy; (3) the export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance; (4) the resulting formation of international monopolistic capitalist association share the world among themselves; and (5) as the final culminating point, the territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers is completed.[60]

The main ideas of anti-imperialism theory are:[61] (i) capital has become international and monopolistic, but (ii) uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism, hence (iii) the proletarian socialist revolution is possible first not only in several countries of Europe, or at least the "civilised countries," as visualised in a somewhat Eurocentric vision of the proletarian revolution in the Communist Manifesto—but "even in one capitalist country, taken singly," which (iv) would form the nucleus, the base, the hegemony, of the world socialist revolution, "attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts ...against capitalism," and engaging "in the event of necessity" in "internationalist" defensive and offensive wars "against exploiting classes and states" in other countries.[62] In reexamining the theory of proletarian internationalism in the context of imperialism of his times, Lenin thus made major new departures in the Marxian understanding of the nature of the national and colonial questions.

National self-determination. The *Communist Manifesto* stresses a specific Marxian "class" approach to the national question, according to which classes which attain political supremacy "constitute" the nation. In each country the working-class must acquire political supremacy (later defined by Lenin as the dictatorship of the proletariat), must constitute itself the nation." Thus the goal of "national self-determination" was to be realised through "proletarian self-determination" within each nation. This very basic tenet of the Marxian theory on the "national question," makes the Marxian understanding fundamentally different from any non-Marxian theory on the "national question." Taking hint from re-thinking by Marx (especially on the Irish demand for separation from the UK, which Marx had at first opposed), and on the basis of his own analysis of the "new', imperialist stage of capitalism—Lenin arrived at an assessment of the *arousing* of national antagonisms instead of their *subduing* as visualised in the *Communist Manifesto*, in the days of imperialism and the world socialist revolution.[63] In this extension of the Marxian theory on the national question—which was now explicitly and emphatically linked with the "colonial question"—Lenin made three modifications, viz. (i) a distinction was made between the "oppressed nations," and the "oppressor nations", (ii) the "oppressed nations" were identified as the victims of imperialism, as "national revolutionary" reserves or allies of the proletariat in the world socialist revolution,[64] (iii) the recognition of the right of the oppressed nations to self-determination was now explicitly interpreted to mean not only the right of the oppressed nations to *secede* freely, but the *desirability* of secession to remove "distrust" and "prejudices" among the oppressed nations.[65] However, all three modifications were still within the framework of the overall programmatic aim of "a united states of the world" (and not of Europe alone) as "the state form of national federation and national freedom which (is) associate(d) with socialism—until the complete victory of Communism bring about the total disappearance of the state...[66] In later developments, the Soviet voluntary *confederalism*, first of the USSR, and then (by implication) of the Warsaw Pact powers seems to have served as means of transition to the socialist voluntary *confederalism* of the future.[67] Bose observes, "All this means that although the assessment of the declining importance of the 'national factor' was *reversed*, Lenin's theory of imperialism and the national and colonial question amplified, rather than contradicted the Marxian theory of proletarian internationalism."[68]

Peaceful Co-existence of States. As Marxian theory reiterated by Lenin during the first world war, " capitalism means war" and the task of the socialist states is to "raise revolts against capitalism,"

it is not evident how a theory of "peaceful coexistence of states" coincides with the Marxian theory of proletarian internationalism. But once this theory was enlarged by a theory of anti-imperialism, of "inter-imperialist contradictions," and the "uneven development of imperialism," propositions about the chances of peaceful coexistence of socialist and capitalist states had to be sorted out. For the "law of uneven development of imperialism" meant: (i) the proletarian socialist revolution could be victorious first in several countries, or even in one country, (ii) it had to survive capitalist "encirclement" by relying on inter-imperialist contradictions over and above its internal and external support from the world proletariat and its "reserves," and (iii) the best method to accomplish this was to try to work out relations of "peaceful co-existence" between socialist states and at least some, if not all, the capitalist states. On the other hand, the Marxian theory of national self-determination had as corollaries (i) the possibility of peaceful co-existence of people, and national freedom and equality within a voluntary union of socialist states,[69] and (ii) the possibility of peaceful co-existence between the socialist states, and the liberated national, sovereign states of the "oppressed nations" after their secession from the imperialist states of the "oppressor nations," whether or not they become socialist in the process of their national liberation, or even if their political independence is a mere cover for economic, financial and military dependency upon the imperialist states.[70]

Four Model Strategies

The above seminal Marxian theories are integrated by Arun Bose in different ways to work out Marxist strategies in international politics, represented by the foreign policies of modern communist states. These four distinct "model" strategies, seem to represent the basic, logical thrust behind the foreign policy experiments adopted by modern Communist states. These strategies are: (i) "transnational" or "cosmopolitan," (ii) the "non-aligned," (iii) "the Soviet-centric" and (iv) the "Sino-centric." The last two strategies are definitely geared to the notions that the "genuine," "reliable" nucleus or "base" or "protector" of the world socialist revolution is the Soviet Union or Communist China respectively. The other two "models strategies" carry no such "country" labels. The "transnational" or "cosmopolitan" model strategy clearly rejects the idea of "socialism in one country, and leaves no scope for idealising the role of socialism in any one country, or group of countries as the "base of the world revolution." The "non-aligned" model strategy also is strictly"poly-centric," "insisting the socialism in each country is fighting for socialism only in one's own counrty."[71] For want of space these strategies are not being discussed in detail nor is it necessary either.[72]

Critical Evaluation

Marxian theory of international relations can be denounced as unscientific, impracticable, utopian, inconsistent and unhistorical. Its shortcomings can be described in brief as follows:

1. All the "four seminal theories" presented by Arun Bose remained in embryonic state. The propositions of these theories could not find any further development theoretically nor realise practically in all these years. Therein lies the failure of these theories.

2. The main theory of proletariat internationalism proved wrong as proletariat of different states actually thought in terms of their nationality and national interest. During different wars and struggles working men worked for the victory of their own country setting at naught Marxian dictum 'working men have no country'. It seems that proletariat of the world have ignored Marx's call for "united action" at global level for their emancipation.

3. Lenin's theory of imperialism is historically wrong because historical facts contradict

Lenin's famous saying: "imperialism is the highest stage of capitalism". Imperialism existed even before the advent of capitalism e.g. Roman and Greek empires in ancient period.

4. According to the theory of imperialism every capitalist country must grow into imperialist country. However, in reality, many capitalist countries e.g. Switzerland, Canada, Australia etc. did not indulge in empire building.

5. Economic factors are not the exclusive factors accounting for imperialism and wars. Empires were built and wars were fought on several other non-economic reasons such as religious, cultural, political, military, personal ambitions of rulers etc.

6. Nation states remained the basic unit of analysis in international relations despite Marxists insistence on class as its basic unit.

7. Imperialism collapsed after the Second World War but not the capitalism as predicted by Marxist theory. Contrarily, in many countries capitalism gained strength after that. Moreover, after decolonisation imperialism again raised its ugly head under the garb of neo-colonialism, economic imperialism and 'Red' imperialism. In other words, old and overt imperialism re-emerged covertly.

8. With the failure of proletariat internationalism world revolution became a far cry. It has been relegated to the realm of impossibility.

9. Marxian theory of national self-determination is also fraught with contradictions. It could not be practised even by socialist countries themselves. For example, the Soviet Union's hold over East European countries for many decades and the unwilling Republics and nationalities within the Soviet Union made this a futile theory.

10. Peaceful coexistence at times proved successful and at other times futile. The long Sino-Soviet and Soviet-American rivalry belied this theory.

11. Marxian theory also suffers from subjectivity and inconsistency. What Marx propounded was later on modified and revised by Lenin whose theories were, in their turn, reformed by Stalin. After Stalin a process of de-stalinisation took over. Later on, Gorbachev restructured everything that his predecessors built assiduously. The same thing happened in China after Mao. Tito, Castro, Ho Chi-Minh have also interpreted Marxian theory in relation to the situation obtaining in their countries.

Notwithstanding the above criticism, the theory is adored by Marxists. In the words of Bose, this theory "is first of all a 'guide to action', based on the dictum that 'in action man discovers the truth.' Consequently, all Marxian analysis of international relations are meant to change international relations, since the basic purpose is not merely to 'interpret' what exists, but to 'change the world'. Such analyses lead to predictions and 'strategies' about the future, which have been 'tested' or are yet to be 'tested' by events."[73] However, it will be agreed by many a scholar that this theory has failed to serve as an objective guide to action, it has failed to change the world and make valid predictions.

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10

The Dependency Theory

The Sources

A number of intellectual precursors of and influences on globalism can be identified. In common with both the realists and idealists, globalism draws upon a heritage of classical theory. This includes the early Christian and humanist concerns with justice and the fate of the individual, the Kantian philosophy of morality, and the dialectics of Hegel.[1]

All globalists have been also influenced either directly or indirectly by the works of Karl Marx (1818-1883). This does not imply that all globalists are Marxists. They simply owe an intellectual debt to him in terms of their methods and some key concepts that described the capitalist mode of production. More precisely, Marx has influenced the globalists by virtue of his emphasis on exploitation, historical patterns of capitalist development and expansion, and the importance of studying a society in its totality and understanding how various parts of society are interrelated.[2]

The theory of imperialism devised by a non-Marxist, the English economist John A. Hobson (1858-1940), influenced the globalist paradigm as well. Hobson viewed imperialism as "the endeavour of the great controllers of industry to broaden the channel for the flow of their surplus wealth by seeking foreign markets and foreign investments to take off the goods and capital they cannot sell or use at home.[3] However, contrary to Marxists, he did not consider the imperialist expansion is inevitable. Hobson believed imperialism was a major cause of war, competition and rivalry between the European powers.

Vladimir I. Lenin (1870-1924) drew heavily upon the works of Hobson and the German Social Democrat, Rudolph Hilferding (1877-1941). From Hobson, Lenin accepted the idea of imperialism as a result of capitalist competition for foreign markets and colonies caused by the under consumption and overproduction. From Hilferding, Lenin took the notion that imperialism reflected the existence of monopoly and finance capital, or the highest stage of capitalism. In his work *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, he underlined: "Imperialism is capitalism in that stage of development in which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital has established itself; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun; in which the division of all territories of the globe among the great capitalist powers has been completed."[4] Lenin argued that imperialism was driven by economic forces and therefore was not a matter of choice but inevitability. The competition between the capitalist states, reflecting the domination of capitalist class interests and uneven development of different countries, unavoidably led to world wars and then to world socialist revolution bringing capitalism to the end. Since Lenin was not only theorist but also a practitioner, his views have had a great deal of influence on revolutionaries throughout the world (especially the Third World).

In the 1950s, with the crisis of the colonial system, the issue of relationship between the developed states and the LDC became acute. Initially, it was expected that North-South relations would be co-operative. The South would develop with the assistance of the already developed North, removing considerable economic and social inequalities.

There was a development (modernisation) school first arose in the 1950s. Theoretically it was based on the concepts of the American structural-functionalist school as exemplified by the works of Almond, Verba, Easton and their associates.[5] The modernisation writers viewed the organisation and the cultural values of traditional society are postulated to be a hindrance to modernisation. The LDCs are lacking of entrepreneurial spirit that was found in European society during the rise of capitalism in the sixteenth century.[6] To overcome the economic and cultural backwardness the LDCs should start the process of modernisation which the developed Western countries had passed. The latter would assist the LDCs as a public duty and as a counter-measure against communism.

However, with time, many writers became sceptical as regards the Western model is desirable and applicable for the LDCs. In addition, the North did not construct really equal economic relations with the South. Moreover, in some cases it continued its imperialistic policy in the form of neo-colonialism. The modernisation literature usually neglected a state's or society's external environment, particularly international and economic factors.[7] Under these circumstances, the new theoretical approach—the dependency school—has emerged as a key alternative to the developmentalism/modernisation. As mentioned, three main currents within the dependency school can be identified: dependencia, centre-periphery analysis, and world-system analysis (Brown).[8]

Dependencia

Dependencia originated in Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s. The key role in formulating dependencia was played by the UN's Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) under the Argentinean economist Raul Prebisch and UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). They were concerned with the important problem of explaining why Latin America and other Third World regions were not developing as anticipated.[9] The ECLA/UNCTAD analysis emphasised Latin America's role as a supplier of primary products which it exchanged for the manufactures of the industrial world, and argued that the 'terms of trade' were moving over the long term against primary products. In these circumstances, development could take place only slowly if at all. The ECLA recommended import substitution industrialisation (ISI)—the creation of an industrial base, behind tariff barriers, which would meet the internal need for manufactured products.

In addition to Prebisch, some other writers have contributed ideas to dependencia school: John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson with their idea of the 'informal empire' of 'free trade imperialism,' and Gunnar Myrdal with his arguments describing how dual economies create 'backwash effects' systematically disadvantaging the traditional sector.[10]

The most important conceptual tool of the dependency school is its analysis of the dual economy. The notion of the dual economy was itself not invented by dependencia theorists, but in their hands it has acquired a character particular to their analysis. According to this concept, as a result of capitalist penetration one part of the local economy of each region has developed into a modern enclave.[11] Here capital accumulates, skills are learned, and class interests are formed whose innermost needs tie them tightly to foreign concerns. The culture of the modern enclave may be of the Third World, but its economic and political character make it a part of the international system. Root and branch it is dependent.[12] Along with the modern economy, the

traditional sector exists—whence the term dual economy. The modern economy works to disintegrate traditional society, while the latter tries to preserve its integrity.

The dependencia theorists—or 'dependendistas' (Dos Santos, Cardoso and Furtado)—argued that development is not autonomous and depends on ups and downs of the world's advanced economies. Choices for the LDCs are restricted as a result of the dictates of capitalism. The result is a structure of domination. Opportunities for LDCs are few and far between because LDCs are allocated a subordinate role in world capitalism. Economic exploitation of LDCs by the developed states is not an accident; rather, it is an integral part of the capitalist system and is required to keep it functioning.[13] The principal conclusion of the dependency approach is that the problems of the Third World arise from the form of growth pursued by the First World; under-development is the product of development.

According to this view, relations of dependence become so reinforcing that the development of the dependent states becomes distorted. This asymmetry will be located in the economic system initially and the distortions may seriously hamper and impair economic development as a result. The dependency will also be marked in technology where the state may find itself importing costly and inappropriate technologies.[14]

The 'dependendistas' believed that the ECLA approach correctly identified the root of the problem but disagreed with the ECLA recommendations. They argued that ISI cannot work, because the internal market for consumer goods is too limited; industrialisation is based on imported capital goods, components and materials which, therefore, do not stimulate the development of independent industrial base and it even increases dependence on multinational capital and on foreign technology.[15]

However, the economic growth in a number of Latin American countries in the late 1960s and most of the 1970s (for example, Brazil and Mexico) disconfirms the theory. Nonetheless, for the 'dependendistas,' this is still 'dependent development' affected by trends in the major industrial countries rather than independently determined.

Along with this point of view, there is another more radical, version of 'dependencia.'

'Centre-Periphery' Analysis

A founding father of this theory was Frank who made case studies of Brazil and Chile to prove a thesis that there is a "chain of exploitation linking centres and peripheries."[16] Latin American countries do not develop, because this chain drains them of the resources they need for development. Development is achievable only via revolution and breaking of links with the developed world.

In spite of his frequent use of Marxist-Leninist terminology, Frank's theoretical framework hardly can be labelled as orthodox Marxist. Contrary to the Marxist understanding of capitalism as "generalised commodity production," Frank defined capitalism as integration in the world division of labour. For that reason, he regarded Latin America 'capitalist' since the sixteenth century and this was the main cause of its underdevelopment.

Frank did not limit himself with only Latin America. He widened his concept to include the whole of the Third World.

A number of other authors (Amin, Barnet and Muller, Emmanuel, Radice, and Rodney) developed Frankian arguments on the same general lines.[17] In particular, they explained the mechanism of exploitation of the periphery. Contrary to the Marxist theory of surplus value, the dependendistas believed that exploitation took place through 'unequal exchange.' According to

Emmanuel, the price of a product is determined by the wage level in the country of origin. Due to the historical reasons the wages in the developed countries are higher than in the LDCs. The effect is that exchanges between high wage and low wage countries work to the benefit of the former.[18]

For the 'centre-periphery' analysis, transnational class coalitions linking elites in industrially developed countries with their counterparts in the South are more important than relations between states. The alliance of the global bourgeois or capitalist class work to the disadvantage of workers and peasants in the periphery. The multinational corporations (MNCs) and international banks are viewed by dependency theorists from a different perspective than that of the realist or pluralist. To the pluralist, MNCs and International banks appear merely as actors other than states. To the realist, they are of secondary importance because of the emphasis on the state-as-actor. To the globalist, however, they are central players in creating and maintaining dependency relations. To the globalist of Marxist orientation, they represent two of the critical means by which Third World countries are put in their subordinate position within the world capitalist economy.

'Centre-periphery' analysts deal not only with external factors but also with internal constraints on development (such as patterns of land tenure, social structures, class alliances, and the role of the state). These internal factors reinforce instruments of foreign domination.[19] Dependency theorists pay particular attention to the comprador class which aids in the exploitation of its own society. In line with the Marxists thesis, the compradors have more in common with the capitalists of the centre countries than they do with their fellow citizens of the periphery. According to Cardoso and Faletto, the relationship between external and internal forces forms a complex whole whose structural links are not based on mere external forms of exploitation and coercion, but are rooted in coincidence of interests between local dominant classes and international ones.[20]

With time, the radical versions of dependencia (including 'centre-periphery analysis') have evolved in favour of more moderate explanations of world dynamics. Smith singles out three main innovations brought by the second generation of dependency writers. The first is the argument that the dual economy is not actually as rigid as was once believed. The proponents of dependency theory recognised that economies of the Third World countries are becoming far more advanced, diversified, and integrated than earlier writers of this persuasion had ever thought possible. The second conceptual innovation made by dependency writers is their new emphasis on the crucial role of the state in this changing order of things. Finally, they recognised the diversity of Third World countries and the significance of local factors in determining the pattern of long-term development processes.[21]

World-System Analysis

The third version of dependency is termed 'world-system analysis.' Some scholars believe this theory does not fit into the dependency school although it shares with the latter the globalist view of the world and was inspirited by the dependencia writings.[22] This theory differs from dependency in two ways. First, it is concerned not only with the lack of Third World development but also aims at understanding of economic, political, and social development of regions throughout the entire world. In turn, this is targeted at explaining of the global existence of uneven development. Second, this approach wishes to understand the fate of various parts of the world at various times in history within the larger context of a developing world political economy. Study of the global capitalist system from a historical perspective is the first priority for adherents of this theory.

'World-system analysis' was introduced by Immanuel Wallerstein, Director of the Fernand Braudel Centre at the State University of New York. In his fundamental work *The Modern World System* (MWS),[23] Wallerstein distinguishes between World Empires, hierarchical polities where

economic transactions over long distances take the form of tribute, and World Systems, or World Economies, where diverse forms of independent political organisations interact via trade. He argues that a world economy emerged in the 'long' sixteenth century, with the establishment of an international division of labour and core, peripheral and semi-peripheral regions. The core area historically have engaged in the most advanced economic activities: banking, manufacturing, technologically advanced agriculture, and ship building. The periphery has provided raw materials such as minerals and timber to fuel the core's expansion. The semi-periphery is involved in a mix of production activities, some associated with core areas and other with peripheral areas. The semi-periphery also serves a number of other functions such as being an outlet for investment when wages in core economies become too high. Over time, particular regions of the world may gravitate between core, peripheral, and semi-peripheral status. Contrary to the liberal economic notion of specialisation as an advantage, Wallerstein points out that this division of labour requires as well as increases inequality between regions.

It is important for Wallerstein to emphasise a systemic nature of capitalism. Capitalism is a system-wide, or global, phenomenon. Not individual states or national economies should be examined. Instead, capitalism as an integrated, historically expanding system that transcends any particular political or geographic boundaries should be studied. Contrary to the realist tradition, Wallerstein underlines that "No state in the interstate system, even the single most powerful one at any given time, is totally autonomous—but obviously some enjoy far great autonomy than others."[24]

The structuring of the world system creates divisions which are reflected in different categories, such as 'international political system' and 'international economic system,' 'class,' 'nation,' 'race', etc.[25] Wallerstein denies that 'development' has taken place in the world. He insists that the liberal/Marxist notion of progress is hardly relevant for the vast majority of humanity, even if a small privileged group in the 'core' are 'better off.'

At the same time, along with Marxism, Wallerstein considers "the capitalist development of the world-economy itself moves toward the socialisation of the productive process."[26] In addition the structure of the world-economy has created the possibility of socialist political movements coming to power in individual states, seeking to construct socialism.

Interestingly, Wallerstein develops some themes in common with realists. First both realists and Wallerstein try build a systems level theory, although he latter emphasise economic factors over political variables. Second, they both recognise the importance of anarchy in international relations. Wallerstein notes that "the absence of single political authority makes it impossible for anyone to legislate the general will of the world-system and hence to curtail the capitalist mode of production."[27] However, the implications of anarchy for the realists and globalists are different. The realists are concerned with anarchy's effects on international political stability, war, and balance-of-power politics involving major states. For the globalists, it is important that anarchy facilitates the development of world capitalism and thus influence economic division of labour involving a core, a periphery, and a semi-periphery. Third, Wallerstein has much in common with the realists addressing the issue of the international distribution of capabilities of power. He recognises the cyclical nature of power distribution and its influence on the world system.[28] However, contrary to the realists, Wallerstein underlines the crucial role of economic factors in defining of the power structure of the world.

There is some discussion among the globalists as regards the role of political, economic, and social factors in shaping of the international relations system. On the one hand, there is Wallerstein,

who reduces the world system to economics. On the other hand, some globalists acknowledge the role of other factors. Chase-Dunn, for example, insists that capitalism is based on inter-action of both political-military power and exploitative economic processes.[29] In his perspective of imperialism, Galtung goes even further defining imperialism as a structural relation of dominance with political, economic, military, cultural, and communication dimensions.[30] The entire structure of dominance has to be comprehended. In line with the 'centre-periphery' analysis, Gultung argues that one must look inside societies to understand the effects of interactions among them.

Three categories of dependency theory are by no means exclusive or necessarily hostile to one another. There are distinctive schools within the dependency approach, but the differences are less striking than the similarities.

Critical Evaluation

The dependency theory confronted a number of serious challenges which undermined its arguments and influence in the academia.

First, the dependendistas are unable to acoount for Third World countries that have been relatively economically successful. The statistics collected by some authoritative international organisations (the UN and its bodies, the World Bank, the IMF and so forth) indicate that during last two-three decades both real living standards and economies of the Third World countries have grown. So, 'development' has taken place. Contrary to the concept of 'dependent development,' some Third World countries, such as ASEAN member-states, Brazil, Chile, China, Mexico, South Korea, Venezuela, etc., were able to overcome their economic backwardness and now even compete with the developed countries on the world markets. The globalists are unable to explain such an 'anomaly' as Japan which belongs neither to European nor North American countries. Finally a question comes up: if a theory can not adequately explain anomalies, has it got a proper premises?

Second, as some orthodox Marxist critics suggested, the dependency theory is tending to be 'romantic' anti-capitalist and a sort of reaction against industrial civilisations as such.[31] It is too naive to ignore the capitalism's contribution into the progress.

Third, there is no clear answer to the question on causality whether dependency is the cause of economic and social backwardness (as globalists claim), or whether it is the effect of this condition.

Fourth, the dependency theory does not offer any historical alternative to capitalism. It does not explain why did capitalism, not other socio-economic order, succeed feudalism and why did it happen to be more effective than socialism? It is also unclear whether capitalism should (and could) be replaced by other order or may be radically reformed?

Fifth, dependency approach presented quite simplistic description of the world structure focusing mainly on dependence or centre-periphery types of relationship. Such an approach ignores some other types of relationship between the elements of the world system—equality or partnership (between either developed or developing countries) and dominance (relationship between large and small states, metropolises and colonies). Moreover, dependencia was concerned with North-South relations while East-West (socialism vs. capitalism) confrontation was by no means less important factor that shaped the Cold War world order.

Sixth, many critics accuse globalists of reductionism pointing out that they try to reduce the operation of the international system down to the process of capital accumulation and related

dynamics. Other factors such as political, strategic-military, geographic, social, ideological and other determinants should be taken into account. Moreover, critics (in particular the realists) suggest the autonomy of political realm and ideology from economics. They argue, for instance, that often the international political-security system determines the international economic system, not the other way around.

Seventh, despite dependendistas' references to internal factors, critics claim that there is an excessive globalist reliance on external factors in explaining poverty and dependence in the periphery and that domestic determinants are underestimated. This is wrong in terms of both methodology and political-ideological implications of such a scheme for relations between the North and the South.

Eighth, some critics of the dependency literature believe that this school seeks less to explain underdevelopment than to unite LDC nationalists and socialists against the West by providing a politically attractive doctrine that blames all Third World problems on outside powers. In fact, the dependency school was tending to be ideology rather than scholarly concept. As Wiarda put it, "one can recognise that there are various relations of dependency in the world without elevating that into a single-casual explanation of all the world's ill or using dependency analysis simply to blame some scapegoat (the United States, multinationals, capitalism) for Third World underdevelopment."[32] By diverting attention from domestic sources of underdevelopment, the dependency theorists actually help to perpetuate the very problem they seek to resolve.

Finally, critics accuse the globalists of theoretical rigidity, little questioning of the framework, and an unwillingness to consider alternative hypotheses.

In response to the criticism, the dependency theorists point out that the attacks on them are based on the value preferences of the reviewer. The vocabulary of the globalist literature based on Marxian insights and categories are still generally viewed with distrust in the West (especially in North American universities). The dependency theorists also reject an accusation of weak empirical basis. They underline that IRT can focus not only on empirical evidences but also on purely theoretical issues. In addition, the dependencia and world-system literature which focused on cross-national studies provided for a considerable empirical material.

There is a growing feeling in the scholarship that despite the decline of the dependency theory this school made a great contribution into the IRT debate. For Brown, dependency is more convincing as a critique of naive developmentalism than as a substantive alternative view of the world.[33] Many authors recognise that the emergence in recent years of a genuine global political economy owes much to the work of dependency proponents, such as Frank, Wallerstein and others. Wiarda also suggests that the dependency theory has a number of significant achievements: it obliges us to focus on international actors in ways that development theory did not; it emphasises world market and financial trends over which the developing countries often have little control; it talks of multinational corporations and other transnational actors who sometimes have considerable influence in developing nations' internal affairs; it brings in US intervention, the role of capitalism, and other international factors about which earlier development theory had little to say. Wiarda warns that "In serious, scholarly hands dependency theory can be useful tool of analysis because out there in the "real world" there are genuine relations of dependent. But in less sophisticated hands dependency analysis has a tendency to spin off in ideological directions in order to criticise the United States."[34] This school lost its former influence, but other theories have to address the issues dependency thinkers have put on the agenda.

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15

Cold War

International relations were very much influenced by the cold war that dominated the international scene particularly after the World War II period. The two great conflicts of the second half of the twentieth century are; the discord between the East and the West and the clash between the rich nations of the North and the poor nations of the South. The former is popularly termed as cold war and is a subject of discussion of this chapter. The North-South conflict will be dealt with in one of the subsequent chapters.

A new international system emerged after the Second World War that was characterised by the domination of two super powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—and the rise of the newly independent states as a result of rapid decolonisation. These two super powers divided the world into two blocs. 'East' consisted of the communist nations in general, specially the Soviet Union and its political and military allies in Eastern Europe. 'West' comprised non-communist nations led by the United States, whose principal partners are the advanced industrial societies of Western Europe, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The term "free world" was also often employed to describe the non-communist world. The free world included the West and various economically less developed nations linked to the United States in mutual defense arrangements. Later on this term was discarded as a misnomer because many countries of the so called "free world" pursued authoritarian policies or had authoritarian regimes, not democratic. The Soviet Union claimed that its government is democratic in the real sense of the word and is opposed to US imperialism. The United States on the other hand held that the Soviet Union wishes to spread communism all over the world. This is how the world came to be divided into two powers blocs. This is how a natural struggle for power between the two super powers became a struggle between two ideologies. The division of the world into two rival blocs i.e. the East and the West was referred to as Bipolar World in international relations' terminology. This bipolarisation had led to a situation of cold war. The very formation of two rival factions has given rise to tension and this tension was named as cold war.

MEANING AND NATURE

Relations between the United States and the USSR were no doubt strained and hostile even prior to the beginning of World War II yet they were characterised as cold war around 1947. The term cold war was first coined by Bernard Baruch, an American statesman. In an address in Columbia, South Carolina, on April 16, 1947, a month after the declaration of the Truman Doctrine, he had said "Let us not be deceived— today we are in the midst of the cold war."[1] The term was taken up by Walter Lippmann to describe the tension and conflict in the bilateral relationship of the US and the USSR in post-World War II period.

In international relations cold war indicates a state of constant conflict and strife, suspicion and mistrust, antagonism and hostility maintained and perpetuated without a direct armed

confrontation between the adversaries. Cold war is not a state of armed struggle, but such a state in which the rivals, while keeping their peace-time diplomatic relations intact, continue their hostility. Both the antagonists adopt all means other than the war to weaken each other. It is not an armed war but a diplomatic and an ideological war. It is fought by means of political propaganda, that is why it is called 'propaganda war'. The cold war is not an actual war but the danger of such a 'hot war' is always imminent. In short, it can be defined as a state of intense diplomatic, political, economic and ideological struggle short of armed belligerency and clash.

Cold war is called a diplomatic struggle between the two super powers after the Second World War for world supermacy or an expression of two incompatible ways of life—those of democracy and totalitarian communism. It is the existence of the tense atmosphere of division, distrust and suspicion between the two power blocs in general and between the two super powers in particular. In other words, the tense and hostile relations that developed between the capitalist countries led by the United States and the communist nations headed by the Soviet Union in the years after the Second World War came to be popularly known as cold war. In this tense atmosphere of division, distrust and discord the super powers engaged themselves in military preparedness, arms race, pacts, alliances, creating sphere of influence and polarising the world.

The cold war was focused mainly on political controversies, in particular on the military and national security issues that divided East and West into contending factions. In the words of Kegley and Wittkopf, "The East-West conflict is essentially a struggle among those at the top of the international hierarchy for pre-eminent status, with each side seeking to protect its own position while gaining advantage in its relations with, and often at the expense of, the other."[2]

ORIGIN OF COLD WAR

Regarding the origin of the cold war there are different opinions. *First*, the seeds of cold war were sown with the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 in the Soviet Russia. *Second*, the cold war had shown its earlier signs a little before the end of World War II. The *third*, and widely prevalent version is that it started soon after the end of Second World War. It is difficult to accept any one view in its entirety because each has some element of truth. All the three views are being discussed below in some detail.

1. Origin with Bolshevik Revolution

The roots of the strained relations between Soviet Russia and the West go back to the very hour of birth of the former in 1917, when the Western nations including the USA, intervened in the civil war in Russia in the aid of a counter-revolution which might nip communism in the bud. The United States had not even extended diplomatic recognition to the Soviets until 1933. Though workable relations between them were gradually established, their mutual suspicion deterred both from coming together against their common enemy — Nazi Germany at the outbreak of the Second World War, and indeed, shortly before Hitler's attack on Poland, a non-aggression pact was signed between Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany. Hitler's sudden attack on Russia in June 1941 compelled it to come to the side of the West. Communist Russia's heroic sacrifices, which paved the way for the Allied victory, seemed to inspire in Allies a feeling of genuine admiration and sympathy towards her and usher a new era of cooperation between East and West. Seeing the strange alliance between the traditional enemies during the Second World War, many optimists were certain that future peace would be maintained by the continuance after hostilities ceased of the unity that prevailed during the difficult war years. The hope of the optimists that unity and cooperation among the erstwhile warring nations would become a permanent feature after the war, was belied. The world was divided into two distinct political entities and thus cold war and

bipolarisation became an accomplished fact. Thus, notwithstanding the cooperation between the two forced by the World War, traditional suspicion and old enmity revamped and repeated in the immediate postwar period as the predominant power of the two superstates fuelled their suspicions of each other.

2. Origin Little before the End of World War II

Another view maintains that cold war began on the eve of the end of the Second World War. According to this view, cold war was caused by "atomic diplomacy" during the last year of the World War. As it became clear that the Allied side would win and the Axis powers would be defeated, the common interest keeping the Allied powers together began to weaken and old suspicion between them resurfaced. The Western powers—the US, Britain and France— had combined with the Soviet Union with an aim to defeat the common enemy—the Nazis and Fascists. Once it became clear to them that the defeat of the enemy was inevitable, their old enmity with the Soviet Union reappeared, although they did not terminate the alliance with it before the final surrender of the enemy.

During the course of the war, the US was busy developing nuclear bomb in cooperation with Britain. Even though Russia was their war-time ally, they kept it secret from Moscow. The US failure to take the Soviet Union into confidence about its nuclear project made Moscow distrust of the ulterior motive and design of the US and its capitalist allies. Its traditional suspicion about them was regenerated.

The dropping of atom bombs by the US on Japan in August 1945 further strengthened this revived old suspicion. After the defeat of Germany the war in Europe was almost over and the whole attention of the Allied powers was directed at Japan which was still fighting in the East. So Allied side prepared the war strategy against Japan and a date was fixed when the US and the USSR would attack Japan from the South and the North respectively. But before the reaching of Soviet forces in Japan, the US, in violation of the above agreed strategy with Russia, dropped two atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and forced the Japanese government to surrender. Thus the war against Japan was over before the fixed date and Japan surrendered before the US forces and not before the USSR. The US became its sole conqueror and administered it for some years. The Russians felt that they were betrayed by the US which did not want the recurrence of the Germany occupation experience in Japan. (Germany was occupied by four Allied powers — the US, Britain, France and the Soviet Union). Moscow interpreted that the US action in Japan was not dictated by the need of ending the war swiftly; it was perhaps a part of the conspiracy of the capitalist countries against the communist world. Thus the making of atom bombs in a clandestine manner and subsequently its dropping over Japan by the US not only took the world by surprise but was interpreted by the Soviet Union as a strategy of blackmail to overawe the communists and to prove the superiority of the armed power of the capitalists.

3. Origin After the World War II

Those who believe that the cold war was a post-war phenomenon, trace its origin to the secret cable of George Kennan, the US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, to the Department of State in February, 1946. Here Kennan pleaded for a stronger attitude toward the Soviet Union. Based on this important cable, the then Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, formulated a new policy of containment with regard to the Soviet Union which was followed by the US in the post-war period. Simultaneously, Kennan was recalled to Washington to head the Department of State's Policy Planning Staff in order to provide an intellectual framework for the new American foreign policy.

Though American in form and content, the cold war was officially declared by a British statesman, Winston Churchill. He was out of office since July, 1945. He addressed the Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946. President Truman presided over this meeting. Though Churchill spoke as a private citizen yet his words had great impact on subsequent international relations. He observed: "A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied victory. Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organisation intends to do in the immediate future....From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent."[3] As a result, the war-time alliance had come to end. He emphasised that Russian understood nothing but force. At any rate, the Fulton speech called for an open termination of the policy of alliance with the Soviet Union and the assumption of the Anglo-American domination of the post-War World. With regard to this speech, Trygve Lie, the first Secretary-General of the United Nations observed: "In retrospect, it is evident that Winston Churchill's Fulton speech was the forerunner of the Western policy that a year later produced the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan and soon after that, the North Atlantic Treaty."[4] Professor Fleming has also remarked: "If, too, there is a Third World War, Churchill's Missouri speech will be the primary document in explaining its origins. His was the first full-length picture of a Red Russia out to conquer the world...it pre-conditioned many millions of listeners for a giant new *cordon sanitaire* around Russia, for a developing world crusade to smash world communism in the name of Anglo-Saxon democracy."[5] Containing of growing Soviet influence and communism in the Balkans in post-war years triggered off the cold war.

It is obvious from the above discussion that it is difficult to give precise timing of the genesis of cold war. At best, the broad approximation is that its seed which was sown immediately after October Revolution 1917, germinated by the end of World War II and blossomed in the post World War II period in full view of the world.

CAUSES OF THE COLD WAR

Regarding the causes of the cold war scholars and historians are not unanimous. These causes are broadly divided into two groups i.e. orthodox and revisionist. According to orthodox view Soviet Union is squarely responsible for the initiation of cold war as it forcibly established communist regime in East European countries in the post World War II period in violation of its agreement with the Western Allied powers. Whereas revisionists argue that the United States that emerged as superpower among the Western nations was responsible for the cold war. Besides these broad groups there are many other factors accounting for the cold war. All these are explained below.

Orthodox View—The USSR Responsible

Faux Pas which were committed by the Soviet Union and which annoyed the US and Western powers are enumerated as under: (i) Russian unwillingness to allow democratic elections in the territories liberated from the Nazis and superimposing communist governments there especially in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania and East Germany. (ii) Russia's refusal to withdraw her forces from Iran whereas Britain and the USA withdrew their forces. (iii) Soviet Union's pressure on Greece and Turkey by supporting subversive activities of communists there. (iv) The Soviet Union destroyed German industries and transferred costly German machines to Russia as reparation, adversely affecting already ruined German economy. Britain and the USA had to spend huge amounts for the recovery of German economy. (v) Refusal by Soviet leaders to help in post-war reconstruction in regions outside Soviet control. (vi) Their maintenance of an unnecessarily large post-war armed force. (vii) Discontinuation of supplies from Soviet areas of occupation. (viii) Their selfish and often obstructive behaviour in the new

destructive

born international organisations. (ix) Perhaps most unacceptable for the US, their anti-American propaganda and propagating of communist ideology which promised to destroy the American type of economic and political system. (x) The orthodox also accuse Stalin of being a man of suspicious nature. Because of his suspicious nature the Americans and Britishers were not able to convince him of their good intention and the reasons for delay in opening up a second front against Germany. Stalin abruptly rejected Allied explanations and held that the Western delays were, in brief, interpreted as a deliberate attempt by the world's two leading capitalist powers to destroy both of their two major ideological opponents at one and the same time. (xi) The orthodox argued that the predecessors of the Bolsheviks were also expansionist. As a result they were able to build a huge empire of Russia. Therefore, they believe that Russians by nature are war-mongers. They feel that Americans just retaliated defensively to check any further Russian expansion. This argument was strengthened by the unwillingness of the Soviets to withdraw the Red Army from Eastern and Central Europe after the Second World War. The Soviet Union came to be perceived as a military rival ready to invade Western Europe and to acquire new satellites under Russian occupation. The apprehension on the part of the Americans was that the Soviet Union was a great threat to peace as well as to their own power and position.

Revisionist View—The USA Responsible

Revisionist school of thought accuses America more than the USSR. After 1960 a new school of thought emerged in America which challenged and revised the orthodox view on various ground. That is why this school came to be known as revisionist school. To the Soviets, causes for doubting American intentions were too many. The following actions of the US displeased the Soviet Union.

(i) The American military intervention in Russia in 1918-19 which was aimed at overthrowing of the Bolshevik Revolution was still fresh in the memory of the Soviets. They were also bitter on the score that the US did not recognise communist regime until 1933.

(ii) Moreover, the war time experience instead of removing the Soviet doubts actually aggravated them. The Soviets recalled the United States dilly-dallying before joining the war against the fascists. The American refusal to inform the Soviets of the Manhattan project to develop the atomic bomb; the delay in sending the Soviets promised Lend-Lease supplies; the delay to open up the second front (causing Stalin to doubt that American policy was to let the Russians and Germans destroy each other so that the United States could then pick up the pieces from among the rubble); the American failure to inform the Soviets of wartime strategy to the extent that it informed Great Britain; and the use of the atomic bomb against Japan, perhaps misunderstood as a ploy to prevent Russian involvement in Pacific peace settlement. The Russians held this use of deadly weapon unnecessary because Japan could have been defeated by the Allied forces even with the help of traditional weapon after the fall of Italy and Germany. They view that American used atom bombs against Japan to frighten Russia and to check his expansion in Eastern Europe and Middle East.

(iii) The Soviet suspicion was further deepened by certain acts of America in post-war years. For example, the United States supported previous Nazi collaborators in American occupied countries, notably Italy, and pressurised the Soviet Union to abide by its promise to permit free elections in areas vital to Soviet national security, notably Poland.

(iv) During the war the Soviet Union had been getting American aid under the Lend-Lease Act but after the defeat of Germany, President Truman abruptly cancelled the Lend-Lease aid, when most needed by war-ravaged economy of Russia. The Western powers had also been opposing the Soviet demand of reparations. This confirmed the Soviet view that the West never wanted Russia

to be stronger. Whereas the United States later designed the European recovery programme known as Marshall Plan in such a way as to ensure non-participation by the Soviet Union.

(v) During talks at Yalta President Roosevelt agreed that the Soviet Union can install friendly governments on her Western boundaries. Therefore, it is inappropriate to contend that the Soviet Union expanded in the East Europe in violation of any agreement. Soviet Union right from Napoleonic War upto Second World War had always been attacked from the west. Therefore, it was in her interest to have friendly regimes in Eastern Europe. This was recognised by Churchill and Roosevelt in Yalta by accepting Soviet supremacy over Romania and Bulgaria.

(vi) The contention held by orthodox that Russia was imposing authoritarian communist government in East European countries as a part of his policy of expansion can also be repudiated on certain accounts. *First*, East European countries never have had before democratic governments therefore to say that Russia acted against democracy was baseless. *Second*, it adds fun to orthodox view which claims America as the protector of democracy in the world. For several times the US helped the dictatorial regimes in the various parts of the world such as Franco regime in Spain, coup in Chile, undemocratic government of General Lon Nol of Cambodia, military dictators (Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, and Zia-ul Haq) in Pakistan, monarchial government in Saudi Arabia etc.

(vii) Regarding activities of the USSR in Greece, Turkey and Persia the contention held by the orthodox that Russia wanted to impose communist governments in these countries was also baseless. Because in Persia, the Soviet Union only wanted some oil concessions. In regard to Turkey he wanted an access from Black Sea to Mediterranean through Bosphorus and Derdanelles. So far as the activities of communists are concerned in Greece he never encouraged directly or indirectly communists' subversive activities in accordance with the October 1944 agreement with Britain.

(viii) The revisionists hold President Truman largely responsible for the cold war. Had Roosevelt continued to be the President in the post-war period the cold war could not have come to such a pass. Even as a Senator Truman was highly opposed to communism. After becoming President he practised his anti-communist feelings by adopting stiff policy towards the Soviet Union. He was always of the opinion that evil ideologies like communism, fascism and nazism should have been nipped in the bud. Moreover, Truman was under the influence of such bureaucrats who had strong convictions against the expanding Soviet influence in East Europe and who time and again insisted that America should assert itself against the rising tide of communism. These officials included among others Byrnes, George Kennan, James Baruch, etc.

(ix) High US defence officials and generals also wanted some sort of tension to persist even after the War so that they may have their sway over the administration. Similarly, vested interests of war industry used its lobby to prevail upon the US administration to pursue the above policy so as to keep their pot boiling.

Objective View — Both are Responsible

According to objective view both the super powers were responsible for the origin of the cold war. There were certain objective reasons that culminated into cold war. These are as follows:

(i) *Misperceptions.* The cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union was rooted not in conflicting interests but in mutual misunderstanding. The cold war is described in terms of a propensity of each party to consider their own actions as virtuous and those of others malicious. These *mirror images*, of course, resulted in conflict and distrust. The tendency of both Soviets and

Americans to have the same perception of each other: "*they* are the aggressors; *they* arm for war whereas *we* arm for peace; *they* intervene in others' territory to expand influence, whereas *we* do so to preserve the prospects for an acceptable way of life. Their *people* are good and peaceloving, but their *government* exploits its people; the mass of their people are really not sympathetic to the regime; *it* cannot be trusted; *its* policy verges on madness. To the extent that such mirror images became operative, as they probably did in the final stages of World War II and shortly thereafter, cooperation was precluded and hostility inevitable."[6]

(ii) *Mutual Antagonism.* The cold war is also seen as a product of mutual antagonism. The history of the origins of the cold war indicates that mistrust and consequent fear were the very bases of the conflict. Stalin was as cautious of the Americans as they were of him. Hostile actions by one power were retaliated by the other. Threats and the suspicions they invariably bred, caused further threats. The cold war cannot be regarded as simply the response of one peaceful nation to the aggressions of another. Nor can the snapping of wartime alliance be attributed exclusively to one side. Rather, the cold war may be seen as an outcome of mutual fear and suspicion; once set in motion, a conflict developed which fed upon itself, breeding hostile interactions between both parties. Thus, it was originated in mistrust of the motives of the other side.

(iii) *Ideological Incompatibilities.* Another reason for the Soviet-American conflict was ideological incompatibilities. Many Americans were apprehensive of Soviet Communist doctrine. There was a particular apprehension that communism was an expansionist, crusading ideology intent on bringing world revolution. As the vanguard of the presumed communist challenge, the Soviet Union itself was the ultimate symbol of the communist threat. Moreover, the threat was increased by the fact that communism was necessarily totalitarian and anti-democratic and, therefore, posed a real threat to freedom and liberty throughout the world. The enemy was evil incarnate. The struggle between the USA and the Soviet Russia was the struggle between good and evil, freedom and tyranny. The Americans felt that the Soviet system was an evil system in which people are deprived of liberty, equality and fraternity—ideals of democracy. The American initiative was extended to safeguard these cherished goals of humanity and democracy. So the struggle was inevitable.

The United States foreign policy became ideological in turn: the counter-ideology may be named as anticommunism. Its policy became deadly against communism. Its actions highly competitive and confrontationist toward the Soviet Union. This interpretation thus sees the cold war as fuelled by historic antagonisms between diametrically opposed systems of belief. Like previous religious wars for the allegiance of men's minds, this conflict was highly bitter, as ideological enemies recognise no virtue in conciliation or cooperation with adversaries.

(iv) *Economic interests.* While the Western bloc favoured capitalist economy promoting individual initiative and enterprise, the Eastern bloc stood for the socialist planned economy controlled by the state. The Western nations are developed countries, but their development is nourished by the exploitation of poor countries of the third world. Naturally, if more and more third world nations have communist governments, the capitalist markets would shrink and the availability of raw materials of poor countries to them would decline. It was, therefore, in the interest of Western powers to keep the third world free from the communist domination, and, if possible, make them an integral part of their economic network. Likewise, the Soviet Union and its allies were determined to deny as much as possible the capitalist penetration into the third world. They hoped that the increased shrinkage in the exploitation of the third world by capitalist countries would ultimately lead to the doom of capitalism.

(v) *Objective Law.* Many historians are of the opinion that it is the law of nature that victorious powers always fought after the victory. After the Napoleonic war the victorious fought among themselves over the distribution of spoils of wars. Similarly, after the Austro-Persian war France and Russia fought among themselves. Similar thing happened after the First World War. Therefore, it was quite natural that the victors of the Second World War also fight to uphold the law of nature.

(vi) *Other Reasons.* The leaders of the two countries were also responsible for the cold war as they saw the world differently. They imposed on events different definitions of reality. In sum, they became captives of their visions of reality. Other reasons were "the emergence of 'power vacuum' which invited the clash, the pressures exerted on foreign policies by interest groups within each society, the impact of shifts in the climate of domestic opinion on international issues, the effects of innovation in weapon technology and the shift in strategic balances they introduced, and the role played by military planners in each society in fomenting the conflict."[7]

In the conclusion it can be said that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was to be solely blamed for the initiation of the cold war. Both were equally responsible as both were victims of their images and expectations. Each of the great powers felt threatened and each had solid reason to see the other with suspicion. All the above viewpoints and theories are only partially correct. They reveal some aspects of Soviet-American rivalry, but not all. The origin of the cold war was due to multiple reasons and no single viewpoint can embrace all of them. All the above interpretations are relevant, and some combination of them is needed to explain the beginning of this global post-War phenomenon.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE COLD WAR

Preponderance of the cold war characterises the international relations in the post-World War II period. The evolution of cold war in this period has not proceeded in consistent manner. It has been marked by varying degrees of intensity. Phases of high conflict alternated with a mix of conflict and adjustment to be followed again by phase of tension and hostility which yielded to a phase of détente and détente in turn suffered a set back and capitulated to another phase of strained relations. In this way evolutionary curve of cold war progressed discreetly upto the early nineties. It may be conceded that characterisation of cold war into the different phases is far from being scientific. It is more or less arbitrary in nature and is designed to make the process of evolution easily intelligible to a common man. How the two super powers acted and reacted to each other during each phase are examined below.

Cautious Friendship and Breaking Alliance, 1945-46

The end of World War II was characterised by suspicion on the part of each former ally about the others' intentions. Part of this period exhibited the optimism that Soviets and Americans would cooperate to protect world peace. At San Francisco conference in the spring of 1945, both worked in this direction by agreeing to the setting up of the United Nations. But with the coming to power by Truman in April 1945, the doubts began to develop and dominate. Truman abandoned Roosevelt's policies aimed at continuing war time alliance with Soviets in the form of post-war harmony. Truman's statement that "if the Russians did not wish to join us they could go to hell"; not only irked the Soviet Union but also indicated the shift in American mood. During this brief interlude, vacillation, ambivalence, doubts and uncertainty marked the behaviour of the two powers. They became increasingly hopeless about the prospects for avoiding confrontation notwithstanding occasional efforts at accommodation. During this brief spell their relations embittered greatly.

In this very period, the Soviet Union imposed communist regimes in the East European countries of Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Yugoslavia and adopted a policy of liquidating the democratic political parties and crushing democratic institutions. Again, the Soviet Union violated the Balkan agreement (concluded between Churchill and Stalin in 1944) regarding the joint sphere of influence of the Soviet Union and Britain over Hungary and Yugoslavia. By military intervention the Soviet Union established communist governments throughout the Balkan region after the close of war. After putting the Eastern Europe behind iron curtain, the Soviet Union attempted at spreading its communist tentacles in the West Europe. America could not afford to be a silent spectator to the growing Soviet influence and expansion.

Mutual Hostility and Intense Conflict, 1946-1953

In this phase cold war took its complete shape and there was always a danger of its becoming hot. It was an era of intense hostility and conflict. During this phase the cold war was largely based upon George F. Kennan's thesis. He was of the opinion that the Soviet strength was on decline. If a strong external pressure could be organised the Red regime would fall like a house of cards. Each side misinterpreted the words and deeds of the other. In February 1946, Stalin gave a speech in which he "spoke of the inevitability of conflict with the capitalist powers. He urged that the Soviet people not to be deluded that the end of the war meant that the nation could relax. Rather, intensified efforts were needed to strengthen and defend the homeland."[8] Immediately after this, Kennan, American diplomat in Moscow sent to Washington his famous "long telegram" assessing the motivations of the Soviet leadership. Thus Kennan made what eventually became an oft-repeated and accepted view: "In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy towards the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."[9] In this way, the *policy of containment* was formulated in the US. It asserted that the Soviet Union should not be given any more opportunity for expansion. The American atomic monopoly offered the military logic for this line of thought.

The policy of containment was enforced by direct military and economic intervention to save threatened American allies— Greece and Turkey—through Truman Doctrine of March 12, 1947; and by the economic integration and regionalisation of the West European Powers by the Marshall Plan of June 5, 1947. Economically, the West European Powers were securely rehabilitated through the generous Marshall Aid. Anti-communist hysteria was deliberately fostered throughout the world. Containment policy or myth remained one of the guiding principles on which American foreign affairs were based for many years. There was an American tendency to view instability anywhere as Soviet conspiracy. This way various situations were defined as cold war incidents, including the Soviet refusal to withdraw troops from Iran, the Communist *coup d'etat* in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin Blockade in 1948, the formation of NATO in 1949 and most importantly, the acquisition of power by the Communist Chinese on the mainland and the Korean War and Taiwan Straits crises which followed. The United States continued her military and economic offensive measures against the Soviet Union. The Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States (ANZUS) (September 1, 1951), the Japanese Peace Treaty (September 8, 1951) were entered into in this period. Thus, the US intensified her ideological offensive, sponsored many military alliances and encouraged arms race during this period.

In 1950, the cold war also reached from Europe to Asia. The Korean War (1950-53) was, in fact, a direct conflict between the super powers. North Korea was fighting with Soviet weapons and Chinese troops, while the USA in the name of the UN force was fighting on behalf of South Korea. This war certainly contained the seed of the Third World War, but it was terminated through an armistice.

An agreement during a war to stop fighting for a certain time : a Truce

The Soviet Union interpreted all the above developments through a similar set of perceptual and biased lenses, seeing American actions as a series of attempts to encircle the Soviet Union and eventually to attack. On its part, the Soviet Union reacted to these dangerous developments, and strengthened the security measures and control. It successfully exploded the atom bomb and established communist regime in China in 1949. Hence, the relationship between the two powers was not merely cold but it was one of overt hostility and confrontation. Both the United States and the Soviet Union remained busy in the game of power politics with a vengeance, and both pursued the same goal: minimising the influence of the other and setting at naught the opponent's presumed efforts to win the world.

Apparent Conflict, Actual Adjustment, 1953-62

This phase is to be studied in the context of the fact that by 1949 the Soviet Union had succeeded in making atom bomb and thereby ending America's atomic monopoly. In 1953 Stalin passed away and with his demise an important force aggravating cold war was removed. Khrushchev the new premier adopted a policy of peaceful co-existence. Both sides, particularly the *Untied States*, talked as if war was imminent but in deeds both acted with increasing caution and restraint and scrupulously avoided the hot war and armed clashes.

During this period, the US organised the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in September 8, 1954 and the Middle East Defence Organisation in February 24,1955. Again through the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1954, she extended the Truman Doctrine to cover the entire Middle East. The US became a party to defence treaties with 43 states, involving over a third of the world's population. She established a network of about 3,300 military bases to surround the Soviet territory. This period also witnessed the beginning of Vietnam crisis (1955) involving both the powers especially America. The crisis lasted till 1975.

During this period, the Soviet Union did not lag behind in strengthening her political and military might. The Soviet Union concluded the Warsaw Treaty with East European communist states on May 14,1955. The Warsaw Pact was a befitting reply to NATO's inclusion of West Germany. The Soviet Union entered into defence treaties with 12 states. It also frustrated the American attempt to provoke counter-revolution in Hungary in 1956. To promote economic integration of East Europe it formed the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON or C.M.E.A) on December 14, 1959.

Obviously under the US instructions, the Western powers, established a fully sovereign Federal Republic of Germany on May 5, 1955. The Potsdam restrictions on arms were removed from West Germany. The Soviet answer was the formation of the German Democratic Republic in October, 1955. In this way, Germany was partitioned into two sovereign states due to the cold war.

Calvocoressi rightly observed: "In the fifties both sides exploded a thermonuclear or hydrogen bomb, the Americans in November 1952 and the Russians nine months later. Despite, the Russian advances the Americans retained their supremacy until about 1953 owing to their superior capacity to delivery, by aircraft or rockets, the atomic weapons which both sides now possessed. The Russians, however, rapidly developed their means of delivery so that a mutual deterrence ruled the mid-fifties...."[10] Not only this, the Soviet Sputnik opened up a new space age in October 1957. These two developments brought a new positive turn in the cold war. It was realised that the hope of victory in a nuclear war was a myth. Consequently, the concept of nuclear deterrence developed that contributed to the partial restoration of stability in international relations.

The above developments initiated a process of co-existence and adjustments among the rival powers and brought them to a negotiating table at Geneva Summit of 1955. Eisenhower and

Bulganin exchanged assurances that nuclear warfare had no rational purpose and that neither USA nor the USSR was interested to begin such a war. Although the first summit did not produce any effective result, it raised new hopes in the form of a dialogue between the super powers. "Geneva spirit" was a clear indication of a new phase in the relations of states since the beginning of cold war in 1945.

In the Suez Crisis of 1956 there was agreement between the USA and the USSR and the former refused to support her close allies Britain and France. Thus, the West Asian crisis could not erupt into major crisis owing to behavioural accommodation of two Super Powers. Khrushchev paid a historic visit to the United States in 1959 and it was hoped that the cold war would now come to an end. Agreement for a Paris Summit to be held in May 1960 to discuss the Berlin problem showed a clear departure from the cold war spirit of 1946. The Antarctica Treaty of 1959 was another indicator of this departure. But the U-2 aircraft incident, two weeks before the commencement of the Paris Summit, once again resumed hostility. Khrushchev declined to participate in the Summit and on his suggestion the negotiations were suspended pending the change in administration in Washington (in 1961). But this dangerous tendency was partly stalled by the Vienna meeting of Khrushchev and President Kennedy in 1961. Though both leaders could not come to any agreement on German and other questions, this meeting proved to be a fruitful reversal of the bitter consequences of the U-2 incident.

The climax of the Berlin crisis came, when on August 13, 1961, a 25-mile long Berlin Partition Wall was erected to check the fleeing of refugees from East Berlin to West Berlin. The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) literally brought the two super powers on the brink of a nuclear show down. However, the crisis was averted by an agreement between Khrushchev and Kennedy, in which the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw the missile base in exchange of the American guarantee never to invade Cuba.

President Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, talked of a "roll-back" of the iron curtain and the "liberation" of Eastern Europe. They denounced the allegedly "soft" and "restrained" containment doctrine of Truman and they apparently promised to launch an ambitious "winning" strategy that would end the confrontation with godless communism for good. But actually communism was not rolled back in Eastern Europe and containment was not replaced by a stringent foreign policy initiative. This phase is also known for Dulles' advocacy of brinkmanship and his threat of "massive retaliation", through which he hoped to compel the Soviets into submission. Although reciprocal antagonism continued but a show down was always avoided.

Thaw in the Cold War, 1963-68

This phase was marked by a deeper appreciation by the Super Powers of utter futility of nuclear war strategy. Notwithstanding the persisting of ideological estrangement, and the assumptions that supported them (including the idea that the struggle between East and West was irreconcilable) and the fact that this period began immediately after the Cuban missile crisis and witnessed the dangerous Vietnam conflict as well as grim arms race, there was a definite thaw in the cold war. Alongwith these recurrences of cold war politics there were signs of the origin of détente.

Some of the burning problems were resolved, for example, with tacit acceptance by the United States of a divided Germany and of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. The precedent for communication established at Geneva and later at the 1959 Camp David meeting was followed by the installation of the "hot line" in 1963 linking the White House and the Kremlin with a direct communication line; the Glassboro summit meeting (1967), and negotiated agreements, such as

the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963), the Outer Space Treaty (1967), and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (1968).

At the American University in 1963, President Kennedy hinted at the need for bringing down tensions:

> Today, should total war ever break out again—no matter how—our two countries would become the primary targets. It is an ironical but accurate fact that the two strongest powers are the two in the most danger of devastation. We are both caught up in a vicious and dangerous cycle in which suspicion on one side breeds suspicion on the other and new weapons beget counterweapons.
>
> In short, both the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, have a mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race....
>
> So let us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity.[11]

A major change in Soviet-American relations was not initiated by Kennedy but this much he surely indicated that there was a shift in America's attitude towards its opponent. As against it the Soviet Union also harped upon the policy of peaceful co-existence between capitalism and socialism. Kegley and Wittkopf rightly observe: "Admittedly those token moves were a far cry from sustained cooperation between the ideological antagonists, but they did signal a departure from the posture of confrontation that had previously typified Soviet-American relations. Cooperative behaviour was evident, however, intermittent and fleeting, amidst a pattern of continued competition for advantage and influence."[12]

Détente, 1969-1978

This phase was marked by the decline of cold war and rise of détente. Relations between the USA and the USSR became quite normal and visits, cultural exchanges, trade agreements and cooperative technological ventures replaced threats, warnings and confrontation. This could have been possible only with coming to power of President Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry A. Kissinger. Their policy towards Soviet-American relations was officially termed as *détente* in 1969. The Soviets also embraced the term to describe their attitude towards the United States.

As a peace strategy and diplomatic doctrine, détente was designed, in the words of Kissinger, to create "an environment in which competitors can regulate and restraint their differences and ultimately move from competition to cooperation."[13] The age of détente was characterised by a continuation of efforts by rival super powers to reduce tension, diminish distrust and increase accommodation that were already underway. Factors accounting for détente and how this process proceeded will be dealt with in detail in a subsequent chapter. Major important events contributing to the improvement of relations and lessening of tensions and arms race were: signing of Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) in 1972; holding of 35-Nation European Security Conference in Helsinki in July 1973 and organising of Review Conference on European Security Conference in Belgrade in 1977. However, certain irritants still persisted. For example, the US favoured armed build up in Iran to counteract growing influence of Russia in Middle East. It also moved to convert Diego Garcia into a military base. During Bangladesh crisis the US sided with Pakistan and Russia with India. Similarly in 1973 Egypt-Israel war, the USSR sided with Egypt and the USA with Israel. But both the super powers avoided to militarily involve themselves in these conflicts.

New Cold War, 1979-1987

Inspite of the positive development of détente in the previous phase, it could not be continued. Certain events of 1978 and 1979 resulted in a decline in the process of détente. Once again bitterness and antagonism raised their head. As superpower relations in 1978 again became sore, some experts began to observe that the two states were moving into a *post-détente* era perhaps best termed as Cold War II or New Cold War. Confrontation rather than accommodation once again became the dominant mode of interaction between the two powers. Their relations were definitely strained and they accused and threatened each other.

The difficulties in negotiating the SALT II agreement revealed, nevertheless, that substantial differences still existed between the superpowers. However, in June 1979 President Carter and President Brezhnev signed SALT II limiting the expansion of the nuclear weapons till December 1985. But US Senate refused to ratify the treaty owing to Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in late 1979. Moreover, continued high levels of Soviet military spending, Soviet "adventurism" in Africa and elsewhere, and the presence of Soviet military forces in Cuba were seen by US administration with suspicion. In El Salvador (Central America) where USA intervened, and the Soviets, Cubans, Nicaraguans were accused of involvement in clandestine supply of arms to insurgents with a view to imposing Marxist-Leninist dictatorship there. In addition, the Carter administration spearheaded a global campaign in favour of human rights that irked and annoyed the Soviet leaders and gave them cause to question American intentions.

These happenings were interpreted in diverse ways. To some, they indicated the death of détente. To others, they signalled the threat of third world war. While to still others, it was not a matter of serious concern and anxiety. But to all, these developments served as a telling reminder that suspicion between the two superpowers was ever present, whether open or disguised.

End of Cold War and Revival of Détente, 1987 Onwards

Out of the three interpretations described in the previous paragraph the third one proved correct as the new cold war did not last long and the process of détente revived. In 1985 when Gorbachev came to power he presented a "new political thinking" to the world. Initially America was sceptical about Gorbachev's intentions of improving relations with the US and the West. Gradually, America realised Gorbachev's sincerity of purpose. The summit level talks between the President of two superpowers that were discontinued in the wake of Afghanistan crisis in 1979 were resumed in November 1985. Ever since there has been a series of such summits as an annual feature creating conducive atmosphere favouring cordial Soviet-American relations and reducing armed race. Geneva Accord on Afghanistan was signed in 1987 and subsequently Soviet troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan. The same year with the signing of INF treaty between the two superpowers, détente was revived. With the collapse of communist regimes in East Europe in 1989 the East Bloc withered away. In July 1991, the historic Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was signed between President Gorbachev and President Bush to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals by about 30 per cent and marked the end of fifty-year long cold war. In December 1991 the Soviet Union ceased to exist as it was disintegrated and its successor Russian Federation was badly mauled by internal problems. In February, 1992 President Bush and Russian Federation President Yeltsin made a formal declaration regarding the end of the cold war.

IMPACT OF THE COLD WAR

Cold war effected not only the Soviet-American relations but the whole gamut of international relations in the post-war period. There is hardly any aspect of international relations— political,

diplomatic, economic, cultural, ideological and military—that has not been influenced by Soviet-American rivalry. Similarly there is hardly any region whether West or East Europe; South East, Far East or West Asia; Africa or Latin America that remained untouched by the cold war. The main impacts of this long drawn international phenomenon are discussed as under:

1. *'Temporary' Arrangements turned Permanent.* Hartmann observed that the 'temporary' political arrangements made during the War-time conferences particularly at Yalta and Potsdam tended to become permanent as relations grew stiffer between the East and the West, while many of the proposed permanent dispositions failed completely of being realised. The 'temporary' division of Germany, pending the formation of an all-German government, persisted more than forty years later, just as did the 'temporary' division of Korea at the 38th Parallel. Poland, 'pending the final determination' of her western frontier at the peace settlement, was still 'temporarily' administering parts of former East Germany. It was only after great difficulty that the powers were able even to agree on the composition of the conference to pass on peace treaties for Italy and the Balkan states—although such treaties were signed in 1946. Not until December, 1955, did these states achieve their promised membership in U.N. The proposed permanent disposition for a 'free and independent Austria' took many years, until mid-1955, to realise, and the 'free and independent Korea' remained divided into pieces. These pieces of unfinished business were owing to the growing disharmony among allied great powers in the immediate post war period.[14] It took forty five years for two German states to unite and that too when the cold war was on its last legs.

2. *Bipolar Power Structure.* The most important impact of the Soviet-American rivalry was on the world political system in the form of change in the power structure that was closely related to the distribution of economic and military power between the two super-powers. Immediately after the Second World War, the United States emerged as the pre-eminent power in the world, but this situation changed quickly as the Soviet Union became a force to be reckoned with. A new world power configuration developed that was termed as bipolar, with the United States and its allies constituting one pole, the Soviet Union and its allies the other. This power configuration roughly run parallel with the phases of Soviet-American rivalry known as 'mutual hostility and intense conflict' and 'apparent conflict, actual adjustment'.

3. *Atmosphere of Bitterness.* Due to cold war world atmosphere was marked by bitterness, doubt and hostility. There was practically no peace in the world although the World War II had ended in 1945. Periodic crises and the threat of war characterised the cold war days. The dream of 'one world' with all people living in peace was gone. Great nations of the world started thinking in terms of the particular bloc to which they belonged. Instead of sitting at the UN to think ways and means to help humanity, there had been going on wordy duels.

4. *Arms Race and Militarisation.* Race for acquiring more and more arms was initiated by big powers. Huge money was spent on arms and dangerous weapons which should be more usefully spent on socio-economic development. Both sides developed thousands of powerful nuclear warheads which were capable enough of destroying the world several times. They also developed long-range missiles which could fly from one continent to another in no time. Owing to this competitive arms race the war clouds hovered over the world for long.

5. *Formation of Military Alliances.* Several military alliances came into existence and an era of regional military organisations began. NATO, Warsaw Pact, CENTO, SEATO, ANZUS etc. were formed as a result of the cold war. The principal European allies of the superpowers were grouped into the NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organisation. With its Asian allies, the US organised CENTO and SEATO, and with Australia and New Zealand formed ANZUS. These alliances undermined

the importance of the UNO. Although these military organisations remained active for quite some time but with the passing of time they lost their cohesiveness as well as relevance.

6. *Bipolycentrism and Multipolarism.* Resurgent nationalism and renewed economic vigor made European members of NATO and Warsaw Pact more vocal and assertive on some matters, especially economic issues. Thus, as the cold war moved through the phase of thaw to détente, the world powers configuration changed from bipolarity to what may be described as bipolycentrism. This concept explains not only the continued dominance the United States and the Soviet Union exercised on military matters, but also to the far greater flexibility that came to characterise interactions between and among First and Second World nations on non-military issues. The term multipolarism signifies the re-emergence of Britain, France, China, Japan etc. as powerful countries especially in economic sphere.

7. *Rapid Decolonisation.* Another impact of the East-West contest was the growth in the numbers of newly independent nations. These nations later on came to be known as Third World nations and their very large number was the base of their political power. The decolonisation process played out primarily since World War II was speeded by the political attacks of the socialist camp on Western imperialism and by the political alliance forged between the former and Third World nations which effectively delegitimised colonialism as an acceptable form of political organisation and control.

8. *Third World—A Victim of Cold War.* The Third World was both an observer and a pawn in the cold war. The Third World found itself the object of superpowers courtship. The courtship assumed the form of competition for allies, of foreign—aid flows often designed more to serve the political interests of the donors than the economic development goals of the recipients, and frequently of massive amounts of military assistance. Small countries of the Third World can be of help to the main Cold Warriors in atleast three ways. They can provide bases; they can be part of the economic system of their respective leaders, and can extend significant diplomatic support in international forums, especially in the United Nations. Although the Third World generally assumed an attitude of non-involvement in the East-West conflict, it nevertheless often became theatre of the most violent conflicts in the post-war period. Not all of these conflicts were direct outcome of Soviet-American rivalry, but few were immune from it.

9. *Internationalisation of Regional Conflicts.* Regional and local conflicts whose origin might have been purely local get meshed with big power rivalry, and big power-patrons are either invited to the third world trouble spots, or they themselves make their way into those places in their perceived interests. Disputes between small states were unnecessarily prolonged to the advantage of big powers as these powers wanted to make capital of it. Korean war, Vietnam crisis, Afghanistan crisis, Arab-Israel conflict etc. are glaring examples to cite.

10. *Assertion by Third World.* Like European members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and also like Japan, the Third World has become more assertive on non-military matters that are otherwise on the periphery of the major political and military issues dividing East and West. That they have been able to do so is in part a function of the evolving nature of the East-West conflict. The essential nuclear stalemate between the superpowers has produced greater flexibility in world politics because the superpowers, sensitive to the dangerous consequences of a direct confrontation between them, have allowed some political events to unfold without their direct intervention. This assertion not only ended the bipolarism but also discouraged the cold war.

11. *Set back to Diplomacy.* Diplomacy suffered a lot during the cold war. International issues were not discussed and settled on the basis of the merit. A nation's approach to any international

issue was influenced by its affiliation with this or that bloc. All serious problems, discussed in the UN and other important forums, polarise the participant nations on the line of the cold war perceptions. Disarmament talks were disrupted several times owing to cold war. Even negotiations between two third world countries were vitiated by their relations with the two cold war camps.

12. *Propaganda Warfare.* There was intensive propaganda undertaken against each other by the superpowers during the course of cold war. Both vehemently attacked the ideological beliefs of the other while perhaps becoming a prisoner of its own. They spared no international forum to severely criticise each other. Electronic media was used extensively for this purpose. Wide range of literature was distributed freely by both sides presenting their viewpoint to the world at large. In educational institutions of capitalist countries, communism was denounced and did not get a fair treatment. Likewise, in communist countries, capitalism was painted as a pure devil. Theories and models were developed only to defend one system and condemn the other.

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16

New Cold War

The origin of the new cold war is generally traced back to December 1979 when Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan. However, Brezezinski, the National Security Adviser of President Carter of USA in his book holds that it was in 1978 that things began to go wrong in the Soviet-American relationship.[1] In the first half of 1970s, there was apparently some reduction in international tensions. SALT-I greatly contributed to the dawn of what was then acclaimed as *détente.* A few things occurred in the second half of 1970s which signified the victory for the USSR over the US. In 1975 South Vietnam fell to communists and the next year the pro-Soviet forces captured power in Angola while the pro-US and pro-China elements suffered a defeat there in the power struggle. This phase reached its climax when the Soviet Union militarily intervened in Afghanistan in December 1979 and the power was captured by a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. Subsequently when Soviets became more emboldened that America reacted more sharply. Thus Brezezinski blamed the Soviet Union for the new cold war.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union held the US responsible for the initiation of new cold war. It has been maintained that with coming into power in the USA by Democrat President Carter and assumption of office by hawkish Brezezinski as National Security Advisor, the US attitude towards Soviet Union underwent a change. Kissinger's view that the only alternative to *détente* was war did not find favour with Brezezinski who disapproved overselling of *détente* by Nixon and Kissinger. He reminded that *détente* required responsible behaviour on the part of the Soviet Union. But its actions in Angola, the Middle East, Ethiopia, the United Nations and finally in Afghanistan certainly indicated that it was playing smart. He advocated a calculated policy of simultaneous competition and cooperation which could promote reciprocal *détente.* This naturally evoked strong Soviet reaction and the fragile *détente* was broken. Thus Soviets accused Carter for beginning the new cold war by unnecessarily combining the Soviet behaviour with the SALT process.

Many observers characterised the deteriorating Soviet-American relations as merely a reaffirmation of their belief that the cold war had never ended, even during the period of *détente.* The conflict persisted even during *détente,* though on a new basis and in a new style; the differences that invariably divide great powers did not disappear. From this viewpoint, the name of *détente* tended to conceal the continuing, fundamental rivalry between the super powers. Hence, Goodman observed: "*détente* (was) a part of the cold war, not an alternative to it."[2]

Gelb further developed this thesis as viewed from the American perspective, saying that the Nixon-Kissinger strategy sought "to evolve *détente* into a new form of containment of the Soviet-Union—or better still, self-containment on the part of the Russians."[3] According to Kissinger's conception, *détente* represented an attempt to devise "new means to the old ends of containment."[4] When the United States enjoyed superiority in strategic and military aspects, according to this agreement, containment and cold war politics was possible by coercion and confrontation. But

from a balanced position, confrontation is not viable and containment only feasible through reduction and collaborative linkages which would tie the Soviets in a web of cooperative arrangements, thereby checking expansionism on their part. From the Soviet perspective, this thesis suggests the possibility that the Soviets might have seen in trade, technological, and diplomatic exchanges a way of reducing the threat of the United States, thereby enabling them to pay more attention on crucial internal problems. It may also have been considered as a means of minimising the threat to the Soviet Union that impending hobnobbing between the United States and China could pose.

Arms control talks were central theme of the whole process of *détente*. With the signing of SALT agreements in 1972 and 1979, each of the superpowers appeared to have gained a principal objective it had sought through the process of *détente*. By this the Soviet Union attained a coequal status with the United States. In the bargain, the United States gained a commitment of moderation on the Soviet Union's part in its attempt to achieve pre-eminent power in the world. In sum, the ideological incompatibilities between the United States and the Soviet Union, hovering of war clouds owing to their military preparedness and their conflicting interests and objectives throughout the world keep the struggle between East and West very much alive.

Until the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in late 1979, the relationship between the two powers was perhaps best explained by Brezezinski as contestation. The term seems appropriate as it stresses the enduring *contest* that remains fundamental to Soviet-American relations. A contest entails elements of both conflict and cooperation. Contestation thus describes the superpowers, dual compulsion to oppose one another throughout the globe, but to cooperate out of necessity because of their common need to avoid nuclear war.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan challenged the correctness of the term-contestation that symbolised the Soviet- American relationship in early 1979. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance warned in early 1980: "Obviously, the bilateral relationship has received a severe blow as a result of what happened in Afghanistan."[5] Immediately after this President Carter announced a new "doctrine" when he warned in his State of the Union address that "an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."[6] Evidently, the Soviet Union was the intended target of the message, Afghanistan its reason. Then in May 1980, Carter explained the perceived Soviet threat in dramatic terms: "Soviet aggression in Afghanistan—unless checked—confronts all the world with the most serious strategic challenge since the cold war began."[7] By that time the US had already planned retaliatory actions such as boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, momentary suspension of American grain exports to the Soviet Union, and curtailment of trade links with the Soviet Union that had developed during *détente*. All these developments and resouring of Soviet-American relations were referred to as new cold war or second cold war that lasted from 1979 to 1986-87.

CAUSES AND EVOLUTION OF NEW COLD WAR

Major causes of the evolution of new cold war are as follows:

1. Reverses Suffered in Vietnam

After the reverses it suffered in Vietnam, America under Reagan Administration was trying its best to refurbish its image. The American people, in a mood of despair, appeared to feel that they had become completely enfeebled, paralysed and impotent. The success stories of the Soviet Union in Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan greatly worsened this psychosis of Americans. In this atmosphere of 'defeatism' and despair Ronald Reagan emerged as the triumphant hero of vast

majority of Neo-conservatives in his country in the 1980 election. He undertook to pull his country out of the morass of dismay and disappointment and usher in an era of "New Resurgence."

2. One-Sided *Détente*

America's Neo-conservatives alleged that the *détente* was "one-sided" and the Soviet Union had "fully exploited it for its own end." The Republican Party took full advantage of this new spurt of conservative mood in the USA and the result was the victory of Reagan as the President in November 1980. The Republicans also increased their strength in the Congress and were able to gain vital majority in the Senate. This had significant impact on the American foreign policy and *détente*.

3. Acts of Carter Administration

The main framework of Reagan's strident and militant foreign policy had already been built by the previous Carter Administration. It was the Carter Administration that had initiated the policy of helping through CIA, the Afghan 'Mujaheddians' fighting against the pro-Soviet Karmal regime. It had also offered help to Pakistan including the supply of sophisticated F-16s. The US decision made in early 1970s to convert Diego Garcia into a full fledged naval base had also been implemented by the Carter Administration. Carter also pleaded the cause of human rights throughout the world including the Soviet Union. His support for human rights was disliked by the Soviet Union. All policies of Carter Administration were retained by the Reagan Administration and implemented with more zeal and with more militant rhetorics.

4. Developments in Indian Ocean

In Ethiopia, an important pro-US country in North Africa for long, a pro-Soviet regime captured power. In Saudi Arabia there was a mini-revolt. The rebels were allegedly trained by South Yemen and Libya which were close to the Soviet Union. There was military encounter between South Yemen aided by Moscow, and North Yemen helped by Saudi Arabia and USA. The fall of the Shah of Iran in early 1979 was a terrible blow to the US. For long Shah of Iran was the main pillar of US foreign policy in this area. All these events revived the hostility between the two powers.

5. Soviet Union's Successes, America's Annoyance

Soviet Union's actions and interventions succeeded in the second half of 1970s in Vietnam (1975), Angola (1976), Ethiopia (1977) and Afghanistan (1979). The US President Reagan accused the Soviet Union of a major share of blame for Polish situation as the latter got imposed material law in Poland in 1981. According to the US, the Soviet Union never misses an opportunity to take undue advantage of the situation and always intervenes to create its sphere of influence. These Soviet actions were not liked by the US. Under these circumstances America stood agaped and in the words of former President Nixon, the US looked like the "pitiful helpless giant". A giant cannot endure to be in a pitiful situation for long.

FEATURES OF NEW COLD WAR

An Indian scholar Prof. Baral has well explained the features of the new cold war.[8] His views are summed up below.

1. Mainly Out of Atlantic and Pacific

In the past, main theatre of the cold war was the Atlantic and the Pacific areas. The battlefield of new cold war was the states of Indian ocean. Both the super powers were not only sending more

and more warships to the Ocean, but were also trying to hire more bases and other military facilities in its littoral states. Strategic importance of the region was revealed during the oil blockade and both sides vied with each other in respect of military presence in the region.

2. Reagan's Rhetoric

Reagan's strident rhetoric added a new dimension into the cold war. He vehemently declared that the US would enter into negotiation with the Soviet Union on arms control only from a position of strength. He hoped that the Soviet Union would be frightened by his rhetoric and rush to the negotiation table with folded hands and bent knees. But his hopes were belied as no meaningful agreement with the Soviet Union could be concluded during large part of his tenure. It was only in last year of his tenure that he became soft and signed INF treaty with Gorbachev. He initiated Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) and also talked of Star War.

3. Nuclear Race

New turn in the nuclear race and nuclear proliferation was witnessed during the days of new cold war. Many third world countries and other nations also joined the race e.g. Israel, South Africa, India, Iraq, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil and Australia. There are two opinions in respect of the impact of this nuclear proliferation on disarmament and peace. The Western scholars opined that the neo-nuclear nations are not mature in handling nuclear weapons and are, therefore, likely to be irresponsible in their nuclear conduct. But several third world countries including India do not agree with the above view. According to them the new members of the nuclear club are as responsible or irresponsible as its old members, and to limit the membership of the nuclear club only to five big powers is not only discriminatory, but also indicates big power chauvinism and overlordship. On the other hand, they would expect that the nuclear proliferation, enhancing danger for all, would compel the "nuclear-haves" to control and gradually eliminate the "vertical proliferation".

4. Delinking or De-coupling

Except Britain, other West European countries, which continued to be close to USA, were in favour of delinking the *détente* in Europe from peripheral conflicts. They no longer blindly ditto the US policies in different regions—Asia, Africa and Latin America. Most of the European allies refused to get themselves involved in American Operations in Afghanistan. They reacted against the prospect of inviting troubles for European peace whenever America feels that its interests in some areas are threatened by "Soviet aggression". In this way West European nations did not allow the new cold war to invade their region for the sake of American interests and thus delinked *détente* from this new phenomenon.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NEW AND OLD COLD WAR

In many respects new cold war was different from the old cold war. Major differences are as follows:

(i) Old cold war was mainly in areas around Atlantic and Pacific but new cold war was outside those areas and occurred largely in Indian Ocean.

(ii) In the new cold war Allies or Alliances were not actively involved. China, Japan and even West European countries were disinterested in this and the hostilities continued mainly between the two super powers.

(iii) New cold War resulted in rigorous nuclear arms race between the two major super powers. Nuclear proliferation was witnessed outside the nuclear club of big five. During old war stress was on qualitative build-up of conventional weapons.

(iv) New cold war was more threatening than the cold war of 1950s and 1960s because of the size of the nuclear arsenals.

(v) First cold war was for the world leadership whereas the second cold war was based on the question of parity or its erosion in the relations between two super powers.

IMPACT OF NEW COLD WAR

The new cold war has effected the international relations in many ways.

1. *Setback to Détente.* The first and foremost casualty of the new cold war was *détente* and arms control talks. SALT-II which was signed after crossing so many hurdles received set back when US Senate refused to ratify it in retaliation of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. After that arms control talks ceased to progress. Between 1979 and 1985 no summit meeting was held between the top leaders of the two countries.

2. *Interference in Developing World.* Unlike the first cold war in which European colonial powers were actively involved and dealt with former colonies, in the new cold war USA was dealing with developing countries (or former colonies) directly. Generally the United States had been siding with the reactionary regimes in developing world with an objective to maintain status quo. This compelled Marxist leaders in these countries to side with the Soviet Union.

3. *Encouragement to Non-alignment.* The new cold war gave a fresh lease of life to the non-aligned movement and more and more countries preferred to join it with a view to have greater manoeuvrability in their foreign policy between the two super powers. No doubt some of the countries of the third world have given facilities to the two super powers regarding stationing of military personnel to maintain and service the sophisticated weapons and equipments, but these states have also shown greater inclination to maintain their autonomy.

4. *Fear of Proxy War.* The new cold war was marked by high technology arms race and increasing intervention and pressure on the developing world. All this increased the possibility of two super powers engaging in proxy wars in the developing world rather than having a direct confrontation.

5. *Economic Difficulties.* This cold war also greatly contributed to the economic difficulties of the super powers and adversely affected the international economy. The high defence spending had resulted in high interest rates which in turn had brought in numerous economic hardships. Though both the superpowers were faced with economic problems but it was the Soviet Union who ultimately succumbed to economic ills in the late eighties.

The new cold war could not survive for long as situation again improved after 1985. Summit meetings between the two superpowers were re-started. After Geneva accord in 1987, Soviet Union agreed to withdraw troops from Afghanistan. Same year INF Treaty was signed between the two powers. In 1989 communism collapsed in East Europe and Gorbachev withdrew Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Soviet Union came in the grip of several domestic, economic, political and ethnic problems and had little time and strength for external conflicts. By November 1990 the Cold War was formally ended and July 31, 1991 Moscow summit confirms the end of the cold war and devastating conflict between the world's two superpowers. In the Moscow summit the historic Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was signed by Bush and Gorbachev to cut their nuclear arsenals by 30 per cent.

In December 1991, the Soviet Union and its Communist ideology collapsed. Many of its Republics declared themselves independent and the remaining republics formed Commonwealth

of Independent States (CIS). President Yeltsin of Russian Federation—successor state of the former Soviet Union declared during his visit to the US in February, 1992 regarding the formal end of the cold war. In June, 1992, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin again met at Washington where the latter announced that reform programme in Russia is irreversible. Both the leaders also agreed to further cuts in strategic nuclear arsenals. With these developments even the new cold war has also become a thing of the past.

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17

Détente

From late sixties, there has been a general shift in East-West relations from the tensions of the cold war to the compulsions and imperatives of *détente*, especially in the matter of military strategy and security. There was a new ray of hope that the advent of *détente* would reduce international tensions and bring an era of world peace. In the words of Northedge and Grieve, "the super powers had, by 1962, come to respect each other's sphere of interest and hence 1962, when the Cuba crisis occurred and quickly subsided, may be regarded as the true beginning of the end of the cold war, or the start of the East-West *détente*, though some would date this from the Berlin Wall in August 1961 and the Soviet-American agreement of that year not to place weapons of mass destruction in outer space."[1]

Though the word *détente* had appeared on the horizon of international relations in 1961-62 and engaged the attention of political observers yet it did not bring the cold war to a complete end. The period between 1962-69 can be characterised as thaw in cold war, as during all this period the cold war went on limpingly. As a matter of fact it was in 1969 that the process of *détente* was visible prominently not only in Soviet-American relations but also Sino-American relations. Throughout the 1970s the process of *détente* made a significant dent in international relations. No doubt it also experienced several ups and downs in the subsequent periods which will be discussed comprehensively hereinafter.

MEANING OF *DÉTENTE*

De'tente is a French term, meaning relaxation of tension. With the watering down of antagonism and hostility between the super powers an atmosphere of relaxation gained momentum in international relations. It was this atmosphere of relaxation that found expression in the term de'tente. In the nuclear age, *détente*, in some form, was essential for survival. Outright hostility was ruled out between the two power blocs. Two super powers realised that by mutual cooperation, their distrust could be minimised and the intensity of conflict reduced. In their mutual interest both sides found it advantageous to enlarge the spheres of mutual cooperation. Thus, in the words of Baral, "as opposed to the cold war which sought to keep the tension in the central balance at a high pitch, the *détente* is a conscious and deliberate attempt to reduce this tension significantly. *Détente* means an effort by both superpowers to develop goodwill, understanding and cooperation between them which may gradually help in decreasing the intensity of the cold war conflict."[2]

Henry Kissinger, the architect of *détente* on the American side, qualified it as "a long step away from the post-war period." It is an attempt "to reconcile the reality of competition with the imperative of co-existence" dictated by the need to avoid military confrontation and above all a nuclear war."[3] On the other hand Soviet scholars Kozyrev and Nilov say, "*Détente* opens up favourable prospect for international cooperation on the soild basis of peaceful co-existence of

states with different social systems."[4] As a path on the road to peace, the era of *détente* is marked by a continuation of efforts by the superpower adversaries to relax tensions, diminish distrust and increase accommodation. In this era Kegley and Wittkopf observed, "cooperative technological ventures replaced threats, warnings and confrontations as principal modes of interaction.... Presumably goodwill could cement together a period of peace."[5] However, *détente* was still an elusive term and meant different things to different people. It was not even equal to *rapprochement*. Nevertheless, there was general agreement that *détente* was potentially a positive process which might yield concrete fruits in future.[6]

FEATURES AND ELEMENTS OF *DÉTENTE*

Main characteristics and elements of *détente* can be discussed as below:

1. *Deterrence.* By mutual consent the two sides may agree to effect mutual reduction of forces and armaments. But at no time would the balance of power between them be upset. Deterrence is the chief element of *détente*. Nixon observes, peace is the by-product of "mutual respect for each other's strength." So *détente* does not exclude maintaining adequate capability by each side. He further says: "Our policy must combine deterrence with *détente*. *Détente* without deterrence leads to appeasement, and deterrence without *détente* leads to unnecessary confrontation and saps the will of Western peoples to support the arms budgets deterrence requires."[7]

2. *Peaceful Co-existence.* Another element of *détente* in the seventies was peaceful co-existence. *Détente* did not seek to eliminate the ideological warfare between them. It continued to stay inspite of progress, if any, in *détente*. Kissinger has rightly observed that the US and the Soviet-Union were ideological rivals. *Détente* could not change that. The nuclear age compelled both to coexist. Rhetorical crusades could not change that either.

In late eighties *détente* entered the phase in which even ideological warfare was mellowed down and gradually it faded out more or less completely in the early nineties. Gorbachev said in 1989: "Nations cannot and should not pattern their life either after the United States or the Soviet Union. Hence, political positions should be devoid of ideological intolerance."[8] It was inconceivable in the post-Second World War period characterised by the cold war. Old forms and means are not allowed to hinder new approaches to the building of humane international relations.

3. *Elements of Conflict.* The advent of *détente* does not imply disappearance of conflict and hostility altogether. For quite sometime, both *détente* and cold war lived side by side. Cold War persisted in some form or the other so long as there were mutual suspicion and hostility between the two rival camps. The period from 1979 to 1985 was marked by New Cold War and *détente* reached its lowest ebb. Thus, for a long time *détente* combined elements of conflict, competition and cooperation.

4. *Negative and Positive Elements. Détente* has both negative and positive elements. Negative element signifies substantial reduction of tensions between the two power blocs in general and between the two superpowers in particular. Positive element indicates increase in mutual trust and understanding between them and the brightening of prospect for world peace. One would give way to the other. Mutual trust helps in healing the cold war wounds. These wounds in turn compel both sides to reduce tensions. *Détente* aims at both these elements.

5. *Mutual Trust Out of Mutual Fear.* The creation of mutual trust between the US and the Soviet Union was one of the chief objectives of *détente*. But, it is worth mentioning that there was little trust between them when they realised the need of *détente*. To a great extent *détente* was grown out of mutual fear and not out of mutual trust. *Détente* was the result of the strategic necessity of avoiding suicidal nuclear war and of awareness of the mutual advantages that could be derived from collaboration.

6. *Multiple Levels of Détente.* Originally, the term *détente* was used to signify the apparent relaxation in the otherwise tense relations between the two super powers — the USA and the USSR. But it will be too parochial to associate *détente* with the gradual improving of relationship between these two powers. As a matter of fact process of coming closer and understanding each other in an atmosphere of humane cordiality was visible in the relations of West European countries and the Soviet Union on the one hand and between the USA and China on the other. The same process was visible in the relations between the United States and East European countries. In a broad and loose sense this process found favour with Moscow and Peking in 1972, albeit it was not attended with a spectacular success at that time. Consequently, the process of *détente* operated on five-pronged levels i.e., Soviet-American level, Soviet-West European level, American-Chinese level, American-East European level and Sino-Soviet level.

7. *Kinds of Détente.* There are three kinds of *détente* e.g. military, economic, scientific and cultural. Though *détente* revolves mainly around military aspects yet its other aspects are not insignificant. Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963), NPT' (1968), SALT-I (1972), SALT-II (1979), INF Treaty (1987), START (1991) etc. are part of military *détente*.

The Soviet Union had been importing wheat from the US. The former had also shown keen interest in borrowing American technology for oil exploration and further development in some key industrial areas. The Soviet Union had also entered into certain economic agreements with France, Germany and other Western countries. In return, it had agreed to supply oil to these European countries. All these developments indicate economic *détente*.

Recently, the US and Russia—the successor state of USSR— have cooperated with each other in undertaking some scientific researches and space exploration. Of late cultural exchanges have also been taking place between these countries. These activities are termed as scientific and cultural *détente*.

CAUSES OF *DÉTENTE*

In sixties, *détente* was the by-product of several factors such as:

1. *Nuclear Nightmare.* The stock-pile of nuclear warheads by rival big powers—the USA and the USSR—which had assumed threatening dimensions made them realise the futility of such a mad race. The increasing costs of a continued arms race thus contributed to the development of *détente*. Northedge and Grieve rightly observed: "The fear of thermonuclear war, which could annihilate both sides, and determination to avoid the kind of confrontations between two super-powers from which thermonuclear war could spring."[9] Hence, the first cause of diminishing tension was the realisation that if the nuclear arms race went on unchecked, there was the danger of the superpowers undermining their economic growth in the long run without adding to their security.

2. *Nuclear Proliferation.* It was contrary to the common interest of two superpowers that more and more nations should acquire the nuclear know-how and thereby pose a new threat to their supremacy. Already they were ill at ease to find Britain, France, China emerging as nuclear powers. It was their anxiety, and, therefore to stem any more proliferation of nuclear warheads, apart from the nations mentioned above, otherwise their position of *par excellence* would suffer a severe set-back. The big powers had the consolation that all the nations who had by then joined the nuclear club, happened to be the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Nations like

Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Iraq etc. were at the threshold of nuclear club which could adversely hit the supremacy of nuclear powers.

3. *USA's Compulsions.* The economic pressure played its part in watering down stiff attitude of the United States. For instance, the dollar was facing depreciation on account of its adverse balance of payments position with Japan and West European countries. Retreat from Vietnam after having burnt its fingers severely jolted American economy in late sixties. Besides, the US also wanted to woo Soviet Union with a view to finding an outlet for its sophisticated industrial products like computers etc. in the East European market.

4. *USSR's Compulsions.* The Soviet Union was also prompted to protect her vested interests by adopting a more conciliatory posture towards the United States. The economic constraints weighed with the Soviet leaders. Their war-oriented economy caused not only the lop-sided development but also resulted into serious shortages of wage-goods and several consumer-durables. Northedge and Grieve explained: "Again, rising living standards in the Soviet Union probably gave that country a strong interest, like Americans'; in reducing the massive scale of arms expenditure in the cold war by arms control agreements, in increasing its lagging technology by agreements with the Western powers to make their skills and equipment available to Russian industry, and perhaps above all, in keeping *status quo* stable in eastern Europe, when it was threatened by liberalisation programme of Dubeck of Czechoslovakia."[10]

By 1980s the economic system of the Soviet Union could not come upto the expectations of the new world of the consumer society and the standards set by the more affluent living patterns of Western Europe and the United States. In the contemporary consumers' goods economy there are a large number of desired goods, many of different styles and designs, these latter change with consumer tastes, and some, as in the case of the automobile, require a variety of supporting services. The Soviet Union was lacking all these. On the material front, it became clear after the initial success in production that the rate of growth of the economy of the socialist societies was definitely lower than that of the societies depending upon the market economy. In agriculture sector, State or collective ownership has proved to be utter failure. A superpower like the Soviet Union having one-sixth of the land surface of the earth was unable to feed its population even after 70 years of the Revolution. For the curing of its economic ills, the Soviet Union was looking Westwards for help.[11]

5. *Principle of Peaceful Co-existence.* The policy of peaceful co-existence was initiated by Russia during the premiership of Malenkov but it became more and more clear during Khrushchev and later Brezhnev-Kosygin period. In the 20th Congress of Communist Party in February 1956 Stalin and his policies were criticised and the Leninist principle of "inevitable war with capitalist countries" was modified and the theory of peaceful co-existence was accepted as the basis of the Soviet foreign policy. Hartmann observed: "The Soviet Union began also to overhaul its foreign policy. The new approach emphasised Soviet willingness to explore outstanding East-West question diplomatically."[12] The US responded gradually to the policy of peaceful co-existence and in this way the process of *détente* went on gathering more and more momentum.

6. *Role of Non-alignment.* The newly independent states in a way also compelled the big powers to adopt the policy of peaceful co-existence. Till 1963 so many new states emerged and most of them followed the policy of non-alignment as a symbol of new national prestige and dignity. They are still exerting more and more influence on issues both of peace and war. By their numerical majority these non-aligned countries became quite vocal in denouncing the big power rivalries and mounting tension as a consequence of the cold war between them. These non-aligned countries succeeded in mobilising the world public opinion in their favour. It became exceedingly

difficult for big powers to cold-shoulder their opinion. They fully realised this reality and started mending their fences well in time. These states would no longer brook any wrong perpetrated by the big powers anywhere in the world. They would call the spade a spade whether it is the USA or the USSR or China involved in the game. For instance in case of Vietnam they took cudgels on behalf of the USSR and China, very much to the chagrin of USA. In the face of these developments, the big powers realised that they will have to relax strings of cold war.

7. *Rise of Multipolarism.* In the sixties bipolarism was on the decline and multipolarism or polycentrism was on the rise in the international sphere. China had emerged as a third major power. France and Britain also regained their power and prestige. It was really remarkable that in Gross National Products, France and West Germany were growing appreciably faster than the United States. Alongwith China, they are narrowing slightly the great gulf between the power of the United States and that of the second-level states. Neither Britain nor West Germany nor France was willing to be dictated by the USA any longer.

Almost a similar trend had become evident inside the communist camp led by the Soviet Union. The Soviet-Yugoslav ideological struggle revealed at an early stage the limits of regimentation inside one camp. Albania showed tremendous courage in resisting the Soviet Union. But all these had been practically overshadowed by the Sino-Soviet conflict. This development had compelled the Soviet Union to take a more moderate course in international relations, even to the extent of cultivating friendship with the United States.[13] Thus intrabloc divisiveness and trans-bloc linkages became manifest tendencies as both the power blocs were cracking.

The two super-powers retained the raw power, both military and economic to make their wishes prevail, atleast among neighbours. However, European countries had found ways of asserting their separate personalities and so had the Latin Americans. It was quite a revolution. The high prices of oil had elevated some and depressed others. Japan was emerging as an economic power. Countries like Taiwan, Korea, Israel, Germany and others had made progress which could only be described as phenomenal. These developments confirmed, without doubt, that new centres of power were emerging.

8. *Sino-Soviet Rift.* The relations between the Soviet Union and the Communist China were going from bad to worse and there were no prospect of any improvement. The Soviet Union had also the United States as her rival. When the United States tried to improve her relations with Communist China in 1972, the Soviet Union also decided to improve its relations with the United States so that she may not be handicapped in the event of war between the United States and the Soviet Union with China helping the United States or in the event of a war between the Soviet Union and China with the United States helping China. It was in this atmosphere that the process of *détente* between the Soviet Union and the United States was initiated.

9. *Fall and Rise in American Influence.* Fall in the influence of the US in sixties and its rise in mid-eighties was another factor accounting for *détente* in these periods. The American frustration with the Vietnam war—intensified later by its failure in Angola—declined the American influence abroad and the Americans were now disinclined—to repeat "Vietnams". Whereas the Soviet Union succeeded in extending its influence in Czechoslovakia, Vietnam, Angola and Afghanistan.

But by mid-eighties there was a sudden fall in Soviet power. On the other hand, the US regained its influence and strength to the extent that it got the Soviet Union yielded to the West on Afghanistan, South Africa, Central America, East Germany, human rights, the INF treaty and Star Wars in late eighties and early nineties on unequal terms and without giving to the Soviet Union even the benefit of normal real politik based transactions. Reagan's Star war programme and the

US success in the gulf war (1990-91) enhanced its power and prestige. Thus in late eighties American strength and Soviet domestic weakness were greatly responsible for renewed *détente*.

10. *Gorbachev Factor.* There is no denying the fact that Gorbachev factor played its significant role in easing out tension in Soviet-American relations after 1985. Notwithstanding Soviet domestic problems and difficulties Gorbachev's "New Political Thinking" for the world was instrumental in bringing *détente* again on the rails. "New Political Thinking "'recognises 'balance of interests' instead of balance of power, cooperation instead of confrontation, internationalisation instead of nationalisation, disarmament instead of armament and de-ideologisation of inter-state relations instead of ideologisation, *détente* instead of cold war."[14] International relations in general and Soviet-American relations in particular have passed into a qualitatively new era with the advent of new political thinking.

11. *"Linkage" Theory.* According to American viewpoint, the *détente* was based on a "linkage" theory. Kegley and Wittkopf explained this theory in these words: "the development of economic, political, and strategic ties between the two nations, equally rewarding to both, would bind the two in a common fate, thereby lessening the incentives for conflict and war. Soviet global aspirations would be mollified, this view was held, because Soviet peace and prosperity would depend on the continuation of peaceful links with the United States. The linkage theory rested on the premise that the Soviets were no longer militarily inferior to the United States."[15]

EVOLUTION AND PHASES OF *DÉTENTE*

The process of *détente* witnessed several ups and downs. Its evolution can be studied by dividing its short history into the following chronological phases. No doubt these phases are somewhat arbitrary yet they point out reasonably grouped diplomatic facts and events.

1. Period of Thaw, 1959-1969

There is no denying the fact that during this period cold war politics continued but there were certain developments as well that could be regarded as the origin of *détente*. This was a phase of thaw in the cold war. The process of *détente*, in its true sense, dates back to the year 1959 when Khrushchev paid a visit to the USA in pursuance of his policy of peaceful coexistence and strongly suggested the programme of disarmament by all the states. He asked for a reduction of foreign troops, establishment of an atom-free zone in Central Europe and the withdrawal of foreign troops and bases in foreign countries. At Camp David in USA, Khrushchev and Eisenhower signed an agreement to the effect that they settle their bilateral disputes by peaceful means and would eschew wars. This generated an atmosphere of peace and brightened the chances of ending the cold war. This historic event was described at that time as the "Camp David Spirit" which became a precursor of peace and understanding.

Another landmark pointing to the direction of *détente* was recorded in 1963 with the signing of Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by three nuclear powers — the US, the Soviet Union and Britain. It was quite a bold and significant event to mellow down the tension of cold war. In the same year 'hotline' telephone and radio links were established between Moscow and Washington. With the signing of the historical Nonproliferation Treaty in 1968, the process gained one more feather in its cap and attracted the attention of statesmen all over the world. Other positive developments of this period were: the Glassboro summit meeting (1967), the Antarctic Treaty (1959) and the Outer Space Treaty (1967).

2. Heydays of *Détente*, 1970-76

During their tenure President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger showed keen interest in the successful implementation of this process. Nixon's visit to Moscow in May 1972 bears an ample testimony to his anxiety for improving Soviet-American relations. His visit culminated in signing Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-I). It was earnestly hoped that this treaty would go a long way in minimising the tension between the two super powers. During this very period Nixon and Kissinger also visited Beijing in 1971 and thus initiated *détente* at Sino-US level.

With a view to normalising the relationship between the two super powers, Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist Party Chief, paid a return visit to Washington in June 1973. This visit also paid rich dividends inasmuch as four agreements were signed between the USA and USSR. These agreements related to the fields of agriculture, oceanography, transportation and such other economic and cultural matters as were likely to bring the two powers more close to one another. A communique followed at the Summit talks; it covered many important issues like reduction of troops in Europe in the interest of an adding peace in Europe.

In assuming power as President of the USA, Ford visited Russia in November, 1974 and had discussion with Brezhnev at Vladivostok and a US-Soviet agreement on guidelines for a ten-year "gap on the arms race" was reached. This marked yet another milestone towards *détente*.

The Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975 was another significant step towards the process of *détente* which was attended by 35 countries of Europe and North America, formulated certain agreed principles governing a variety of relationship between the states of two blocs. Though Helsinki decisions did not essentially ease the situation, nor these were legally binding on the participants yet these did make for some relaxation of tension. The existing alliances were to continue but there were provisions for peaceful alterations of borders, unrestricted flow of ideas and movement of peoples and more cooperation in the economic field. These friendly ties between the two powers were not only getting stronger on the surface of this world rather this amity was visible in the outer space as well. The Apollo-Soyuz joint mission in July 1975 was a glorious illustration in this respect.

3. Problems in *Détente*, 1977-1979

In the post-Nixon-Ford era, the Soviet-American *détente* was hanging on a thin thread. In the initial years (1977-78) of the tenure of Jimmy Carter the process of *détente* received severe jolts due mainly to his 'open diplomacy,' emphasis on human rights and difference of opinion over the SALT-II agreement. But the situation was saved from taking an ugly turn as Carter became more discreet in his pronouncements and behaviour.

President Carter's political declaration that his "inclination" is "to aggressively challenge" the Soviet Union for influence in the crucial areas around the world indicated his spirit of cold warrior. Carter named Vietnam, Iraq, Somalia, Algeria, China and even Cuba in this connection. His itch to throw a political and ideological challenge to the Soviet Union had dismayed many of his allies in Europe and the Third World.

President Carter's carefully worded letter to Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov without mentioning the Soviet Union specifically even once triggered off a controversy that lowered the temperature of the relations between the two countries by several degrees. Soviet Union protested against American interference in Soviet internal affairs in the name of defending human rights. Seen from Moscow's perspective, the human rights issue looked like a weapon to encourage dissent and subvert the communist form of government at least in Eastern Europe if not in the Soviet Union itself.

In 1977 the US-USSR *détente* remained in disarray due to the failure of several rounds of SALT-

II talks. Set against the background of President Carter's vocal support for Soviet dissidents, Russian rejection of the Carter proposals for limitations of strategic arms had clearly taken the Americans by surprise. What the Russians expected was confirmation of the Vladivostok accord with curbs on the American Cruise missile and hopefully acceptance of their insistence that the Russian Backfire bomber is not a strategic weapon. What was expected in fact, was a continuation of the Kissinger approach. The Carter proposals came to them as a bombshell. The major proposals involved a "deep" reduction in the total number of strategic weapons with limits only on the range of Cruise missile and not its deployment. Due to these differences USA- USSR talks regarding SALT-II agreement failed in May 1977. The prospect of *détente* remained in doldrums till September, 1977. There was all-pervasive apprehensions that the superpowers never cry a halt to the mad arms race. But silver lining appeared on the horizon in September 1977 when both the superpowers concerned voluntarily agreed to abide by the limitations imposed by SALT-I agreement even though it was to cease to operate formally after October, 1977. However, after crossing great hurdles SALT-II was finally signed in 1979.

Carter's vocal style of public diplomacy beginning with the human rights emphasis and then making public his SALT proposals, which were drastically altered from the framework agreed to at Vladivostok in 1974 by Kissinger, before the negotiations began were viewed by the Russians as highly provocative. If Carter's "Open book" approach, floating the details of his proposals in public before reaching the bargaining table, was unnecessarily confrontative, the substance of Carter's proposals differed sharply from the previously agreed upon framework, and have complicated future prospects for arms control and the process of *détente*.

A positive development in the process of *détente* during this phase was the *Review Conference* of the European Conference on Security and Peace held at Belgrade in February 1978. Review Conference at Belgrade was attended by all the signatories of the First Act of the all-European Conference. The Belgrade meeting showed that all the participating states see in *détente* the highroad of international relations, a road to which there is no other alternative. Neither the Soviet-Union nor the United States and their allies ventured to question the need to consolidate the policy of *détente*.

4. Setback to *Détente*, 1979-1985

This phase was marked by a steep downward trend in the process of *détente* and the revival of cold war. The massive Chinese invasion of a tiny country like Vietnam in February 1979, in order to what Vice-Premier Teng called "punish" and "teach a lesson" to Vietnam and the seeming acquiscence of the Anglo-American bloc, marked a portentous development in which *détente* was likely to be a natural casualty.

The situation started deteriorating during the last years of Carter's tenure in the wake of Afghanistan crisis in 1979-80. A puppet government backed by the Soviet Union came into power after the Soviet military intervention in that country. There was a wide spread apprehension in the mind of America that the Soviet intervention might spread in the vulnerable countries neighbouring Afghanistan like Pakistan, Iran etc. Political instability in the latter countries strengthened this apprehension. It was not unlikely that Russia would spread its tentacles to bring the West Asian countries under its sphere of influence. It thus was against America's interests. This development gave a rude shock to the process of *détente*. In its turn, the USA made an axis with China and Pakistan in this region to contain further influence of the Soviet Union.

The SALT-II which was signed after a great difficulty was not ratified by the US Senate as the USA was unhappy with the USSR on Afghan issue. Hence during this period, there was neither

any summit level talks between the two countries nor was any headway made in respect of disarmament. On the contrary Reagan administration with a view to intimidating Russia started harping on Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) popularly known as Star War Programme.

Such political developments and upheavals as occurred in Kampuchea, Vietnam, Arab-Israel relations and Afghanistan harmed the process of *détente* and began a new cold war. Nevertheless, the situation was not so grim as to spell complete pessimism. *Détente* had met with considerable success in Europe. Big powers were in accord in respect of European Security and Peace. What was desired was that such an accord should also be there in respect of the entire world.

5. Re-emergence of *Détente*, 1985-Onwards

As mentioned above, by the mid-80s, the situation in Soviet-American, and consequently in East-West relations, as a whole, had deteriorated giving cause for great concern. It was at this stage that Gorbachev and his new political thinking came to the rescue. As a result of this new thinking came a dramatic change, the global atmosphere greatly improved and contacts and summits, became the order of the day. The USSR under Gorbachev was ready to cooperate with the United States on a predictable and stable basis and was eager to make headway, combining continuity with new ideas. In Gorbachev's own words: "The fundamental principle of the new political outlook is very simple: nuclear war cannot be a means of achieving political, economic, ideological or any other goals.... On a par with the nuclear threat, the new political mode of thinking considers the solutions of other global problems, including those of economic development and ecology.... To think in a new way also means to see a direct link between disarmament and development."[16] Gorbachev had a different attitude towards the American people as he did not regard them aggressive. He disliked tensions, confrontation or intense rivalry between these two countries; such a situation was harmful for the larger interests of all people.

There were indications in the second half of the 1980s of the international tensions, bitterness and resultant distortions of values, fading away. Notwithstanding occasional tensions and habitual cynics between rival powers, the top leaders preferred gradual but conciliatory approach. The iron curtain was lifted, the fortress of apartheid crumbled, the Berlin Wall demolished, power-blocs collapsed, disarmament progressed, summit meetings organised, military alliances wound up and thus cold war ended.

After coming into power Gorbachev had several super power summits first with Reagan and then with Bush. During these summits top leaders showed their willingness to take Washington and Moscow *beyond détente towards a cooperative relationship*. A Brief resume of these summits is given below:

(i) *Geneva Summit, November 19-21, 1985.* After Afghanistan crisis, this was the first fruitful Soviet-American summit between Gorbachev and Reagan. The two leaders jointly declared that a nuclear war should never be fought and there could be no victor in such a war. The need for preventing any war, nuclear or conventional, between the two countries was emphasised.

(ii) *Reykajavik (Iceland) Summit October* 11-12, *1986.* The second Gorbachev-Reagan summit deepened mutual understanding on many major problems of world politics and bilateral relations, on questions of war and peace and the termination of the nuclear arms race.

(iii) *Washington Summit, December 7-10, 1987.* The signing of *INF Treaty* was the major outcome of the third Gorbachev-Reagan summit. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty was the first international agreement to reduce the deployment of existing nuclear weapons. The land-

based medium range nuclear missiles capable of travelling between 500 km and 5000 km that the two super powers had agreed to destroy in Europe over the next three years constituted merely a fraction— just three per cent—according to one estimate—of their nuclear arsenals. Despite this shortcoming, the INF Treaty was undoubtedly a small step towards world peace, but an important and historic step signifying man's determination to survive the nuclear age.

During 1987 itself through Geneva accord the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw troops from Afghanistan thus removing a major cause of irritation between the USA and the USSR.

(iv) *Moscow Summit, May 29-June 2, 1988.* At the fourth Gorbachev-Reagan summit both sides exchanged instruments of ratification, thus putting into effect the INF Treaty. Many other joint documents, agreements and a joint statement were adopted promoting bilateral relations.

(v) *Malta Summit, December 2-3,1989.* After assuming office President Bush's first meeting with Gorbachev was held aboard ships off Malta. The meeting had no fixed pre-set agenda and no special preliminary was done. The aim was to hold a free exchange of opinions, a wide-ranging dialogue and to compare the assessments. At the end of their meeting, both the leaders held a joint news conference, which described as "an important symbol" by Gorbachev, "because it has never been in history that the leaders of our two states held a joint news conference."[17] He also declared that the Soviet Union will never start a war against the United States. During the previous years the former US President was in no mood to slow down, much less halt, the economic war against the Soviet Union. The Malta summit marked the beginning of a new era, not just US-USSR relations but in post-World War II international politics as a whole.

(vi) *Washington Summit, May 30 - June 2, 1990.* The second summit between Gorbachev and Bush resulted in the signing of a series of major Soviet-US documents. These leaders put their signatures to an agreement on the elimination and non-production of chemical weapons, a protocol to the treaty on limiting the tests of nuclear weapons, a protocol to the treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, an agreement expanding student exchanges between higher learning establishments, and an agreement on commercial trade relations. In addition, the two Presidents made a joint statement sealing the major elements of a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Two other main issues discussed were—the reunification of Germany and connected details and other regional conflicts. The question of German unification dominated the summit whereas the other regional conflicts received relatively limited attention. The dominant view of both countries was that regional conflicts should not be allowed to put spokes in the wheel of US-Soviet bilateral relations. A significant observation made by Bush was: "The world has waited long enough, the cold war must end."

(vii) *Helsinki Summit, September 9,1990.* This summit between Gorbachev and Bush resulted in a broad agreement on several aspects of the Gulf crisis and, in effect, averted a large-scale armed conflict which seemed imminent. There were admittedly differences on certain perceptions, but the super-powers agreed on the main issue that the Iraqi forces must pull out of Kuwait territory. The two world leaders also agreed that the comprehensive UN resolutions on the issue should be implemented by all nations.

(viii) *Paris Summit and Pact, November 19,1990.* The conducive effect of the above summits no longer remained confined to two super-powers, it also had its full impact on European nations. The *détente* also permeated at European level with the signing of an historic pact on November 19, 1990 between the heads of State and Government of the NATO and Warsaw Pact. Through this treaty 34 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact agreed to reduce their conventional arsenals for

the first time since World War II. They also declared for the first time that they were adversaries no more. It paved the way for a new period of cooperation in Europe. It also marked the formal end of the cold war especially in Europe and beginning of an era of peace free from the frantic race for armaments.

(ix) *Moscow Summit and the START, July 31, 1991.* On July 31, 1991, US President Bush and Soviet President Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) to reduce their strategic arsenals by about 30 per cent and hailed it as a signal that "dispelled five decades of mutual mistrust". If Paris Pact (November 1990) formally ended the cold war this treaty confirmed the end of cold hostilities between super powers. The Soviets will end up with a 35 per cent cut in their strategic warheads, from around 11,000 to 7,000 and the US with a 25 per cent reduction from about 12,000 to 9,000. The treaty limits the strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) to 1,600 each. But even with the proposed cut, the two sides will have 4,900 ballistic missiles each.

(x) *Sweeping Reduction in Nuclear Arsenals, September 27, 1991.* In a spectacular shift in the American defence and security policy, President Bush on September 27, 1991 announced a sweeping unilateral reduction in U.S. nuclear arsenal and invited the Soviet Union to match "our bold initiative" with "equally bold steps."[18] He said the changes in the Soviet Union provided an "unparalleled opportunity" to change the nuclear posture of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Few days after this announcement, President Gorbachev also declared sweeping cuts in tactical nuclear weapons on land and sea to match reductions announced by US President Bush. (More details about these reductions will be given in subsequent chapter on Disarmament and Arms Control).

In December 1991 the Soviet Union was disintegrated and Gorbachev relinquished the charge of its Presidentship. The successor Russian Federation and its President Yeltsin continued to follow the policy of *détente*.

(xi) *Bush and Yeltsin's Announcement regarding cuts in Strategic Nuclear Arms, January 29, 1992.* US President George Bush announced massive unilateral nuclear arms cuts in early 1992 and Russia matched the US step by substantial reduction in former Soviet strategic arsenal and an offer of a joint global defence system. The 50-billion dollar US arms cut, which made further cuts conditional on Russian reciprocity, opens itself to cover an even larger area for disarmament after President Yeltsin's announcements. President Bush, swinging between triumph abroad and a looming recession at home with a low-ever popularity rating, declared in his state of the union message to the Congress that the US "the leader of the west has become the leader of the world"[19] with communism dead and the cold war won.

In Moscow, President Yeltsin, in radio and TV messages, said about 1250 nuclear charges had been removed from standby alert and that manufacture of long distance cruise missiles and heavy bombers were ended. Russian Federation has taken over all the obligations of the former Soviet Union.

(xii) *Russia and US as Allies.* The end of the cold war had been proclaimed by President Bush several times in the early nineties, but on February 1,1992 he and visiting Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin made a formal declaration to that effect and proclaimed the beginning of a new era in US-Russian relations. After more than three hours of talks at the Camp David retreat, the two leaders signed a declaration charting a new relationship, which President Bush said, was "based on trust, based on a commitment to economic and political freedom."[20] Mr. Yeltsin said "There has been written and drawn a new line and crossed out all of the things that have been associated with the cold war...from now on, we do not consider ourselves to be potential enemies."[21]

The highlights of the Camp David declaration are a commitment to follow up the latest arms control proposals, to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to curb the spread of conventional weapons and to settle regional conflicts and to counter terrorism and drug-trafficking.

(xiii) *The US-Russia Summit June 16-17, 1992.* This two-day summit evolved a framework for cooperation in various fields in the post-cold war era, including the creation of a "credible Euro-Atlantic capability" to maintain peace in European hot- spots like Yugoslavia where a civil war was going on. The "Washington Charter" that US President Bush and Russian President Yeltsin signed alongwith six other major documents, called for wide-ranging economic, scientific and military cooperation between the two nations, opening the way to possible joint military exercises. The two leaders who were meeting after the collapse of the Communist Soviet Union, also issued a "joint statement on global protection system" containing an agreement to study the feasibility of establishing a joint missile warning.

With this cold war ended and *détente* took the shape of more constructive relationship among super powers. Both the erstwhile cold warriors embarked upon a similar path of summit meetings and improving of political, economic, cultural, scientific and technological relations. Thus bringing relief to the rest of the world. It is clear that Russia and the USA are now moving to a higher degree of mutual understanding and even cooperation. Prospects of conventional and nuclear disarmament are encouraging.

IMPACT OF *DÉTENTE*

Soviet-American *détente* had a wide-ranging impact. It not only influenced their bilateral relations but embraced the whole gamut of international relations. The relaxation of tension has led to the following trends in the contemporary international relations.

1. *End of the Cold War.* Decades-old hostilities between the super powers, together with the all-out research for military bases, political allies and vulnerable puppet regimes, have become a thing of the past. The Iron Curtain was lifted, the citadel of apartheid breached, the Berlin Wall demolished, ideological blocs collapsed, military alliances terminated, arms race decelerated, struggle for expansion of sphere of influence contained, clouds of third world war rolled by, division of the Europe disappeared and solution of the many regional conflicts appeared possible. Thus, the foremost impact of *détente* was the end of cold war.

2. *Progress towards Disarmament.* There is considerable progress towards disarmament. As a result of *détente*, there is no political or military threat facing either super-powers; so there will be no justification for building up large arsenals of nuclear and conventional weapons. In the last few years, several big power summits have taken significant steps towards disarmament. These are INF Treaty (1987), agreement on elimination and non-production of chemical weapons (1990), Paris Pact to reduce conventional weapons from Europe (1990), START to reduce strategic arsenals by 30 per cent (1991), voluntary reduction in nuclear arsenals both by the US and the USSR (1991), NPT extension (1995), CTBT (1996) etc. More such arms reduction talks and treaties are on anvil.

3. *Irrelevance of the Military Alliances.* Military alliances like SEATO, CENTO had already faded away. Remaining active and potent alliances like NATO and Warsaw Pact also lost their much relevance after November 1990. The heads of 34 NATO and Warsaw Pact Nations, assembled at a historic summit in Paris on November 19, 1990, signed a landmark treaty slashing their massive

cold war non-nuclear conventional weapons in Europe. The accord reverses the biggest arms build-up in history. These alliances have no adversary since the end of the cold war. With the collapse of communist regimes in East Europe, Warsaw Pact was dissolved in July 1991. It seems that the era of making military alliances is over now.

4. *Proliferation of Détente.* Improved Soviet-American relations had its snow-balling effect. It reflected in the *détente* at other levels such as Sino-US level, East-West European level, Russia-West Europe level, America-East Europe level, Sino-Russia level and Russia-Japan level. The relations of these countries *inter se* were far from cordial. However, in the past few years things have changed for the better. They have come closer and have better understanding than before.

For example, at *Sino-US level* the process of *détente* was initiated during President Nixon's tenure in the early seventies. After Mao's death, when China adopted an open door policy its relations with the United States and other Western countries further improved in late seventies. But the relations between the two powers had become strained after severe condemnation by the entire West, including the USA, of the ruthless suppression of pro-democracy demonstrations by students in Beijing (Tiananman Square massacre) in June, 1989. The first high level diplomatic contacts between the USA and China after a gap of nearly a year and half were made on December 1, 1990. The Chinese Foreign Minister visited Washington and held talks with Secretary of State James Baker in a cordial atmosphere. China extracted its price for its tacit endorsement of the US-sponsored UN Security Council resolution sanctioning the use of force to compel Saddam Hussain pull out its forces from Kuwait. In 1991, the US Government extended its most-favoured nation treatment in trade matters to China for another year. The imperatives of business and commerce were evident in the gesture. Thereafter relations between the two continued to improve.

Détente also made headway at *Sino-Soviet level.* The process began gradually in 1971 when China was admitted to UNO. Soviet Union, the US and India, among other countries, extended full support to the admission. In 1986, Gorbachev in his famous Vladivostok speech, appealed for *détente* and cordial relations even with its arch rival China. Chinese leader Qian Qichin visited Moscow for talks in 1988, marking further progress in establishing friendly relations. In February, 1989 high-level contacts were established between the two countries after three decades when foreign ministers of two countries held talks. After a gap of 30 years summit talks held between the two countries when Gorbachev visited Beijing in May, 1989. This Soviet-Chinese summit was an historic event that gave a dynamic boost to bilateral relations in the political, economic, scientific and other spheres. Following talks between Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng (who visited Moscow on April 23-25, 1990) and top Soviet leaders, an accord was reached between the two communist giants to take practical steps to implement arrangements for mutual reduction of troops along their borders. They felt that steps to implement the arrangements would strengthen good neighbourly relations and promote peace in Asia Pacific region and throughout the world. Mr. Li's visit was the first by a Chinese Premier in the past 26 years. Both the powers signed a long-term economic agreement, covering a wide range of activities.

America and West European countries have not only extended their hand of cooperation—political, economic, scientific and technological to the successor Russia to help tide over its economic difficulties but they have assured similar help to the East European countries. Russia is also mending its fences with Japan, Israel, South Korea etc. Thus, *détente* is spreading throughout the world and old rivals in the various parts of the globe are coming closer.

5. *Resolving Regional Conflicts.* After the re-emergence of *détente* in the second half of eighties,

solution to regional conflicts became possible. Both the USA and the USSR were creating better conditions for a search for compromise, for dialogue between the conflicting sides in different regions. A good example of a responsible and well-balanced approach to the problem of settling regional conflicts was the signing of the Geneva accords on Afghanistan. A gist of the accord lies in non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Soviet troops withdrawal from that country. In compliance with this accord, the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Afghanistan in 1989. The Soviet-American dialogue also helped in easing tension in different regions. Since the Soviet Union and United States had many friends and allies in different countries, either could directly or indirectly be involved in solving any regional conflict. The world has recently witnessed the coming of independence to Namibia. The civil war has ended in Nicaragua and democratic elections have been held there. War in Kampuchea ended in August, 1991 and with this chances improved for a settlement of 12 years old Kampuchean problem. In each case Moscow and Washington have played a constructive role. There is less tension in relations between Ethiopia and Somalia, Libya and Chad—those African countries, which not so long ago, tried to settle their disputes on the battlefield. There are hopeful signs for the settlement of the long conflict around Western Sahara. Relaxation of tension in relations between Morocco, Libya and Algeria is also felt. If confrontation is replaced with a constructive search for mutually acceptable solutions to the existing problems, there is every reason to hope for a fair and peaceful settlement of Palestinian problem in West Asia. The US could vacate Kuwait from Iraqi forces only with the kind support and non-intervention of the Soviet Union.

6. *Irrelevance of NAM.* As a result of the virtual end of the cold war and the growing *détente* between the two super powers, doubts are being expressed in several quarters about the future of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM). It faces a new challenge. Experts feel that new alignments in international relations call for a reappraisal of the movement that once served a valuable purpose of reinforcing the independence of the Third World countries and enabled them to take decisions on merit. Today, while the movement's main concerns remain the same, the unprecedented changes in East-West relations have necessitated a fresh look at its relevance and future role. Many feel that the movement which began as a brilliant and innovative act of policy-making has now lost its relevance.

A 22-page Accra Declaration, issued after the 103 NAM Foreign Ministers' session, demanded the expansion of the United Nations Security Council and proposed the restructuring of the group's strategies to meet the new challenges following the end of the cold war. The session urged that NAM's new emphasis should be on eradicating poverty, hunger and illiteracy and called on the international community to help in these matters. The NAM's ministers' meeting overwhelmingly rejected Egypt's proposal for merger of NAM with the "Group of 77" and also Yugoslavia's suggestion for a change in the name of the movement. Most of the participating countries felt that the name was more relevant than ever before and the changes only vindicated the principles the movement stood for.

7. *De-ideologisation of International Relations.* Ideologies - socialism, communism, capitalism etc.—are no longer the determining factors of foreign policy of the nations. In international relations ideological motivations have lost their relevance now which played a very crucial role during cold war days. Initially, the emphasis was on peaceful co-existence between two social and ideological systems instead of confrontation. Later on it was followed by constructive cooperation between the two systems and substituting balance of interest for balance of power. With the collapse of communism in East Europe in 1989 and then in the Soviet Union in 1991, the de-ideologisation of international relations became complete. Nations with different ideologies are coming closer e.g. America and China, Russia and South Korea, Russia and United Germany etc.

8. *Unification of Germany.* Another momentous and historic impact of *détente* was the unification of East and West Germany on October 3, 1990 to form a new and powerful state. The Union symbolises the unity of East and West after 45 years of a double faced experience. The foreign ministers of four allied countries (the USA, USSR, Britain and France) which defeated Germany in 1945 signed the treaty for unification. United Germany is now a force to be reckoned with economically, industrially and militarily.

9. *Other Unifications.* Paris Summit of November 1990 culminated in removal of division between East and West Europe and lifting of Iron Curtain formally. It ushered in an era of integration in Europe and brought the European nations economically and politically closer. North and South Yemen formally proclaimed their unification, becoming the Republic of Yemen on May 22, 1990. The merger also erases the vestiges of the Arab World's only communist Government in Aden (South Yemen). It is widely believed that as a result of top- level talks between the leaders of North and South Korea, a union will emerge very shortly.

10. *Economic Development and other issues.* The massive amounts spent, until recently, on the manufacture of armaments, procurement of weapons grade material and the entire arms industry, which has been flourishing for decades, are likely to be reduced and diverted to economic development. Nations, especially erstwhile socialist states are paying more attention towards solving their economic problems through liberalisation and mechanism of free-market. All nations of the world are now interested in preventing ecological disaster, combating hunger and disease and fighting all other manifestation of evil and degradation, such as drug abuse or international terrorism, which are trans-boundary phenomena. They are for the development of broad, mutually beneficial and equitable cooperation among nations; the achievements in science and technology, which should be shared among all countries; environmental protection etc. because accumulation of wealth at one end of the scale and of poverty at the other may have disastrous consequences for mankind.

11. *Impact on UNO.* The impact of super power *détente* on the working of international organisations such as UNO is natural. The UN and its various forums are now free from super powers rivalries, factionalism, tussle, etc. Courtesy and decency have supplanted acrimonious and hostile behaviour. President Gorbachev has had the ambition of elevating the status of the UN as an arbitrator in international conflicts and ultimately as a world policeman. Whereas the world body found itself a helpless spectator in Afghanistan, the same organisation has exhibited its potency in the Gulf crisis, due mainly to the unanimity of approach by the superpowers. Since 1991 a number of new members were admitted to UN without difficulty or opposition.

Now it remains to be seen whether this encouraging trend in the process of *détente* in the second half of eighties and early nineties continues without much interruption or not. Similar upward trend was seen in the seventies as well but the same met with fiasco in 1979 in the wake of Afghanistan crisis. Any such crisis may crop up any time in future precipitating again a downtrend. Though prediction in international politics is risky yet if the present world situation is any indication, it can be concluded that no such big crisis is likely in the foreseeable future and the process of *détente* may continue uninterrupted and unabated.

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13

Determinants of Foreign Policy

It is a known fact that the formation of government is essential to run a state and no state can live without maintaining interstate relations which have become so essential in these days. To that end every government has to formulate a foreign policy. Like internal and domestic policies—industrial policy, agricultural policy, defence policy, education policy, labour policy etc.—a state gives special attention to the careful formulation and successful execution of its foreign policy. A successful foreign policy enhances a nation's power and prestige in the comity of nations. Foreign policy gains also increase a government's credibility in the eyes of public internally as well as externally. Herein lies the importance of foreign policy. It has become one of the most important corefields of international relations.

DEFINITIONS AND NATURE OF FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy, according to Hartmann, "is a systematic statement of deliberately selected national interests."[1] Foreign policy connotes a greater degree of rational procedure, and a type of planning involved in a step-by-step progress to a known and defined goal.[2] It is a relatively rational answer to prevailing external conditions. Though there are certain constraints, national and international, to any such well thought out planning, yet an endeavour is invariably made, and will continue to be made.

Padelford and Lincoln observe that through foreign policy, every state decides "what course it will pursue in world affairs within the limits of its strength and the realities of the external environment."[3] It, therefore, gives a sense of direction to a state. It suggests adequate means for the easy journey to this direction. It creates a sense of purpose as well as a confidence to achieve that purpose. It becomes so indispensable that no state can operate at international level without it. Foreign policy may be defined both in narrow and broad sense. Narrow definitions emphasise the action aspect of foreign policy. In this sense, according to Schleicher, it refers to "the actions (including words) of government officials to influence human behaviour beyond the jurisdiction of their own state."[4] Therefore, foreign policy mainly implies a course of action. Padelford and Lincoln remark, "Foreign policy is the key element in the process by which a state translates its broadly conceived goals and interests into concrete courses of action to attain those objectives and preserve its interests."[5]

In the broad sense, it includes according to Schleicher, "the objectives, plans, and actions taken by a state relative to its external relationship."[6] As every state has various objectives— political, economic, military, ideological or cultural—it has technically many policies. That is why, it has been suggested that one should speak of foreign policies rather than a foreign policy. But foreign policy and foreign policies have totally different meanings. As Lerche and Said clarify: "Probably the best way to avoid confusion is to keep in mind that foreign policy (singular) is usually phrased in terms of goals, whereas policies (plural) draw their relevance from objectives."[7] Thus a broad

definition of foreign policy contains three elements—goals or objectives, policy plans and actual actions undertaken by a state to regulate its external relations.

In the words of Rodee, "Foreign policy involves the formulation and implementation of a group of principles which shape the behaviour pattern of a state while negotiating with other states to protect or further its vital interests."[8] Modelski defines foreign policy as "the system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment."[9] But Mahendra Kumar treats Modelski's definition as partially correct. According to him, foreign policy should *regulate* and not only change the behaviour of other states. Therefore, he modifies Modelski's definition of foreign policy "to include within its range all activities of a state to regulate the behaviour of other states, either through change or status quo, in order to ensure the maximum service of its interest."[10] He further defines foreign policy "as a thought- out course of action for achieving objectives in foreign relations as dictated by the ideology of national interest."[11] Felik Gross introduced another addition by holding that even a decision to have no relations with a state is also a foreign policy or, in other words, not to have definite foreign policy is also a foreign policy.[12] In this way, foreign policy has both positive and negative dimensions. It is positive when it aims at adjusting the behaviour of other states by changing it and negative when it endeavours for such an adjustment by not altering that behaviour.

In sum, every state decides its own course of action in international relations in the light of its means and ends. Then it conducts its foreign relations and behaves at international level and regulates the behaviour and action of other states according to that action plan. This is what a nation's foreign policy means.

Components of Foreign Policy

According to Lerche and Said, normally foreign policy includes three elements. These are: (1) formulation of the objective in the most precise terms possible; (2) the nature of the action to be undertaken, stated with sufficient clarity to guide and direct the state's other officials; and (3) the forms and perhaps the amounts of national power to be applied in pursuit of the objective.[13]

Mahendra Kumar describes four components: (a) policy makers, (b) interest and objectives, (c) principles of foreign policy, and (d) means of foreign policy.[14] According to Jangam, foreign policy is the policy of a nation towards other nations and generally it involves four factors : (1) principles underlying foreign policy, (2) problems faced by the nation, (3) the particular way of making policy including the role of foreign policy makers; and (4) the products or results of foreign policy.[15] The above description renders the concept of foreign policy more clear.

Objectives of Foreign Policy

Interest can be explained as the aims passed on to the policy makers by the community. It may also be defined as the general and continuing ends for the attainment of which a nation conducts its foreign relations. It includes such matters as security against aggression, development of higher standards of living, and the maintenance of conditions of national and international stability. Foreign policy is inconceivable without national interest. At the same time it must be clarified that national interest does not exclude the significance of international obligation, especially in the present-day world.

On the other hand, *objectives* are the product of national interest. "They are" , in the words of Mahendra Kumar, "interests spelled out and made more precise in the light of the present-day complexity of international relations."[16] He further clarifies that all interests of a nation will not be

regarded as objectives unless they are strongly loved by the political community and the same is prepared to make some sacrifice or take some risk for their realisation. In this way, objectives are of a more specific nature than interests.[17]

Common objectives of the foreign policy of all nations are: (1) maintaining the integrity of the state, (2) promoting economic interest, (3) providing for national security, (4) protecting national prestige and developing national power, and (5) maintaining world order. These can be supplemented by specific objectives according to the peculiar problems, needs and conditions of the particular country.[1]

Pre-requisites of Foreign Policy

Study of foreign policy necessitates that the following factors must be borne in mind.

1. Foreign policy has many *constituents*, most important of which are defence, diplomatic and economic interests. These constituents though singly salient, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They often co-exist and strongly influence each other.

2. Foreign policy is made in the name of a state, but it is the *government* which *really formulates* and executes it. The government is not an inanimate body. It is a synthesis of organisations and individuals having their organisational and personal interests which are not necessarily similar.

3. Foreign policy never operates in vacuum rather it is conditioned by an *environment*, both *domestic* and *external*. The domestic environment consists of political parties, pressure groups, rival bureaucratic organisations, public opinion, political culture etc. The external environment comprises among other sub-systemic actors—neighbouring states and others belonging to the region, super powers and international organisations, especially the UN, World Bank, IMF and regional organisations like O.A.S. and SAARC.

4. In government it is *some individuals* around whom foreign policy making revolves. It may be the President or Prime Minister or the King of a state and his foreign minister, advisers and subordinates. Mostly the Head of the Government (e.g. the Prime Minister in India and the President in the USA) plays the prominent role in this regard.

5. Foreign policy always involves both *decision* and *action*, with decision perhaps the more important element. Action on behalf of an objective can result from policy only if the decision itself indicates clearly what the policy maker had in mind both as to objective and procedure.

6. Foreign policy embraces both *important* and *less important matters*. The routine matters are dealt with at lower levels whereas important things are sent to higher levels for disposal. There is a linkage between the degree of the importance of the subject and the level of authority where it is disposed of.

7. *Cost-risk factor* in foreign policy has also its significance. A policy decision requires the commitment of resources, the assumption of a risk or both. One must keep in mind that, in foreign policy as in life, everything has its price. The most complex problem in policy formulation is the decision about how much effort should be made in pursuit of an objective in view of competing claims of other goals and the resource crunches.

8. Foreign policy has to be examined from *actual behaviour* pattern of states rather than exclusively from declared objectives or policy plans.

INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY

The instruments of foreign policy may be said to be those institutions or devices through which the national power or resources are used for the accomplishment of the interests and objectives. These are as follows:

1. *Diplomacy*. Good diplomats—ambassadors, envoys, ministers etc.—and through their art of diplomacy can put country's viewpoint effectively before the world and fulfil foreign policy objectives by means of mutual negotiations and thus spare their country from resorting to coercive methods. Diplomacy reduces the area of disagreement and misunderstanding with other states. It is instrumental in reaching out agreements, treaties and pacts with other nations. It plays its role both during war and peace.

2. *Publicity and Propaganda*. These can be used steadily to combat and break down the undesirable attitudes and opinions and to create the desired attitudes and opinions. Propaganda can be used, as it was used by Hitler and later on by super powers during Cold War, for the systematic falsification of true propositions or positions and the establishment of suitable ones. India's factually strong case on Kashmir has been distorted by a systematic and ceaseless propaganda by Pakistan, so much so that quite some people in the world may wonder as to what, after all the facts of the case are. Publicity through radio, television, magazines and other literature is also used as an instrument of foreign policy.

Thus these three factors—diplomacy, publicity and propaganda—are employed by a nation for building up its public relations, for removing undesirable or discreditable factors like embarrassment, misunderstanding, suspicion, fear, etc. between itself and other nations, and for projecting a favourable and acceptable image to other nations. These also help in increasing the power and prestige of a nation.

3. *Balance of Power*. This method is used for avoiding imbalance of power and strengthening the position of given nations. For example, Britain employed the principle of balance of power for a long time in the European power politics in order to maintain the *status quo* and prevent any particular power from being too strong.

4. *Collective Security*. The principle of collective security is adopted to secure collective defence—as threateningly posed or actually mobilised— against a powerful nation or nations. Balance of power and collective security are extremely useful as instruments for smaller nations which have a limited capacity to defend themselves.

5. *International Law and Organisations*. These are also used by nations whenever possible for advancing the objectives of their foreign policy. During the post-War (I) period, Britain and France used the League of Nations to maintain *status quo* which was in their favour. Now we see that a number of Third World countries are using the platform of the United Nations for some of the basic goals of their foreign policies— anti-colonialism, anti-racialism, disarmament, just economic order and so on.

6. *Economic and non-political methods*. Various economic methods are also adopted by various nations to achieve their foreign policy objectives and also to harm the interest of opponents. Economic organisations are formed for this purpose e.g. E.U., N.A.F.T.A., L.A.F.T.A., W.T.O., I.M.F. etc. Economic methods have already been discussed in detail in the previous chapter on 'National Interest'. Sometimes nations also exploit religious, cultural and ethnic affinity to fulfil foreign policy objectives e.g. the use of Islam by many muslim countries.

7. *War and Peace*. The institutions of war and peace are a kind of ultimate answer to the

problems of a nation's foreign policy. Of the two, peace comes on the heels of war, generally inaugurating a basic change in the foreign policies of nations concerned. But war is generally a devastating answer to the problems of a nation's foreign policy. When objectives of foreign policy cannot be achieved through other means, nations resort to war as an end argument.

DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy of states is determined by a number of factors. These important determinants having bearing on foreign policy can be broadly classified into three categories: (i) general or objective, (ii) specific or subjective or internal, and (iii) external factors. The general and objective factors determine the framework in which policy choices are to be made and operated. These are the factors which are common to all the countries in determining their foreign policy. While the specific and subjective factors vary from country to country in accordance with their internal conditions and needs. These specific factors determine the specific response of leadership to a particular situation, and therefore indicate the direction of a foreign policy. There are some external factors also that influence a country's foreign policy. All these factors are of great significance, and they clearly indicate that foreign policy can never be satisfactorily explained by any simple determinant. These are explained in detail as follows:

General and Objective Determinants

These are of four types that play role in determining the foreign policy of all the states.

1. *Sovereignty and Integrity of the State.* The first factor that every state keeps in mind while formulating foreign policy is the safeguarding of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is the main responsibility of a state to safeguard the property of citizens and to protect their interests whatsoever they are. This responsibility also involves the concept of security of national boundaries and if necessary to occupy other alien part of the territory. The states aiming at the protection of their own territory, pursue the policy of *status quo*. The states endeavouring to subjugate occupied or non-occupied territory may be named as pursuing the expansionist policy. The policy of safeguarding the interest of the citizens inside or outside the state, is known as policy of 'prestige'.

2. *Inter-dependence of States.* All the states big or small, rich or poor are dependent on one another for one or the other reasons. This inter-dependence may result in conflict or cooperation so the states under these stresses attempt to create a situation under which international behaviour may not be broken completely. Foreign policy is formulated in such a way as to maintain a balance with bargaining. For example, India did not recognise Israel for long, to dissuade the Arab countries from siding with Pakistan in the event of Indo-Pak dispute.

3. *Promotion of National Interest.* It is the primary duty of all states to promote and further their national interests through their foreign policies. There may be difference between the interests of one state with that of another as they naturally vary according to time, place, location and circumstances, but the interests as self-preservation, security and well-being of its citizens are the common interests on the basis of which foreign policy is generally made.

4. *Internal and External Conditions.* Foreign policy of every state is conditioned by certain internal and external factors. Internal factors include geography, population, economic needs, ideology, history and culture, military capacity, social structure, personalities, public opinion etc. External factors are global environment, great power structure, alliances, international organisations, world public opinion, reaction of other states etc. The degree of influence of these factors on the foreign policy may vary from country to country. The same are discussed in detail as under:

Specific, Subjective or Internal Determinants

Every state has its own specific interests that require specific decision in foreign policy making. A state may be facing certain problems and difficulties and therefore, has to take several internal factors into consideration while formulating its foreign policy. These internal factors are known as subjective or specific factors and may differ from state to state. These particular or specific factors are as under:

1. *Geography.* A permanent and stable determinant of foreign policy is geography. It determines the temperature, resources, frontiers and neighbours. The size of the state, topography, shape, location and climate are important components of geography. A size large enough to support a population, sufficient to man an adequate military establishment; a *climate* which is uniform and conducive to physical vigour, preferably either temperate or tropical highland, a *topography* offering boundaries with natural defence barrier such as mountains, forests, swamps, rivers, deserts and oceans and a *shape* which is compact rather than disintegrated or scattered and thus easier to defend, provide part of the necessary power potential allowing a state to pursue an independent foreign policy. *Location* is one of the crucial elements in moulding the foreign policy outlook. The insular location of the United Kingdom has influenced the general character of the British foreign policy as decisively as the isolated geographic position of the United States in the case of the American foreign policy. Location has created for them a sense of security as the vastness of size has conferred the same sense upon Russia and China.

In the context of new technological developments, the importance of geography has suffered a set back. The coming of supersonic jets, inter-continental ballistic missiles and rockets have made the mountains and seas vulnerable. Now within few hours any distance can be covered and heavy bombers can encircle the globe. Possibility of offensive defence against nuclear missiles is remote. A state while formulating its foreign policy takes a distant country as seriously as it takes a neighbouring country. Notwithstanding the above developments, the importance of geography is still intact as the foreign policy of every state continues to be related to its geography, though partially.

2. *History.* Another guide to foreign policy is the history of the country. From history alone the nation inherits a style and culture which in turn influence the foreign policy making. History is the past record of the doings of a community, of its failures and successes. The past experience, failures and successes guide policy makers to deal with present problems. If a specific policy had proved to be rewarding in the past, policy-makers would like to try the same policy for tackling similar situations in future. On the contrary, if a particular policy had proved to be a failure to deal with a situation, the policy-makers would try a different policy under an identical situation in future.

History shapes the current tradition and the self-image of a society, and therefore, the specific national style. The British habit of muddling through, the French concern with security, honour and glory, the German ruthlessness, the Russian obsession with secrecy, and the American habit to interpret international issues as moral issues, India's policy of non-alignment and *Panchsheel*, have definite and specific historical roots. In every case, such a national style and character influenced the making and execution of foreign policy.

3. *Population.* It, as a determinant of foreign policy, is relevant both in quantitative and qualitative terms. The political, economic and military phases of a nation's foreign policy is also moulded by the size, character and distribution of its population. It is believed that the greater the number of population, the greater will be its power. Manpower determines the standard of living,

values, the way of life and even expectation of a nation. The significance of China and India rests partly on the large size of their population. Besides the quantity, the quality of population as revealed in its educational level, skilled labour, technical know-how, health and strong national character, is a determinant of foreign policy. The quality of population also influences the quality of political system, public administration, leadership and even execution of foreign policy.

4. *Natural Resources.* Food, minerals, metal, coal, crude oil, water resources constitute an important element of national power and consequently of foreign policy. Availability of these resources in plenty definitely enhances the importance of a country. For example, the presence of petroleum has significantly strengthen the position of West Asian countries in international relations. They have used oil as a tool of their foreign policy. If natural resources are not locally available, they have to be procured through international cooperation. Availability of strategic and crucial raw materials will place a country in advantageous position in foreign affairs. On the contrary, a country lacking in these resources will follow a weak foreign policy.

5. *Economic Factors.* Today, no state in the world can boast of economic self-sufficiency. Even the United States is greatly dependent upon world trade for economic prosperity. This mutual interdependence of the economies also works as a determinant of foreign policy. Economic interdependence leads to international economic activity which is expressed in terms of tariffs, import quotas, trade agreements and other financial arrangements. Sometimes maladjustments in international economic relationship create tension in the world which further takes the form of political and military action. States are not equally gifted by nature with natural and economic resources nor are they capable of utilising available resources. Therefore, nations make their foreign policies in a way so that the supply of war materials may not run short and their trade may have a favourable balance. International economic activity also needs facilities and protection of foreign investment. All these economic factors have bearing on foreign policy.

6. *Development.* Usually, a developed nation tends to follow an independent foreign policy whereas a backward nation is inclined to pursue a dependency policy. The latter, owing to its poverty and military weakness, would rely on developed nations for economic development and / or for its protection against a powerful enemy. Such compulsions do not normally perturb strong and developed nations. However, security is a relative term and even the most powerful nation perhaps does not feel fully secure. Many a time developed nations like Britain and France are not able to follow independent foreign policies. They are often required to toe the line of NATO dictated by the United States. Although Japan is an economic power and threatens to overcome the United States in the economic sphere in near future yet it is militarily weak and is dependent upon the US for its security vis-a-vis Russia and China. Japan is compelled to follow the dictates of the US in the realm of foreign policy. Thus, in foreign policy corelationship between development and independence is indefinite and uncertain.

In general, developed states have more active foreign policy than developing states. The former, due to their superior resources, can afford to be more involved in external issues. However, sometimes even developing states, follow active foreign policies to the extent of intervening in other countries, directly or indirectly e.g. Sukarno's Indonesia, Nasser's Egypt, Gaddafi's Libya, Saddam's Iraq etc.

7. *National and Military Capacity.* It includes the military preparedness of a state, its technological advancement and modern means of communication. The economic development and enlightened political institutions are also associated with the national capacity. States with adequate military capacity will have greater initiative and bargaining power in foreign policy matters. Only those states have adopted aggressive postures who feel themselves militarily strong.

National capacity determines as well as executes foreign policy effectively. If the state increases its national capacity, its foreign policy will need a big change. It will strive to attain a position of distinction in international relations, if it decreases, the state will have to compromise with its poor status. For example, at the end of the Second World War Britain became a less powerful state. Change in its national capacity had considerably changed British foreign policy. The change in the US foreign policy after the war was owing to the tremendous rate of economic growth and military success in the war that encouraged it to pursue a policy of involvement instead of isolation.

8. *Ideology.* There has been a great debate on whether ideology *per se* acts as a determinant of foreign policy. Some scholars say that democratic nations believe in peace while dictatorial regimes believe in war. But reality falsifies this hypothesis. America and Britain, by no means, are less war- prone than Russia and China. At times a leader makes the use of ideology merely to justify his policy or behaviour in familiar terms which is acceptable to his countrymen. But on the other occasions a nation goes to war not for national security but only to compel others to subscribe to its ideology. An objective view on this matter is that ideology alone is not a policy goal. This is proved by the fact that nations professing opposite ideologies live in peace with each other for a number of years. However, there is another side of the picture. Foreign policy of the Soviet Union cannot be fully explained if one ignores the ideology of communism. 'World revolution' remained one of the chief objectives of the USSR's foreign policy for many years. Russian expansion after 1945 aimed at establishing of communism as much as her political domination.

However, the role of ideology as a determinant of foreign policy should not be over emphasised. Often ideologies are used simply to obscure the real facts of a situation or real motives of ambitious rulers. Sometimes governments stand for certain ideas only to command popular support at home and preferably abroad also. The foreign policy of India and many other countries despite ideological overtones cannot be explained except in terms of national interests. In short, it can be said that ideologies do not fully determine foreign policy objectives although they influence to some extent their directions.

After 1986, era of *detente* has once again returned and Super Powers like the USA and the USSR came closer. People have again started talking of the 'end of ideology.' Even ex-President Gorbachev had stressed the need for "deideologisation of international relations." He was also of the opinion that nations with opposite ideological systems should not merely co-exist peacefully but should move further in the domain of constructive cooperation. Ideological camps or blocks which emerged after the Second World War have almost disappeared now. No country is interested in ideological rigidities. All these post-cold war developments have further lowered the role of ideology in the formulation of foreign policy.

9. *Public Opinion.* Specially in democratic countries public opinion cannot be ignored as one of the determinants of foreign policy. It is often vague, volatile, amenable to quick changes and difficult to mobilise. But once on a particular problem public opinion is mobilised and expressed in clear terms, it becomes difficult for the government to overlook it while taking decision on the issue in question. It was the force of the public opinion in the United States politics, that compelled the government to order withdrawal of the American forces from the South Vietnam. Likewise, it was also under the pressure of public opinion that Krishna Menon had to resign in 1962 after the Chinese aggression. Thus generally public opinion acts as a determinant in shaping the foreign policy of a nation.

10. *Decision-Makers.* The attitude of policy and decision-makers is also carried weight. Leadership determines the strength and the direction of a foreign policy. The role that a country performs at

a particular time, and the foreign policy that will be pursued, are outcome of the qualities of those who are in the position to make decisions. How decision-makers perceive national interest and their image of the external and global environment has much to do with the making of foreign policy as final decision regarding foreign matters lies in their hands. In fact, policy decisions in external matters can never be separated from the psychological traits, the personality or the predisposition of the leaders. They, and not the abstract state or organisation take the most crucial decision concerning foreign policy.

11. *Domestic Instability.* Sometimes domestic instability also works as a determinant of foreign policy. Quincy Wright, an eminent scholar of international politics as well as war has observed that a ruler prevents sedition by making external war. It is a common saying in India that Pakistan has been continuously following an aggressive and hostile attitude towards India as it has never been able to deal with numerous internal issues challenging its very legitimacy and existence. Some Pakistani also allege the same thing about New Delhi. Many people suspected that the nuclear explosion of 1974 by India was primarily meant to divert the attention of Indians from domestic difficulties and enhance the image of Mrs. Gandhi who was then fishing in troubled water at home. The opponents of President Nixon criticised that in October 1973 he over emphasised Russian threat in Middle East and resorted to 'nuclear alert' because he wanted to escape from the Watergate which was about to dethrone him. The Clinton administration took action against Iraq and Afghanistan in 1998 to divert attention of the Americans from Monica Lewinsky affair. Thus it is the insecurity of the ruling elites often projected or taken as domestic instability that moulds the foreign policy on several occasions.

External Factors

Certain external factors and situations also influence and shape a nation's foreign policy. These factors are as follows:

1. *International Organisations.* These include international law, the UNO, and its activities, UNESCO, ILO, WHO, IMF etc. The nations cannot completely ignore international law, treaties and contracts so that their violations may not put in danger the policies. Almost all countries are also members of the UNO. Its decisions and activities effect the foreign policy of many nations. The Communist China for a long time ignored international organisations and consequently could not secure its due position in the sphere of international relations. In 1971 she became a member of UNO and this fact caused several shifts in China's foreign policy.

2. *World Public Opinion.* World public opinion provides dynamism to external environment. It is always changing. It is very difficult to know it unless it becomes very clear and organised. Like a flicker of light it influences the foreign policy rarely. The characteristic of consistency is absolutely absent in it. Only if domestic public opinion of many countries combines it becomes an *effective* world public opinion. Then it also serves as a determinant of foreign policy. No country howsoever powerful can go ever challenging world public opinion.

3. *Reaction of other States.* The states cannot always neglect the viewpoint of other states while making their foreign policies. Moreover, every state has some friendly nations or allies. Their reaction about a particular policy has to be given special attention. States usually never attempt to pursue those interests which are totally opposed to the fundamental interests of other states. If a policy ignores the reaction of other states it has little chance to succeed.

4. *Other External Factors.* The other external factors that have a bearing upon foreign policy are general world conditions, whether tense or relaxed, cold war like or detente like, war prone or peace oriented. General regional environment, whether surrounded by hostile or friendly neighbours.

Special endemic problems inflicting the region like Palestinian problem in West Asia. Political and economic global problems like arms race, nuclear proliferation, economic depression, economic protectionism, economic inequalities e.g. North-South problem, refugee problem, international terrorism, drug-trafficking, AIDS, environmental degradation etc. Prevailing alliance system and power structure in the world—bipolar or multipolar also influence foreign policy of various states.

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25

Diplomacy

Diplomacy is a part and parcel of international relations. Foreign policy comes into action only through diplomacy.

Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

By making a foreign policy, government of every state participates in international politics and maintains interstate relations. One of the major instruments or techniques of executing foreign policy is diplomacy. Further the diplomats are the personnel or state officials who practise method or technique of diplomacy in day-to-day international affairs and in achieving foreign policy goals. Though the terms foreign policy and diplomacy are used interchangeably and are inter-dependent yet these are technically different. Foreign policy is the business of governments (top political leaders as policy makers such as head of government, cabinet ministers, parliament; and top foreign ministry bureaucrats and advisors) whereas diplomacy is the job of trained officials (diplomats such as envoys, ambassadors, high commissioners, charge d'affairs, counsellors, secretaries, attaches; consuls general, consuls, consular agents etc.). The former is substance, the latter is method. J.R. Childs has made a similar distinction between the two. In his words, the foreign policy of a state is "the substance of foreign relations" whereas "diplomacy proper is the process by which policy is carried out."[1]

Notwithstanding the above distinction both are interdependent and complementary in this complex contemporary world. The foreign policy making is closely related to one important function of diplomacy that is reporting and negotiation. The feed-back and reports received from ambassadors by the home government as well as negotiations carried on simultaneously at different world capitals and the UNO greatly influence its foreign policy decisions. This way diplomacy plays important role in foreign policy decision-making process. On the other hand in these days politicians not only frame foreign policy but at times conduct negotiations, participate in summits and conferences and actively indulge in diplomacy of foreign visits. These functions of policy makers are akin to roles of diplomats. Moreover, the policy makers continue to monitor the progress of diplomats in respect of the accomplishment of objectives determined by them and give necessary help wanted by the latter.

Meaning and Definition

To achieve foreign policy objectives and to fulfil national interests, governments, communicate with those whose actions and behaviour they wish to deter, change or reinforce. No doubt very quick and sophisticated means of communication are available in this scientific world yet centuries old formal diplomatic channels are used by governments in addition to direct communication between foreign ministers and heads of state. That is why Frankel defines diplomacy as "the business of communicating between governments."[2] Similarly Lerche and Said define diplomacy

as "a technique of state action ... whereby communications from one government go directly into the decision-making apparatus of another ... If the operational purpose of policy is to secure the agreement of other states to national designs, it is only by diplomatic means that such assent can be formally registered and communicated. In this sense, diplomacy, is the central technique of foreign policy."[3]

The Oxford English Dictionary, offers the following definition of diplomacy: "the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist." According to the *Chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionary*, diplomacy is "the art of negotiation, especially of treaties between states; political skill."

In the words of Panikkar, an Indian diplomat, "Diplomacy, used in relation to international politics is the art of forwarding one's interests in relation to other countries." In this art diplomat has "to yield as little and gain as much as possible", in the interest of his country, "diplomacy involves a pitting of wits against each other."[4]

"Diplomacy" defines Sir Ernest Satow "is the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states."[5]

Harold Nicolson, a great scholar and practitioner of diplomacy in the twentieth century explains five different meanings of the word diplomacy. These are (1) as a synonym for foreign policy, (2) as negotiation, (3) the machinery by which such negotiation is carried out, (4) as a branch of the foreign service, and (5) as "an abstract quality or gift, which, in its best sense, implies skill in the conduct of international negotiation; and, in its worst sense, implies the more guileful aspects of tact."[6] However, finally he also accepts the above mentioned definition given by the *Oxford English Dictionary*.

Quincy Wright explains at two levels. In the popular sense it means the tact, shrewdness, skill and intelligence with which negotiations are carried out; in the specific sense it means "the art of negotiation, in order to achieve the maximum of groups objectives with a minimum of costs, within a system of politics in which war is a possibility."[7]

Nature and Characteristics of Diplomacy

From the above definitions it may be deduced that the nature of diplomacy consists of the following:

1. It is a technique of implementing foreign policy.
2. Diplomacy is a channel or business of communicating between governments.
3. It is a method of adjusting and managing inter-state relations.
4. It is the art of forwarding nation's interests.
5. It is a quality or skill of international negotiation.
6. It is a bargaining game aiming at achieving maximum and giving minimum.
7. It requires tact, intelligence, shrewdness and wit.
8. It implies both compromise and threat, persuasion and penalty, reward and punishment, carrot and stick and so on.
9. It is workable and useful both in peace and war.
10. For successful and effective working it requires trained and professional diplomats.

Classification of Diplomats

In a technical and professional sense diplomacy includes two types of personnel: (i) diplomatic officers and (ii) consular officers.

(i) *Diplomatic personnel.* The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) divided the heads of diplomatic missions into three general categories. The first category comprises ambassadors and high commissioners; the second comprises Envoys extra-ordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary; and the third category is made of charges d'affaires. The diplomats of first two categories are accredited (officially presented) to the head of the host state whereas charges d'affaires are accredited to the foreign minister or secretary of the state of the host country.

A good number of diplomatic officials who work under the above in mission or embassy are (1) counsellors of embassy or legation who rank highest among diplomatic staff. (2) secretaries of an embassy or legation, usually ranked as first, second and third secretaries; and (3) attache's who may be junior career officers or noncareer persons serving on a temporary basis.

(ii) *Consular personnel.* Related to the diplomatic function is the consular function and services. Consular functions (codified in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963) include processing and issuing entry and exit visas, facilitating commercial and other activities related to investment, processing ships' papers, and providing information about the home state to all interested parties. Consuls are divided into five classes: (1) Consul general; (2) Consuls; (3) Vice consuls of career; (4) Vice consuls not of career; and (5) Consular agents. Consular personal enjoy less diplomatic privileges and immunities than diplomatic personnel in the host country.

Functions of Diplomacy

Owing to the revolution in communications and growing trend of direct diplomacy between Heads of State and politicians the traditional functions of diplomacy have changed and diminished. Despite this change diplomacy in contemporary times has assumed new role and significance in many ways. In addition to the main role of diplomats in bargaining and communicating information, they perform several other functions which are discussed below:

(1) *Representation.* The diplomat represents his country abroad. This representation is of three types—symbolic, legal and political. As his country's symbolic representative he attends a number of ceremonies and functions such as Independence Day, Republic Day parades etc. As legal representative he casts his vote at international conferences on behalf of his government. As political representative, the diplomat is to sell the foreign policy of his country and project a favourable image of his country. "Whether in agriculture, medicine, music, physics, or military policies, if their government has some stake in a project, diplomats must symbolise that stake by their physical presence and continuing concern. In their symbolic capacity, ambassadors are concerned with the totality of relations—whether political or not—between their own country and the one to which they have been sent,"[8] summarizes Holsti.

(2) *Negotiation.* The second important function of diplomats is negotiating. It involves the transmission of messages between the foreign ministries of the home and the host states. Diplomats are mainly negotiators. Negotiation is the pursuit of agreement by compromise, bargaining and direct personal contact. Their function is to draft a wide variety of bilateral and multilateral agreements, treaties, conventions, protocols and other documents of a political, social and economic nature. Development in communication has reduced the role of the diplomat as negotiator, but the function of negotiation continues. Now mostly this role is performed by Heads of State/government and foreign ministers. As a negotiator diplomat is to bargain and strike a balance between 'giving what is asked and getting what is wanted.' Success in negotiation depends upon several factors such as preparation of agenda, maintenance of due secrecy, the spirit of compromise and the strength of military or economic power backing it.

(3) *Obtaining Information.* According to Holsti, "information and data are the raw materials of foreign policy, the gathering of information—by official acts, at cocktail parties, or by covert means—is the most important task of the diplomat aside from his or her bargaining activities. Precise information must be made available to those who formulate policy if there is to be a minimum discrepancy between the objective environment and the image of the environment held by policy makers."[9] Only a resident diplomat can have the real feel of the political, economic, social and other conditions prevailing in the host foreign country.

(4) *Reporting.* After gathering information next step is reporting the same to the home country. The way he interprets the obtained information and sends the same to home greatly helps his home country taking an effective decision. For instance, economic attache's will send reports to their home offices on balance of payments, growth rates, inflation and unemployment of the host state and trade and investment opportunities therein. Political officers usually report on the structures, processes and personalities of political movements and political parties in the host country. Relative electoral strength of different parties, their personalities, their friendliness or hostility towards the home state are also regularly reported. Military attache's send information regarding the host country's military force; the quality of its military leadership, military equipment, weapon system, strategic, military installations, tactical sites etc. Reports about religious activities, youth affairs, class structures, vital social statistics, ethnic, religious and social group activities are of great significance to political, economic and military analysis.

(5) *Protection of Nationals and National Interest.* The diplomat has to protect the nationals of his country resident in the land in which he is stationed. He has to safeguard the interests of businessmen and other nationals who are living or travelling abroad and to prevent any sort of discrimination against them in foreign land. During catastrophes or civil disorders, the role of diplomat becomes more crucial. "Nationals have to be protected or evacuated, if necessary, they must be represented by legal counsel if jailed, and their property or other interests abroad must be protected if the local government does not provide such service,"[10] explains Holsti. The diplomats has to look after national interests as interpreted by policy makers and according to treaties and principles of international law. To promote own country's interests diplomat usually seeks to strengthen relations with friendly countries and neutralizes force hostile to itself.

(6) *Making Policies.* These days diplomats also provide advice to makers of foreign policy and occasionally take significant policy decisions themselves. "All diplomats serve in a sense as policy makers, because they provide a large portion of the information upon which policy is based. A principal contribution of diplomats in the policy-making process thus comes from their skill of interpretation and judgement about conditions in the country to which they are accredited,"[11] observes Holsti. But their advice or warnings are not always considered or heeded by the top politicians that matter in their home countries.

(7) *The Substantive Functions.* In the opinion of Poullada, "there are both substantive and procedural aspects" of the functions of diplomacy.[12] Five substantive functions of diplomacy, according to him are: (i) conflict management, (ii) problem solving, (iii) cross-cultural interaction, (iv) negotiation and bargaining, and (v) program management. "In order to perform these substantive functions the diplomat uses certain procedural arts and crafts such as the refinements of protocol, diplomatic drafting, press relations, yes, and even gastronomy,"[13] points out Poullada.

Instruments and Techniques of Diplomacy

There are number of instruments and techniques of diplomacy that may be employed to achieve the goals of foreign policy. Kautilya, the ancient Indian master of statecraft and diplomacy has given four instruments of diplomacy that may be employed singly or jointly in a given situation. These are *sama*-reconciliation or negotiation, *dana* - giving gift or concession, *danda*-punishment and *bheda*-creating dissension. Similarly many modern writers are of the opinion that states usually adopt three basic mode of behaviour to achieve diplomatic objectives—cooperation, accommodation and opposition.[14]

Lerche and Said have put forward the following four techniques of diplomacy: [15]

1. *Coercion*. Coercive moves made by other means are communicated diplomatically. In many cases, rupture of diplomatic relations has a coercive element, as does exclusion of the target state from international conferences or organizations. Coercion may also be applied in negotiation by an ultimatum, by establishment of a rigid time limit for the conclusion of an arrangement, or by the registration of a formal or informal protest or complaint.

2. *Persuasion*. The advancement of arguments and the proffering of *quid pro quo*, both persuasive devices, are within the exclusive province of diplomatic technique. While the actual line between coercion and persuasion is very thin, and the two techniques oftenly mix with each other, there is a real difference in both motivation and atmosphere, and most diplomatic initiatives are at least initially cast in persuasive form.

3. *Adjustment*. Diplomacy is an art of give and take. Adjustment is admirably suited to the task of enabling two states to modify their positions on an issue in order to reach a stable relationship. Its directions of communication, its potentially non-coercive nature, and its subtlety and flexibility all contribute to its usefulness. However, the adjustment function of diplomacy is effective only if both parties are amenable to negotiation and give and take; nothing in the diplomatic instrument can overcome a state's rigidness or unwillingness to change a policy.

4. *Agreement*. Diplomacy is a technique for reaching agreement. Usually it is believed that diplomacy is the art of negotiating written agreements. Agreement may involve coercion, persuasion, or adjustment, and that no agreement is possible unless both parties wish it. Formal written agreements are the most binding structures on international commitment offered by international politics, and can be reached only by diplomatic means.

Good Diplomacy and Ideal Diplomat

Effectiveness and goodness of diplomacy depends upon the qualities and abilities of diplomats. A good number of scholars from ancient to present times have endeavoured to point out the qualities of an ideal diplomat. Indian ancient scholar Kautilya was of the opinion that an ideal diplomat should belong to a noble family and be skilful, possessed of a good memory, eloquent, honest and loyal to his own prince. Ottaviano Maggi in his work *De Legato* (1596) contended that an ambassdor should be trained theologian, should be well versed in Aristotle and Plato, and should be able to solve the abstruse problems in correct dialectical form. Sometimes it was demanded that 'a handsome youngman with a good complexion', or 'a capacity for absorbing without derangement vast quantities of intoxicating liquor' was considered essential in an envoy. No doubt these qualities are now not considered essential.

In 1716 Monsieur de Callieres in his treatise on diplomacy gave a list of qualities of a good diplomat, which are recognized even today. Instead of deception, deceit and intrigue, de Callie'res stresses integrity, continuity, good faith, and confidential but honest negotiation by professional

diplomats. Two hundreds years after Callie'res, M. Jules Camleon also expressed the similar opinion. According to Camleon essential qualifications of a diplomat are moral authority, personal credibility, genial personality, compromising ability and lack of hotheadedness. K. Anatoliev believes that circumspection and an ability to evoke and maintain confidence are perhaps the most important qualities that an ideal diplomat should possess. By circumspection he means not to display hastiness in the assessment of various phenomena, in the policy of a country.

An authority on diplomacy, Nicolson[16] has enumerated the following seven qualities of an ideal diplomat which are widely acclaimed.

1. *Truthfulness*. By this Nicolson means "not merely abstention from conscious misstatements, but a scrupulous care to avoid the suggestion of the false or the suppression of the true." It enhances an ambassador's long-range credibility and subsequent effectiveness.

2. *Precision*. This means 'not merely intellectual accuracy but moral accuracy.' The diplomat should be accurate both in 'mind and soul.' Intellectual accuracy is the faithful description of the reality perceived by the ambassador. Moral accuracy is the ability of ambassadors to express their views boldly and to avoid providing the home office with ambiguous or politically agreeable reports.

3. *Calm*. He should avoid "displaying irritation when confronted by the stupidity, dishonesty, brutality or conceit," and eschew all personal animosities, predilections, prejudices and exaggerations.

4. *Good Temper*. He should be able to keep his temper under complete control at all times. A display of anger, for example, is regarded as a betrayal of weakness.

5. *Patience*. Nicolson considers it an indispensable quality for the successful negotiator, and he quotes the words of French Ambassador M. Jules Camleon, "the wind is bound to be contrary at times, and then one has to tack to get into port."[17]

6. *Modesty*. Modesty is a central quality. He should avoid variety and should not be flattered by or, worse, boast about their diplomatic victories and successes.

7. *Loyalty*. He should bear a special loyalty to his country, a loyalty that will prompt him to tell his government what it ought to know rather than what it wants to hear. And finally Nicolson reminds us the qualities of intelligence, charm, industry and courage and even tact.

A set of *guidelines* constructed by Coulombis and Wolfe[18]; and Lerche and Said[19] for effective and efficient diplomats are consolidated and given below:

1. The diplomat must have a clear understanding of the situation in which he is working. He must be sensitive to the forces at work in his problem area.
2. He should have a basic knowledge of the languages and of the working of government, trade and industry, and above all a genuine interest in people of the host country. He should adjust himself to the local ways of life, including good manners. He should respect the host country's customs and traditions as well as constraints from protocol.
3. The diplomat must understand the needs and interests of the host country without losing sight of his own country's overall policy objectives.
4. The diplomat must be fully aware of his real action capability. He must be having full estimate of coercive support available to him from his home government.
5. The diplomat's approach must be flexible.
6. He should be reasonably compromising but not over-eager to compromise.

7. He should suppress personal likes and dislikes; think only of national interests as defined in the policy directions of his government.
8. He is to implement executive instructions faithfully, regardless of his personal assessment of the wisdom of these instructions.
9. He should recognise and assess public opinion, but should not be entrapped by it.
10. He should not dramatise his reports merely to attract high-level attention at home and abroad—or just for the sake of good prose.
11. He must not be over-suspicious.
12. He must be a good socialite. A participation in a social-cultural function, a 'duck hunt', 'a delicious luncheon', 'minor sports' and 'good movie' may be extremely useful.[20]
13. He should act not only for the time-frame of his tenure as ambassador. He must also think of his successors.

TYPES OF DIPLOMACY

The diplomacy may be categorised into different forms on the basis of time, techniques, practices, personnel (diplomats), diplomatic dealings. Some of the major kinds prevalent in the present time are discussed below.

Old Diplomacy

Though diplomacy in general is as old as states and their relations yet the diplomatic practice that is today called old diplomacy was originated somewhere at the close of the 16th century and continued upto 1918-19. During this period "international diplomacy was concerned mainly with the building up of allies (and of detecting other people's allies). But it was a 'closed' affair, not involving deep hatred or violent animosities, as monarchical and aristocratic Europe was essentially one community with a deep-rooted feeling of Western European unity. Hence old diplomacy was a friendly, humane and polite art, carried on with much finesse and a great deal of mutual toleration,"[21] describes Panikkar. The old diplomacy was based mainly on three schools of diplomacy in vogue in Europe during those centuries namely Italian (Venetians and Machiavelli), French (Grotius, Richelieu, Tallyrand etc.) and German (Metternich and Bismarck).

Some common ***features*** of these three schools of old diplomacy were:

1. *Mainly European.* The concept of Europe was the centre of old diplomatic activities. Old diplomacy was mostly confined to Europe and non-European countries were outside its purview.

2. *Big Power Affair.* The idea of the greater importance and responsibility of the Great European Powers than of the small ones dominated the old diplomacy. What to speak of the numerous non-European countries, even the small countries of Europe had no role in old diplomacy. It was mainly a big power affair of European countries.

3. *Aristocratic Affair.* The diplomatic officers were selected and appointed by the monarch from the rank of the nobles and aristocrats. They were solely responsible to the king. They were not career diplomats recruited on merit through competitive exams. The diplomatic officials of different countries thus belonged to the same aristocratic class and had occasions to meet and work with each other in different capacities. Having thus known each other and worked together for years, these officials possessed similar experience, similar taste and similar culture.

4. *Secrecy.* Old diplomacy was based on the assumption that negotiation must always be a process rather than an episode, and that at every stage it must remain confidential. Strict secrecy was observed while conveying the issue and conducting the negotiations. Secrecy was considered essential for resolving differences. Moreover, there was no taboo on secret pacts and agreements.

5. *Flexible.* Owing to the lack of fast means of transport and communication it was extremely difficult for the monarchs to keep constant touch with their diplomats in various states, they had to allow them a considerable freedom in matters of negotiations. The monarchical governments and aristocratic diplomacy made the freedom of ambassadors and the flexibility in the matters of negotiation and the conduct of entire diplomatic relations, possible. The pressure of public opinion that makes flexibility impossible was non-existent.

6. *Foul Means.* For serving national interests, diplomats often resorted to foul means and practices such as bribing and murder.

New Diplomacy

The era of new diplomacy ushered in the twentieth century and especially after the First World War when international conditions changed considerably and democratic governments replaced monarchies. The twentieth century symbolised, "a new era order in world affairs.... one in which governments were fast losing their aristocratic leanings and their aloofness, and peoples were speaking to peoples through democratic representatives and informal channels .... While diplomacy remained a rather esoteric profession, carried on by men of wealth and influence and power, it was conducted with the assistance of a growing number of career officers, the elite guard of diplomacy, whose standards of competence and training were being steadily raised,"[22] explained Palmer and Perkins. Thus new diplomacy was more professional and non-political.

The ***factors responsible*** for the decline of old diplomacy and ***rise of new diplomacy*** were: (1) With the rise of democracy the diplomats were now required to keep themselves in tune not only with the views of their governments but also with the changing moods of the public. (2) The growing importance of public opinion have made all states very sensitive to currents of public sentiments. That is why they give more time and effort to educational and propaganda work. One of the main functions of diplomats is reporting on the attitudes of the people in the host countries. (3) New techniques of communication have now drastically altered the tempo and temper of diplomacy. Telephone, telegraph, radio, television, satellite communication, internet, computer together with fast supersonic air transportation have reduced the status of ambassadors to that of glorified clerks. With communication and information revolution the foreign minister or head of the government can direct virtually all diplomatic representatives. At times he may by-pass the regular diplomatic channel and directly negotiate with his counterpart in other countries. The policy makers have become their own diplomats. (4) Military alliance system after the Second World War and trading bloc system after the cold war have given birth to 'coalition diplomacy' and 'economic/commercial diplomacy' respectively. (5) With the emergence of several new sovereign independent states in Asia, Africa and Latin America, new faces with distinctly separate cultural identities, loyalties, schemes of priorities etc. appeared on the international scene. New diplomacy assumed worldwide character and was no longer confined to Europe. (6) Acceptance of the equal status of all states big and small; the extension of the principle of democracy to the international field, introduction of the principle of decision by 'majority vote' in international affairs; expansion of mass media etc. replaced secret diplomacy with open diplomacy.

The chief ***characteristics*** of new diplomacy are:

(1) *International.* New diplomacy is truly an international affair. The composition of international society has greatly altered; numbers of states have increased and the centre of gravity has shifted away from Europe.

(2) *Specialization.* As the functional specialization is on rise, the tendency to engage different persons in different types of diplomatic negotiations abroad is also on increase. As the Ambassador is a generalist, he may not do justice to a subject of technical nature. Now to negotiate on trade and science special delegations consisting of economic experts and scientists respectively are sent abroad. To work out military pacts and security arrangements, military Generals and security experts are engaged. Similarly in disarmament and arms control talks specialists and peace researchers are involved.

(3) *Summit or personal.* Now important issues are directly discussed by summit level (top) political leaders of concerned countries directly rather than by their professional diplomats. The direct contact and negotiation between heads of states/governments and foreign ministers in bilateral matters or in multilateral arrangements, international conferences and meetings of international organisations have several advantages. Top political leaders are able to risk and apply their discretion to reach some settlement. They can take bold decision on the spot.

(4) *Open.* New diplomacy is identical with open diplomacy. It insists on open covenants of peace openly arrived at and not on private international understanding of any kind. It proceeds always frankly and in the public view.

(5) *Democratic.* New diplomacy is subjected to democratic control. The broad framework of diplomacy containing the vital objectives and not the process of negotiation are democratically determined and subjected to democratic scrutiny and control.

Distinction Between Old and New Diplomacy

The major differences between the two are:

(1) The old diplomacy was mainly confined to Europe whereas the new diplomacy is all pervasive, world wide and truly international in nature.
(2) Unlike old diplomacy, new diplomacy is not dominated by big powers of the Europe.
(3) If old diplomacy was aristocratic the new one is democratic. The diplomats in the past were drawn from the aristocratic class today they are recruited from public. New diplomacy is mostly practised by professional career foreign service officers who are recruited on the basis of merit.
(4) Though negotiations in both types are conducted secretly yet the old was more secret than the new. There is no place for secret agreements and treaties in new diplomacy.
(5) New diplomacy is more frequently conducted through summits than the old diplomacy.
(6) Old diplomacy was run by generalists whereas the new one is dominated by specialists from commerce, economics, science and military.

Secret Diplomacy

Old diplomacy was marked by secrecy, secret dealings and secret agreements. Secrecy means undercover and shady dealings. In the nineteenth century when true democracy was not developed secret diplomacy was an important sub-category of old diplomacy. The Congress of Berlin of 1878 was a fine example of secret diplomacy in the nineteenth century. History is full of such secret treaties. During World War I a good number of promises were made by the Allies to Italy and other states to keep them neutral or to ensure their participation in the struggle. These secret promises bedevilled the Paris Peace Conference and conflicted with the principles the Allied nations professed to hold. Several treaties of alliance and friendship have contained secret provisions — for instance, the *Entente Cordiale* between Britain and France in 1904. The secret provisions of the Yalta Agreements of 1945 caused an international sensation when they became

public. Later on the secrecy was justified on the plea of wartime necessity and expediency; but it is widely felt that the price was too high. The clandestine treaties bred a great amount of suspicion, fear and mistrust at international level.

"The evil of secret treaties, as of secret diplomacy in general, is the deliberate concealment of the end products of negotiations, not of the negotiations themselves. Most international diplomacy is necessarily carried on in secret; at least, very little publicity is given to it,"[23] observe Palmer and Perkins. Leaders of democratic states are frequently faced with the question of how much should be told, and when and in what manner. Palmer and Perkins suggest, "they must weigh the obvious value of keeping the public informed of major developments in foreign affairs against considerations of national security and the effect upon the negotiations in progress, and upon the other countries concerned, of telling too much too soon."[24]

Harold Nicolson, an authority on diplomacy distinguishes between two types of activities: foreign policy making (statecraft) and negotiations (diplomacy).[25] He rightly suggests that foreign policy making should be the domain of elected politicians and it should reflect public needs and pressures. The art of negotiation (that is, the effective execution of established policies toward other states) should be performed by diplomatic professionals, who know the peculiarities of international interaction and have the type of personality that contributes to successful negotiations. In brief, policy making should ideally be subject to democratic controls, but the work of implementation of policy should be assigned to trained and politically neutral experts, policy making should never be secret nor there should be any secret agreements and treaties but negotiations may still be conducted secretly.

Open Diplomacy

With the advent and growth of democracy came the open diplomacy especially in the twentieth century. The US President Woodrow Wilson began open diplomacy after the First World War. He was of the opinion that one of the causes of this war was secret understandings and agreements among nations. In his message to the Congress on January 1918 he pleaded that in future there should be nothing but "open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in public view."[26]

The principle of open diplomacy was adopted by the covenant of the League of Nations and later by the Charter of the United Nations. In reality open diplomacy cannot be practised in toto. Negotiations between states require a high degree of finesse and give and take. They can never be conducted in the white glare of publicity with any fruitful outcome. As already mentioned above negotiations (diplomacy) and final decisions (policy) are two different things. Palmer and Perkins suggest "The major issues involved, however, can and should be publicly declared and discussed and the decisions and agreements which are reached by negotiation can and should be subjected to the most searching scrutiny."[27] But at the same time to be successful, negotiations may be conducted behind the scene. It is the secrecy that is undesirable not the diplomacy itself. Many have argued that `open covenants' are certainly desirable but they can hardly be `openly arrived at'.

Most of the scholars in the world support Nicolson's preference for publicly debated policy making as well as for open covenants and treaties. At the same time they oppose publicly aired and scrutinized negotiations. Couloumbis and Wolfe beautifully explain: "Negotiations can be compared to the situation of a small man who has the choice of being confronted by a heavy weight bully either in a crowded bar or in a deserted alley. In the bar, with other people watching,

it would be difficult for the man to back down or to run away without being publicly shamed. In the alley, on the other hand, the weaker man's thoughts would resolve around how well and how quickly he could apologize or how effectively he could run, climb or hide."[28] They further say, the aim of negotiations "is not victory but a viable, acceptable and preferably favourable compromise."[29]

The chief propounder of open diplomacy President Wilson himself concluded secretly a series of negotiations with British Prime Minister Lloyd George and the French Prime Minister Clemenceau at Paris after the First World War. The Treaty of Versailles was largely an outcome of these secret negotiations. Immediately after the Paris Peace Conference President Wilson probably realised the shortcomings of his open diplomacy thesis and began a tactical retreat. In a meeting with the Senate in 1918 he declared: "When I pronounced for open diplomacy, I meant not that there should be no private discussions of delicate matters, but that no secret agreements should be entered into, and that all international relations, when fixed, should be open, above board and explicit."[30] This open diplomacy is for open agreements and treaties and not for totally open negotiations which should be carried out away discreetly from public glare by trained diplomats and should promote the goals set up by policy makers.

Personal and Summit Diplomacy

When foreign ministers, prime ministers and even heads of states directly and personally participate in diplomatic parleys, it is called personal diplomacy. When vital national interest and major political considerations are involved in any issue, the negotiations are usually conducted by top level political leaders. This practice, in fact, is not a recent development; only it has become more common in the recent past. Personal diplomacy was practised by Alexander the Great, Jullius Caesar, Charlemagne, Henry VIII of England, Francis I of France, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon Bonaparte. Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill personally conducted the most important part of diplomacy during and after the Second World War. The Simla Summit attended by Indira Gandhi and Bhutto in 1972, Lahore Summit attended by Vajpayee and Sharif in 1999, Moscow Summit between Brezhnev and Nixon in 1972, Washintgon Summit between Yeltsin and Bush in 1992 are examples of personal or summit diplomacy. Extensive and frequent foreign visits by heads of states have become important means of personal diplomacy.

Personal diplomacy is in vogue through personal agents and direct contact. By by-passing the normal channels of diplomacy or by using them only to a limited degree, the heads of states/governments often depend upon personal representatives to tackle ticklish problems in international relations. US President Wilson's reliance on Colonel House, Roosevelt's on Harry Hopkins and Nixon's on Kissinger are the fine examples of this trend. Sometime, heads of states directly contact each other by telephone. With the advent of computers and internet net-meeting and teleconferencing have become possible. They also correspond directly, or send messages to each other by personal emissaries and confidents.

Summit meetings are conferences of top political figures—heads of states or governments — who are able to make important political decisions and conclude agreements, possibly without normal diplomatic channels. Although it is an ancient practice, the label summit diplomacy is quite new. 'Summitry is old wine in a new bottle'. Sir Winston Churchill coined the phrase in 1953, when he proposed a conference of Western and Soviet heads of governments. Subsequently, summit diplomacy became quite popular in international relations. For example 53 nations Commonwealth Heads of Government Meet (CHOGM), 114 nations Nonaligned (NAM) summit, G-8 summit etc. have become regular and important international events of the contemporary world.

Multilateral and Institutional Diplomacy

Conference diplomacy was a precursor of institutional diplomacy and parliamentary diplomacy is a by-product of institutional diplomacy. All these forms of diplomacy are inter-connected and inter-related and come under *multilateral diplomacy*. It is pertinent to discuss conference diplomacy first.

Conference Diplomacy. A large part of international dealings is conducted through the medium of international conferences and the periodic meetings of regional and international organisations. This is known as conference diplomacy. The term diplomacy by conference is used to describe 'the frequent recourse to multilateral method' by which nations are doing business with each other. Diplomacy by conference is a multilateral method of diplomatic negotiations in which leaders or representatives of more than two countries participate and is characterized by numerous and complicated rules of procedure. "Diplomacy by conference" wrote Roy, "was gradually coming into vogue from the beginning of the twentieth century. The Hague Conference of 1899 and 1907 can be regarded by some as early examples of Conference Diplomacy. But these conferences were convened for special purposes and could not be considered as regular features of diplomatic devices of the period."[31] It was the World War I that gave a boost to the idea of conference diplomacy under the pressure of common danger. During that War the Allies met in numerous conferences to determine and execute common policies on different aspects of the war effort. A number of conferences followed in succession e.g. Paris Peace Conference (1918), Disarmament Conference at Washington (1922), Economic Conference at Genoa (1922), Disarmament Conference at Geneva (1927), London Conference (1930) etc. Thereafter the conference diplomacy continued to develop. During the World War II again conference diplomacy was employed by the Allies frequently. The Casablanca Conference (1943), the Moscow Conference (1943), the Teheran Conference (1943), the Bretton Woods Conference (1944), the Yalta Conference (1945), the San Francisco Conference (1945) etc. are fine examples of this diplomacy during and after the Second World War. Subsequently, conference diplomacy became a routine feature of international relations. Latest examples of this diplomacy is NPT Review Conference (1995), Conference on Disarmament that discussed the CTBT in 1996 and conference of the 135-member World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1999. This way the conference diplomacy has come to stay beyond doubt. Usually nations resort to this diplomacy to discuss and solve common problems, to achieve special objectives, to tackle common danger and to make international treaties.

Institutional Diplomacy. With the rise of international and regional institutions like the UN and its specialized agencies, IMF, WTO, NATO, EU etc. a new type of diplomacy has come into existence namely institutional diplomacy. A "novel, revolutionary and worldwide institutionalizing of diplomacy" has become widely prevalent, according to Thompson.[32] Diplomacy by conference discussed above is mostly about *ad hoc* conferences or one-time conference for a specific purpose. With the establishment of a number of durable international organisations and institutions, a new kind of organised and permanent diplomacy by conference took roots. Negotiations are usually conducted by international institutions with a view to solving international conflicts and problems. The foremost example in this respect is the diplomatic efforts undertaken by the United Nations from time to time in regard to various international conflicts and crises. Baral explains, "the UN helps both adversaries meet on the negotiation table and, if necessary, throws some ideas into the middle of negotiation which may help resolve the crisis. The UN played an important role in ending the Korean conflict in 1953. It also took some steps to bring to an end the Congolese crisis of 1960, and the Middle East War in 1967 and thereafter."[33] The United Nations is a world body in which almost all the nations of the world are members. That is why diplomacy conducted in the UN has acquired extra significance. Diplomacy in the UN is known by several names such as

public diplomacy, conference diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy and parliamentary diplomacy. It has been also dubbed as bloc diplomacy, diplomacy by groups and even diplomacy by majorities.

The UN is a kind of permanent international conference. Representatives of its member-states are always posted at the headquarters of the organisations. Their very presence provides a suitable atmosphere for constant diplomatic negotiations. This has greatly changed the nature of conference diplomacy. While in the past it might have required months or even years to agree upon the procedures of *ad hoc* international conference, the UN provides a set framework which enables it to summon an international conference to discuss urgent issue at a short notice.

In addition to the UN, other regional organizations like the OAU and OAS also perform diplomatic role when they settle disputes of their member-states. In 1982 OAS endeavoured to bring to an end the Falkland war.

Parliamentary Diplomacy. The parliamentary diplomacy is a sub-type of multilateral diplomacy and especially a child of institutional diplomacy. The term parliamentary diplomacy was coined by a former US Secretary of State Dean Rusk describing what goes on in the UN General Assembly and its other organs. The parliamentary form of multilateral diplomacy usually follows those procedures and techniques which are generally used by legislative bodies of democratic nations such as public debate, voting, decision by majority vote, reporting out of committees etc. Rusk describes the following components of the parliamentary diplomacy: (i) a continuing organisation, (ii) regular public debate exposed to mass media, (iii) a set of rules governing the procedures, and (iv) formal conclusions expressed in resolutions passed by majority;[34] and we can add a fifth one (v) existence of committees.

The procedures, debates and the use of committees in the General Assembly show a remarkable similarity to national parliaments. The debates and actions upon draft resolutions, the elections of officers and of members of the elective organs, the determination of the United Nations budget, the Secretary-General's annual report which is superficially similar to a 'State of the Union' message, and the political manoeuvering in the General Assembly do bear a resemblance to procedural practices in national legislatures. In the UN General Assembly the activities of the different regional and political blocs that endeavour to influence the outcome of deliberations are akin to political parties, regional blocs, and special interest groups found in parliamentary bodies. Speech-making by Head of States or their representatives and lobbying by blocs and groups of nations have become regular practice in the General Assembly and other large international gatherings.

Despite similarity of appearances, tactics, procedures and formalities, there are vital differences between national parliaments and the UN organs. Both are fundamentally different in purpose, character and effectiveness. Unlike the national legislative assemblies whose majority decisions are legally binding, majority decisions of the UN General Assembly are not legally binding and cannot be enforced. The former has citizens of the same state, the latter representative of different political entities. While members of national parliaments make up their minds how to vote and vote in their own names, delegates in the United Nations follow instructions of governments on distant shores and cast votes in the name of countries they represent. On the one hand parliamentary diplomacy has been criticized on the plea that often nations indulge in propaganda and polemics which vitiate the climate for international peace. On the other hand it has been appreciated because it serves as antidote to oligarchism that was prevalent during days of old diplomacy.

Bilateral Diplomacy

Sometimes it is said that improved communications, faster travel and the growth of multi-

lateral diplomacy make the traditional forms of bilateral diplomacy irrelevant in modern conditions. But this is not true. No modern state considers it feasible to handle its external relations solely through the United Nations or the regional groupings. Bilateral issues and matters between two countries and neighbours were and are continued to be tackled through bilateral diplomacy. When the issue is bilateral, it normally requires negotiation by two concerned nations. India and Pakistan, India and China, India and the USA, the US and Russia etc. meet at a number of times to sort out their differences. Alongwith multilateral diplomacy, bilateral diplomacy is still relevant owing to the following factors: (i) Bilateral missions normally carry out consular, commercial, information and other functions which only the most severe critics would argue could be dispensed with entirely. (ii) as domestic economics everywhere come increasingly under the control of governments, international traders need more help from their own governments and its missions in foreign countries in their bilateral commercial negotiations with other countries. (iii) bilateral missions are also used for aid and developmental tasks. (iv) nations often set up special bilateral consultative, study and core groups to enhance cooperation in a particular field or to sort out a specific issue.

Economic Diplomacy

Economic diplomacy or commercial diplomacy has also made a significant place for itself in the contemporary international relations. The role of 'oil diplomacy' and 'dollar diplomacy' in present times illustrates the importance of economic diplomacy. The heightened interest in economic diplomacy has been occasioned by the increasing liberalisation and globalisation trends on the one hand and the growth of regional trading blocs such as NAFTA, SAFTA, APEC, LAFTA, EU etc. and World Trade Organisation (WTO) on the other. Economic issues such as the use of sea-bed, the establishment of a New International Economic Order, the international allocation of resources—energy, raw-material technology protection of intellectual property rights, foreign investment, joint ventures, economic aid, debt etc. now occupy a large part of both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Tackling of these issues is as much a question of politics as of economics for the nation states.

Economic methods are used both in times of peace and war. International trade, economic aid and assistance are used as convenient tools of diplomacy in peace time. During war various economic measures are often most effectively used as a means of coercing the adversaries. During war time a country tries to inflict economic hardship to its adversary through blockade. Britain the most powerful naval power in the past, had been employing naval blockades since the time of Queen Elizabeth-I. It played an important role in the Napoleonic war and the two World Wars. The effectiveness of economic measures as a coercive method gave rise to the idea of 'economic sanctions.' The US, Japan and some other countries imposed economic sanctions on India and Pakistan when they exploded nuclear device in May 1998.

With industrialisation and liberalisation increased the power of capitalists in several countries. They began to exert greater pressure on their respective governments to find new markets and obtain concession for their merchandise. The diplomats of these countries in their turn again began to evince keen interest in furthering the commercial interests of their countries in other states. After rapid decolonization when newly emerged developing countries embarked upon a path of economic development, economic diplomacy got further momentum.

The growing importance of economic diplomacy may be measured from the fact that a number of new posts such as commercial attachés, trade commissioners, trade representation etc. have been created in diplomatic missions by countries in the recent past. These are in addition to the old consulate machinery.

Hi-tech Diplomacy

The impact of technology on diplomacy is no less significant. Information technology has revolutionalized politics, commerce, defence and diplomacy. The magic of information revolution is going to metamorphose every aspect of life in the 21st century. Mainstream culture of this century will revolve around satellite TV, Internet, Cyberspace, Email, Multimedia etc. Telecommuting can create a virtual office at any place. Through it one can communicate with any one in any part of the world. Teleconferencing is the new buzzword. Email is fast, discreet and reliable, does not work on two shifts a day, or observe holidays, or go on strike. It has even overshadowed the earlier technologies of telex and fax. Changes in technology have vastly improved the security and the speed of communication between missions abroad and their governments and encouraged the growth of telegraphic, email and internet traffic. As a result, governments react much more quickly to world events and they maintain a closer and more constant dialogue with their representatives abroad and thus with other governments. Rapid transport too has a dynamic effect. National leaders can now speak to each other instantaneously on hot lines to diffuse any crisis in bilateral relations.

The spread of global television and the use of satellite for transmission have increased the awareness of foreign policy issues through the immediacy and depth of coverage of far away events. The growing public demand in democracies for more open government and ever easier access to government information means that the classic techniques of discreet and secret diplomacy have had to be adapted to cater for more public exposure and critical analysis. Diplomatic activities have to be justified more rapidly, carefully and honestly than in the past.

All these types discussed above have their own merits and demerits. Despite disadvantages every type is in use in the present time except old diplomacy. There are a few other types of diplomacy such as *preventive diplomacy* and *quiet diplomacy* which were discussed in some detail in the chapter 'Maintenance of Peace and Security'.

In the end it can be said that diplomacy is an important tool of foreign policy. It is a crucial and continuous activity in international relations. Though with changing times and ever changing requirements of nations, diplomacy has changed its forms and style yet its importance has remained intact as ever.

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30

The United Nations

The UN Charter

The setting up of the United Nations Organisation (UNO) represented a renewed attempt to accomplish world peace through international organisation, as different from world government. The makers of the United Nations Charter were basically the representatives of the victorious nations in the Second World War. They quickly got the charter signed by the concerned states while the crucial last stage of the war was still being fought in Europe and Pacific. Their idea was that wartime unity and cooperation would sideline the hurdles that arise more easily in time of peace and security. Thus, the UN Charter was purposely drafted as a means of justice and orderliness in international relations, a document of the world community at large and not as a subsidiary to victorious allied coalition. The drafters were interested to disassociate the Charter of the United Nations from any postwar peace treaty, such as Versailles after World War I, that might hamper the smooth operation of the world organisation in the long run. It was also essential to delink the United Nations from its weak predecessor, the League whose unimpressive record and alienation from great powers such as the United States and the Soviet Union could at best discourage the participation of these countries in the new world organisation.

The UN Charter was signed by representatives of fifty one nations at San Francisco on June 26, 1945. Within three months the Charter was ratified by all of the permanent members of the Security Council and by majority of the signatories; and on October 24, 1945, the United Nations formally came into existence. Claude very beautifully summarised the composite of forces and interactions that produced the United Nations Charter. In his own words, the charter was the outcome of "past experience in the building and operation of international institutions, wartime planning, great power and particularly American leadership, intensive negotiation amid an intricate pattern of national disagreements and conflicts of interest, and popular pressures for realisation of the desperate demand and noble aspiration for a just and durable peace."[1] This great document contains more than ten thousand words, with 111 Articles divided into 19 chapters.

The UN Charter clearly states the purposes, principles and general nature of this international organisation. The Charter delineates all the United Nations' subsequent relationship and programs. "The Charter also is a multilateral treaty establishing the pattern of agreements among and obligations of its members and as such, is an important addition to international law. As a written constitution, the Charter provides the UN's organisational structure, principles, powers and functions,"[2] explains Bennett.

As the United Nations is neither a world government nor a world federation, its members' obligations are limited and only their cooperation can put UN functions into practice. Unlike national governments the organisation has no means of enforcing its measures. Even the final interpretation of Charter obligations depends upon its members.

Like most other constitutions, not all principles and practices can be determined by simply going through the Charter. Interpretation and actual usages of the document have been far more significant than the few amendments incorporated into it. In this connection Bennett rightly observes, "Only by examining United Nations practices can its Charter's functions, nonfunctions, and malfunctions really be understood. Sometimes its constitutional principles have acted either as catalysts or as barriers to action; at other times, the attitude and will of the members have been more influential."[3]

Originally the UNO had 51 member countries. By 2010 membership rose to 192 countries.

Purposes

The purposes of the United Nations according to Article 1 of the Charter are:

1. *To Maintain International Peace and Security:* The means for achieving this purpose include peaceful settlement of disputes (Chapter VI) and collective security (Chapter VII) for prevention and removal of threats to the peace or acts of aggression. The Security Council is assigned primary duty for peace maintenance but shares this function with the General Assembly and the International Court of Justice. The Chapter VIII dilates upon the role to be played by regional organisations in maintaining peace.

2. *To develop friendly relations among nations:* Various organs and agencies of the UN provide excellent platform to member-states for developing friendly relations among themselves.

3. *To cooperate in solving international economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems and in promoting respect for human rights:* The Economic and Social Council is to serve as the major organ for putting this goal in practice with enough support from the General Assembly and from such autonomous international specialised agencies in the economic and social sphere as governments may create and bring into formal relationship with the United Nations. The Charter lacks in giving any specific or detailed meaning of this objective. Major responsibilities for promoting human rights are assigned to the General Assembly and to the Economic and Social Council. The Economic and Social Council is directed to establish one or more commissions in the area of human rights and is empowered to recommend and prepare draft conventions on human rights. The encouragement of respect for human rights and fundamental freedom is declared to be a basic objective of the trusteeship system. In 1948, the General Assembly adopted overwhelmingly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Since then the UN has endeavoured to develop covenants (with treaty-binding powers) rather than declarations.

4. *To be a centre for harmonising the actions of nations* in attaining these common ends and more specific goals. This as well as other statements of purposes in either the Preamble and Article 1 of the Charter are vague and devoid of means of implementation. These vague goals are (*a*) taking appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace, (*b*) practising tolerance and living together in peace as good neighbors; and (*c*) establishing justice and respect for international law.

Basic Principles

The United Nations acts with the following principles mentioned in Article 2 of the Charter.

1. The UN is based on the sovereign equality of all its members.
2. All members are to fulfil in good faith their Charter obligations.
3. They are to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and without endangering peace, security and justice.
4. They are to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against other States.

5. They are to give the United Nations every assistance to any action it takes in accordance with the Charter, and shall not assist States against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.
6. The United Nations shall ensure that States which are not members act in accordance with these principles in so far as is necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.
7. Nothing in the Charter is to authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.

The principles discussed above "constitute a substantial body of basic norms on which the United Nations structure and functions are superimposed. Although this group of norms is not always clear as to meaning and is not internally consistent, it represents, in combination with the purposes of the organisation, the essential statement of the philosophy of the United States,"[4] observes Bennett. As a philosophy is not very useful without execution, the international behaviour of States determines these norms or others are prevalent in international politics.

ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The Charter provides for the six principal organs of the United Nations. These are (*i*) General Assembly; (*ii*) the Security Council; (*iii*) the Economic and Social Council; (*iv*) Trusteeship Council; (*v*) the Secretariat; and (*vi*) the International Court of Justice.

General Assembly

The General Assembly is a paramount and central organ of the UN. It acts as the "plenary forum wherein all members of the United Nations meet each year to consider and debate the major issues of international politics.... . And to its rostrum come foreign ministers, ambassadors, and leading statesmen to present the views of their country on these issues and to appeal to world opinion for support,"[5] comment Padelford and Lincoln. The General Assembly is composed of all the members of the UN. Although each state can send the maximum of five representatives, it has only one vote. The representatives act according to the directions of their respective Governments while deliberating in the General Assembly and are answerable to their respective States. All important matters are decided by two-thirds majority. These important matters are: recommendations regarding peace and security, selection of non-permanent members of the Security Council and the members of the Trusteeship Council, expulsion of members and budgetary questions.

The General Assembly performs deliberative, supervisory, financial, elective and constituent functions. Its functions are to discuss, make recommendations, consider, call the attention, notify and initiate studies. It largely plays recommendatory and advisory role. Its supervisory and investigating responsibilities are immense. It has power in regard to finance, non-self-governing territories, the election of the members of the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the judges of the International Court of Justice alongwith the Security Council, and the admission of new members on the recommendations of the Security Council.

The General Assembly has several committees and subsidiary organs for performing its role properly. Seven main committees are: Political and Security Committee, Economic and Financial Committee, Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee, Trusteeship Committee, Administrative and Budgetary Committee, Legal Committee and Procedural Committee. The Assembly can also form more committees, for dealing with specific problems.

The General Assembly meets once a year in regular session commencing on the third Tuesday in September. There is also provision for special sessions and emergency sessions.

The Uniting for Peace Resolution adopted in 1950, enlarged the sphere of activity of the General Assembly. As a consequence of this Resolution, if the Security Council fails to exercise its power for maintenance of international peace and security owing to lack of unanimity among the permanent members, the General Assembly is authorised to consider the matter immediately and make appropriate recommendations for collective measures. In case of breach of peace or act of aggression, it can authorise the use of armed forces when necessary to maintain international peace and security. The Uniting for Peace Resolution has transformed the General Assembly from a merely deliberative body into an organ with effective power to solve crises situation and has made it the ultimate custodian of collective security.

With the passing of time the role and importance of the General Assembly was enhanced by the contemporary world politics and by the use of certain constitutional devices, such as: (*i*) by shifting of issues from the Security Council to the General Assembly; (*ii*) it can recommend with regard to issues on the agenda of the Security Council; (*iii*) by passing of the Uniting for Peace Resolution by two-thirds majority; (*iv*) its recommendations are being followed as if they are legally binding decisions; (*v*) it has considerable moral authority based on sheer strength (192 member states). It is like the town meeting of the world, open conscience of mankind and the Parliament of Man. This prominence and "centrality was not necessarily established by design in the Charter but was soon achieved through vigorous exercise by the General Assembly of its Clearly designated functions and through its assertion of additional authority in areas, such as the maintenance of peace and security, in which its Charter mandate is ambiguous"[6] observed Bennett.

Security Council

The Security Council is mainly an 'action agency' of the UN and thus is akin to the executive organ of government. Unlike the General Assembly it is a much smaller but a continuous body, capable of meeting on any given day. Originally it consisted of 11 members. The first amendment of the Charter in 1965 expanded its strength to 15 members. Now it has five permanent members China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States and ten non-permanent members elected by the General Assembly for two years terms, without eligibility for immediate re-election. At the time of election of the non-permanent members due consideration is accorded to the contribution of members of the UN to the maintenance of international peace and security and also to equitable geographical distribution *e.g.* five from Asia and Africa, two from Latin America, one from Eastern Europe and two from Western Europe and other states. Each member of the Security Council can send only one representative.

The Security Council is so organised as to be able to function continuously and regularly to tackle any crisis situation. A representative of each of its members must be present at all times at the UN headquarters. The Council may meet elsewhere than at headquarters if it considers this advisable. The rules of the Security Council require meetings of the Council at intervals of no more than fourteen days, but this rule is frequently ignored. By common consent, actually the frequency of meetings is determined by such considerations as the existence of disputes or threatening situations, the willingness of states to bring these situations before the Security Council, and the nature of the dispute and parties involved in relation to any prospects for the Security Council to contribute to the resolution of the conflict or to provide propaganda advantage for any state or group of states.

The five permanent members enjoy the right to veto. On substantive matters their concurrence is essential. But on procedural matters an affirmative vote of any 9 members is sufficient, such matters being; chairmanship of the Council, items on the agenda, dates and timings of the

meeting. But whether a particular matters is procedural or substantive is to be decided by the vote required for a substantive issue. This way the permanent members enjoy double veto.

According to Hari Hara Das, "the political logic of the Charter provided for the linking of the two factors *viz.*, the dominant position of the Council in the United Nations and the dominant position of the five Great Powers in the Council. Thus Great Powers unity was the basic factor on which the whole concept of the Security Council was based."[7] Pre-eminence of the big powers in the United Nations and its Security Council is also explained by Bennett in the following words: "The big powers, which dominated both the war effort against the Axis and postwar planning for an international organisation, visualised the Security Council as the paramount organ of the United Nations. Providing a mechanism to aid in maintaining international peace and security was to be the primary purpose of the new organisation and enforcement would depend upon the power of the large states..... Therefore, the big powers, it was felt, should have positions of authority on the Security Council commensurate with their responsibilities for maintaining world peace and security."[8]

Broadly speaking, the Security Council enjoys deliberative, executive, elective and regulative powers. The role or functions of the Security Council are listed below:

(1) to consider, discuss, investigate and make necessary recommendations in regard to situations arising out of threat to peace, breach of peace or an act of aggression or any other controversy;
(2) to take or execute such action as may be necessary to facilitate the pacific settlement of international disputes, to deal with threat of the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, including enforcement measures and supervision of military action taken by the United Nations;
(3) to recommend to the General Assembly admission of states for membership in the United Nations;
(4) to recommend expulsion of states for violations of the Charter, or restoration of privileges;
(5) to formulate plans for the regulation of armaments;
(6) to review the administration of strategic areas and trusteeship territories;
(7) to participate with the General Assembly in the election of judges to the International Court of Justice;
(8) to make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to judgement of the International Court in the event a party fails to perform its obligations thereunder;
(9) to recommend to the General Assembly the person to be appointed Secretary-General of the United Nations;
(10) to participate in deciding whether a conference to revise the Charter should be held. The Council is obliged, like other organs, to submit annual report and special reports to the General Assembly.

The Security Council could not fully perform the role that was assigned to it by the UN Charter. In the opinion of Das, "Over the years the number of its sessions has decreased and the scope of the political issues taken by it for discussion has considerably narrowed."[9] The reasons for the decline of the importance of the Security Council were *first*, rifts and disagreements among the Great Powers in the post-war years; *second*, the adoption of the Uniting for Peace Resolution by the General Assembly in 1950; and *third*, the emergence and growth of powerful regional

security alliances like the NATO, SEATO, CENTO and Warsaw Pact, etc. during Cold War years of late forties and early fifties.

The role and prestige of the Security Council has changed from time to time. In the words of Bennett, "From an optimistic beginning, through a period of growing frustration manifested by frequent exercise of the veto and the use of the Council as an East-West propaganda arena, the Security Council sank in world esteem to a low point in the 1950s."[10] Loss of the effectiveness of the Security Council was compensated by strengthening the General Assembly and by utilising the initiative of the Secretary-General. In the 1960s the Security Council regained some of its lost prestige and power. Meetings were more frequent, and stalemate was eschewed by the increased use of abstentions, the adoption of resolution by consensus, restraint in the exercise of the veto, and endeavours to accommodate divergent views in the drafting of resolutions before they were brought to a vote.

The end of the Cold War in 1990-91 began a new era in the history of the Council. In the contemporary time the Council's activities have the following four important dimensions; according to Manju Subhash *et. al.*: (*i*) Expanding the Charter conception of the meaning and requirements of international peace and security to tackle new challenges within the parameters of the Charter; (*ii*) deployment of vastly 'vitalised' peace-keeping operations in theatres of conflict; (*iii*) compelling the targeted parties through non-military sanctions to comply with the decisions of the Council; and (*iv*) authorisation of necessary use of force by interested individual member states in situations where UN capabilities are not deemed sufficient.[11]

New type of challenging tasks have been taken by the Security Council other than exercises of supervision of adherence to cease-fire arrangements between the parties to a conflict. These tasks are humanitarian, administrative, electoral and police functions: conduct of elections or referendum (as in Cambodia, Mozambique, Namibia and Western Sahara), refugee relief and repatriation (as in El Salvador, Mozambique, Rwanda and Somalia), whetting the human rights record of civilian police (as in El Salvador); disarming or demobilisation of armed men (as in Angola, El Salvador and Somalia), and protection of areas designated for the safety of civilian populations (as in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda). Not only this the Security Council sometime takes up assignments which the concept of peace keeping apparently does not include and for which it is not suited *e.g.* enforcement of no-flying zones in the former Yugoslavia and rehabilitation of State structures in Somalia.

The Economic and Social Council

Under Article 55 of the Charter, the UN is expected to create conditions of stability and well-being which are essential for peaceful and friendly relations among nations. To accomplish this objective, there should be economic and social progress leading to higher standard of living and full employment. Collective effort at international level is required to solve socio-economic problems. For this the Economic and Social Council (*Ecosoc*) works as another principal organ of the United Nations.

All 54 members (membership was 23 prior to 1973 and 18 prior to 1965) are elected by the General Assembly for three-years terms, with one third of the terms expiring each year. No state is entitled to continuous membership, but as a practical matter, to assure adequate financial and general support of programs, all of the permanent members (except Nationalist China) have been regularly re-elected. Other seats are rotated on a regional basis. Small and underdeveloped states are in majority in *Ecosoc* and can pass resolutions favourable to their own interests, as all decisions are taken by simple majority vote. But implementation of these decisions and measures depend

mostly on the financial support of rich and powerful states. The Council meets twice annually, with a spring session in New York and a summer session in Geneva.

The following are the powers and functions of the Council: (1) to make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health and related matters; (2) to make recommendations with respect to above matters to the General Assembly,to the members of the UN and to the specialised agencies concerned; (3) to make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all; (4) to prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly with respect to matters falling within its competence; (5) to enter into agreements with specialised agencies, bringing them into relationship with the United Nations; (6) to call international conferences on economic, social and humanitarian cooperation among nations; (7) to coordinate the activities of the specialised agencies of the United Nations and (8) to obtain reports from them.

Among its significant activities and achievements are its persistent concern for human rights. Since 1960, with the adoption of General Assembly declarations proclaiming the 1960s and 1980s as the Second and Third Development Decades, *Ecosoc* has remained busy in solving the problems of and fulfilling the aspirations of the developing nations. Some of the major results of the study and research activities of the *Ecosoc* are the *World Economic Survey*, the *Report on the World Social Situation*, the *United Nations Statistical Yearbook*, the *United Nations Demographic Yearbook*, and the *United Nations Yearbook on Human Rights*. Achievements and extensive research projects of the specialised agencies of the UN are no less significant.

The Council works through commissions, committees and other subsidiary bodies. These ar
Six functional commissions. Statistical Commission, Population Commission, Commission for Soc
Development, Commission on Human Rights, Commission on the Status of Women, Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

Five regional commissions. Economic Commission for Africa. (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific (Bangkok, Thailand), Economic Commission for Europe (Geneva, Switzerland), Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Santiago, Chile) and Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (temporarily located in Amman, Jordan).

Six standing committees on Programme and Coordination, on Natural Resources, on Non-governmental Organisations, on Inter-governmental Agencies, on Transnational Corporations and on Human Settlements.

A number of standing expert bodies on such subjects as crime prevention and control, development planning, international cooperation in tax matters, and transport of dangerous goods.

The Trusteeship Council

The Trusteeship Council was set up to supervise and administer trust territories placed under its disposal by individual agreements. Chapter XII of the UN Charter provides for an international trusteeship system which shall apply to (*a*) territories held under mandate; (*b*) territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and (*c*) territories voluntarily placed under the system by States responsible for their administration.

The objectives of the system were (*i*) furtherance of peace and security, (*ii*) promotion of socio-economic interests of their inhabitants, (*iii*) progress towards self-government, (*iv*) encouragement of respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms and (*v*) promotion of equal treatment

in social, economic and commercial matters for all members of the United Nations and their nationals.

The role of the Trusteeship Council is (1) to supervise, on behalf of the international community those non-self-governing territories that are designated as trust territories. The administration of each territory is carried out by the General Assembly through the agency of the Trusteeship Council. All other functions of this Council pertain to the methods for exercising this supervisory role. (2) The preparation of a detailed questionnaire on the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the territory, to be used as a basis for an annual report by the administering authority. (3) Examination of the spokesperson for the administering authority based on the reply to the questionnaire, and a written report from the Trusteeship Council to the General Assembly. (4) The receipt and examination of petitions from individuals or groups within the trust territory. (5) Periodic visits to each trust territory by delegates of the Trusteeship Council. From the above description it is evident that the supervisory role of the trusteeship system was more effective than the mandate system of the league.

The composition of the Trusteeship Council is a little complex one. All members of the United Nations that administer trust territories are ex-officio members of the Trusteeship Council. Any permanent members of the Security Council that are not administering powers also have automatic membership. To achieve parity in members between administering and non-administering states, the General Assembly elects sufficient additional members to achieve this equality. At the maximum, during the 1950s the Trusteeship Council had 14 members with the United States, the United Kingdom, and France among the seven administering members of the Security Council, and five other members elected by the General Assembly. By 1975, 10 out of 11 trust territories gained their independence leaving only the five permanent members of the Security Council on the Trusteeship Council. After 1975 the only remaining area under its supervision was the Trust territory of the Pacific Islands (the Republic of Belau or Palau) with the United States as trustee. Independence of this territory in 1994 left the Trusteeship Council with no business to perform and it has become non-functional. Its works completed, the Trusteeship Council now consists of the 5 permanent members of the Security Council. It has amended its rules of procedure to allow it to meet as and when occasion requires.

The rules of procedure of the Trusteeship Council contained in Council resolution 2200 (LXI) of May 25, 1994 will become operational and the Council may meet as and when occasion may require. The Secretary-General in his 1994 Annual Report on the work of the organisation has recommended that the General Assembly may proceed with steps to eliminate the organ in accordance with Article 108 of the Charter.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ)

The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, with headquarters in the Hague. It functions in accordance with its Statute, which is an integral part of the United Nations Charter. The Court is open to the parties of this Statute which automatically includes all members of the United Nations. A state which is not a member of the UN may become a party to the Statute on conditions determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and San Marino have adhered to the Statute under these conditions.

The Court consists of 15 judges known as the members of the Court. They are elected by a concurrent vote of the General Assembly and Security Council. They are chosen on the basis of their qualifications, not on the basis of their nationality. Care is taken, however, to see that the

principal legal systems of the world are represented in the Court. No two judges can be nationals of the same state. The judges serve for a term of nine years with the terms of five judges expiring every third year. They may be re-elected. They cannot engage in any other occupation during their term of office. In hearing a specific case, if there is no judge on the court of the nationality of one or more of the states that are parties to the case, such state or states may appoint a national judge to sit for that case. These additional judges participate with full voting rights.

The members (judges) of the Court elect their President and Vice-President for three years; they may be re-elected. They appoint their own Registrar. Cases are decided by majority vote of the participating judges. Nine judges constitute a quorum. In case of a tie, the President of the Court has a casting vote.

The Court hears those cases that are referred to it by the contending parties. Only states may bring cases before the court, but no state is required to submit any case for hearing any decision. In contrast with national legal system, the ICJ does not have compulsory jurisdiction. This is a great deficiency of the Court. In addition, the Security Council may recommend that a legal dispute be referred to the Court.

The General Assembly and the Security Council can ask the Court for an advisory opinion on any legal question; other organs of the United Nations and the specialised agencies, when authorised by the General Assembly, can ask for advisory opinion on legal questions within the scope of their activities. More than three-fourths of all requests to the Court for advisory opinions have been made by the General Assembly.

The jurisdiction of the Court covers all questions which States refer to it, and all matters provided for in the UN Charter or in treaties or conventions in force. States may bind themselves in advance to accept the jurisdiction of the Court in special cases either by signing a treaty or convention which provides for reference to the Court or by making a special declaration to this effect. Such declarations accepting compulsory jurisdiction may exclude certain classes of cases.

In accordance with Article 38 of the Statute, the Court, in deciding disputes submitted to it, applies: international conventions establishing rules recognised by the contesting States; international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted by law; the general principles of law recognised by nations; judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as a subsidiary means for determining the rules of law. The Court may decide *ex aequo et bono* (according to what is just and good, *i.e.* on a basis of practical fairness rather than strict law) but only if the parties concerned so agree.

The Security Council can be called upon by one of the parties in a case to determine measures to be taken to give effect to a judgement of the Court if the other party fails to perform its obligations under that judgement. Despite several deficiencies and weaknesses, the ICJ has played a significant role in the growth of international legal system.

The Secretariat

The Charter establishes a Secretariat that is the principal administrative body of the UN consisting of thousands of international civil servants headed by the Secretary General. He is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council for a five-year term. The major obstacle to selection is the agreement on a candidate by the major powers, since any permanent member of the Security Council may exercise a veto. Deadlocks usually took place in the selection process, and the term of the first Secretary-General had to be extended by the General Assembly without concurrence of the Security Council.

The Secretaries-General who served this organisation were:

Year	*Name*	*Country*
1946	Trygve Lie	Norway
1953	Dag Hammarskjold	Sweden
1961	U Thant	Burma
1972	Kurt Waldheim	Austria
1982	Javier Peres De Cuellar	Peru
1992	Dr. Boutros Boutros Ghali	Egypt
1997	Kofi Annan	Ghana
2007	Ban Ki-moon	South Korea

The work of the Secretary-General involves a certain degree of inherent, creative tension that stems from the Charter's definitions of the job: both *Secretary*, as the chief executive of the Secretariat responsible for its administration, and *General*, as spokesperson and embodiment of the will of the international community.

The major function of the Secretary-General are: (1) to be the chief administrative officer of the organisation: (2) to act as secretary to all the major delegate bodies of the United Nations; (3) to perform functions assigned to him by the General Assembly and the three Councils; (4) to make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the organisation; (5) to appoint the Secretariat staff under regulations established by the General Assembly; and (6) to act on his own initiative to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter that in his opinion threatens international peace and security. In practice , the role of the Secretary-General has enlarged far beyond the expectation of the makers of the Charter. This enlarged role has resulted both from circumstances and from the initiative of each of the incumbents in the office.

The post of *Deputy Secretary-General* was created by the General Assembly in December 1997 as a part of Secretary-General Kofi Annan's reform package. Ms Louise Fre'chette of Canada was appointed as the first Deputy Secretary-General who took up her duties in March 1998. Main responsibilities of the Deputy Secretary-General are: to raise the profile of UN's development activities, to direct the implementation of the reform agenda and to strengthen the leadership of the UN, and women's role in it.

An international staff assists the Secretary-General. The highest standard of efficiency, competence and integrity govern recruitment, which is on as wide a geographical basis as possible. In performing their duties, the Secretary-General and his staff must not seek or receive instructions from any Government or any other authority external to the United Nations. Member States of the United Nations have agreed to respect exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretariat and not to seek to influence it in carrying out those responsibilities. The Secretariat consists of a total staff of about 8,700 drawn from 160 countries.

The Secretary-General and the Assistant Secretaries General enjoy full diplomatic immunity. The officials of the UN enjoy immunity from legal process for all their statements, writings and deeds, performed by them in their official capacity. They enjoy exemption from taxation for their salary and emoluments paid them by the UN.

(To know the role of various Secretaries General see 'Preventive Diplomacy' of the next chapter.)

In addition to six principal organs, the United Nations have about 18 specialised agencies such as the WHO, UNESCO, ILO, FAO, ICAO, ITU, UPU, IMF, IBRD etc. Besides Agencies some Commissions are also associated with the UN such as the International Law Commission, Human Rights Commission, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) etc. Moreover, there are some 14 major United Nations programmes and funds devoted to achieving economic and social progress in the developing countries. For example these are: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) etc.

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36

Human Rights and International Relations

I. INTRODUCTION

In the twentieth century especially in its second half the question of human rights gained prominence. It became a theme of study and discussion in all branches of International Studies such as International Relations (IR), International Law and International Organization. The objective of this chapter is to analyze a few major impacts of human rights on the discipline as well as actual course of international relations. The Holocaust[1] was the event that acclaimed human rights as an issue in world politics. After Second World War, the concern for the international protection of human rights has gained impetus.

In this paper, International Relations (IR) stand for the discipline, a subject of study in academic institutions whereas international relations denote actual course of relations among nations at world level.

Alois Mock, then foreign minister of Austria, articulated the primacy of human rights at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights. He said, "The human being is indeed unique: its dignity and worth do not depend on any outside authority. Human rights are not bestowed upon the individual by any state, social group, or political party—they are part of man's very nature."[2] Jack Donnelly, an authority on human rights further explains the importance of these rights. He writes, "Human rights are, literally, the rights that one has simply because one is human. This deceptively simple idea has profound social and political consequences. Human rights, because they rest on nothing more than being human, are universal, equal and inalienable. All human beings hold them, universally. One either is or is not human and thus has or does not have human rights, equally. And one can no more lose these rights than one can stop being a human being—no matter how inhuman the treatment one may suffer. One is entitled to human rights and is empowered by them." Human rights of individuals provide a framework for political organization and a standard of political legitimacy. Donnelly further adds, "Where they are systematically denied, claims of human rights may be positively revolutionary. Even in societies where human rights are generally well respected, they provide constant pressure on governments to meet their standards."[3]

II. IMPACT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Now we come to the main theme of this paper i. e. impact of human rights on international relations.

1.) New Agenda and Subject-matter of International Relations (IR)

The focus of the study of the discipline of IR in the twentieth century was mainly on war.

Lately a new subject-matter was added to the scope of IR. New agenda of IR now consists of policy issues such as global environmental concerns, the problem of AIDS, legal and migration, the North-South controversy over economic disparities, reform of the UN, terrorism, international law and prosecution of crimes against humanity, drug trafficking, smuggling of all kinds of good including weapons, democratization and the full range of human rights from civil and political rights to the right of development.

2.) Growing Importance of Non-State Actors

A number of non-government organizations (NGOs) have emerged at world level that deal with international human rights issues. Prominent among these are Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Freedom House, American Civil Liberties Union etc. With the advent of these NGOs, the State no longer remains the sole actor in international politics. Non-State organizations thrived as international actors in their own right due to issues like human rights. These organizations and their activities have profound impact on international relations and world politics. Non-State actors, their activities and role have gained importance in international relations and these also become an important subject-matter of IR.

3.) UN Charter, Universal Declaration and Covenants

The *UN Charter* seeks to "achieve cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights* declares that "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world." It deals not only with the traditional civil and political rights, but also with economic, social, and cultural rights. The human rights revolution set in motion by the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has *spurred the enactment of international treaties and the development of regional covenants.* Major international treaties are International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), and Optional Protocol (1966) providing for the right of an individual to petition an international agency. These instruments seek to prevent discrimination and intolerance; prevent and punish the crime of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity; abolish slavery or forced labor, protect persons subjected to detention or imprisonment; protect the rights to organize and bargain collectively; and protect the rights of refugees, indigenous and tribal peoples; women; the disabled; and of the child. The agreements *institutionalize* and *guarantee* human rights, and form the basis for renewed concern over the promotion of human rights by governments, private organizations and multinational business enterprises.

The principles on which the above are based are: a) All human beings; without distinction, have been brought within the scope of human rights instruments, b) Equality of application without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, c) Emphasis is on international cooperation for implementation.[4]

4.) International and Regional Human Rights Organizations

Human rights organizations have mushroomed and are playing significant role throughout the world. These include international, regional and non-governmental organizations. Under *international organizations* come UN human rights bodies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR); *multilateral institutions* exemplified by World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World

Health Organization (WHO) and the International Labour Organization (ILO). There are regional inter-governmental organizations including Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Organizations of American States; Council of Europe; European Court of Human Rights Organizations for Security and Cooperation in Europe. As mentioned above, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have emerged alongside states as important actors in human rights, refugee work, humanitarian aid, and other global issues. The World Bank believes that creating the conditions for the attainment of human rights is a central and irreducible goal of development. By placing the dignity of every human being at the very foundation of its approach to development, the Bank helps people in every part of the world build lives of purpose and hope.

5.) Human Rights and their International Enforcement

At international level a number of special bodies have been set up to enforce human rights as per international covenants mentioned above. These enforcement bodies deal with particular aspect of human rights. These bodies are the Human Rights Committee, the Group of Three, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the Committee against Torture and the Committee on the Right of the Child. In general, these bodies supervise the enforcement of the relevant international human rights conventions by reviewing the information received from all reliable sources including reports from States, international governmental and non-governmental organizations and communications alleging violations of human rights received from or on behalf of the victims of such violations. Besides, such procedures as of good offices and urgent actions have also been developed to meet the exigencies.

In addition, the UNESCO and ILO have developed their own supervisory systems to consider and deal with States' reports, the complaints relating to the application of the human rights conventions adopted by these organizations and with question of interpretation of the human rights tools.[5]

It is an overall responsibility of the Commission on Human Rights to consider the question of violations of human rights in all parts of the world. The UN Commission on Human Rights, besides considering the question of violation of human rights, initiates actions on the situation of human rights in different parts of the world by appointing special reporters and establishing working groups.[6]

6.) Social International Movements and Normative Regimes

Campaign for human rights led to the growth of diffuse social movements and normative regimes such as international human rights regimes. Both—movements and regimes are gradually evolving a kind of global governance as well as civil society. Lawson gives "a list of general movements that have both local (or state) bases and global networks would include the environmental movement, the feminist movement, the peace movement, the gay rights movement, the animal rights movement, various movements supporting indigenous rights, democratization and/or human rights as well as religious movements involved in social or political causes."[7] Regarding these social movements Camilleri and Falk write, "this multiplicity of movements represents an extraordinarily diverse range of values, actors, issues and conflicts"[8] in international relations.

7.) Human Rights and Bilateral and Multilateral Relations between States

Many a time the issue of human rights has made or marred the bilateral and multilateral relations between nations. During Cold War era the Western nations especially the US used to boast of their good human rights record. They also launched a prolonged propaganda against

communist countries in regard to their poor human rights record. The Soviet Union and its satellite communist countries took this Western propaganda as an attempt to instigate their population. The Western insistence on human rights caused bitterness in its relations with communist, authoritarian and other countries.

The preservation of human rights and democracy has been at the foundation of United States' foreign policy. The United States took the lead in furthering the realization of universal human rights worldwide in the last half of the 20th century. While providing assistance to other countries the US puts conditionality of good human rights record. The US Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 defines human rights as including "freedom from torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged detention without charges; disappearance due to abduction or clandestine detention; and other flagrant denial of the rights to life, liberty and the security of the person." The Act also mandates the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human rights and Labor to submit *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* annually to the Congress. The reports are used as a resource for shaping US policy, conducting diplomacy, and providing assistance and for cooperating with private groups to promote the observance of internationally recognized human rights. Various US administrations have sought to promote democracy abroad that spoilt its relations with many countries including India. The Carter Administration used four policy tools—military aid, economic aid, multilateral development banks and private economic transactions—to encourage or to pressurize repressive governments to reduce their level of human rights violations. For some time during the Clinton Administration the issue of human rights remained a great irritant in Indo-US relations as well. Thus human rights have complicated Western countries' relations with other countries including India.

8.) Human Rights and Fragmentation of the States

In the garb of human rights secessionists and ethno-nationalists demand nationhood as embodied in formal statehood. This usually means the division of an existing state into at least two or more parts in order to satisfy the demand for full autonomy. For example the Basques seek to split from Spain, the Quebecois from Canada, the Tamils from Sri Lanka, the Chechens from the Russian Federation, Kashmiris from India and so on. These secessionist and ethno-nationalist movements are seen as fragmenting the state system from below and to this extent have been regarded as a threat to world order. Although self-determination can be understood as a human right, it is not an absolute right, being limited so as not to create a threat to national and international security and not to infringe the rights and interests of other members of the international community.

9.) Human Rights and Weak States

One of the many domestically created threats and problems that characterize weak states in the contemporary world includes the problem of human rights abuse. A state with human rights abuse is regarded as the 'weak state' in the comity of nations and sometimes a failed state as well.

10.) Human Rights and Information Technology

Correct and timely information is an essential tool and an important precondition for effective responsive action and the promotion of human rights, whether by organizations, individuals, governments, or international organizations. One of the critical functions which international human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch perform is as collectors, filterers, translators and presenters of information regarding alleged violations. The first essential step towards processing information is, of course, gathering

it. Groups then determine whether the data received is trustworthy enough to serve as the basis for further investigation, public statement, or other responsive action. Human rights NGOs use information to garner concern regarding and popular support for various causes and translate that concern and support into activities designed to protect embattled individuals or groups, end invidious abuses of authority and power, and prevent potential violations of human rights. Metzl rightly writes, "Information imparted by these groups also plays a crucial role in developing popular concern and generating political pressure for action in response to a particular situation."[9] Instruments such as the fax machine, electronic mail (E-mail)and the Internet, which facilitate the quick and inexpensive transfer of information from those with first hand knowledge of particular abuses to the wider community of concerned individuals across the globe, are playing a significant role in the formulation of effective responses to violations of human rights. In this age of information technology any local or national human rights abuse becomes international within no times. The NGOs, governments and the United Nations are utilizing information technology systems (email, computer conferencing, and on-line data bases) to advance the cause of human rights.

11.) Human Security Reinforces Human Rights

The concept of human security gained recent currency with the publication of *United Nations Human Development Report 1994* which provided a major statement on the new security paradigm. The report argued that traditional definitions had been far too narrow, with the concept being largely confined to "security of territory from external aggression, or as the protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust."[10] Forgotten in all this were the more basic concerns "of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives." Human security was defined generally in terms of safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression as well as "protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life—whether in homes, in jobs or in communities."[11]

Under this new concept a particular list of seven security concerns is: i) economic security, ii) food security, iii) health security, iv) environmental security, v) personal security, vi) community security and vii) political security.

The notion of human security has particular importance for human rights. The shift from 'state security' to 'human security' has encouraged a more sustained focus on the fact that human rights abuses—which range from torture, arbitrary arrest and detention to sheer neglect of basic sustenance needs—not only constitute a serious security issue, but often occur as a direct or indirect result of state-sponsored activities. The more recent 'war on terror' is another development that concerns not only the actions of the US abroad, but the worry among human rights groups that it will be used to justify new methods of oppression in the US as well as in other countries.

In short, human rights abuses have often been defended on the grounds that they are justified by the ends they served—and that is the greater good served by securing the 'national interests. However, this argument goes directly against another key moral position, articulated most clearly by Kant and adhered to today by many other moral theorists, and that is the principle that people must never be treated as a means to end. Each and every human is an end in him or herself. Now a days it is not acceptable to invoke national interest to justify cruel, degrading or repressive treatment of groups or individuals by the state or its agents. For if the modern theory of sovereignty imposes any moral duties on states, it is surely the security and well-being of their own people. Thus concepts of human security and human rights complement and supplement each other.

12.) Globalization and Human Rights

The present era of globalization is opening the door for the promotion of human rights to become an integral part of worldwide politics and law. The years ahead will bring more fruits regarding human rights than those achieved during the second half of twentieth century. Attaining human rights values and realizing global justice are interlinked and mutually reinforcing aspirations. "Both globalization as a process, and global governance as a set of formally and informally institutionalized practices, may therefore be seen to have absorbed or subsumed the '*international*' within a larger framework denoted by the all-encompassing '*global*'."[12] The globalized world has been especially critical of the extent to which the doctrine of state sovereignty, with its emphasis on non-intervention in the internal affairs of states, has been used as a shield behind which some state elites have perpetrated gross human rights abuses. The force of this latter term is, rather obviously, one that relies on a thoroughly cosmopolitan morality that transcends all boundaries in its focus on humanity.

13.) Terrorism and Human Rights

In this age of globalization and increasing interdependence almost every significant terrorist activity has international implications. Consequently, combating of terrorism has become a major task for all governments and inter-governmental systems, both at international and regional levels. After 11 September 2001, the fight against terrorism has become more vigorous. "Both the acceleration in terrorism and fight against it have also brought about a major debate on the issue of terrorism and human rights,"[13] opines Narang.

Louise Arbour, the then UN high commissioner for human rights (her term was from 2004 to 2008) said the US-led counter-terrorism struggle has set back the cause of human rights by "decades" and has exacerbated a "profound divide" between the United States, its Western allies and the developing world. "The war on terror has inflicted a very serious set back for the international human rights agenda,"[14] she said. What she considers as Washington's excesses have undercut her efforts to crusade for human rights, particularly in places where political repression is greatest. The United States has used harsh interrogation techniques and transferred suspects to countries where they stand a chance of being tortured.

Thus there is manifest and latent impact of terrorism on the enjoyment of human rights. Manifest affect is when groups of individuals resort to acts of terrorism and in so doing kill or injure people, deprive them of their freedom, destroy their property, or use threats and intimidation to sow fear. The latent impact is in the form of state's response to terrorism and adoption by it of policies and practices that exceed the bounds of what is permissible under International Law and result in human right violations such as extra judicial executions, torture, unfair trials and other acts of unlawful repression, that violate the human rights not only of the terrorists but of innocent civilians.

III. HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDIA

India has been a close partner for international relations in supporting human rights and its related systems. Even in 1948, India had taken an active part in the drafting of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and it is signatory to the six core human rights covenants. India has advocated a holistic and integrated approach that gives equal emphasis to all human rights, based on their interdependence, interrelatedness, indivisibility and universality, which reinforces the interrelationship between democracy, development, human rights and international cooperation for development.

World's biggest endeavour for human rights education is also being made in India. The study of human rights is being introduced in the formal school system from the secondary level. At present, the national University Grants Commission of India supports human rights courses in as many as 50 colleges in 26 universities. "The courts, educated and aware of international obligations to human rights jurisprudence, are increasingly adjudicating cases with a pro-human rights vision. The media and wide array of NGOs are alert and aware to human rights violations. As a result of all this, human rights awareness is continually growing in India"[15], observes Shalini Dewan.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) had a presence in India in earlier years; the current Office of the Chief Mission was opened in 1981, under the broad umbrella of the United Nations Development Programme, to respond to the steady stream of Afghan asylum seekers. India does not have a national law for refugees and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was requested to exercise its mandate and expertise in determining whether a person is a refugee. Since 1995, India has been an active member of the Executive Committee of the UNHCR, a body that shapes the UNHCR's policies and priorities globally.

From a peak of 25, 335 refugees under its mandate in 1993, there are 11,172 refugees under UNHCR's mandate in India today. Almost all are issued residential permits by the Government. Efforts began in 1994 toward drafting a legal mechanism for refugee protection in South Asia with the formation of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) an initiative of Sadako Ogata, a former UN High Commissioner for Refugees. The India EPG led by Justice PN Bhagwati, former Chief Justice of India, presented a draft model national law in early 2000 which has since been shared with relevant Government ministries. At present, the working group led by the National Human Rights Commission is debating the merits of the draft law and is in the process of proposing further amendments.[16]

The Constitution of India provides for justifiable civil and political rights in the chapter III that enumerates six fundamental rights for citizens. Economic and social rights have been given in the form of Directive Principles of State Policy in the chapter IV. For furtherance and protection of human rights the Union government has set up National Human Rights Commission, National Commission for Women and National Minority Commission. The Child Labour Act prohibits child labour in India.

IV. CONCLUSION

Human rights and international relations are complementary and supplementary to each other. In the present state of international relations it is not possible for any country's government to prolong human rights violations owing to international and regional organizations, NGOs, international treaties and covenants, international law and international enforcements etc. Concepts of human security, information technology and globalization all have enhanced the promotion of human rights to a great extent.

Human rights have provided new agenda and subject matter to the discipline of International Relations. Many Non-state organizations have emerged as international actors in their own right due to issues like human rights. On the other hand there are several international and regional human rights organizations. These and their activities have profound impact on international relations and world politics. UN Charter, Universal Declaration and other subsequent Covenants *institutionalize* and *guarantee* human rights, and form the basis for renewed concern over the promotion of human rights by governments, private organizations and multinational business

enterprises. At international level a number of special bodies have been set up to enforce human rights as per international covenants mentioned above. It has resulted in better implementation of human rights at world level.

Campaign for human rights has also led to the growth of diffuse social movements and normative regimes such as international human rights regimes.

Many a time the issue of human rights has complicated the bilateral and multilateral relations between nations e. g. Western countries' relations with other countries including India.

In the garb of human rights secessionists and ethno-nationalists demand nationhood and statehood that create the problem of fragmentation of states. Major problems that characterize weak states in the contemporary world include the problem of human rights abuse.

In this age of information technology any local or national human rights abuse becomes international in no time. The NGOs, governments and the United Nations are utilizing information technology systems (email, computer conferencing, and on-line data bases) to advance the cause of human rights. The latest concept of human security further reinforces human rights.

The recent trend towards globalization has greatly helped in the promotion of human rights. The general impact of globalizing forces and global concern for human rights may well lead one to believe that the very notion of 'international relations' as such is out-dated and that a stage of 'post-international politics'[17] (as suggested by James Rosenau) or global politics and relations has been reached.

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21

North-South Dialogue in the UN and Outside

As already discussed, the traditional East-West division of the globe has become structurally obsolete. From the point of view of the Third World's Less Developed Countries (LDCs), the characterisation of the Soviet Union as the East during Cold War days has no operational significance now. So far as the structure of contemporary international relations is concerned, East is today's South and West is today's North. If the East-West conflict of the cold war days is over, North-South conflict has taken its place in the present world. The economic division of the world between rich nations of the North and poor nations of the South is known as North-South divide. Struggle of the Third World countries for economic independence and justice is known as North-South conflict.

The US bloc and the Soviet bloc belong to the same dominant and neo-imperialist rule-system, while the developing countries together constitute the subordinate and semi-colonial sub-system. The global struggle is now taking place, not between the international proletariat and the international bourgeoisie, as visualised by Marxism-Leninism, but between the North and the South, the developed and the developing nations. The North has already closed its ranks. It remains for the countries of the South to come closer and to chalk out an appropriate strategy against the neo-colonialism of the North and for attaining economic independence and development.

ISSUES OF NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT

The Western industrialised and developed countries organised the international monetary and multilateral trading systems in the postwar period in such a way as could subserve their interests and objectives only. Owing to their ideological differences with the West, the Second World of the Soviet Union and East European countries set up an economic order with only minimal ties with the First World. Developing countries on the periphery of the First World were also outside the privileged circle, yet the continuance of colonial economic relationship into the era of political independence integrated the Third World nations with Western systems over which they had no control. Many Third World nations thus considered the existing economic structure as one that was against their interests and a reason of being their backward position. The end of colonialism from their viewpoint merely brought an another era of more covert, clever and dangerous exploitation.

For their economic independence and emancipation, developing countries have demanded a New International Economic Order. The controversy over creation of a new and just order has been an issue largely between the First and Third Worlds. The Socialist bloc has formed political alliances with one side or the other from time to time, and on a number of issues, as political gains seemed to dictate. But partly because of its own relative lack of economic links with the South and the West, and partly because it believes it bears no responsibility for the bad affects of colonialism suffered by the Third World, the Second World has not been an intimate participant in the recent

North-South conflict "except, perhaps as a critical observer, and, on occasion, as meddler when those issues have provided opportunities to be exploited to the advantage of the Second World."[1] Many developing countries had also made a tactical distinction between the USA and the Soviet Union within the broad pattern of economic confrontation. Because unlike the USA, the Soviet Union did not possess economic structures of dominance such as MNCs; and there was a strong condemnation of the racist and imperialist ideology in Marxism as well as in the official and foreign policies of the Soviet Union.

In the last few years ideological differences between the First and Second have disappeared and both are coming closer to each other. The planned or command economies have failed in solving the economic problems of the communist world. The collapse of command structure/system has compelled the socialist countries to seek greater contacts with the West to realise their own domestic economic objectives and to receive more aid from the West to save their crumbling economies.

The Third World comprises about three fourth of the world's population, but it accounts for only about one-fifth of the world's combined gross national product. Furthermore, the gap between the world's rich and poor have grown, and the inequalities are projected to expand further in the future. Kegley and Wittkopf rightly observe; "the present division of the world between an overpopulated and often poverty- and-hunger-stricken Southern Hemisphere and an affluent, consumption-oriented North is thus likely to persist. Many Third World leaders perceive these stark realities as the product of a system so structured as to systematically assure perpetuation of international inequality."[2] They specially find four defects in their relationship with the North particularly troublesome. W.A. Lewis, the Nobel Prize winning economist, has summarised them as follows:

(i) The division of the world into exporters of primary products and exporters of manufactures.
(ii) The adverse factoral terms of trade for the products of the developing countries.
(iii) The dependence of the developing countries on the developed for finance.
(iv) The dependence of the developing countries on the developed for their engine of growth.[3]

In short, after the Second World War an international economic system emerged where the developed West held the trump cards and the other side, the South, just the number cards; one side was well organised to promote its economic interests through institutions like the "club of Ten", G-7, IMF/IBRD and the OECD; the other side represented a hopeless majority of nations having no experience and understanding of what was happening to them. As political independence could not bring an end to their economic dependence, they came to the UN for the redressal of their grievances. It had given them the status of "sovereign equality" and its Charter enshrined the principles of economic cooperation with a view to promoting "higher standard of living, full employment and conditions of economic and social progress and development". Thus, the platform of the UN and its agencies became launching pad of their economic struggle. With increase in their number, they endeavoured more vigorously for just economic order.

SOUTH'S HOPES—UN'S LIMITATIONS

Developing countries of the South were very optimistic about the UN's role in getting economic justice. They were very hopeful that UN would come to their rescue in solving economic difficulties and in transferring prosperity from North to South. Saksena rightly observes: "The history of the

United Nations' concern with economic matters has been a history of constant struggle between those who wanted to get the Organisation involved in a meaningful regulative role, and those who sought to keep it out of that role, in international economic relations."[4]

Notwithstanding developing countries hopes and aspirations, the hard facts of post-war economic situation put the following limitations on the UN's role in this regard. *First*, the United Nations was not authorised to operationally regulate international economic relations. Its role was confined merely to initiating of studies and reports. *Second*, the institutional arrangements like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) having considerable regulative and supervisory role were chiefly devised to further the interest of a group of developed nations headed by the United States. *Third*, in postwar period there emerged, contrary to what the UN Charter envisaged, not one international economic system but three: the industrially advanced market-economies led by the United States of America; the state-managed economies of East Europe led by the Soviet Union; and the underdeveloped economies of the poor developing nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America.[5] The three did have the background of some common experiences, but their economic interests after the Second World War were quite different from each other.

It is worth mentioning that out of the three economic worlds that emerged, the first two were capable of managing on their own. The intra-relationship amongst the countries of the first world as also the second world remained outside the framework of the United Nations. Likewise, the inter-economic relations between the two, the Western group and the Soviet bloc, as and when they developed after the beginning of détente have remained outside the purview of the United Nations.

Regarding the South as well as both the other two, East and West, have by and large maintained a relationship least influenced from the UN side. In the beginning, the economic relations between the Soviet bloc on one side and developing countries on the other were minimal, and some time non-existent. When in mid-fifties the Soviet aid and the trade policy was initiated, it remained bilaterally managed with limited countries. The United Nations hardly played any part in it.

So far as the West-South relations are concerned, the former constituted the core of the international economy, the latter its periphery. Despite revolutionary advances in science, technology, trade and communication, the distance between the centre and the periphery continued to widen progressively. In this sphere as well the United Nations was kept from exercising any meaningful role. The multilateralist ideology based on free non-discriminatory trade and financing of international commerce urged on the United Nations at the outset by the United States was quietly abandoned. The overt requirements of the so-called cold war but, covertly, US concern to promote its own vested interests, promoted it to pay more attention to the reconstruction of the war-ravaged economies of its European allies.

In the above system, developing countries were "used" through bilateral and multilateral aid and loans (which simply meant buy-now the specified technical services and manufactured goods of the Western world and pay later by your hard-earned hard-currency) and through multinational corporations and also by their traditional policy of "divide and rule" which consequently yielded sale of conventional arms to the Third World countries and this, much to the economic advantage of the rich and advanced countries of the North. In this way their poor and peripheral status as well as their economic slavery to the developed powers continued.

PHASES OF DIALOGUE INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE UN

How North-South dialogue proceeded in the various forums of the UN and outside it like NAM, CHOGM etc. to achieve the NIEO will be discussed in the form of five phases.

1. Realisation of the Problem

In 1950s, the Third World countries were obsessed with the fear of cold war and remained concerned with how to insulate themselves from the same. They paid little attention to the North-South divide and to the creation of New International Economic Order. However, they were not ignorant of the problem and realised the economic inequalities between the North and the South. Both in the UN and the Bandung Conference (1955) they drew attention to the need for improving the conditions of poor countries. But it must be mentioned that this realisation was not deep rooted. They also did not take any concrete steps to lesser the economic inequalities between the North and the South.

The first attempt ended with the still born International Trade Organisation (ITO) and the institution of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. After that it was emphasised that a UN agency be instituted to provide *inter alia* technical and financial assistance to underdeveloped countries or helping to finance plans of economic development which could not be financed from the country's own resources. Many such proposals were made by one or the other newly emerging states.

By the early 1950s, a number of such vague proposals finally shaped into a concrete one: the setting up of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). The debate, expert-reports, studies, interactions and negotiations that followed were perhaps the most significant developments, in the context of international economic relations. They proved to be highly "educative" to the new states and helped identify the basic issues. The actual marking of such UN institutions as IBRD, IMF, GATT, ECOSOC etc. was also exposed; that they are neither intended to, nor capable of, fulfilling the aspirations of the Third World countries.

For many years the issue of SUNFED remained on the agenda of the General Assembly, the ECOSOC and related United Nations bodies concerned with economic matters. When at the 24th session of ECOSOC (1957), all was set for final recommendations for the creation of SUNFED, the United States, The United Kingdom and Canada put spokes in the wheel. The US tactfully introduced a new proposal calling for the establishment of a "Special Fund". The name was not very different from SUNFED but its premises, contents and objectives were. The US got it adopted before few could understand what was all about. Indeed, the new Special Fund (SF), thus set up was merely an extension of the already existing UN programmes of Technical Assistance (TA) and Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA). That is to say, provision for assistance in terms of UN expert advice on pre-investment, feasibility-study level, availability of some fellowship for training of personnel of underdeveloped countries. Thus, the basic goal sought in SUNFED was discreetly buried. During fifties, the then numerically smaller group of Third World Nations worked for organisational responses to their needs and achieved very limited success. The UN Special Fund was evolved as a partial response to South's demand for substantial United Nations economic development aid.

2. Articulation of Goals and Initiation of Measures

In the 1960s, as their number in the United Nations increased, Third World countries were able to press for economic development and related issues even more forcefully in and outside the UN. The Group of 77 was formalised in 1964 and the group surpassed the two-thirds mark as a

proportion of the total membership of the UN. This means that the Group of 77, if and when it can act as a unit, can pass any measure it chooses. The egalitarian principle, one-state-one-vote, and all comprehensive functions assigned to the General Assembly by the UN Charter provided the necessary tools. In a true sense, the struggle for New International Economic Order was initiated during 1960s. The goals of NIEO were articulated and a few measures were taken towards their attainment.

Besides discussing political issues, the Belgrade Summit (1961) of NAM also called for efforts to remove "economic imbalance inherited from colonialism and imperialism". The demand for economic justice was further intensified with better articulation and more determination at the Cairo Summit (1964). It made the "first attempt to articulate the developmental demands of the Third World and to evolve a consensus on the broad parameters of the changes needed in the international economic system."[6] Subsequent Summit of NAM also voiced for NIEO.

In the UN, Third World countries demand was expressed in the form of three specific proposals: establishment of (i) The United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF); (ii) United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO); (iii) The revival of International Trade Organisation (ITO) and, with that objective, to convene a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

In sixties, the cold war witnessed a declining trend and the number of developing countries started increasing in the UN. In the changed situation, the *pro-status quo* powers altered their tactics. They allowed the opening of new institutions proposed by the majority and at the same time adds their own. But in each case, these newly created institutions were deprived of their basic objectives and they continued either in name only, or their operational capacity was so concealed that it was difficult to know their real character.

The UN declared 1960-70 as First Development Decade. The decade aimed at breaking the cycle of poverty, hunger, ignorance and disease. The primary objective of the decade was to attain a minimum growth rate of 5 per cent in the annual income of the developing countries.

Meanwhile, the UN institutions were multiplied, increasing the paper work, but bringing no significant or qualitative change in the existing economic system. The UNCTAD, which was set up in 1964 as an organ of the General Assembly acted only as the lobbying agency of the Third World countries where they could meet the other groups of states, periodically, to discuss trade and development issues. The limitations of the UNCTAD pressures were shown by the adoption of conciliation procedures regarding voting on all important matters. Therefore, the lengthy negotiations during and in between the seven sessions of UNCTAD, to evolve a consensus have brought little or no fruit in obtaining any worthwhile "equitable" trade relations for the countries of the South.

The UNIDO created in 1965 in the face of stiff resistance of the United States and disinterested attitude of the Socialist countries, has lost much of its original purpose. The UN Capital Development Fund established in 1966, by sheer number of votes has proved to be an exercise in futility as it could not muster support of the Western and Socialist countries.

Likewise in UN's affiliates and related institutions, some quantitative changes were brought about, but they could not achieve qualitative results in the existing unjust economic order. The World Bank created the International Development Association (IDA) to provide low-interest soft loans and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) to encourage investment of private capital in underdeveloped countries. This "constitutional" activity accompanied by exhortation to help the poor, newly-emerging, nations also led to the creation of regional banks—the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank. In all these

institutions, however, the source of finances, and more importantly the decision-making process, continued to be controlled by the industrially advanced countries of the Western World. Their Club of Ten (including Japan), later the Group of Seven powerful industrialised nations—United States, United Kingdom, France, Japan, Italy, Germany and Canada— held the strings in firm control on the matters concerning international trade, transfer of technology, financing, shipping, economic aid etc. Thus even in post-imperial world, the Third World countries of the South "were not having any control or say even in matters affecting their vital interests".[7]

3. Assertive Action and Confrontation

Three developments provided the background for North-South conflict in the 1970s. *First*, within the Western world, the rise of the European Economic Community (EEC) and Japan, as additional economic power centres, broke the preeminence of the United States in the existing economic system. By the turn of the seventh decade the economic system went into doldrums. All this happened outside the UN system. *Second*, inside the UN, a militant and vigorous protestation against the existing economic system had cropped up. The growing frustrations that the developing countries had experienced, the intensive interaction amongst themselves led them to the forging of a united front—the Group of 77. With the passage of time, and the experiences gained, the group became a force in the United Nations, demanding the restructuring of the international economic order. *Third*, the use of oil as weapon by the OPEC in 1974 to pressurize other countries, especially the West, to change their views on the Arab-Israel conflict by raising manifold the oil price. This development encouraged the developing countries and they felt that united action on their part would go a long way in realising their goal of economic emancipation. Further, they realised that the time had come for radical postures and actions like OPEC style. The oil-exporting countries drew their strength by virtue of the fact that they were members of the United Nations and that all of them belonged to the Group of 77.

So far, the Western nations have endeavoured to reduce the United Nations to a position of a "non-factor" in international economic relations. For the first time, and of course only when they experienced a serious threat to their economic welfare, they sought the forum of the United Nations for resolving the "energy crisis" and to put pressure on the oil-producing countries. In this matter, they required the support of the non-OPEC countries of the Third World who were much more severely hurt by the blazing hike in oil prices. But when western leaders spoke of military intervention, or concentrated economic pressures to lower the price for all users, the Third World countries refused to support them. Instead they seized this opportunity, in full solidarity with its OPEC members, to put forth their own demand for creation of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The demand consists of the equitable sharing of world trade in manufactured goods, international shipping, reforms in the international monetary system and re-structuring of the socio-economic sector of the UN system.

These proposals were not totally new as they were put forth in the past although piece-meal, in the different forums of the United Nations. What was new was the economic-political environment of the 1970s. What was new was the bold defiance, united action and militant approach of the Group of 77, exhibited against the stiff opposition of the Western rich nations. The Third World countries hoped that they would be able to gain important concessions from rich countries only through a "class-struggle" method.

The G-77 effectively joined the non-aligned movement during the 1973 Algiers Summit of non-aligned nations when issues relating to economic as well as political "liberation" assumed great significance. Algeria, then chairman of the non-aligned countries, led the call for what became the

Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, held in 1974. Using their large numbers, the Group of 77 secured passage of the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order. Significantly, both the declaration and the special session coincided with the world wide energy and food crises of the early and mid-1970s. These crises, as Kim put it, "'United' the rich North and the poor South in a new partnership of economic misery."[8]

The Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order emphasised the principle of sovereign control of natural resources and of economic activity. A program of action spelled out specific measures relating to trade, international credit, capital flows, and economic rights. Later in 1974 the General Assembly, again reflecting the rolling majority commanded by the developing nations, adopted the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. The charter reasserted the sovereign right of national control over internal wealth and resources. Foreign investment, foreign ownership of property, activities of transnational corporations, and the right of states to join primary-commodities-producers' association were additional issues.

Earlier, at its twenty fifth session, the General Assembly had declared the period from 1 January 1971 to 31 December 1981 as the Second United Nations Development Decade, and adopted an International Development Strategy for this decade. The General Assembly resolution regarding the establishment of the NIEO, adopted by its sixth special session, specifically recommended this International Development Strategy for realisation of the NIEO. The IDS aimed at a 6 per cent average annual rate of growth in the GDP of the LDCs during the Second UN Development Decade.

Other matters were discussed at subsequent regular meetings and special sessions of General Assembly and at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). So far ten sessions of the UNCTAD have held and its eighth session was held at Cartagena de Indias (Colombia) in February, 1992. Included in the discussions were the topics of debt relief for developing countries through cancellation or rescheduling, commodity price stabilisation, compensatory financing mechanism to stabilise export earnings, and price indexation which would tie the prices developing nations receive for the goods they export to the capital goods they import from the North.

Thus the UNCTAD became an important forum of World's poor and a central stage on which the North-South conflict has been played. But developing nations raised the issues described above in other international forums outside the UN such as the IMF, the World Bank, the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, and the ad hoc Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), which met in Paris for about eighteen months between the end of 1975 and mid-1977. The subject of new economic order also became the main topic of discussion in the Colombo Summit (1976) and the Havana Summit (1979) of NAM. In all these forums the Third World countries worked mostly like a "trade union" and the target of their bitter criticism was the developed world.

On their part, developed countries did not accede willingly to Third World demands and have actively opposed those regarded as most threatening or costly. But neither were they able to redirect those demands in the direction they preferred. The CIEC was to have been the predecessor of a forum outside the UNCTAD for a continuing North-South dialogue. It also came a cropper.

If the failure of the CIEC discouraged Northern hopes for a non-UNCTAD forum for a continuing North-South dialogue, the South has also experienced frustration in many forums on many issues. The Multilateral Trade Negotiations concluded in Geneva in 1979 are a case in point. In principle, developing nations won a crucial concession at Geneva; extension of the principle on

non-reciprocity, thus allowing developed countries to great trade preference to developing nations without violating GATT's rules regarding most-favoured-nation non-discrimination. This enabled developed nations to give even further to the Third World the preferential trade treatment embodied in the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) which most First World nations had granted developing nations during the past decades.

The real effects of the GSP on the main issues of Third World concern were not spectacular. This fact, combined with developing nations' perception that the MTN unduly catered to the interests of Europe, Japan and the United States, explains why most Third World nations did not agree easily to the MTN accords. "Their reluctance in the face of what otherwise was heralded as a concession to their needs reflects an impatience with principle, a restless concern for immediate specific benefits."[9]

Third World interests were expressed in, and were often the source of, a series of world conferences held during the 1970s. As these conferences frequently became forums for abusive exchanges between North and South, their contribution to solving-not just articulating—the global problems the world continues to face have perhaps been negligible. As Bennett points out, the range of *ad hoc* conferences is, nevertheless, significant; the human environment (1972), women (1975), human settlements (1976), water (1977), desertification (1977), disarmament (1978), racism and racial discrimination (1978), technological cooperation among developing countries (1978), technology transfer (1978), agrarian reform and rural development (1979), and science and technology for development (1979). In Bennett's own words, "To receive the subjects covered in the World conferences of the 1970s is to list the most vital issues of present world conditions. The conferences represent a beginning in a long and evolving process of keeping within manageable proportions the major problems of humanity."[10] Here the United Nations can take some credit.

Leaving aside any credit, the pervasiveness of the global *ad hoc* forum was praiseworthy. North and South continued to disagree on how the United Nations might best create an institutional framework in which to consider the issues that divide them. Third World countries of the South were for centrally defining and setting the development economic issues through the UN General Assembly and perhaps the UNCTAD. On the contrary, rich countries of the North preferred "relatively small, functionally specific forums" generally outside the General Assembly. Thus, during the seventies, all the efforts by the developing countries made within the United Nations to evolve a system for global economic cooperation germane to their needs of economic development have brought little fruit. The pressure for creating a NIEO was without a sharp-edge despite South's militancy, assertive and united action.

4. Compromise and Cooperation

In the 1980s the attitude of the developing countries of the South underwent a change with regard to militancy and confrontation. They were now more inclined towards compromise and cooperation among themselves (South-South Cooperation) as also with the North. After the Havana Summit (1979) of NAM, the non-aligned countries apparently realised that class-struggle was not the right path for them, it had not significantly changed the stubborn attitude of rich nations. On the other hand, a few leading developed countries of the North became more annoyed and non-cooperative as a consequence of the militancy showed by developing countries during the seventies. Ramphal rightly observed in early 1981: "The 1970s was a decade of false dawns and failed efforts— ten years littered with the wreckage of innumerable meetings and the debris of dashed hopes."[11] This realisation seems to have, to some extent, reduced this militancy on the part of the latter, and inspired them to look inward while not blunting their just struggle against the North for NIEO. The strategy of confrontation, adopted by Fidel Castro of Cuba who was its

Chairman between Havana and New Delhi, was largely abandoned and Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the new chairperson, opted for a new dialogue between the North and the South with a spirit of compromise and cooperation. She also stressed South-South cooperation which had already existed at conceptual and policy levels, but which had so far eluded serious attention. In this direction, she got convened an economic summit of both developed and developing countries in the UN in October 1983. It did not produce any immediate substantive results. But it did provide a fine opportunity for frank exchange of views on different aspects of NIEO.

An Independent Commission on International Development Issues under the Chairmanship of Willy Brandt, the Ex-Chancellor of Germany, was established at the instance of the World Bank, to find a new approach for North-South dialogue in which the element of confrontation could be removed. The commission submitted its report in early 1980 in which it improved the proposals that had been aired over the last decade or so. It paid much attention to the legitimate grievances of the developing countries. It emphasised on the need for 'massive transfers' of resources from the rich countries to the poor countries for their sustained development and alleviation of world poverty. The commission also suggested the ways of transfer. In accordance with the recommendations of Brandt Commission, it was decided to hold discussions on the issue outside the framework of the United Nations.

As recommended by Brandt Commission a Summit Conference was arranged at Cancun at Mexico on 22-23 October, 1981 in which leaders of 14 developing and 8 developed industrialised countries took part. At the Conference the major discussion focussed on the issue of structuring the proposals for global negotiations. Most of the developing nations asserted that global negotiations involved the supremacy of the United Nations over its specialised agencies, e.g., IMF, the World Bank etc. The United States took the stand that the decision taken by these agencies within their respective areas were final. The United States took this stand because it felt that while in the UN General Assembly the developed countries were in minority, in the key specialised agencies they were able to control the major decisions due to the system of weighted voting. The stand of USA was also supported by Britain and West Germany.

Despite these differences the Conference agreed to "launch global negotiations on a basis to be mutually agreed and in circumstances offering the prospect or meaningful progress". It was also agreed to give priority to promote dialogue about energy problem and to increase of food production in developing countries. It asserted that trade was more important than aid and hence often trading system should be maintained. The developing countries should pursue policies which would attract private investments.

In 1981 the Commonwealth Heads of Governments Meeting at Melbourne recommended the constitution of a group to review the issue of North-South Dialogue. On 2 February, 1982 a group was constituted by the Commonwealth Secretariat under the Chairmanship of B. Akporode Clark- a senior Nigerian diplomat with representatives of Zimbabwe, U.K., Australia, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Jamaica, Guyana and India as members. The group submitted its report *The North-South Dialogue: Making it Work*, on 27th August, 1982 to the Commonwealth Secretary-General. In its report the group suggested a number of recommendations. These were: (i) The governments should enhance the coordination of the implementation of their national policies on North-South issues. (ii) The Group of 77 (now consisting of about 130 developing countries) should establish its own Secretariat to play a role of providing support for developing countries. (iii) Specialised agencies and other international organisations should avoid conflict, duplication and competition. (iv) Global round of negotiations on international economic cooperation for development should be launched as soon as possible. (v) More use should be made of single issue conferences. (vi) Negotiations

should be conducted in small groups rather than plenary bodies, where possible. (vii) Greater use of expert panels should be made. (viii) Care should be taken in the choice of negotiations and spokesmen of groups as well as Chairmen of negotiations conferences. (ix) The South should be urged to make full use of its representation in the Bretton Woods institutions to put forward its policies and advance its interests.

In December 1981 the representatives of the developing nations presented a resolution to the General Assembly for North-South negotiations on the restructuring of the international economy. However, United States, expressed opposition to the resolution on the plea that it posed a threat to the independence of established economic institutions like World Bank and IMF. Therefore, the developing nations did not insist on the taking up of the resolution.

The Brandt Commission published its second report in February, 1983. In the report titled as—*Common Crisis—North-South Cooperation for World Recovery*—the Commission proposed a series of financial measures to assist the resolution of the current balance of payments debt and banking crises and to help promote recovery in developing and industrial countries. The Commission recommended among other things, increased cooperation among the developing countries through strengthening of regional payment arrangements; expansion of financial facilities in developing countries including establishment of a Third World Bank; support for enlarging refinancing and guaranteeing developing countries export credit facilities; and increased direct investment in the third world by the developing countries. The Commission also emphasised the need of improving international financial system and suggested a number of steps in this regard. It made proposals for emergency measures which could help in improving the world trading environments and food production in developing countries.

The origin of the South-South Meet or New Consultations (1983) lies in the failure o. the North-South dialogue. As the North did not respond favourably to the demands of the South, the latter decided for South-South meet to concentrate on the following nine points: (1) Agreement on the immediate launching of global negotiations; (2) Increasing food production in developing countries; (3) Reversing of the present disturbing trade in the flow of assistance from the developed to the developing countries; (4) Strengthening of multilateral cooperation; (5) Devising mechanism to finance the development of energy resources in developing countries; (6) Speedy adoption and implementation of schemes to lighten the financial burden of increased oil prices and to ensure supplies of aid to developing countries; (7) Provision of financial support for balance of payments problems in the transitional stage of oil importing developing countries; (8) Reversing protectionist trends; and (9) Development of solidarity and collective self-reliance of developing countries to reduce their vulnerability to pressures from and events in affluent countries. The deliberations, however, showed that the member states were sharply divided and failed to reach any consensus. Differences particularly existed over various facets of the US position. At the end of the South-South Meet, a hope was expressed that the exchange of view at New Delhi would enable the Group of 77 to discuss and negotiate effectively with the industrialised countries to come to an agreement on the procedure and frame of global negotiations. It was insisted that a concerted strategy should be adopted on these negotiations in the United Nations.

The issue of North-South relations also figured at the Commonwealth Heads of Governments which met at New Delhi in 1983. The meeting called for a "comprehensive review of international monetary, financial and relevant trade issues" and emphasised the need for the discussion of these issues at an international conference with universal participation. It asserted the Commonwealth could play a useful role in this regard and set up a Commonwealth consultative group for the purpose of promoting a consensus on the issue.

By 1984 the North-South dialogue stood frozen and multilateral institutions in which the industrial nations have a decisive say, were confronted with new problems, especially with regard to resources matching the growing needs. The sixth and seventh session of the UNCTAD which were also held in the eighties could not yield much results. Despite an explosive growth (about three times) of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 1980s, the share going to developing countries has declined whereas a bulk of it had gone to the high-income countries. The 1980s have been described as "the evil, perverse decade" for Latin America and some of the other countries of the South whose GNP fell during that period. The South was determined in the late eighties to see that this does not happen again.

5. Trends in the 90's

The 1990s began with the fall of communism in the East Europe and the Soviet Union. They re-adopted free market economy. For the redressal of their economic ills they now increasingly looked to the Western countries. The latter also turned to these countries hoping for new markets for their products, machine and technology. With the disappearance of division between East and West and their coming closer has made the North-South division more prominent and polarised. Third World may no longer receive as much economic aid and attention from the rich Western countries as in the past. With the Cold War over the world's top industrially rich Western countries are turning their invisible eyes and ears on each other to get ahead in the lukewarm war of global economies. Many military allies of the United States have long been economic rivals. On the economic front, evidence is growing that long-time military allies are viewing each other with increasing suspicion. Former CIA director, William Webster was quoted in 1991 as saying that "economic security is part of our national defence".[12] His nominated successor Robert Gates, has told the US Senators that "some of our allies in the Cold War are now at times serious adversaries in the global market place."[13] The change in strategy comes at a time when many officials in Washington believe the liberalisation of the world economy could lead to new national security risks. This is because the US—now the only superpower—is highly dependent on Japanese and European capital to finance its trade and fiscal deficits.

In preparation of the lukewarm war of global economics, a new CIA task force on international economics has been set up to provide the public and private sectors with economic data and prevent technology transfer to competitors. As Western nations are taking advantage of warmer relations with Moscow to strengthen their control over the Third World, the CIA intends to concentrate on economic dimensions of regional issues in the developing world. The agency is worried that Third World debt problems could lead to political instability in some countries, threatening pro-US regimes which provide unimpeded access to natural resources for the industrialised North. There is concern that a liberalised international economy will make business transactions easier for those involved in the international drugs, arms, technology-transfer and nuclear deals. The CIA also intends to monitor the global transfer of capital especially from North to South. D.K. Thussu observes, "New links between old rivals seem to have set the stage for an alliance against predominantly Third World targets".[14]

After a week long special session (April 25-May 1) on the development problems and other challenges facing the developing countries, the UN General Assembly adopted a comprehensive declaration calling for debt relief for the Third World and asking industrial countries to set aside a percentage of their gross national product for aid. The 38-point declaration was not legally binding but was expected to provide general guidelines to help the underdeveloped world. It reflected a compromise between industrialised and developing nations that was reached after more than two weeks of bargaining, North-South contention and compromise. The General

Assembly called for an "open and credible" multilateral trading system and resistance to protectionism everywhere.

The financial institutions, according to the UN move should be provided with adequate resources to support long-time development to facilitate structural reform and to alleviate the adverse consequences of adjustment for poor and vulnerable groups. The declaration calls on developed countries to devote 0.7 per cent of their GNP to official development assistance and 0.15 per cent to the least developed countries.

A new group of developing nations emerged in 1989 in the name of G-15. The G-15 was formed after the 9th NAM's summit meeting at Belgrade in 1989. It consists of countries which belong to the NAM and other developing countries including Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, India, Yugoslavia, Venezuela, Peru, Mexico, Zimbabwe, Senegal, Malaysia, Jamaica, Nigeria etc. It decided to meet annually to develop a common strategy for adoption at international forums and to formulate and adopt concrete measures for South-South cooperation. The first summit of developing nations, held at Kuala Lumpur on June 2-3, 1990, decided to set up a steering committee to coordinate the work of G-15. The committee, comprising Foreign Ministers of Malaysia, Venezuela and Senegal, was to decide on the size and location of its secretariat. The leaders resolved to turn the G-15 into a powerful "action group" of the South to effectively represent the case of the poorer nations in international forums in close consultations with the G-77 and the non-aligned movement. The summit agreed in principle to establish an information technology centre to disseminate information on investment and trade opportunities in the South and transfer of technology among developing countries. The summit also agreed on the mechanism to stimulate South-South cooperation. It described the debt problem as formidable and stressed the need for more innovative, comprehensive and flexible responses to the problem to reverse the negative net transfer of resources.

It seems that South's G-15 was formed on the lines of North's G-7 (Group of Seven). The latter was initiated by Vallery Giscard d' Estaing then President of France in 1975 who had invited the leaders of USA, UK, West Germany, Italy and Japan to come to Paris for an economic summit in the wake of crisis generated by the use of oil as political weapon by Arab oil producing countries. The number rose to seven in 1976 when Canada was admitted in the Group. The subsequent years saw G-7 summits become an annual event, no longer restricting itself to economic issue but discussing all matters of international importance. With the admission of Russia at Denver Summit in June 1997, the Group was renamed as G-8. Leaders of G-15 have been at pains to explain that G-15 is not any counter to G-8 of the powerful industrialised countries of the North. Instead, G-15 is reckoned to be a "catalyst" or "action group" within the framework of NAM and G-77 group of developing countries.

The second summit of G-15 held at Caracas (Venezuela) in November 1991 where Venezuelan President C.A. Perez called upon to forget confrontation with the North and the need for new relations between the North and the South to promote better understanding. He also said the G-15 should work a "loco-motor" to exploit the opportunities for the third world countries in the new world order. In this summit India called upon to seize the "historic opportunity" provided by the end of super power rivalry to their combined energies and seek to resolve their problems through South-South cooperation. The then Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao said for the first time in the world history, a truly global and integrated world economy was emerging. But globalisation could be fruitful only when a consensus development dimension was introduced and became an integral part in the process. Mr. Rao said the process of globalisation must be made far more supportive of the emerging trends.

"There has to be a willingness to deal with issues like financial flows, the debt overhang, access to markets and to advances in technology so that globalisation and interdependence can be equitably managed in the interest of all"[15]. This was the role that G-15 could and should play, he said. India pledged its support to the implementation of South-South projects and the promotion of South-South cooperation envisaged by the Group of 15.

A crucial session of the South Commission consisting of chief executives and other eminent personalities of the developing world held at Caracas (Venezuela) in 1990. The former Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere, was head of the commission and India's Dr. Man Mohan Singh was Secretary-General. The commission stressed that the developing countries must give up the habit of always looking up to the North and deal with their problems through self-reliance and cooperation with other developing countries. There must also be common negotiating positions in the South, as the industrialised countries of the North had in international negotiations. There are great possibilities of South-South cooperation, which had been held back by lack of communication among the developing countries.

In October, 1991 the World Bank President Lewis Preston, had assured the developing countries that the anticipated developmental needs of Eastern Europe and of Russia would not result in less aid to traditional developing countries. Addressing his first press conference after taking over from Barber Conable, Mr. Preston said, there was "enough head room" to meet the need of all the countries.

The UNCTAD has cautioned developing countries that their financial liberalisation would work only if accompanied by appropriate institutional reform and vigorous supervisory and prudential arrangements. In a document on accelerating the development process, to be placed in its eighth session which was to start from February 8, 1992 at Cartagena de Indias (Colombia), the Geneva based UNCTAD said on November 12, 1991, the recent experience of financial liberalisation in developing countries had conclusively borne out that it had worked successfully only after macro-economic stability and institutional development had been attained. It said one of the most important impediments to resource mobilisation in a large number of developing countries was macro-economic instability and unpredictability. High and volatile inflation and unexpected swings in wages, exchange and interest rates created a high degree of uncertainty in the cost of and return on investment in both physical and financial assets, UNCTAD said. The UNCTAD was of the view that the development of capital markets in the developing world could help to solve some of the structural problems and enhance the efficiency of financial intermediaries by introducing competition and reducing the vulnerability of firms to variations in the cost and availability of bank credits.

The Commonwealth Summit (CHOGM) at Harare in October 1991 put into sharp focus the vital issue of replacing dictatorial and semi-dictatorial regimes with ones sanctioned by popular vote. A majority of the 50 members of the Commonwealth fall in either category. At the end a consensus declaration apart from calling for the promotion of democracy and the rule of law, also expressed the Afro-Asian countries' concern regarding economic development. Declaration recognised development as an issue exclusive of any precondition while emphasising the 50-nation grouping's role in promoting democracy and human rights. At one point of time, the summit had vertically split with the developed members insisting on the track record of human rights of a member as a condition of aid. The Harare summit did not accept the British-Canadian proposal to make economic aid conditional on the actual introduction of democratic reforms. Britain seems to interpret the reference in the declaration to aid allocation "within a framework of respect for human rights" as acceptance of such a linkage.

The Group of 77 at its meeting in Teheran in November 1991, has finalised a substantive plan of action on international cooperation as the areas of resources for development, international trade, technology, commodity and trade in services. These were discussed with other countries in UNCTAD-VIII. The meeting also launched the second round of negotiations under the Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) among the developing countries, a significant example of South-South cooperation.

A consensus on the vital changes to be brought about in the nearly three decades old UN organ was arrived at UNCTAD VIII which also reached agreement on the other five crucial areas of the agenda on resources for development, international trade, technology, services and commodities. The over 130 countries that participated in UNCTAD VIII in February 1992 adopted the consensus document on fortifying national and global action and multilateral cooperation for a salubrious and equitable world economy.

In the post-Cold war era, globalisation has become a buzz world. A foretaste of what globalisation should be was felt at Bangkok (Thailand) at the 10th session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNC TAD-X) held from February 12 to 19, 2000 which was attended by 188 countries. For the affluent West and Japan and the World Bank and the IMF, globalisation means that the developing countries must lose their identity in making the rich richer and the developed more developed and in return, the South should be satisfied with a handful peanuts they can munch. All the same, UNCTAD-X was the forum for the developing countries and they made it clear that globalisation was not for a chosen few, but for all. Bangkok session developed its own paradigm of good governance, crusade against corruption, debt-related problems and its own potential blue print for the next round of trade talks on agriculture and services. The UNCTAD approved an Action Plan to be implemented before the next session four years later (i.e. 2004). In more than one way, the developing countries have succeeded in their efforts to transform UNCTAD as a trade union for the developing countries.

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that the United Nations has played a great role in identifying the basic economic issues and in providing a platform for discussions and negotiations at world level. It has also contributed to general economic and currency stabilisation through the IMF, etc. But as Saksena points out, "It has so far failed to acquire a central position in regulating international economic relations and in resolving conflict of interests between the two sides, the North and the South—one-side seeking that central role for the United Nations and the other side successfully denying that role."[16]

The economic fighters in the UN are obvious. The nations on the one side are those which are economically and militarily very weak, but inside the UN, they have a vast majority of votes. The countries on the other side are those who are in minority keeping in view their voting power in the United Nations yet they enjoy real power outside it. One side is for basic change in the existing world order through the UN. The other side thwarts their attempts and insists on reform instead of change and that too on its own terms, outside the framework of the United Nations and in a way that consolidates its powerful status. "North-South dialogue" observes Varma, "seems to have reached a stalemate today. The developed countries headed by the United States are resistant to change, which partly comes out of their lack of understanding of the advantages that would accrue to them if they are prepared for developing a greater, and a genuine, inter-dependence between themselves and the countries of the South."[17]

The adoption by the UN of the International Development Strategy, the Declaration on the New International Economic Order and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was the outcome of nearly a decade of conference diplomacy by the Less Developed Countries (LDCs).

Bandyopadhaya rightly observes: "But in practice, the acceptance of this demand by the UN General Assembly has proved to be hardly anything more than a mere nominal recognition of the urge of the LDCs for a greater share in the distribution of world resources. If the resolutions of the General Assembly reflect the majority of the LDCs in the UN, their non-implementation by the DCs (Developed Countries) shows the oligarchic and neo-imperialistic control of the DCs over the concrete structure of contemporary international relations."[18]

The Third World vigorously campaigned for the NIEO and North-South dialogue even outside the UNO through conference diplomacy in different international fora like NAM, CHOGM, G-77 etc. Some developing countries also launched new platforms like South Commission and G-15 to promote South-South cooperation and to evolve common strategy to be adopted at different international forums. With a view to achieving its goal of NIEO, the South will have to struggle hard and long to change stubborn attitude of the North.

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22

New International Economic Order

After the end of imperialism and colonialism, about 130 newly independent and developing countries have been making frantic efforts for economic independence and economic development. In the decade of 1970s countries of the Third World made persistent demand for the establishment of New International Economic Order (NIEO). The conflict between North and South for quite sometime has been over this very issue. While the South again and again makes a demand for NIEO, the North resists it.

The international economic system is facing a crisis which is characterised by strains of stagflation in the developed market economies, a structural underdevelopment problem in the developing countries and slowing down of growth rate in and collapsing of the socialist world. In this troubled situation, complex issues of interdependence are not being adequately appreciated. The developing countries often complain that their interests are being adversely affected by the policies of the developed world, while the developed countries blame the developing countries for mismanagement and sub-optimal utilisation of resources.

PRESENT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

The crisis of 1930s was marked by very high unemployment rates and low economic growth rates. It was a classic long-term depression with a very low growth, fall in international trade and an unstable international monetary situation. International economic crisis of the '30s was tackled mainly through economic nationalism. It was manifested in high degree of protectionism and in a shift away from world-wide economic relations to bilateral agreements, both in the field of trade and in the field of finance. It was exhibited in an overall "beggar my neighbour" policy when the solution of domestic economic problems was concerned.

The weakness of the world's economy, which was the result of a breakdown of the western economic order of 1930s, and the necessity to restore the international economic order after the Second World War gave rise to the present international economic order, which was created in the mid-1940s. The economic system that emerged in the aftermath of the World War II contained three sub-systems. These sub-systems were (i) the Western system of Interdependence; (ii) the North-South system of dependence; and (iii) the East-West system of Independence. No doubt, the problems and processes of the sub-systems differ yet the separation of the three sub-system is artificial since interactions and problems overlap all systems in the real world.

The present crisis is rooted in the economic order established after 1945, which had left out a large part of the world, including the South and East unrepresented. Furthermore, the system existed on an implicit assumption of stability, but this stability was disturbed from within due to the internationalisation of capital, lack of sanctions or non-compliance with accepted rules and the

rise of new entities whose behaviour rules are not fully understood. Thus the present international economic order came to stay on the basis of the operation of transnational oligopolistic forces, which is not conducive to the quest for a just and more equitable world order.

Characteristics of the Present Economic Order

The chief characteristics of the present world economic order are briefly mentioned below:

1. It relied on East-West Divisions and is marked by confrontation between the North and the South.

2. It safeguards the interests of the North and is governed by economic interaction based on the principle of non-discriminatory liberal trade.

3. It is nationalist and irrational.

4. In the present economic system, the trade is so regulated that the developed countries gain access to markets of developing countries on favourable terms.

5. It has encouraged inflow of foreign private capital from the developed countries to the developing countries and consequent increase in the activities of multinational corporations.

Shortcomings of the Present Economic System

The above system worked well during the period—end of 1940s to early 1960s—for those countries which evolved the system. But it contained some basic weaknesses which are discussed below:

1. *Exclusion of Majority Countries.* The first was the absence of the Eastern and the Southern countries from the negotiations which formulated the basic values and principles of the order.

2. *No Sanction.* There was no sanction on behaviour in conflict with the originally agreed upon principles and policies.

3. *Instability.* There were no policy restrictions in the order which could provide for a situation where domestic economic processes within a major participating country were leading to instability, and it was not certain that domestic economic processes would always lead to stability. When the process, due to economic and political mechanism both within participating countries and amongst them and other countries, led to instability in the 1960s, there were no answers in the present international economic order as to how to cope with such a situation.

4. *Economic Ills.* The above weakness led to the slowing down of economic growth, to inflation and to monetary instability which culminated in the end of the fixed dollar/gold exchange rate in 1960s and 1970s. That was the beginning of a world-wide economic crisis.

5. *Inequality and Inefficiency.* An economic order can be judged on the bases of two criteria; its efficiency and its equity. The economic order which was created in 1940s had led to more inequality by the beginning of 1980s than when the system was created. It has also led to more inefficiency, over-utilisation and waste of scarce resources and under-utilisation of resources such as labour. A system which does not live up to the major criteria of efficiency and equity has to be removed.

6. *Not World-Wide.* The existing international economic order is not worldwide but centred around the developed nations. Although it was a better system compared to what existed in 1920s and in 1930s, it was too compartmentalised. There were no links between decision-making on

matters such as finance, trade, food and energy, or between international and national policy-making.

7. *Recession and Stagflation.* The deep economic recession of 1970s had developed into a lasting depression that led to an economic crisis in 1980s with same characteristics as that in 1930s. We already are witnessing many phenomena which are similar to those in the decade before the Second World War; very low growth rates, high unemployment rates, stagnation in international trade etc. There is one important difference; the 1930s were marked by deflation, whereas we now have high inflation. It is less difficult to deal with a situation of low growth, unemployment and deflation than to cope with stagflation. Stagflation requires the use of various instruments and these varied instruments do have conflicting effects.

8. *Notoriety of MNCs.* In the existing economic order multinational corporations (MNCs) and the Transnational Corporations (TNCs) have grown and expanded enormously in the name of resource transfers to the developing countries. But the TNCs are oligopolistic and profit motivated commercial entities, with centres of their decision-making located in the developed countries, thereby not necessarily providing the full benefit of the resource transfer to the developing countries. The MNCs not only eat into economic vitality of those developing countries in which they operate, but also seek to control the latter's political structures. Thus MNCs have an effective instrument of developed countries to dominate the domestic as well as the foreign policies of developing countries. The bitter experiences resulting from the working and manoeuvrings of multinationals, the developing Third World countries have been demanding for long in different forums for their control and regulation by some international agency.

9. *Export of Raw Material.* Most of the developing countries with few exceptions of 'middle-class members' of the South depend upon the export of raw material for earning foreign exchange. Their economies often suffer owing to the sharp fluctuations in the prices of these raw materials. In order to check the element of uncertainty in their economies, they have since long been demanding for taking some steps for stabilising the prices of their key raw materials. The rich countries, instead of being faced with hiked prices of imported raw materials by OPEC—like cartels, were pleasantly surprised to see this intense competition among supplier countries of other raw materials to sell their commodities at reduced prices. This is the chief cause of the unwillingness of developed nations to cooperate with poor countries in evolving some method of stabilising the prices of some key raw materials whose sale greatly determines the shape of latter's economies.

10. *Tariff and Quota Barriers.* The South countries encounter a lot of difficulties in selling their manufactured products in the markets of the North countries. Contrary to their occasional promises not to hinder the flow of goods of developing countries to their markets, the developed countries have tended to raise steep tariff and quota barriers and a wide variety of non-tariff barriers such as inspection requirements and complex customs regulations against the import of these goods. By adopting the principle of protectionism, the developed countries apply the rule of divide and rule. They give preferential treatment to a few countries which are subservient to the former in one way or another. These few privileged countries which are accorded the "most favoured nation" treatment and similar other status feel elated and do not hesitate to connive with their benefactors in the latter's designs against the vast majority of the members of the South.

11. *Technological Disparities.* Technology is urgently needed by the developing countries for their economic development. In the sphere of technology, they are far behind the developed countries. For last many years they are demanding the transfer of technology from rich to poor nations. Some technologies have been transferred over the years. But this transfer has not been

quite satisfactory to the South for many reasons. The amount of transfer has been small. The quality of technologies which have been transferred is mostly outdated and poor in quality.

12. *Structural Factors*. The present crisis could not be found merely in deficiency of aggregate demand. One has to look into structural factors, including issues of profitability. The over-accumulation, the oil shock and the secular wage increase were all gradual results of the interaction of the forces of demand and supply, which, in retrospect, can be identified as a logical consequence of the growth pattern of the '50s and the '60s. In this sphere, (in addition to demand management which desires a large transfer of productive resources to the developing countries), there is a need for restructuring the role of labour and of capital in the developmental processes in the world.

13. *Outside Threats*. The present economic order is not only threatened by forces from within but also by forces from outside. The oil crisis and the export growth of the so-called newly industrialised countries were two such threats, but these external challenges cannot be considered as the cause of the breakdown of the system. They only added to the international threat of the system. It could no doubt be argued that these external threats were not exogenous but were the consequences of the deliberate choices which had been made by the participating countries to keep other countries out of the international political and economic system.

14. *Destruction of the Environment*. The pattern of development pursued and preached so far, has led to a wreckless destruction of the environment and misuse of scarce resources, and has consumed a large part of the world's productive capacities for the production of armaments and weapons of destruction. There is an urgent need for efforts to promote peace and disarmament for achieving real development and examining the possibility of accomplishing it.

15. *Out-dated*. The present economic order gets its sustenance from an out-dated thinking. It is the offshoot of the classical economic thought based on perfect competition, free enterprise and free international trade—a situation which seldom exist any longer. The lack of monetary disciplines, the trade disorder and the internationalisation of capital over the '50s and '60s, to which even Keynesian instruments of demand management have little effectiveness. As the present world economic order is not based on a democratic basis with representation provided for each nation, it lacks the ability to induce a new negotiation process in an effective manner. The existing global institutions are not sufficiently equipped to harness all the resources available to the world community. Today's major schools of thought (whether they advocate a re-emergence of the market phenomenon, profess a global democratic socialism, or a temporary de-linking of the Third World) provide little contribution towards solution.

DEMAND FOR NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

All the above shortcomings of the present international economic order prompted the developing countries of the South to demand and work for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). While minor adjustments in the system have been made by the developed countries to suit their own interests, nothing has been done so far to change as the relationship between the developed and the developing countries is concerned. The organisation of EEC in Western Europe and the recognition of Japan as a major economic power have led to some adjustments on what is described as a trilateral basis. But the less-developed countries (LDCs) have been systematically left out of these adjustments. As a consequence, while the prosperity in the developed countries has been growing, the condition of the developing countries is becoming more and more miserable. There is a perpetual and unmistakable bias in the present international economic system in favour of the industrialised nations, and one has to conclude that the poverty of developing countries is, to a large extent, the result of the malfunctioning of the international economic system. Alongwith

industrialised countries, developing countries are also to be blamed to some extent for their poverty. The blame for aggravating this poverty lies with the existing international economic system.

It is because the world requires something new, something really democratic and world-wide, and something which is really an integrated order, that the demand for a new international economic order is justified. Yet we are far from this objective.

The call for NIEO was made in the '70s by LDCs and they continue to struggle for it even today. The NIEO is based on the assumption that the prevalent international order perpetuates and aggravates international inequalities and that new relationship of interdependence should replace the older patterns of dependence and unequal exchange. It is argued by the South countries that the rich North countries are morally obliged to increase and facilitate the flow of resources to less developed countries and that it is in their self-interest to encourage the promotion of growth and development of the poor countries in order to expand their markets.

The LDCs strongly feel that they have a legitimate share in the wealth of developed countries (DCs) which they have accumulated through the long process of exploitation of poor countries, in the past as well as at present. The former are not demanding a big share of the wealth of the latter. They are appealing to the latter to part with a fraction of their wealth so that the former can stand on their feet, and a better world based on equity and justice can be created. After prolonged and intense negotiation and persuasion the developed countries agreed to give 0.7 per cent of their GNP as official development assistance (ODA) to the developing countries. But in reality the DCs have failed to fulfil this promise and there is very bleak chances of its fulfilment in the foreseeable future.

Programme of Action for NIEO

During April-May 1974, the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly called for the establishment of a New International Economic Order and similar appeals have been made since then on a number of occasions. So far ten sessions of UNCTAD have been held where in this issue was fiercely discussed. The Conference on International Economic Cooperation also known as North-South Conference was held in Paris in May 1977. After that Third World countries raised this demand for several times in the UNO and outside it especially in NAM summits, CHOGM, Conferences of G-77, G-15, Cancun Summit and regional organisations. (For a detailed study of the attempts made by the developing countries in and outside the UNO, see the previous chapter). But all their efforts yielded little fruit and NIEO is still a far cry.

The UN General Assembly, at its Sixth Special Session in 1974, declared its determination to establish a New International Economic Order. By another resolution the General Assembly adopted, at the same session, a Programme of Action for the establishment of the NIEO, which included the following aspects:

1. Fundamental problems of raw materials and primary commodities as related to trade and development.
2. International monetary system and financing of the development of developing countries.
3. Industrialisation of the developing countries.
4. Transfer of technology.
5. Regulation and control over the activities of transnational corporations.
6. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of states.
7. Promotion of cooperation among developing countries.

8. Assistance in the exercise of permanent sovereignty of states over natural resources.
9. Strengthening the role of the United Nations system in the field of international economic cooperation.
10. Special programme for the most seriously affected developing nations.[1]

Developing countries do want that their economic development should not be at the whims of developed countries. MNCs should not treat them as colonies supplying raw materials. International economic system should be based on the principles of sovereign equality of all states, non-intervention and full control over natural resources.

The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties, as pointed out in item 6 of the Programme of Action, was adopted by the General Assembly at its Twenty-ninth Session in the same year. This Charter provided, *inter alia*, for: full sovereignty of states over their natural resources; control over multinational corporations (MNCs); nationalisation of foreign investment; sharing of common natural resources; right of primary commodity producers to organise their own associations; right to sub-regional, regional and international cooperation; equitable terms of trade; duty of the developed countries (DCs) to transfer technology to the less developed countries (LDCs); remunerative prices for the primary products of the LDCs; transfer of resources from the DCs to the LDCs through disarmament, extension of generalised, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory tariff preferences by the DCs to the LDCs; expansion of trade by the LDCs with the socialist countries; promotion of their mutual trade by the LDCs; increased net flow of financial as well as real resources from the DCs to the LDCs; assistance from the DCs for resource mobilisation by the LDCs; treating the seabed, ocean floor and the subsoil thereof as the common property of all states; full and effective participation of all states in the international decision-making process for the solution of world economic, financial and monetary problems.[2]

Article 8 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties expressly stated that "States should cooperate in facilitating more rational and equitable international economic relations and in encouraging structural changes in the context of a balanced world economy in harmony with the needs and interests of all countries, especially developing countries, and should take appropriate measures to this end."[3]

The International Development Strategy (IDS) adopted at Twenty-fifth Session of General Assembly aimed at 6 per cent average annual rate of growth in the GDP of the LDCs during the Second UN Development Decade (1971 to 1981), with the possibility of achieving a higher rate in the second half of the Decade. It was expected by IDS that the gap in the living standards between the DCs and the LDCs would be abridged.[4]

ISSUES AND MEANS OF NIEO

Main issues of the existing world economic crisis and the various means through which NIEO can be achieved are discussed below. The following requisites are absolutely essential in a medium to long-run context.

1. *Food and Agricultural Productivity.* Substantial increase in food productivity in the Third World is required which will help to cushion their terms of trade against adverse demand conditions affecting commercial crops. An increase in agricultural productivity especially in foodgrain production is essential if the international economic order is to restructured. For formulating an effective food and agricultural policy, the complex inter-relationship between land, population and labour force in agriculture had to be unfolded in greater detail. There exist no operational guidelines for restructuring agriculture apart from provision of technologies and inputs to the farmers through public extension programmes, which has not been particularly successful in developing countries.

In this sphere, developed countries are hesitant to provide much help to the developing nations. The United States has the greatest export surplus which can perhaps help in feeding the millions in the poorest countries. A section in the US is of view that food can be used as a weapon like oil.

2. *Rapid Growth and Development Aid.* A rapid growth in the production of capital goods is equally important for developing countries. It has been suggested that the developed countries should contribute one per cent of their GNP to the developing countries as development aid. The goals of NIEO can be rapidly achieved by means of development aid. The developed countries can also help the LDCs by writing off of old debts or putting a moratorium over it. The Third World debt in 1990 stood at approximately 1.3 trillion dollars which represents approximately 44 per cent of the gross national product of all developing countries combined. In sub-Saharan Africa, the debt reached about 108 per cent of GNP. The international debt strategy is in a state of transition since 1987, despite aggravating debt difficulties with the increased arrears payment by middle-income countries. It is generally agreed that the only viable path to normalise debtor-creditor relationship is "growth (4-5 per cent per annum) through structural adjustment in debtor countries and a supportive external economic environment" which can be facilitated by the World Bank, the IMF and other sources. The moot question is whether this growth rate can be achieved fast enough and whether the needed financial support will be forthcoming. If LDCs seek more aid or loans, what they should do is to use the resources for higher growth and profitability in order to improve their repaying capacity. What is needed is to formulate economic policies that reduce the burden of payment of interest and repayment of the principal (debt).

3. *Trade.* In regard to foreign trade LDCs demand higher prices on their export goods, some sort of guarantee of a similar development for export and import prices and better possibilities for facilitating entry to the markets of the rich countries.

The gains from trade, or any other advantage, get accumulated in the developed countries while they do not seem to get consolidated in the less developed countries. This differential pattern between the countries in the so-called 'core' and 'periphery' is partly due to low consumption levels and partly to paucity of institutions for consolidating the gains in the developing countries. The need is to consolidate gains from trade in these countries.

Another way out for the developing countries is to open their own markets in the developed countries for exporting their products. The developed countries can provide protection to the interest of less developed countries. Mutually agreed norms can be chalked out in order to bear the burden equally.

There is an unrealised potential for more trade amongst the developing countries. South-South cooperation in trade may also help LDCs overcome limitations of domestic market size, offer possibilities for realisation of economies of scale, lead to a decrease in transportation costs and, in the long run, foster indigenous technological development. The level of South-South trade in the contemporary world economy appears to be low, at first sight, but is roughly consistent with the distribution of world income and the direction of international trade flows. There appears to be, however, important economic, institutional and political constraints to an increase in South-South cooperation.

4. *Regional Cooperation.* It may be both a feasible and a desirable strategy to opt for regional cooperation on related mutually agreed upon items, selected cooperation between countries who

agree on the issues based on mutual advantage, and concentrate on areas of like mindedness rather than conflict. This could be a transition strategy, creating the necessary precondition for more global cooperation.

5. *Industrial Restructuring*. The interdependence between the industrialised and the developing countries has deepened. A growing number of developing countries has been integrated into the international economic system which has remained heavily dominated by the industrialised nations. It may be stressed that this development was mainly the result of the process of internationalisation of capital. A large part of the volume of exports from the developing countries to the industrialised countries has been a result of the expansion of west-based commercial and business corporations that have set up subsidiaries in many developing countries.

The developing countries intend raising their degree of industrialisation. This goal cannot be attained without the involvement of industrialised countries. It is not evident how far these industrialised countries are willing to help and cooperate with the developing countries. The latter countries wanted that they should be entitled to "a larger perpetual share of world industrial production". This demand of developing countries was opposed in the UN General Assembly by the representatives of the European community and Japan. Developed countries were willing to accept only that the developing countries are entitled to a "larger industrial production".

As a result of the growing competition between countries in attracting investments, a globally managed restructuring may appear to be an illusion. If the developing countries want to remain involved in international economic trade relations they have to consider significant modifications in their domestic structures to increase their leverage. To draw a policy in the sphere of industrial restructuring is thus somewhat risky task.

6. *Energy*. Both industrialisation and agricultural growth strategies in the developing countries require increasing inputs of energy. Excessive dependence on fossil fuels could lead to serious balance of payment problems in countries which depend upon petroleum import. Irrespective of this balance of payment problem, conventional wisdom also advocates a search for alternative and renewable sources of energy in view of the fast depletion of the scarce resources on our globe.

With regard to policy choices for augmenting the energy supply, water is identified as a major source for further exploration. More often, hydel power stations are highly capital intensive and rivers flow across countries. Inter-country cooperation in cost-sharing and output sharing, for both power generation and irrigation would serve a useful purpose. Other areas of inter-country cooperation among South and Southeast Asian countries were in petroleum refining and thermal electricity generation.

7. *Regulation of TNCs*. Transnational Corporations (TNCs) or Multinational Corporations (MNCs) which are responsible for internationalising capital in contemporary world thus form an important part of the NIEO debate. Developed countries are failing to transfer the promised 1 per cent of their GNP per annum to the developing countries as development aid, due to internal budgetary crises. The developed countries have been arguing that larger resource transfers to the developing countries could take place through direct investment of the Transnational Capital. Since TNCs are oligopolistic and profit motivated commercial entities, with centres of their decision-making located in the developed countries, they may not necessarily provide the full benefit of the resource transfer to the developing countries.

The host developing countries have to equip themselves to maximise their gains from TNC operations. Two ways are suggested for this (i) regulation of TNC operations and (ii) development

from within. In order to be able to devise an efficient system of regulations it is found necessary to understand and examine the characteristics of the TNCs. Furthermore, it is conceived that within a country, a countervailing power should be developed not only in laws, but also in terms of strengthening the domestic economy. There is an urgent need to examine what institutional forms could be developed as countervailing power to the TNCs. It is also imperative that more research be done to examine the various forms of TNC participation, and the behavioural differences between them. Finally, the possibility of South-South investments, as an answer to the present TNC investments must be explored.

8. *Technology Transfer*. The role of transfer of technology from developed to the developing countries is be of crucial importance in view of the wide disparity between the technological levels in the two groups. The disparity in the level of technology is conceived to be one that was leading to an accentuation of income disparities between the nations. The widening technology gap was not only due to the much higher expenditure on their R & D effort by the North compared to the South, but also due to the former's capacity to realise the fruits of respective innovations by inducing changes in the global pattern of production and trade. For the developed countries, technology has in fact become an instrument of domination.

It is stressed that acquisition of technological capability and technological autonomy by the developing countries are prerequisites for reducing the technology gap. Developing countries cannot solely depend on technology transfer from developed countries for increasing productivity. The need for and the possibility of autonomous technology development in developing countries is emphasised. Many of these countries have the required capabilities and, in the absence of an adequate domestic effort, their capabilities are under-utilised or sucked away in the form of a 'brain drain" to the developed countries. In the long run, autonomous technology development is necessary for changing the present patterns of dependence. It is realised that this technology development cannot be restricted to the low-level labour intensive "appropriate technology" but would have to extend to many areas of high technology which are also required for the efficient development of national resources.[5]

Scientific and technological know-how is precisely not under the direct control of the developing countries but under the control of multinational enterprises. For achieving the goals of NIEO, it is essential that developing countries should ensure that the developed countries are rid of the rights to produce any technique which they are capable of producing. It has to be ensured that such a system of rule is not monopolised or usurped by the MNCs.

9. *Reform of the International Monetary system*. A complete reform of the international monetary system and financial institutions having highly inequitable pattern of adjustment rules are urgently needed. The powerful international bodies where decisions are taken and can be enforced are the Security Council of the UN, the World Bank, other important economic organisations and international financial institutions (IFI). The developing countries have little or no power in these important world bodies. Unless LDCs are given share in decision-making of these bodies, it is very difficult to realise the goals of NIEO.

The World Trade Organisation

The World Trade Organisation (WTO) came into being on January 1, 1995 when the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) formally transformed itself into this organisation as a major entity overseeing international trade. The WTO was set up as a result of a world trade treaty known as the 'Final Act' (of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations). The Final Act was signed

at a ministerial conference at Marrakesh (Morocco) in April 1994. The WTO mandate was extended beyond the traditional GATT role of negotiations related to trade in goods to include trade in services as well as intellectual property rights. The three multilateral agreements which make the WTO charter include: (i) GATT 1994; (ii) the General Agreement on Trade in Service (GATS) and (iii) Trade-related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The principles inherited from GATT and embodied by WTO include promoting a trading system that is *non-discriminatory, reciprocal, liberalised, predictable, fair and helpful to less developed countries.*

The WTO administers the above mentioned agreements through various councils and committees. It is a watchdog of international trade, regularly examining the trade systems of individual members. Its code of conduct includes the principle of non- discrimination between trading partners and equal treatment for imports and domestic goods in internal markets. The WTO is theoretically open to all nations who merely undertake to comply with the rules and accept the obligations. These are, that the member-countries should practise free trade, establish a fixed level of import tariff and finally accept the verdict of the WTO in any dispute with another member-country. Its headquarter is at Geneva.

In 1996, the Ministerial Conference of the WTO took place. The ministers failed to adopt a US initiative to include labour standard in the WTO programme, saying that the ILO was the most appropriate body to deal with such issues. Agricultural trade liberalisation was next on the agenda, to begin in 1999. These two issues have been the most contentious, since imposition of labour standards would take away the advantage of poor countries while agricultural trade could wipe out the food security of others.

The demonstrators at the summit meeting of the WTO at Seattle (USA) in November 1999 showed that many groups are violently against free trade. The protesters said the WTO rules advance the global ambitions of multinational companies at the expense of jobs and the environment. They also attacked the WTO for being too secretive. Different developing countries too expressed their unhappiness on the attempt to impose labour and environmental standards as part of trade. The result was that the talks ended in failure and the process of liberalising trade received a set back. The US is equally unhappy, since the WTO takes decisions by majority vote and the US has no veto power. It would also have to change its own laws and bring them in conformity with WTO rulings. The 135-member countries were unable to come to an agreement at Seattle summit on the future working of the WTO. In 2003 its membership rose to 148. Originally it had 125 members.

The 2001 WTO ministerial meeting in Doha (Qatar) saw the launch of a new round of multilateral trade talks on breaking down protection barriers. The fifth ministerial meeting at Cancun (Mexico) in 2003 failed. The Cancun meeting was expected to finish 50 per cent of the WTO's Doha agenda that was planned to be completed by January 1, 2005. This deadline is unlikely to be met now. The Cancun meet collapsed due to the following divisive issues: Poor countries wanted better access to Western markets for their agricultural products; the US wanted concessions from developing countries in return for lower trade barriers. Cancun has seen the emergence of a very vocal and powerful block called the G-21, comprising developing countries led by India, China and Brazil. The G-21 sought an end to the EU-US farm subsidies, which allow Western agricultural products to flood global markets, ruining local farmers. This was opposed by the US and the EU.

Global trade is in the interest of all nations and any set-back to framing the rules of the game is a set back to every member. Hard positions may yield some clapping, but economic gains alone will benefit in the long-term.

Political Conditions of NIEO

Jan P. Pronk of UNCTAD, Geneva had suggested the following political conditions for the attainment of NIEO:

(i) A redefinition of the policy content of a NIEO (in the areas of money and finance, energy, food, industry and trade). This should receive more attention than it has uptil now—at least as much as the attention being given to the procedures for negotiating a NIEO.

(ii) The implementation of a world emergency and recovery programme, which should precede negotiations for a NIEO.

(iii) Rethinking national policies both within industrialised countries—in particular, growth, stabilisation, employment and social welfare policies—and within developing countries—such as distribution policies and self-reliance options; and a willingness to discuss domestic policies internationally in order to harmonise them with the necessary international policies.

(iv) South-South cooperation, politically as well as economically, in order to strengthen the bargaining position of the Third World.

(v) East-West détente and disarmament.

(vi) Basing negotiations on some form of short-term mutual and long-term common interests, in the awareness of both interdependence to be increased and inequalities to be decreased. This would have consequences for both negotiation tactics and institutions.[6]

NIEO-STILL A MIRAGE

Efforts to achieve NIEO were made as far back as 1974 and the same were pursued in the UNO, UNCTAD, NAM summits, CHOGM, G-77 conferences, G-15 sessions etc. But success in this respect still eludes the developing countries. Throughout the 1980s poverty has been on the increase in the Third World, the disparities in income and life-styles between the developed and developing countries have widened and indebtedness of the latter has become more critical.

But even the goals of the International Development Strategy (1971-1981) have not been achieved, even partially. The target of 6 per cent average annual rate of growth of the GDP of the LDCs was contingent on the transfer of 1 per cent of their GNP by the DCs to the LDCs. But not only have the former failed to realise this target, there has in fact been a progressive decline in their official development assistance to the latter. The same trend is going on since 1973, and no major rich nation has so far transferred even one-third of 1 per cent of the GNP to the poor nations in the form of official development assistance.

Terms of trade have not been changed, tariff barriers have not been removed, international economic institutions have not restructured, no international monetary reforms involving the LDCs have taken place, the external debt problem remains intact, and the MNCs are still expanding their tentacles over the developing countries. Bandyopadhyaya rightly criticises: "there has taken place a spectacular increase in arms sales by the DCs to the LDCs during the seventies. In other words, the military-industrial complex of the DCs, instead of being interested in the NIEO, have been busy off loading the military and obsolete technologies of international capitalism on the LDCs and making enormous profits in the process. Naturally, the so-called North-South dialogues between the DCs and the LDCs for the establishment of the NIEO have proved to be little more than hollow-mockery[7]".

It is but natural, therefore, that the developing countries are generally unsuccessful to achieve the target of 6 per cent average annual growth-rate, which is regarded essential for take-off into

self-sustained economic growth. With the exception of the OPEC, where artificially high growth rates can be seen due to the oil factor, the LDCs have generally fallen considerably below this target.[8] Countries of South have generally attributed the failure of the North countries to honour their commitments to the "intransigence" of the latter and their lack of "political will" with regard to the creation of the NIEO.

The LDCs must free themselves, as far as possible, from the economic chains of the DCs, through rapid economic development and mutual economic cooperation as well as through a calculated political offensive on the infrastructures of global neo-imperialism. But rapid economic development in the LDCs presupposes a radicalisation of their own domestic structures. Moreover, the inner contradictions among the LDCs would make any attempt at mutual economic cooperation difficult, unless such cooperation is appropriately perceived as an essential strategy in this global endeavour towards NIEO.

From this perspective, the strategy adopted by the LDCs for achieving the NIEO appears to suffer from two major deficiencies, according to Bandyopadhyaya. *First*, it could not emphatically stress the need for the self-sustained economic growth and self-reliance of the Third World countries, and the institutional and political reorganisation which would be necessary for this purpose. *Second*, it has been unable to understand the gravity and the multi-dimensional nature of the global struggle that "the LDCs would have to wage against the DCs for any significant restructuring of international economic relations."[9]

There seems to have been some shift in the behaviour of the North. While they have reluctantly accepted the concept of a NIEO, they have been systematically avoiding the broader implications of the concept, or accept any one of the three major demands put forward by the Third World countries. They do not yet seem, according to Varma, to recognise (1) that the existing system—through trade barriers, limited access to technology and capital and inadequate monetary and financial arrangements—is discriminatory against the poor nations; (2) that the developing countries have a right to participate in the world economic system without losing control over their natural resources or their freedom to follow their own priorities or policies; and (3) that this can be possible only through (a) a gradual restructuring of international financial institutions, and (b) a reorientation of policies governing relations between developed and developing countries. "It is true that a large number of institutions have come into existence in recent years which are pleading for the cause of the poor nations and some leading intellectuals in the West have begun to acknowledge the inadequacies in the existing international system, the recognition of the necessity of a change at the official level seems to be dim..."[10]

Macro-economic stabilisation and 'structural adjustment programme' (SAP) launched by the IMF contains a powerful means of economic restructuring which affects the livelihood of millions of people. Instead of improving the situation, the SAP has contributed towards the global impoverishment. According to Chossudovsky, "the application of the IMF's 'economic medicine' has led to the compression of real earnings and to the reinforcement of the cheap labour export economy: the same menu of budgetary austerity, trade liberalisation and privatisation is applied simultaneously in more than 70 indebted countries in the third world and eastern Europe".[11]

Debtor countries lose economic sovereignty and control over fiscal and monetary policy, the central bank and the ministry of finance are re-structured, state institutions are undone and an economic slavery is introduced. A 'parallel government' that supersedes civil society is set up by the international financial institutions (IFIs). Countries are blacklisted if they fail to achieve the IMF's 'performance targets'.

The execution of the structural adjustment programme in a large number of individual debtor

countries works for the 'Internationalisation' of macro-economic policy under the direct control of the IMF and the World Bank on behalf of formidable financial and political interests (e.g. The Paris and London Clubs, the G-8). The new kind of economic tutelage and political control—a kind of 'market colonialism'—supersedes people and governments through the impersonal interplay (and deliberate manipulation) of market forces. The Washington based international bureaucracy is assigned the duty of implementing a global economic plan which affects the livelihood of more than 80 per cent of the world's population. If all these economic trends are any indication the developing countries may have to pass through a long period before its goal of NIEO is achieved.

In his presentation at the UNCTAD-X (Bangkok, February 2000) Mr. Michael Camdessus, the outgoing Managing Director of the IMF, focused on the consequences of an "exclusion" of marginalised countries from the process of globalisation. He used such expressions as "humanising globalisation," "a new paradigm of development" and called for the need to deliver globalisation to the least developed countries. In the new global financial architecture, there should be a place for developing countries to sit with G-8 rich countries to thrash out the global economic problems.

The Director-General of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), Mr. Juan Somavia, felt at the UNCTAD-X that globalisation in its present form would not last long. Assailing the present form of market-driven, almost one-sided globalisation, the ILO chief said "one gets fed up" with the largely western prescription of "one size fits all." He feared this kind of prescriptive globalisation "was not delivering" an international order that could be politically and socially acceptable to all countries including the developing countries.[12]

The NAM which rallied against the industrialised North and their grip on the world's economy and resources, no longer even talks about a NIEO or a New World Information and Communication Order in the post-cold war era.

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35

International Terrorism

Over the years, terrorism has become another great problem in international relations. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in both domestic and international politics. Since the dawn of civilisation it has been used as a tool to achieve political ends. However, it has emerged as a global problem and a cause of concern for international community only in the twentieth century. More specifically it became an international problem since 1950s. The process of globalisation in the post Cold War era, has also globalised terrorism. The spectre of terrorism, trans-border and trans-oceanic *per se* has currently shaken the world with panic and scare, as never before. It is a threat to international peace and community—no less grave than the Nuke terror. It is terrible still the latter is manageable by some kind of regulatory and control regime, terrorism is uncontrollable by any means. Today, terrorism is not just confined within the territorial limits of a nation but literally "international" in that its range is trans-national, its membership is world wide, its networking is global and targets can be anywhere anytime—from Nairobi to Oklahoma, Beirut to New York, Dar es Salaam to Kashmir. Most countries of the world including Russia, Spain, Japan, Italy, Israel, India, Ireland, Sri Lanka, China, the UK and the USA are suffering due to terrorist activities in one way or another. International terrorist attack increased from about 342 a year between 1995 and 1999 to 387 between 2000 and 2001.

India has been the worst sufferer from the activities of Pakistan-Afghanistan trained terrorists who are operating in Kashmir through some self-styled groups. But no one including the US took India's warning and concern seriously. For the last about twenty five years, India has been battling with terrorism almost single handedly.

Definition of Terrorism

The word terrorism was coined in the guillotine days of the French Revolution, though the practice of it is much older.[1] The concept of terrorism dates back to the bloody assassinations of the ancient Greeks, Romans, Hindus and to barbaric customs such as suspending people over fires for not paying their taxes or heeding message of the rulers etc.[2] In the beginning it was used as a tool to attack or stop barbaric governance within a State. Accordingly the views of the writers also differed with respect to the activities of the people in each period and their perceptions confined only to defend the rights of the people against the arbitrary governance of the monarchies.

The word terrorism first appeared during the French Revolution. Some of the revolutionaries who seized power adopted a policy of violence against their enemies. That period in history was known as the 'Reign of terror.' The term terrorism has different meanings and has no internationally accepted definition. It is a less easily defined term. It is full of political and intellectual ambiguity . Commonly it is mentioned as use of force, creating terror or fear, intimidating methods, especially to secure political ends, liquidating resistance, stifling dissent, guerrilla warfare etc.

Publicity forms an essential component of a terrorist's strategy. According to Hans Morgenthau, "Terrorism is what the bad guys do." A Chinese philosopher once said, "Kill one and frighten 10,000" is the motto behind the terrorist acts. A terrorist thus concentrates more on creating a state of fear for achieving his goals. The objective as Walter Laquer observes "is to attract an audience and deliver a message."[3]

One of the earliest attempts to clarify the concept of terrorism in modern social science defined it as "the method whereby an organised group or party seeks to achieve its avowed aims chiefly through the systematic use of violence."[4]

According to Thornton, terrorism is a symbolic act intending to influence political behaviour of the country by extra normal means, entailing the use or threat of violence.[5] The most important element in Thornton's definition is the claim that all acts of terror in an internal war are deliberately propagandist acts, which are always designed to convey a message, sign or warning to either their opponents, the neutral population or to those who belong to or sympathies with the terrorist movement.

No doubt use or threat of violence is an important element of terrorism yet all kinds of violence do not involve political terrorism. But most acts of violence such as wounding, arson, assassination, destruction of property etc., are defined as crimes under the legal codes of all states. Unlike violence, the effectiveness of terrorism rests mainly on the element of surprise and fear. Terrorism differs from other crimes in that terrorists always claim to be acting for a cause other than their personal benefit. A terrorist's first loyalty is not himself but to his cause, just as soldier's is to his country. Hence, terrorists generally are willing to take greater risks than criminals, whose concern is their own safety. Most other crimes are of a personal nature in which the victim is a central figure and generally the main audience. In terrorism, on the other hand, a victim who normally is not the one for whom the message is intended. Watson rightly points out, "terrorism must not be defined only in terms of violence, but also in terms of propaganda. The two are both in operation together."[6]

The term terrorism was first defined at the Third Conference for the Unification of Penal Law held at Brussels in 1931 as follows:

"The deliberate use of means capable of producing a common danger to commit an act of imperiling life, physical integrity or human health or threatening to destroy substantial property."[7] Such acts included "Arson; explosion; flooding or submersion; ignition of asphyxiating or noxious substances; interruption of the normal operation of means of transport or communication; damage to or destruction of government property and public utilities; pollution; fouling, or deliberate poisoning of drinking water or staple foods, causing or propagating contagious or epidemic disease; any wilful act which endangers human lives and the community and so on."[8]

The Government of France has given different arguments in term of defining terrorism. According to it "any act of barbarism committed in the territory of third state by a foreigner against a person who has a nationality, other than of the offenders, for the purpose of exerting a pressure on a conflict not strictly internal in nature is called an act of terrorism and that foreigner is terrorist."[9] Grant Wardlow defines political terrorism as "the use of violence by an individual or a group, whether acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety or fear indicating effects in a target group larger than the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into the acceding to the political demands of perpetrators."[10]

This definition gives an elaborate commentary on various aspects such as state terrorism, state

sponsored terrorism and terrorism by non-state actors, like the various factions of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the Baader Meinholf Gang of West Germany, the Sikh extremists, the Red Brigade of Italy, etc.[11]

Definition of 'terrorism' in the US Intelligence and Surveillance Act of 1979 and the United Kingdom Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1976 'stress the use of violence to coerce or intimidate the civilian population in order to affect government policy."[12]

Another definition put forth by the United States government is also given here: "The term terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience."[13]

Definition of International Terrorism

Latest communication and transportation opportunities have enabled an international net work of terrorism to develop with a certain degree of centralised organisational structure. International terrorism has an international network of logistic links and operative structure at its disposal. Terrorist groups such as Osama bin Laden's *Al-Qaida* spread throughout the world operating as a network. They have a global reach with presence in several countries. They also have support and operation cells in different countries. They have access to weapons including explosives. It is learnt that they have been endeavouring to acquire nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

Even the Security Council resolutions like Resolution 1373 do not give a detailed definition of terrorism. They just give examples of terrorism which include the 9/11 attacks, the acts of specific groups like Al-Qaida. These resolutions give an impression that these were passed to satisfy security concerns of the more influential and sufferer members of the Security Council. From 1996 onwards, the United Nations has been considering the proposal of a comprehensive treaty on international terrorism. But no success has been achieved as the negotiations are deadlocked owing to the definition of terrorism. The deadlock is caused by the following questions by certain members: (i) What distinguishes a "terrorist organization" from a "liberation movement"? (ii) Do one can exclude activities of national armed forces, even if they are perceived to commit acts of terrorism? (iii) If not, how much of this constitutes "state terrorism."

In spite of the disagreement that persists among the States to arrive at a legal or universally accepted definition of terrorism both domestic and international terrorism can be broadly specified as "criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a State of terror in the minds of particular persons, or groups of persons, or the general public."[14] According to the Adhoc Committee on Terrorism of the UN: "Any act of violence endangering or taking innocent human lives or jeopardizing their fundamental freedoms and affecting more than one State, such act being committed as a form of coercion to secure some specific end."[15]

According to the Draft document submitted by India to the UN on a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism in October 2000, "Any person by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, does an act intended to cause: (a) death or serious bodily injury to any person; or (b) serious damage to a state or government facility, a public transportation system or infrastructure facility with the intent to cause extensive destruction of such place, facility or system, or where such destruction results or is likely to result in a major economic loss; when the purpose of such act by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act; and any person who participates as an accomplice in an offence and organises, directs or instigates others, aids, abets, facilitates or counsels the commission of an offence; and or in any other way contributes through a group or an organisation with a knowledge to commit criminal activity.[16]

An incident of violence can be judged to have an international terrorism dimension if it signifies that (1) the terrorist action is supported by one or more foreign pro-terrorist regime: (2) the act was aimed to influence international opinion and whether the attack is on foreign personnel or it is aimed at overthrowing a foreign government.[17]

Though there exist a number of definitions on terrorism in national and international perspectives, the few definitions specified above, certainly reflect the principal elements of international terrorism. Accordingly, international terrorism can be stated or defined as the acts of any individual or a group or an organisation or a rogue state directed at a particular states, or an organisation of international stature or the civilians of any state, or to attack one or more states at a time or at different intervals to induce fear into the minds of the people of the world or any act of violence containing international dimensions or consequences of it reflect on the relations of the national-states.

Aims and Tactics

What is the rationale that motivates terrorists and animates terrorism? The objective of this part of the chapter is to understand the depth of terrorists' frustration, the core of their aims and motivations, and to appreciate how these considerations affect their choice of tactics and targets.

The fundamental aims of international terrorism and its varied domestic counterparts are to destroy, by any means, the fundamentals of responsible constitutional governance. In particular, terrorism seeks to force civilised society to violate its own basic values and the disciplines that sustain them. In simple words, terrorism seeks to scare the human decency out of people in order to get them to perform the purposes of terrorist leaders and networks by direct action, or at the least, through support for or somnolent consent to the elimination of reasonable order locally and globally.[18]

The aims of almost all categories of terrorism is to pose a threat to those they consider oppressors, enemies and obstacles in the achievement of their goals. Their tactics includes hijacking, black-mail, ruthless killing by shooting and use of bombs, etc. Terrorist groups are generally too small and weak to operate successfully against governments. Therefore, violence is not their immediate goal and that's why they insist upon psychological rather than practical results. The 'purpose of terrorism, therefore, is to create an emotional state of extreme fear among specific groups, and thereby, ultimately alter their behaviour and bring about general or particular changes in the structure of society and government. For example, the aim of Palestinian terrorist attacks in Jerusalem in 1975 was to gain popularity. Therefore, terrorists are generally dedicated to a cause, for the achievement of which even the sacrifice of human life including their own lives are not considered so important. A terrorist wants to be an example for others. Although his acts are criminal they become a sign of courage to be followed by the rest of the group's followers. Thus, jostling crowds, busy hotels, crowded trains, business centres, water highways, countryside, even small rural areas are increasingly becoming targets of modern terrorists. The meek nature of the general masses at large has prevented cognate efforts by security forces to identify terrorists immediately.[19]

The tactics and technology of the subversive groups have become more sophisticated and their target wide-ranging. The targetting patterns of the extremists include leaders of importance, public figures, common man, key installations, industries and power stations. It becomes a difficult task for the law enforcing agencies to protect these targets from possible attacks due to the presence of surprise element.

The use of terror by certain groups is to attain political objective. Terrorism has been used by political organisations with both rightist and leftist objectives, by nationalistic and ethnic groups, by revolutionaries, by armies and governments themselves. In the latter half of the 19th century, terrorism was adopted by adherents of anarchism in western Europe, Russia and USA.

The 20th century witnessed great changes in the use and practise of terrorism. It became the hallmark of a number of political movements, stretching from the extreme right to the extreme left of the political spectrum. Technological advances such as automatic weapons and compact, electrically detonated explosives gave them a new mobility and lethality.[20]

Psychological aims of terrorists are not less significant. Hoffman explains, "it must be recognised that terrorism is fundamentally a form of psychological warfare. This is not to say that people do not tragically die or that assets and property are not wantonly destroyed. It is, however, important to note that terrorism is designed, as it has always been, to have profound psychological repercussions on a target audience. Fear and intimidation are precisely the terrorists' timeless stock-in-trade. Significantly, terrorism is also designed to undermine confidence in government and leadership and to rent the fabric of trust that bonds society. It is used to create unbridled fear, dark insecurity, and reverberating panic. Terrorists seek to elicit an irrational, emotional response."[21]

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS

Major Terrorist groups in the world are:

Worldwide

Al-Qaida: Established by Osama bin Laden in the late 1980s, it aims to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the world by working with Islamic extremist groups. Has worldwide reach and is financed by approximately $300 million that Bin Laden inherited from his family.

Palestine

Abu Nidal Organisation: Split from Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1974. Carried out terrorist attacks in 20 countries. Relocated to Iraq in December 1988. Has operational presence in Lebanon and several Palestinian refugee camps. Operates over a wide area, including West Asia, Asia and Europe. Has considerable support from Iraq, Libya, and Syria (until 1987).

HAMAS: Formed in late 1987. Wants Islamic Palestinian state in place of Israel. Concentrated in Gaza Strip and West Bank. Receives funding from Palestinian expatriates, Iran, and benefactors in Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states.

Palestine Islamic Jehad: Same goal as HAMAS. Receives financial aid from Iran and limited assistance from Syria.

Palestine Liberation Front: Receives support mainly from Iraq. Has also received support from Libya

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine : Marxist-Leninist group founded in 1967 as a member of the PLO. Operates in Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and the Occupied Territories. Receives safe haven and some logistic assistance from Syria.

Lebanon

Hizbullah : Radical Shia group, wants increasing political power, opposed to Israel. Closely allied with and often directed by Iran. Operates in the Bekaa Valley, Beirut, and Lebanon. Has cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North America, and Asia. Receives substantial aid and training from Iran and Syria.

Philippines

Abbu Sayyaf Group: Smallest and most radical of Islamic separatist groups. Some of its members have studied or worked in West Asia and developed ties with *mujahideen* in Afghanistan. Wants an independent Islamic state in some areas in southern Philippines

Algeria

Salafi Group for Call and Combat (GSPC): The most effective armed group in Algeria. Algerian government has accused Iran and Sudan of supporting them.

Spain

Basque Fatherland and Liberty : Aims to establish independent homeland based on Marxist principles in northern Spain. Operates in the Basque autonomous regions of Spain and south-western France. Received training in Libya, Lebanon, and Nicaragua. Also appears to have ties with IRA.

Egypt

Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya : Egypt's largest militant group, active since the late 1970s. Rifai Taha Musa, a hard-line former member of the group, signed Osama Bin Laden's 1988 fatwa calling for attacks against US civilians. Primary goal is to overthrow the Egyptian government and replace it with an Islamic state. Has worldwide presence, including Sudan, UK, Afghanistan, Austria and Yemen.

Al- Jehad : Active since the late 1970s. Close partner of Al-Qaida. Goal same as Al-Islamiyya. Wide network outside Egypt, including Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, Lebanon and UK.

India (Jammu & Kashmir)

Harkat ul-Mujahideen: Formerly known as the Harkat ul-Ansar, based in Pakistan, operates primarily in Kashmir. Its leader, Fazlur Rehman Khalil, linked to bin Laden and signed his fatwa in 1988 calling for attacks on US and Western interests. Operated terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. Linked to hijacking of IA plane to Kandahar. Has supporters in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), Pakistan, Kashmir. Includes Arab veterans of Afghan war. Cadres trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Collects donations from Saudi Arabia, other Gulf and Islamic states, Pakistanis and Kashmiris.

Jaish-e-Mohammed: Islamist group in Pakistan, has rapidly expanded since it was formed in February 2001. Aim is to unite Kashmir with Pakistan. Based in Peshawar and Muzaffarabad, but terrorist activities primarily in Kashmir. Maintains training camps in Afghanistan. Cadre and resources drawn from the Harkat ul-Jehad al-Islami and the Harkat ul-Mujahideen. Has close ties to Afghan Arabs and the Taliban. Bin Laden suspected of funding it .Involved in the attack on the Parliament House in New Delhi on 13 December 2001.

Lashkar-e-Taiba: Armed wing of Pakistan-based Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad. Formed in 1989. One of the three largest and best-trained groups fighting in Kashmir. Based in Muridke (near Lahore) and Muzaffarabad. Trains militants in PoK and Afghanistan. Gets donations from Pakistani community in Persian Gulf and the UK, Islamic Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs),

Pakistani and Kashmiri businessmen. Maintains ties to groups around the world, ranging from Philippines to West Asia and Chechnya.

Turkey

Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) : Aims to establish an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey. Has received safe haven and aid from Syria, Iraq and Iran.

Ireland

Irish Republican Army : Formed in 1969 as clandestine armed wing of Sinn Fein, a political movement dedicated to removing British forces from Northern Ireland, Irish Republic, Britain, and Europe. Has received training and arms from Libya and the PLO.

TYPES OF TERRORISM

Broadly, terrorism may be classified in the following manner:

Repressive/State Terrorism. It denotes complete suppression of people especially opponents and dissidents by the state. For a long time the repressive measures of the state were described as terrorism, hence the term 'state terrorism' was coined. The earlier editions of dictionaries define terrorism in this very context and ascribe it to the state repression of the dissent or protest in their varied manifestations. It was much later that the extremist and violent activities of individuals and groups using arms and ammunition in pursuit of some political ideology or objective were brought within the scope of the definition of terrorism.

Revolutionary and War Terrorism. When terrorism is employed to make a revolution successful and to overthrow a corrupt and repressive regime, it is known as revolutionary terrorism. A sub-category within this type is sub-revolutionary terror that indicates acts committed out of political and ideological consideration. During war when belligerent countries terrorise each other and especially civilian population it is called war terror. Sometimes terrorists apply all kinds of arms, weapons and ammunition to terrorise people. They create war terror by making a war-like condition.

Xeno-terrorism and Homo-terrorism. In Xeno-terrorism terrorist groups fight against foreigners for achieving goals like realignment of political boundaries. They do not depend on the support of the people of the target country and hence are more indiscriminate in the use of violence. Homo-terrorists on the other are fighting for their own countrymen. This group has to fashion its strategies carefully as they cannot afford to lose the popular support. In this type, indiscriminate use of force and violent methods can be counter-productive.

Local, National and International. *Local terrorism* is always confined to a region, area or province of a country. Range and targets of terrorists' activities are limited to a particular region or province to get their political and economic demands accepted. Sometimes provincial or regional political groups adopt terrorism to get their demand of secession or autonomy accepted by the federal government of the country. Terrorism prevalent in north-eastern states of India such as Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura, Manipur etc. fall under this category.

When a whole nation suffers from terrorist activities it is called *national terrorism*. Its targets, range, sphere of activity and network of terrorist groups spread through-out a country but within national boundary. Some Kashmiri terrorist organisations have their network in different cities and states of India. They operate and strike at different places outside the Jammu and Kashmir State.

Among the various types of terrorism, today *international terrorism* coupled with religious extremism has become an important cause of concern for the international community. The emergence of trans-national terrorism involving terrorists of different nationalities planning, training and executing acts of political terrorism has been greatly on the rise. In the post-cold war world, the character and extent of international terrorism have drastically changed with the increase in its destructive power and use of modern communication technologies. Range, sphere of activity and networking of terrorist groups have greatly expanded through-out the world. All these have culminated into the phenomenon of international terrorism. It has been sufficiently defined and explained in the preceding and following paragraphs of this chapter.

State Sponsored Terrorism. As stated above, terrorism has crossed national boundaries. Some governments secretly support terrorist groups by providing weapons, training and money for attacks in other countries which is termed as 'State sponsored international terrorism.'

State sponsored terrorism is being encouraged since two decades by nations with their neighbouring nations. Structural factors are thought to be crucial in explaining specific type of state involvement. The U.S.A. has to take some blame as the leading exporter of this form of terrorism, which by its expansionist and hegemonistic tendencies has sought to use terrorism internationally and elevate to the rank of a foreign policy instrument. The U.S.A. in the past financed, supplied arms and provided military training to some nations in its fight against the erstwhile Soviet Union.

This kind of terrorism starts at the behest of a belligerent neighbouring state normally and gets mixed up with local problems so as to hide its real designs. It starts with grievances of local people towards authority and later for mass base it may attach for a particular cause say, religion, region, ethnicity etc. Youth-unemployed and frustrated form the core of this group. Recently, South Asia has emerged as a hub for international terrorism with Pakistan and Afghanistan being the major sponsores. Terrorist organisations like Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Harkat-e-Toiba, Lashkar-e-Toiba etc., from Pakistan and Al-Qaida, Taliban from Afghanistan enjoyed the patronage of their respective governments which was a known fact.

Religion based Terrorism. A close scrutiny of international terrorism over the last two decades have been the resurgence and proliferation of terrorist groups motivated by a religious imperative. According to the US State Department Report, religiously motivated and sectarian terrorism will continue to grow in the near future. This brand of terrorism regards violence as a divine duty. It is not restricted to a particular religion. White Supremacists in the US, the radical Jewish groups in Israel, radical Sikh fundamentalists and conservative Hindu elements in India and Islamic fundamentalism (Al- Qaida network) all over the world fall under this category. A few nations like Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Sudan, Iraq, N. Korea, Syria, Libya, Iran (the last seven nations were called as "Rogue States") have taken this form of terrorism too far which has divided the world into two major religious groups - Islamic nations and Non-Islamic nations (in the post September 11 attacks) threatening each other.

One kind of fundamental Islamic sentiment of a few misguided religious bigots is responsible for present terrorism that creates the horrible global crisis now. Such a fundamentalist sentiment grew in size, dimension and extent in the 1980's and 1990's. Its roots are deep-seated in countries like, North Africa's Libya, Tanzania, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Morocco, and Ethiopia. Its adherents have made South Asia, Tajikistan of Central Asia, Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo and Croatia of Southern Europe, Chechnya of Russia, Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia of South East Asia and Zhing Zang region of China their hunting grounds.

In one inventory by *The Economist*, Muslims were responsible for 11 and possibly 12 of 16 major acts of international terrorism between 1983 and 2000. Five of the seven states listed by the US State Department as supporting terrorism are Muslims, as are a majority of foreign organisations listed as engaged in terrorism.[22] Beginning in 1993, the principal attacks on Americans and American facilities all appear to have originated with Osama bin Laden. September 11, 2001 revealed the existence of his sizable global terrorist network with cells in perhaps 40 countries and with the expertise and resources to attempt well-planned simultaneous attacks.[23]

The four major religious extremist organisations of the contemporary world are: Al Qaida, Hizbul Mujahiddeen, Lashkar-e-toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad.

Ideological Terrorism. Ideologically terrorism may be extreme right and extreme left. Naxalite insurgency prevalent in Indian states of Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Tripura etc. and Maoist insurgency in Nepal are the latest examples of leftist terrorism. Maoists in Nepal are fighting for the establishment of the rule of the proletariat. They revolted against the present system after November 2001. The violent tussle between the government forces and the Communist groups in Nepal has recently taken around a thousand of lives.[24]

Suicide Terrorism. Suicide terrorism is the new phenomenon in the sphere of international terrorism. Suicide strikes by organisations like Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jehad in Israel, the Hizbullah in Lebanon, the LTTE in Sri Lanka are some outfits which use this form of terrorism. The threat of suicide bombing confined to W. Asia and S. Asia in the past, is slowly spreading to other regions of the globe. North America and India are the current victims. It has caused untold misery and damage to the common man. This kind of terrorism is driven not only by religious but also ethnic nationalism. In future, majority ethnic communities are at risk of experiencing conflicts driven by ethnic nationalism.

Nuclear Terrorism. The emergence of nuclear, biological, chemical and cyber-terrorism (NBC^2) is directly linked to technological progress. In 1974, Ford Foundation came out with an authoritative and mind boggling analysis and real possibility of nuclear terrorism. Of all the forms of terrorism in the present century, nuclear terrorism has become a major threat to the very existence of human beings. The ever increasing proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials makes the threat of their being stolen by or supplied to terrorists. This has assumed much significance after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the USA.

The terrorists are not only seeking nuclear weapons, but also biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction as also practising cyber terrorism. The main worry for the nations is that nuclear terrorism need not be carried by criminals alone, but even by the disgruntled groups within a particular government. This may happen in case of a civil rebellion or civil war, some competing military groups or factions might seize all or part of the country's nuclear stock pile. Terrorism is often said to be the weapon of the weak against strong. Nuclear terrorism is surfacing as a means to humble even the strongest. Its impact is blood-chilling. The terrorists can do anything they want with this kind of terrorism, and can take the whole of the target nation to ransom.

Cyber Terrorism. It is another recent form of terrorism. Barry Collin, a senior research fellow at the Institute for Security and Intelligence in California , coined the term "cyber terrorism" in the 1980s. The concept is composed of two elements: cyberspace and terrorism. Cyberspace according to Collin may be conceived of as "that place in which computer programmes function and data moves." Terrorism has already been defined earlier in this chapter. By combining definitions of these two, Conway gives a narrowly drawn working definition of cyber terrorism: "premeditated, politically motivated attacks by sub-national groups or clandestine agents against information, computer systems, computer programmes, and data that result in violence against non-combatant targets."[25]

Many have suggested adopting yet broader definitions of the term. Matthew Devost, Brian Houghton and Neal Pollard defined 'information terrorism' as the "intentional abuse of a digital information system, network or component toward an end that supports or facilitates a terrorist campaign or action." They conceive of information terrorism as the "nexus between criminal information system fraud or abuse, and the physical violence of terrorism."[26] This allows for attacks that would not necessarily result in violence against humans—although they might incite fear—to be characterised as terrorist. "We shall define cyber terrorism as any act of terrorism.... that uses information system or computer technology either as a weapon or a target,"[27] stated a recent NATO brief, *Technology and Terrorism.*

To be clear cyber crime and cyber terrorism are not similar. Cyberspace attacks must have a 'terrorist' component to be labeled cyberterrorism. The attacks must instill terror as commonly understood and they must have a political motivation. As for terrorist use of information technology and terrorism involving computer technology as a weapon/target, only the latter may be defined as cyberterrorism.

In 1999, 12 of the 30 groups deemed foreign terrorist organisations by the US State Department had their own websites. In 2002, a majority of the 33 groups on the same list have an on-line presence.

Hizbullah—a Lebanese-based Shiite Islamic group also known as Islamic Jihad, the Revolutionary Justice Organisation, Organisation of the Oppressed on Earth, and Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine—established its collection of web sites in 1995. The group currently manages three such sites: one for its press office, another to describe its attacks on Israeli targets (accessible at <http://www.moqawama.tv>), and a third, Al-Manar TV, for news and information (on-line at <http://www.manartv.com>). All three may be viewed in either English or Arabic.[28]

In a similar vein, the web site of Hamas, the Palestinian militant Islamic fundamentalist group, which is currently off-line, presents political cartoons, streaming video clips, and photomontages depicting the violent deaths of Palestinian children. It has been claimed that the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), a fundamentalist sect warring with the Algerian government, posted a detailed bomb-making manual on the Hamas site. The on-line home of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a guerrilla force in Sri Lanka best known for the 1991 assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, offers position papers, daily news, an online store—for sale are books and pamphlets, videos, audiotapes, CDS, a calendar, and the Tamil Eelam flag—and free e-mail services. Other terrorist sites host electronic bulletin boards, post tips on smuggling money to finance their operations, and provide automated registration for e-mail alerts.[29]

Bio-terrorism. It is a silent reprisal by a faceless enemy whose aim is to spread terror—the terror of getting annihilated by biological and chemical attacks, and, most devastatingly, the terror of just waiting, waiting for a genocide to happen. Biological and chemical weapons have the capability of travelling unseen in the air and causing mass deaths in a matter of days.

The bio-terrorists struck even before the Americas could recover from the devastating September 11 attacks that killed thousands and shattered millions. This time the strike was not a big TV spectacle like the WTC bombings but Anthrax exposure causing deaths.

In March 1995 the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan attacked a Tokyo Subway with Sarin nerve gas,

killing 12 persons and injuring thousands. Besides this chemical attack, there have been at last 15 instances in the last 30 years when bio-weapons have been used. They have been deployed by the Vietnamese in Laos, South African forces in Angola, Soviet troops in Afghanistan, the CIA in Cuba and Iraqis in Iran.

It is ironical, how the US, which now seems most endangered by germ warfare, had taken the lead to reproduce these deadly weapons way back in the 40s. It has not only conducted several bio-weapons tests in the 50s and the 60s, but has also been carrying out mock biological attack in more than 200 sites across the country.

Biological weapons are defined as any infectious agent such as a bacteria or virus used intentionally to inflict harm upon others. This definition is often expanded to include biologically-derived toxins and poisons. Types of biological weapons are Anthrax, Ricin, Botulism, Smallpox, Clostridium Perfringens, and Camelpox. The most common types of chemical weapons are: Sarin (used in Tokyo subway), Soman, VX, Hydrogen Cyanide and Mustard agents.[30]

Complex Terrorism. Keeping in view the destructive power of terrorists, availability of new communication technologies and vulnerability of all nations to terrorists' attack some scholars have given new name to and type of terrorism. Where in the 21st century Kanjilal calls it as *'neo-terrorism,'* Schweitzer and Dorsch name it as *'super terrorism'* and Homer-Dixon refers it as *'complex terrorism.'* In the words of Kanjilal, "It is all evident from the dimension, extent and targets of attacks that it is no mere terror in the conventional sense, but a planned act of aggression in wanton violation of rules of warfare .... it is an indication of what has come to be identified as 'neo-terrorism.'"[31]

Schweitzer and Dorsch define super terrorism as committing violent acts using advanced technological tools to cause massive damage to populations and/or to public and private support networks. It includes all forms of nuclear, chemical and biological attacks except small chemical poisonings. It also includes cyber crime, designed to knock out security, economic and emergency systems.[32]

Thomas Homer-Dixon says that present day nations are easy targets of terrorist attacks due to two trends: *First*, the growing technological capacity of small groups and individuals to destroy things and people; *second*, the increasing vulnerability of our economic and technological systems to carefully aimed attacks. While commentators have devoted considerable ink and airtime to the first of these trends, they have paid far less attention to the second, and they have virtually ignored their combined effect. Together, believes Homer-Dixon, these two trends facilitate a new and sinister kind of mass violence—a *'Complex terrorism'* that threatens modern, high-tech societies in the world's most developed nations.[33]

The regular **growth in the destructive capacity** of small groups and individuals is driven largely by three technological advances:

(i) *more powerful*, portable, affordable, rugged and easy-to-use *weapons* such as rocket-propelled grenade launchers, machine guns, light mortars, land mines and cheap assault rifles like the famed AK-47.

(ii) the dramatic progress in *new communication and information technologies* from satellite to the Internet—facilitate violent groups to marshal resources and coordinate activities around the world.

(iii) modern, high-tech societies are filled with supercharged devices packed with energy, combustibles, and poisons, giving terrorists ample opportunities *to divert* such *nonweapon technologies to destructive ends.* On September 11, 2001 terrorists converted a high-tech means of transport (aeroplanes) into a high-tech weapon of mass destruction to attack the USA.

Dixon further points out the *additional vulnerability* of nations, especially advanced and Western nations, is the product of two key social and technological developments: *first*, the growing complexity and interconnectedness of our modern societies; and *second*, the increasing geographic concentration of wealth, human capital, knowledge, and communication links.[34]

CAUSES OF TERRORISM

A number of causes and factors are responsible for the growth of terrorism. These are unredressed grievances by the government; denial of legitimate political, economic and civil rights; frustration because of poverty, unemployment and economic deprivations; social and political injustice; separation and secessionism etc. Further misery, zionism, fundamentalism, racialism, frustration, political intolerance, religion based crusades, insecurity and confusion are growing in many societies and nations that consequently create psychological conditions for the growth of terrorism.

"Terrorism thrives on varied causes, though terrorist acts often are grounded most essentially in personal or borrowed longing for self-justification: *I am!* Among the leading sources of terrorist causes today is *predatory entrepreneurialism*— social, economic and political—which nourishes destructive passions as it destroys shared norms of civilisation,"[35] observes Newland. No doubt, there are various factors which are responsible for terrorism but many acts of terrorism are the outcome of a deeply ideological conviction or dedication to a certain political cause. It will be pertinent to discuss some of these factors in detail.

1. *Israel-Palestine Rivalry.* One of the foremost causes of the growth of terrorism in the contemporary world is enemity between Israel and Palestine. Newland points out, "A most viable and deeply saddening inspiration for expanding global terrorism is the escalation of generation-long, tit-for-tat, more than one eye-for-an-eye conflict between Israel and Palestine, which have blinded both to the humane roots of their historically great cultures, now plunged into natural degradation, if not destruction."[36]

2. *Colonialism.* Terrorism is also a result of many years of brutal suppression, physical torture and cultural dehumanisation which is used by colonial power in a foreign country. In the process of anti-colonial struggle for national liberation, violence and terrorism became the ultimate tactics. Terrorism is brought about where and when an open political participation is not possible on account of severe oppression.

3. *Extension of Guerrilla Strategy.* Many a time terrorism was employed by revolutionary leaders 'as an extension of guerrilla strategy.'[37] In many national liberation movements as well as communist movements, guerrilla tactics played very important role. Wilkinson clarifies that this does not imply guerrilla "always employ terrorism, or even agree with the principle unless it is extremely carefully supervised. It can rebound on the guerrillas by alienating the popular support which they depend upon."[38] Sometimes terrorism gets provoked by security forces which could wipe out guerrilla cells and capture supplies that have been possible by enormous amount of efforts of the revolutionaries.

4. *Fundamentalism.* Religion has become the main motivating force for terrorism across the globe. In 1980s and the 1940s the underground Jews in Palestine who were forcibly expelling Palestinians in pursuance of the objective of setting up an Israeli state were described as terrorists.

From 1950 onwards, the armed resistance of Palestinians was described as terrorism. In the 1980s terrorism was unleashed by Sikh fundamentalists in the Indian state of Punjab. During the mid 90s in the nerve gas attack on Tokyo subway, police suspected the hand of apocalyptic sect Aum Shinrikyo. Few years earlier, Moscow intensified its efforts to set up 'Troika' alliance to drive away the spectre of Islamic militants. The flock of refugees who have fled due to disturbances in Afghanistan, Kyrghizstan and Uzbekistan has added a new dimension to the existing problem. The Pan-Islamic Wahabite agenda of the Taliban movement, the Islamic fundamentalism in Jammu and Kashmir (India), Chechnya (Russia) and Xinxiang Province (China) are classical examples as how these fundamentalist elements in different nations have used religion to carry out terrorist activities. Samuel Huntington in his famous 'Clash of Civilisations' thesis propounds that in future if there is going to be a major war, it will be fought on religious lines—Islam vs Christianity. International terrorism spread by Osama bin Laden's 'holy warriors' (Jehadis) is also based upon Islamic fundamentalism and Chauvinism.

5. *Organised Crime and Drug-Trafficking.* There is a growing nexus between terrorists and internationally organised crime and drug-trafficking networks. Newland reveals, "Central to terrorism are international criminal activities that are linked to cultural, business, and governmental corruption—in Afghanistan under the Taliban, in Columbia's drug wars, and on streets scattered around the world."[39] A distinction between terrorism and organised crime has become very blurred recently. The terrorist's aims are ideological and political, while organised crime's goal is financial, but the instrument is same. They both need money and arms. In Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tigers engage in drug trafficking to finance their struggle, in north-eastern India terrorists kidnap tea planters and hold them to ransom to help fund their fight for secession. In Chechnya, the secessionists were heavily involved in drug distribution. Pakistan has been one of the major merchants of illicit drugs and supplies a fifth of all heroin consumed in the USA. According to an earlier CIA study, the top brass of Pakistan's armed forces, bureaucracy and political leadership are involved in drug trafficking. The warlords of Afghanistan and their Pakistan friends had been enjoying the benefits of billions of dollars of drug money for over a decade. Terrorism in Kashmir and elsewhere is financed largely by the money provided by the drug lords of Pakistan—and all in the name of Islamic fundamentalism.

6. *Advances in and Availability of Weapons.* Improvement in and easy availability of small weapons are largely responsible for the growth of terrorism in the recent past. Progress in materials engineering, the chemistry of explosives, and miniaturisation of electronics has brought remarkable advances in all key weapons characteristics such as accuracy, destructive power, range, portability, ruggedness, ease-of-use- and affordability. Improvement in light weapons are especially pertinent to trends in terrorism and violence by small groups, where the device of choice include rocket propelled grenade launchers, machine guns, light mortars, land mines, and cheap assault rifles such as famed AK-47. A few years ago, a small band of terrorists or insurgents attacking a rural village might have used bolt-action rifles, which take precious time to reload. Now, cheap assault rifles multiply the possible casualties resulting from such an attack. Like drug traffickers, arms mafia and smugglers are very active these days in several countries. Through them these small weapons are easily available to terrorists. Weapons supplied to Arab-Afghan fighters (*Mujahideens*) against Soviet Union by the US in early 1980s were later on fell into the hands of terrorists. The *Taliban* and *Jehadis* were the reincarnated conglomerate of Afghan *Mujahideen*. The incredible sophistication of modern weapons have enabled terrorists to inflict greater degree of damage, gives an added teeth to modern terrorism.

7. *Secessionism.* After decolonisation many mini and micro-sovereign states with populations

of a million and less came into existence. With this development many small ethnic groups in different nations were encouraged to demand recognition for their separate identity and to seek separate nationhood. This type of terrorism's classic example is the Irish Republican Army and its unrelenting terror campaign against the British. The Irish republican movement traces the cause of Ireland's woes in British occupation of the six countries. Section of Quebecords in Canada, Basques in Spain, Croatians in Yugoslavia, Armenian in Turkey, Tamil in Sri Lanka, Khalistanis and Kashmiri militants in India and Maros in the Philippines are a few among such secessionist groups resorting to political violence as a method for the realisation of their aims. Armed secessionist movements were further accelerated in different parts of the world with the collapse of the Soviet Union and decline of communism.

8. *Modern Technology.* The easier and convenient means of communication and availability of modern technology facilitated terrorism's access to different parts of the world and it started growing up in different countries. The advent of closely interconnected international community, modern and efficient transportation system and instantaneous transmission of news around the world has altered the situation dramatically. It has brought substantial cooperation between different terrorist groups with divergent political, ethnic and geographical backgrounds. Increased density of global communication and information technology turned the world into a global village. Recruitment, training, joint planning and execution have now become easy for any terrorist group as it need not be based in the target nation. It can carry out the attack from anywhere.

Bin Laden's *Al Qaida* became the world's pre-eminent terrorist organisation[40] by "cleverly combining the technological munificence of modernity with a rigidly puritanical explication of age-old tradition and religious practice," observes Hoffman.[41] He was also perfect example of products of the 1990s and globalism. With the satellite telephone, bin Laden was able to communicate with his followers in real time around the world during his isolation. Hoffman further elaborates: "*Al Qaida* operatives, moreover, routinely made use of the latest technology themselves: encrypting messages on Apple Power Macs or Toshiba laptop computers, communicating via e-mail or on Internet bulletin boards, using satellite phones and cell phones themselves.... For bin Laden, the weapons of modern terrorism critically are not only the guns and bombs that they have long been, but the mini-cam, videotape, television and the Internet."[42] This is the best example of bin Laden's quick exploitation of "twenty-first century communications and weapons technology in the service of the most extreme, retrograde reading of holy war."[43] Thus these new communication technologies dramatically enhanced the reach, activity and power of terrorist groups.

9. *Abetment by States.* As Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter has prohibited the use of force by States in their relations with other states, several states started encouraging terrorists through proxy wars and supporting militant outfits or fundamental groups in the name of religion. With the encouragement from states, terrorists in the modern world became more ruthless and technically more efficient with the use of sophisticated weapons.

Pakistan for long has been considered as a partner of militants. It is an open secret that Pakistan supports Muslim rebels in Jammu and Kashmir and spreads the flames of militancy in every nook and corner of this Indian State. The asymmetrical conflict between India and Pakistan, which is the outcome of the differentials and disparities between them in size, population and resources, has resulted in Pakistan's sponsorship of cross border terrorism in the Indian soil. Pakistan's grievances against and fear of India, which are as old as its creation, still remain unsettled and unresolved. As it is not in a position to settle the Kashmir issue through open conflict, Pakistan was constrained to take recourse to proxy, unconventional war with India.

During Taliban regime, Afghanistan also became a big breeding and training ground for Islamic militants and terrorists. There are 18 or so terrorist organisations operating out of Pakistan. Every one enjoys official patronage. "The bigger *jehadi* groups—such as *Lashkar, Al-Badr* and *Harkat-ul-Mujahideen*—have their own training facilities in various Afghan and Pakistani cities."[44] The Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan plays a pivotal role in sustaining the *jehad* (holy war) of factory and terrorist schools.

In the post-World War II period some countries have used terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy. Pakistan is a glaring example of this category of countries. In her research based study, Kshitij Prabha points out: "Pakistan has been using terror tactics in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir to achieve its foreign policy objectives i.e. creation of a sovereign Sikh state and conquest of Kashmir respectively."[45]

Pakistan's official support for the fighting in Afghanistan and Kashmir advertently abetted international terrorism and inadvertently promoted internal sectarianism. Militant groups which are product of the Pakistan radical *madrasas* "regularly proclaim their plans to bring *'Jehad'* to India proper as well as to the West, which they believe is run by Jews. *Lashkar-e-Toiba* has announced its plans to 'plant Islamic flags in Delhi, Tel Aviv, and Washington.' ...Several militant groups hoist pictures of burning American flags on their calendars and posters," warns Stern.[46]

10. *Exporting Terrorism.* Pakistani terrorist groups have been exporting their version of Jehad all over the world and thus helping the growth of international terrorism. The Khudamudeen *madrasa*, according to its chancellor, is training students from Burma, Nepal, Chechnya, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Yemen, Mongolia, and Kuwait. Out of the 700 students at the *Madrasa*, 127 were foreigners in 2000. Nearly half the student body at Darul Uloom Haqqania, the *Madrasa* that created the Taliban, is from Afghanistan. It also trains students from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Russia and Turkey, and is currently expanding its capacity to house foreign students from 100 to 500, its chancellor said. A Chechen student at school revealed that his goal when returned home was to fight Russians. And according to the U.S. State Department, Pakistani groups and individuals also help finance and train the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a terrorist organisation that aims to overthrow secular governments in Central Asia.[47]

11. *Economic Reasons.* Instability and economic disparity in the developing world is one of the primary factors. The disparity between the 'haves' and the 'havenots' leads to DIE (Dependency, Inequality and Exploitation). Such a situation beyond a tolerable limit would lead to prolonged and even violent backlash from the deprived sections.

Huntington elaborates this factor: "Governments that fail to meet the basic welfare and economic needs of their peoples and suppress their liberties generate violent opposition to themselves and to Western governments that support them. So also do non-Muslim governments, like those of Russia, India, and Israel, that attempt to control Muslim populations who prefer to be misruled by their own kind."[48]

The rich and the developed world are enjoying the power and authority at the cost of the majority. This has encouraged some groups in the underdeveloped nations to fight against the monopolistic tendencies of the rich nations. And terrorist attacks are a way to vent out their feelings.

Sometimes terrorism is being sponsored by the economically powerful nations. They resort to violence and indulge in blatant coercive diplomacy with a view to intimidating the poor and less

powerful developing countries. One of the resultant impact of such action is the retaliatory action by small developing nations against such malevolent tactics of the powerful nations in the form of state sponsored international terrorism.[49]

12. *A Creation of the United States.* The present author[50] along with many others[51] believe that the United States cannot absolve itself from the responsibility for creating the menace of global terrorism. The present phenomenon of global terrorism is America's own creation. It is the outcome of its own doings, policies and unilateral displays of power since the end of the Second World War.

No doubt, the United States cannot be solely blamed for terrorism yet it is greatly responsible for this. Good, positive, global and multilateral policies initiated by it during last months of the Second World War and immediately after that War were abandoned by it in the subsequent years. Very quickly these were replaced by bad, negative, self-centered and unilateral policies. The US may justify this replacement owing to the then prevailing circumstances and Cold War politics. These replaced policies bring with them seeds of global terrorism. US's denial of rights to Palestinians, denial of economic aid to poor and needy nations, US's no to a ready UN deployment force, no to International Criminal Court, no to enforceable standard for human rights, back tracking from arms control, US's Cold War politics and creation of Afghan *Mujahideens*, US's deaf ear to India's warnings, US's destructive policy on Iraq etc. provided breeding ground for global terrorism. In addition to several other factors, America's unilateral and self-serving polices laid foundation for the present day global terrorism to a great extent.

"America creates bushfires all over the world. But it expects the world to do the fire-fighting. Terrorism was its creation. But it wants the world to join the war against it,"[52] criticises Menon.

IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It is as old as human civilisation and was used in entirely different contexts during different periods of history. It assumed more and more international dimension in the twentieth century. The process of globalisation in the late twentieth century made it more global. Instead of discussing impact of terrorism during the whole course of history this part is confined to examining major consequences of international terrorism in the recent past keeping in view latest developments in international relations.

1. *New Era in International Relations.* International terrorism opened a new era in international relations. The terrorist attack on twin towers of the World Trade Centre (New York) and Pentagon (Washington, DC) on September 11, 2001 has created a special kind of alarm bell before the international community for their quest for peace, harmony, brotherhood and cordial international relations. The terrorist attacks were a critical turning point for both the Untied States and the international community. September 11 not only changed the New York city skyline forever, but also fundamentally altered the nature of international relations and foreign policy of several nations and especially of the US.

2. *New Type of Security Threat.* International terrorism has created a new type of security threat which is more covert, sudden, undeclared and dangerous than the conventional war. This new threat is aimed at cities, busy business centres and markets, government offices and buildings, legislatures, political leaders, bureaucrats and civilian population in addition to police and military personnel. No one can predict possible scenarios for future terrorist attacks. Communication, information, technological and economic systems of the present time provide the novel opportunities to terrorists to attack more destructively. Dixon rightly writes: "Terrorists can make connections

between components of complex systems—such as between passenger airliners and skyscrapers—that few, if any, people have anticipated.... More likely than not, the next major attack will come in a form as unexpected as we witnessed on September 11."[53] Security threat to nations has enhanced due to diversion of non-weapon technologies to destructive ends, use of human bombs, ramming of cars and jeeps laden with explosives into military and civilian targets. No nation is safe from this threat including the most powerful like the USA, Britain, Russia, China, Japan, India etc.

3. *Instrument of Foreign Policy.* Of late terrorism has been used as an instrument of state policy by nations such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Libya etc. With the use of terrorism as a State policy have arisen phenomena and concepts like proxy war, surrogate warfare, international civil war, low-intensity conflict etc. The country which is at a disadvantageous position in comparison to its adversary, often resorts to `surrogate or subliminal warfare' with the latter, by instigating and assisting rebels and dissident elements, in its effort to weaken the control of the government of the other state by hurting and embarrassing it. The governments support terrorism in other countries through money, diplomatic facilities, passports, sanctuaries, experts, training camps, weapons, explosives and justifying ideologies. The terrorists who are called `criminals' by foreign governments whose nationals they attack are hailed as `freedom fighters' by the governments who support them. Thus terrorism is indeed the weapon of the weakest, used in areas where such groups or their state-sponsors cannot mount a large-scale organised military challenge to the government concerned. In recent times, Pakistan is a classical example of using terrorism as a State policy. Successive Pakistan governments tried to achieve the goals of creating a separate Sikh State and conquering of Kashmir through normal instruments of foreign policy. "But when these efforts proved futile, the Pakistan government switched over to use of terrorism in a well planned manner, which created tumultuous uproot in the body politic of India"[54] since early 1980s.

4. *Spoiled Relations between Nations.* As a result of terrorism relations between several nations were either spoiled or further deteriorated. For example bitterness and misunderstanding were heightened due to terrorism in relations between Israel and Arab nations, India and Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka, India and Bangla Desh, the USA and some Islamic nations etc.

5. *The Clash of Civilisations.* A few years back Samuel P. Huntington propounded and predicted a 'clash of civilisations' in the post-cold war era. He talked about the imminent collision between Islam and the West. Huntington believes that terrorist attacks on the US on September 11 and events thereafter verify his hypothesis and make his predications true. In Huntington's own words: "Reactions to September 11 and the American response were strictly along civilisational lines. The governments and peoples of Western countries (Britain, Canada and Australia) were overwhelmingly sympathetic and supportive, making commitments to join with the United States in the war on terrorism. Strong support was also manifested among Germans, French and other European peoples.... The leading countries of non-Western, non-Muslim civilisations—Russia, China, India, Japan—reacted with modulated expressions of sympathy and support. Almost all Muslim governments condemned the terrorist attacks, undoubtedly concerned with the threat Muslim extremist groups posed to their own authoritarian regimes. Only Uzbekistan, Pakistan and Turkey, however, provided direct support to the American response, and among major Arab governments only Jordon and Egypt endorsed that response. In most Muslim countries, many people condemned the terrorist attacks, a small number explicitly endorsed the attacks and huge numbers denounced the American response. The longer and more intensely the United States and its allies use military force against their opponents, the more widespread and intense will be the Muslim reaction. September 11 produced Western unity; a prolonged response to September 11 could produce Muslim unity."[55]

On the other hand, many are not in agreement with Huntington's famous notion of 'The Clash of Civilisations.' They firmly believe that any particular religion has nothing to do with the heinous and inhuman acts of terrorism. Riyaz Punjabi gives the following two arguments against Huntington's view point.

The *first* is to transcend the 'Clash of Civilisations' hypothesis which has provided a theoretical basis for terrorists to justify their actions. *Second*, neither Islam nor Muslim states are a monolithic whole. There are sharp sectarian differences prevalent among Muslims. The sectarian killings in Pakistan and even in Afghanistan during Taliban rule provide illustrations to the point. The factor of cultural differentiation also divides Muslim community and the perception of a united Muslim *Ummah* (large community) is a myth. Muslim states erroneously defined as Islamic states are equally divided according to their strategic interests. The bloody eight-year long war between Iran and Iraq and lately the gulf war involving Iraq and Kuwait provide illustrations to the point. Thus, projection of a united Muslim front or a united group of Muslim states is a fallacy.[56]

6. *New Division of the World.* The US response to the terrorist attacks seemed frighteningly reminiscent of Cold War-era policy, especially in the initial US reaction and in its approach to the military campaign in Afghanistan. "You are either with us, or you are with the terrorists," President Bush warned in his initial television address following the attacks. Later on the Bush administration modified its stance considerably, the apprehension that this conflict will create a new division among nations of the world has remained. For a while chances of the burgeoning of another horizontal divide (after the cold war divide) of the world between nations reposing faith in the US-led international coalition and nations having little confidence in the competence of Anglo-American leadership became bright. Such a new division would have started a *neo-cold war* in the 21st century. This was a dangerous perception. Subsequently, this apprehension could not become a reality as international terrorism could not clearly divide the world into two hostile blocs, as was possible in the cold war.

7. *International Coalition.* After September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre in the USA, the entire world became conscious of curse of terrorism in the world. In his broadcast to the people on the evening of the invasion President George W. Bush said, "We have seen the first war of the 21st century." President in a speech on September 20 to joint session of Congress, announced the start of a "War on terror." Almost every country in the world, supported the international coalition to fight terrorism led by the USA for throwing the Taliban regime out of Afghanisatan. In fact, it was only after September 11 tragedy that the world woke up to the reality of terrorism effecting the entire world. The US and various other countries of world were earlier turning a blind eye to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in India. Since early nineties, India was also insisting the world community to take a serious view of Pakistan-Afghanistan nexus in training and exporting terrorists to different countries. India has been the worst sufferer from the activities of Pakistan-Afghanistan trained terrorists who are operating in Kashmir through some self-styled groups. But no one including the US took India's warning seriously. One may wonder that the US felt the need of an international coalition to fight terrorism only when nemesis fell upon itself with all severity . It has been criticised that the US devised the mechanism of international coalition to avoid international isolation. The international coalition, which had no greater role than to provide moral and sympathetic support to Washington, was being used by America as a forum for legitimising its actions which otherwise could have evoked sharp reactions the entire world over. No doubt, international coalition was successful in freeing Afghanistan of Taliban's terrorist regime yet it was unsuccessful in either catching Osama bin Laden (killed by the US forces on May 2, 2011 at Abottabad - Pakistan) or nabbing top rulers of Taliban regime like Mullah Omar.

8. *Terrorism Replaces Communism.* For the West and especially for the US there is a new enemy to fight in the post-Cold War era. Previously it was capitalism *vs.* communism during the cold war period. Now after the collapse of communism new challenge is terrorism. The 'war on terror' has not ended with the ouster of Taliban from Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein from Iraq. Network of Al Qaida and other terrorist groups is still intact in different countries. Their attack in Saudi Arabia in mid-2003 proved that they have not been wiped out. Many groups still indulge in terrorist activities in Kashmir. The war on terrorism is going to be continued in protracted manner in years to come. Thus struggle in the initial years of the 21st century will be against terrorism.

9. *Counter Terrorism Measures.* To tighten the noose of terrorists, in the recent past, several anti-terrorism steps have been taken by different countries of the world. Major counter-terrorism measures taken by various countries at national and international levels are: tightening of immigration rules, passing of terrorism prevention acts like Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act (POTA-2002) by India and the Patriot Act by the US in October 2001, banning of terrorist organisations and freezing their assets, increased border vigilance, assistance in criminal matters, more intelligence sharing, more frequent diplomatic consultations between and visits of national leaders on the issue of terrorism, more defence and strategic cooperation, more joint exercises and hi-tech training, extradiction treaties between different nations etc. In addition to these, the U.N. has also stepped up its efforts against terrorism. At times these counter-terrorism measures adversely affected people-to-people relations between nations. In their over-enthusiasm to counter-terrorism, some countries have damaged human rights and rule of law. There are complaints from some countries that civil liberties have been sacrificed in their pursuit of security.

10. *Change of Regime in Afghanistan and Iraq.* Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq were changed as a consequence of the US War on terror which were otherwise very difficult to remove. 'Operation Enduring Freedom—the US name for its war on terrorism was launched in October 2001 and by December of that year Taliban regime was ousted. The Bonn Agreement that followed the ouster of Taliban from Kabul installed an interim government headed by Hamid Karzai, charged with the task of convening a grand council, a *Loya Jirga*, which would have the right to confirm his appointment, set up a commission to frame a new constitution and decide on a schedule to hold fresh elections. Karzai was swept into the post in June 2002 by Loya Jirga. According to the Bonn Agreement all parties not believing in democracy—the Taliban and the Communist Party—were to be banned from participating in politics of Afghanistan. Afghans with criminal record were also to be banned from Afghan politics. New parties were also to be registered with the Ministry of Culture.[57]

The American-led war against Iraq was launched on March 19, 2003. With the fall of Tikrit on April 14, once considered Saddam Hussein's most likely last stand, the second Gulf War ended in effect after just three-and-a half week. A clear sense of relief was palpable worldwide over the early end of the war in the first week of May 2003, following the fall of Saddam Hussein's autocratic regime in Baghdad. The US appointed retired Lt. General Jay Garner as the civil administrator of Iraq. Garner was given the job to install a new interim government in the country to oversee the transition to a proper, democratically elected government in the near future and to re-build the country in the coming months. Representatives of up to nine different factions which opposed Saddam regime were to run the interim government.

11. *Impact on the UN.* The UN's response to tackle terrorism came rather very late. During the past 25 years or so, the UN almost failed to determine what constitutes terrorism and cross-border terrorism. Its inaction and indifference boosted the morale of terrorist groups and led to events like September 11, 2001 attack on the U.S. It was only in the late 1990s that the UN possessed a

legal and political framework to combat terrorism on an international scale. Two major anti-terrorism conventions were put in place : The 1997 Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Both conventions accumulated over 50 signatories till 2002, but only a handful of ratifications. Both documents provide an extensive framework for action by individual countries and for cooperation between countries. The second Convention regarding the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism automatically entered into force on April 10, 2002 in accordance with its provision requiring the ratification of 22 States to come into effect. The speedy entry-into-force of the pact is widely regarded as a sign of heightened international commitment to fight terrorism, especially following the September 11 attacks against the United States. Twenty-two of the 26 ratifications/accessions received so far took place after that date. In total 132 countries have signed the convention.

"In fact, Security Council resolutions 1368 and 1373, passed in late September 2001 in response to the terrorist attacks, are among the most comprehensive, far-reaching resolutions ever issued by the body. Passed unanimously—a significant achievement in its own right given the council's history of bitter divisions among the five permanent members—these resolutions provide a detailed programme of action for member - states to cooperate in every aspect of terrorism prevention. From halting funds to pursuing suspects and to sharing information, these resolutions are landmark accomplishments for the United States,"[58] compliments Sabeel Rahman.

Major organs of the United Nations—the General Assembly, Security Council and Secretary-General - immediately swung into action after September 11 terrorist attack on the USA. Statements denouncing terrorism were made, resolutions condemning terrorist attacks passed, global anti-terrorism coalition forged, sanctions against Taliban imposed, a global convention against terrorism as well as convention aimed specially at fighting acts of nuclear terrorism initiated, the International Convention for the suppression of the financing of terrorism enforced and the world's first - the International Criminal Court created.[59]

Many in the world believe that the most serious casualty of the US military action against Taliban in Afghanistan (2001) and war on Iraq to unseat Saddam Hussein (2003) was the credibility and relevance of the UN. This world body is under serious threat of being rendered irrelevant during the current era of US-dominated unipolar world. Unlike Gulf War-I (1990-91), the Gulf War-II (2003) launched by the USA did not have the consent of the UN. Due to US activism against terrorism, the UN's credibility stooped very low.

12. *Mounting American Dominance.* The Gulf War (1991) and collapse of communism as well as the Soviet Union made the United States the sole super power. Thereafter its successes in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) further enhanced its sole super power image. Terrorism provided the US the opportunity to lead and prove its military might. Terrorist attacks on the US proved counterproductive. Through its fight against terrorism the US got justification to enhance its supremacy and dominance in the world. "America is the only super power. It is highly arbitrary. No wonder, it is hated. It threatens to take law into its own hands if it is not allowed its way.... America creates bushfires all over the world. But it expects the world to do the fire-fighting,"[60] observes Menon.

The USA has established a strong military presence in Central Asia. This has brought it into some conflict with Russia, China, India and other European countries, which have stakes in the region. The outcome is loaded with several possibilities and oil is the overriding interest.

13. *Change in Foreign Policy of Nations.* International terrorism brought substantial changes in the foreign policy of all major nations of the world. The terrorist attacks catapulted the US into a

genuine not a metaphorical war whose goals and geographic scope constantly expanded. Keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists, their state sponsors, or any regimes the United States considered too dangerous became another major objective of the American foreign policy. There was tremendous extension in America's foreign engagement owing to international terrorism. It has militarily intervened in Afghanistan and Iraq, sent troops and covert forces into new countries, put military bases in new regions and countries, become engaged in new conflicts, undertaken unprecedented intelligence collaborations and embraced new allies, many of them uncomfortable bed fellows.

There was a reorientation of Russia's foreign policy as well. President Putin gave up the carefully calibrated foreign policy he had followed until September 10, 2001. Earlier he had endeavoured to improve relations with China, India, Iran and North Korea, while at the same time coming closer to Europe and the United States. A move in one direction was offset by a move in another. From September 11 onward, he embraced the United States, recognising its primacy globally and on his own borders. His another objective was to present unresolved Chechen conflict as part of the righteous international war against terrorism. He even did not mind the end of the super power strategic relationship, accepting U.S. withdrawal from the Anti Ballistic Missile treaty for the price of a formal arms cut. For Putin the gains were substantial domestically, politically and economically.

International terrorism and September 11 attacks have provided China with low-cost opportunities to cooperate with the Untied States through intelligence sharing, efforts to unearth terrorist financing mechanism, and the like. The increased cooperation and decreased American attention to a China 'threat' have lowered fears among Asian states of Sino-US rivalry, paving way for greater regional integration—a Chinese objective. Despite all these, critical differences and mutual suspicions remain between the US and China over Taiwan, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, human rights, missile defense, and the role of American power in Asia and beyond.

Another significant impact of international terrorism has been that it widened a transatlantic gap that opened years ago in the way Americans and Europeans view the international system. September 11 created a brief situation of transatlantic comity, symbolised by NATO's unprecedented offer to defend the United States against attack. Europeans also supported the early stages of American military action in Afghanistan. Later on when the Bush administration began contemplating regime change in Iraq and broadened the scope of the war on terrorism to embrace possible action against other 'axis of evil' members, Europe began to view the United States as increasingly dangerous. The closer they (Americans and Europeans) get the more they become aware of their differences.

14. *Adverse Economic Impact*. Terrorism has adverse affect on economic growth and public finances, raising important issues for policy makers. Terrorism affect countries' fiscal accounts by disrupting economic activity, lowering the efficiency of tax administration, and affecting the composition of public spending in a manner that reduces growth. Higher military spending due to terrorism can reduce outlays for education, health care, and other productive activities. Moreover, destruction of physical infrastructure, interruption of education and health services, and indirect effects on trade, tourism, and business confidence all weaken a country's fiscal position and hurt economic growth. The majority of countries can encourage growth by decreasing military spending, which frees up resources for capital formation.[61]

The exact co-relationship between poverty and terrorism remain a matter of debate, but it is evident that the new U.S. interest in aid and development stems from the anti-terrorism connection.

The Bush administration's decision to set up the Millennium Challenge Account—which, if it takes form according to the plan, will be the largest increase in U.S. foreign aid in forty years—reflects a decisively broadened view of the development imperative.

COUNTER TERRORISM MEASURES

So far as there are some fanatic and determined persons who are ready and willing to die, the threat of terrorism will remain. The struggle against terrorism will be a long drawn affair. Hoffman rightly points out, "Terrorism has existed for 2,000 years and owes its survival to an ability to adapt and adjust to challenges and countermeasures and to continue to identify and exploit its opponents' vulnerabilities. For success against terrorism, efforts must be as timeless, innovative, and dynamic as that of opponents."[62] To lessen the risk of complex international terrorism the world requires new strategies instead of the conventional counter-terrorism measures already adopted by many nations. The international community has to strike at the root of terrorism while the world opinion is against fanaticism-driven acts of terrorism against humanity that destabilises the established democratic and civilised order. To minimise and ultimately to eliminate the threat of terrorism, counter-measures have to be multi-pronged: psychological as well as physical; diplomatic as well as military; economic as well as political; persuasive as well as punitive; and national as well as international.

Some major counter-measures undertaken by the international community are discussed as under:

OUTSIDE THE UN

Efforts have been made both outside and inside the UN for combating terrorism. Outside the UN since long international humanitarian law clearly prohibits international terrorism. Starting from the Lieber Code of Conduct for Armies in the Fields of 1863, till the Geneva Conventions of 1944 and the Additional Protocols of 1997 and the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunals of Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 1993, and, the 1994 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the 1998 Rome Statute of International Criminal Court, clearly specifies that terrorism in any manner constitutes as a crime against humanity and forms part of international criminal law.

In 1984, an international conference was organised in Washington by the Jonathan Institute. Some consensus began to emerge among the various scholars, politicians and decision-makers the world over. Some of the important suggestions were: the concept that one man's terrorist can be another man's freedom fighter must be done away with; local populace should cooperate with law enforcement machinery even at the cost of personal misery; prompt and strict decisions should be undertaken by various nations for controlling terrorist psychologically.

The London Economic Summit Conference organised by the NATO States and Japan in 1984 proved to be another landmark for the eradication of terrorism which decided that unless we attack the roots of terrorism, only superficial relief could be seen but terrorism would increase in the total quantum of its impact. Creation of general awareness and organisation of public support against terrorist acts could be of immense use.

INSIDE THE UN

Considering the customary principles of international law and the provisions of the Charter of the UN especially Art. 2 (4) and the provisions of human rights Covenants and humanitarian norms,

the international organisation had adopted a number of conventions dealing with international terrorism from the days of the League of Nations. Among the various conventions a majority of them deals with terrorism in the air. By and large all of them aim at promoting concrete measures to suppress and punish acts of terrorism in any manner inconsistent with the principles of international law.

The rules which are laid down by the conventions on various aspects can be classified such as : (1) the criminalisation of unlawful seizure of aircraft and ships as well as physical attacks upon them; (2) the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons; (3) the taking of hostages; (4) the use of certain substances or explosive devices for terrorist purposes; and (5) financing terrorism in any manner. Apart from the international conventions, various regional organisations like the European Union, the Organisation of American States, the African Union and the SAARC etc., also adopted their own independent conventions prohibiting terrorism by all means in their respective regions.

In order to counter terrorism and to halt the activities of certain "rogue-States" the United Nations also condemn terrorism indirectly. Thus the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations[64] stipulates that "Every State has the duty to refrain from organising, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife, territorial acts directing the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force." Further, the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States[65] adopted in 1970 in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, The International Law Commission Draft Code of Offences against Peace and Security of Mankind,[66] the General Assembly's resolution on the Definition of Aggression[67] in 1974, the Declaration on Strengthening of International Security of Mankind[68] also condemn terrorism in all its forms.

From 1972 onwards the General Assembly sought the cooperation of international community against terrorism as a separate item of agenda to deal with sternly. However, the politics of cold war hampered further steps by the UN in effectively combating terrorism which in turn led to several organisations and states to involve and support international terrorism freely.

The UN Conventions

Upto mid-1990s, the UN did not take international terrorism seriously. Thereafter it endeavoured to possess a legal and political framework to combat terrorism on an international scale. The UNs anti-terrorism measures got further momentum after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the US. There are already some **12 treaties** dealing with different aspects of terrorism. In addition there are two additional initiatives under consideration—(i) a global convention against terrorism and (ii) a convention aimed specifically at fighting acts of nuclear terrorism. The third one, the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism automatically entered into force on April 10, 2002.

The Convention itself provides **one more definition**: an act intended to cause death or serious injury to civilians with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or organisation either to carry out—or not to carry out—a particular action.

The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism obligates States Parties either to prosecute or extradite persons accused of funding terrorist activities, and requires banks to enact measures to identify suspicious transactions.

Ongoing negotiations on a comprehensive convention for the suppression of terrorism, first proposed by India, would strengthen the existing legal anti-terrorism framework. It included a

"depoliticalisation clause, namely that an act of terrorism involving innocent civilians and civilian targets cannot be considered a political offence."

Under normal law, if you plead that you have committed an offence in furtherance of a political objective, an offender cannot be extradited, but here that defence is taken away. "If you target innocent civilians by the use of indiscriminate violence, then motivation does not justify your crime."[69]

The UN Resolutions

Another landmark in the UN history of combating terrorism is the passing of two Security Council resolutions in September 2001—Resolution 1368 and 1373. Resolution 1368 recognises any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security.

Calls, on all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and stresses that those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable;

It Calls also on the international community to redouble their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts including by increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant international anti-terrorist conventions and Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 1269 of 19 October 1999;

It Expresses readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations.[70]

In this connection, Resolution 1373 (September 28, 2001) is more extensive and far-reaching as it established a **Committee of the Council** to monitor the resolution's implementation and called on all States to report on actions they had taken to that end no later than 90 days from 28 September.

Under terms of the text, the Council decided that all States should prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism, as well as criminalise the wilful provision or collection of funds for such acts. The funds, financial assets and economic resources of those who commit or attempt to commit terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts and of persons and entities acting on behalf of terrorists should also be frozen without delay.

The Council also decided that States should prohibit their nationals or persons or entities in their territories from making funds, financial assets, economic resources, financial or other related services available to persons who commit or attempt to commit, facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts. States should also refrain from providing any form of support to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts; take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts; deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support and commit terrorist acts.

By other terms, the Council decided that all States should prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other countries and their citizens. States should also ensure that anyone who has participated in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice. They should also ensure that terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the seriousness of such acts is duly reflected in sentences served.

By further terms, the Council decided that States should afford one another the greatest measure of assistance for criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts. States should also prevent the movement of terrorists or their groups by effective border controls as well.

Also by the text, the Council called on all States to intensify and accelerate the exchange of information regarding terrorist actions or movements; forged or falsified documents; traffic in arms and sensitive material; use of communications and technologies by terrorist groups; and the threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction.

States were also called on to exchange information and cooperate to prevent and suppress terrorist acts and to take action against the perpetrators of such acts. States should become parties to, and fully implement as soon as possible, the relevant international conventions and protocols to combat terrorism.

By the text, before granting refugee status, all States should take appropriate measures to ensure that the asylum seekers had not planned, facilitated or participated in terrorist acts. Further, States should ensure that refugee status was not abused by the perpetrators, organisers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims of political motivation were not recognised as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists.

The Council noted with concern the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organised crime, illicit drugs, money laundering and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other deadly materials. In that regard, it emphasised the need to enhance the coordination of national, subregional, regional and international efforts to strengthen a global response to that threat to international security.

Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, the Council expressed its determination to take all necessary steps to fully implement the current resolution.[71]

The International Criminal Court

In what was widely hailed as an historic event, the required 60th ratification of the Rome Statute was deposited with the United Nations on April 11, 2002 paving way for the creation of the world's first permanent war crimes court. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is to be based in the Hague, Netherlands and is expected to be established in 2003. In place of impunity, a system of accountability is set up for those crimes that are described in the statute—genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and eventually, also aggression. The Statute does not overtly and clearly include crimes like terrorist acts and terrorist attacks. Belief by many that crimes against humanity cover terrorist attacks and terrorist acts against civilian innocent population is still debatable and yet to be settled down.

The Statute was full of legal safeguards to ensure due process, including the principle of "complementarity," which meant that the Court would only step in if a national system were unable or unwilling to do so. The primary responsibility for the punishment of crimes is with States and not with the international community.

The Court will consist of 18 international judges elected for a nine-year term, and a team of prosecutors and investigators. It will not be part of the United Nations instead it will be accountable to the countries that ratify the Statute, which have agreed to prosecute individuals accused of such crimes under their own laws, or to surrender them to the Court for trial.

Although the effort to combat terrorism is embodied in several treaties and two UN resolutions adopted in the wake of September 11, there is no world tribunal currently empowered to try terrorist cases. Some say they could be brought before the International Criminal Court (ICC), which is expected to be operational in 2003. But US and other officials have expressed reservations. They fear the proposed charge of crimes against humanity may not be well defined and the proceedings could politicise the court. In any case, many argue, national courts could do the job more efficiently.

The SC's Counter-Terrorism Committee

The Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee will continue to have a key role to play in combating terrorism and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Because of its responsibility in ensuring the implementation of international anti-terrorism conventions and standards, the Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee will continue to be at the centre of global efforts to fight terrorism.

"Despite enhanced attention and more concerted action, the problem of terrorism will require sustained long-term action if it is to be addressed successfully. . . . . We face a grave and growing threat from international terrorism. Terrorism is a global scourage with global effects, its methods are murder and mayhem, but its consequences affect every aspect of the United Nations agenda—from development to peace to human right and the rule of law,"[72] said UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

Other Measures

In addition to the above measures taken at international level, several countries have also taken steps at national and bilateral levels. These steps aiming at countering terrorism are: tightening of immigration rules, passing of terrorism prevention acts like the Patriot Act (October 2001) by the US and the Prevention of Terrorist Act (POTA, 2002) by India, banning of terrorist organisation and freezing their assests, increased border vigilance, assistance in criminal matters, more intelligence sharing, more frequent diplomatic consultations between and visits of national leaders on the issue of terrorism, more defence and strategic cooperation, more joint exercises and hi-tech training, extradition treaties between different nations etc.

SUGGESTIONS

Apart from the above measures the following steps are further suggested to curb the menace of terrorism.

The key elements such as definition, methods and means of terrorist activities should be identified and a workable international convention be put in place. The Draft Convention already submitted by India to the UN has to be discussed by the member-states. Proposals of modifications that are necessary to strengthen the hands of the UN may be considered. All proposed measures and means to incorporate in a multilateral convention should be within the purview of International Law and Human Rights and Humanitarian norms and in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter.

Nations should exclude terrorist acts from the clause of political offences in various extradition treaties to have an effective prosecution and punishment of terrorists.

Steps should be taken to constitute an international police force under the UN auspices consisting of forces of all states to detect the terrorist activities of various states and groups and to

catch terrorists at the international level in handing over them either to the UN or to the International Criminal Court.

Terrorist attacks on innocent civilians should be treated as crimes against humanity and terrorists responsible for these be made accountable through the International Criminal Court.

Steps should be taken in fixing the responsibility on the States which aid and assist terrorism in any fashion and to determine appropriate measures for the breach of the provisions of the proposed convention which may include fixing compensation payable by such states or even resort to other punitive actions prescribed under international law to be implemented under the auspices of the United Nations.

If terrorism has to be wiped out from the world then countries like Pakistan whose track record is of breeding, supporting and harbouring terrorists have to be pressurised to abandon foreign policy of *jehad* and terrorism. The international community must tell Pakistan firmly to crush terrorist groups operating on its soil, to close all those *madrasaas* (seminaries) that are fanning and exporting fundamentalism and terrorism, to have check on the syllabi of the remaining *madrasaas*, to strengthen secular education and democratic political system.

Intelligence agencies and police should be strengthened. The intelligence should be able to provide the information about terrorist's targets, timings and sites in advance. Along with government agencies, people can make a significant contribution towards improving the general security environment. Special task force trained for counter-terrorist activities may be raised. The deployment of special forces in countering terrorist activities has become a reality in many countries. In this regard, the experience of different countries can help. For example the way the West German Police defeated terrorist faction, the way the French Army took measures to improve their anti-terrorist capabilities. The Italian Police too had to combat large-scale terrorist violence from new fascist groups and the left wing challenges of the Red Brigades. The national law and order machinery of several countries has to be strengthened.

Since the present day terrorists are very well organised and more professional than their counterparts a decade ago, new conceptions of safety and security should rise. There is a need for the sophisticated security procedures which can go all the way from airport screening to the border area.

The widening gap between the various governments regarding evolving common strategy for suppression of terrorism needs to be viewed in the context of the potential for threat that it holds. Even the European convention on suppression of terrorism is restricted by Article 5 and Article 13, which refuse the extradition of a terrorist on many grounds. In an environment where terrorist violence is endemic and the world stands hopelessly divided on various laws all countries should shun their national prerogative for dealing with terrorism. Many efforts have been made by a number of nations to control state-sponsored terrorism, such as through economic sanctions, but so far they have not reached a consensus either at the national or international level.

Various international instruments to deal with the different aspects of the problem of terrorism lack real legal sanctity. In the absence of an umbrella legislation on terrorism, world community has 13 international treaties. All these agreements are merely temporary responses to violent manifestations of perceived threats of terrorist activity with respect to aircraft and ships, airports and fixed maritime platforms, diplomats, hostages, explosives and other dangerous instrumentalities and the financing of terrorism. Thus the international law on terrorism is in patchwork.

Finally, despite the Review Conference held on the Rome Statute in 2010, acts of terror were

not considered vital enough to be included under its authority. International community is unable to deal with and legislate on terrorism owing to lack of consensus.

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23

The Impact of Nuclear Weapons

In August 1945, with the dropping of atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan by the USA, the Second World War came to an end and a new atomic era ushered in. Like any other technological advancement, invention of nuclear bomb had also its wide social, economic and political implications. It was not a marvel evoking interest of the scientists, technologists and military strategists alone but it also constrained political leaders and political scientists to deal with new issues of the nuclear age. Nuclear energy can be used for military weapons and peaceful purposes. Its use for military purposes is fraught with several perils for humanity. People all over the world had to decide between the several options namely war and peace, security and vulnerability, extinction and survival, disarmament and development etc.

International relations were no longer remained unaffected by the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. Traditional pattern of international relations underwent a radical change with the advent of these weapons. Several new concepts of international politics emerged. Practical relations among different countries assumed new dimensions. The possible nuclear holocaust haunted several international conferences, international organisations and led to several new treaties and relationship. All this added to the vital significance of these weapons for international relations.

"The first atom-bomb also symbolised", according to Bilgrami "the ever widening gap between man's dynamic progress in the attainment of the destructive capacity through science and technology and his corresponding lack of progress in the area of peace and security."[1] This was the contradiction of international relations after the Second World War. The study of international relations in the post-World War II period is incomplete without the discussion of the impact of nuclear weapons. Palmer and Perkins rightly observe, "No competent analysis of international relations in the second half of the twentieth century can ignore the consequences of the availability, for the first time in history, of 'power without limit'—power for the benefit or for the destruction of mankind"[2].

The impact of nuclear weapons on international relations can be enumerated as below:

Caused Cold War

The first and foremost impact of nuclear bomb on international relations was that it caused a split between the allies of Second World War especially between the United States and the Soviet Union. *First*, secrecy with regard to the manufacturing of atom bomb and *second*, the secrecy concerning its dropping over Japan by the US was considered by the Soviet Union as acts of betrayal on the part of the former. The nuclear bomb became one of the main causes of the beginning of the mutual suspicion between the US and the Soviet Union and later intensified cold war tension and distrust.

The advent of nuclear bombs and the US's monopoly over them in the years immediately after

the Second World War, encouraged it to dominate over international issues and to contain the expanding Soviet sphere of influence by executing policy of containment. However, the US monopoly was broken by the Soviet Union when it acquired nuclear weapons in 1949. The nuclear weapons were used as a threat of massive retaliation and the statesman's foremost task had become to convey the convincing credibility of his nuclear threat to his opponent. Race for arms and military alliances became order of the day in international relations in late forties and throughout the fifties.

For a few years after the Second World War, nuclear weapons also encouraged the process of bipolarisation in the international relations. Newly independent, weak and small countries which fell frightened by the destructive capabilities of the nuclear weapons were compelled to seek protection by aligning themselves with one or the other nuclear power. Later on proliferation of these very weapons were instrumental in breaking up of bipolar world and ushering in multipolar world.

Problem of Proliferation

The United States enjoyed a monopoly of nuclear bombs until 1949, a condition which many Western statesmen including Winston Churchill—regarded as the chief deterrent to Soviet aggression and the chief shield for Western Europe. In September, 1949 the Soviet Union exploded her first atomic bomb. Britain became the third member of the 'nuclear club' on October 3, 1952; France, the fourth member on February 13, 1960; China, the fifth on October 16, 1964; India, the sixth in May, 1974 and Pakistan, the seventh in May 1998. India's successful nuclear explosion showed that states with civilian and peaceful nuclear energy programmes could simultaneously and surreptitiously pursue a weapon's capability. The United States experimented with the thermonuclear weapon (Hydrogen bomb) in November 1952, and the USSR followed suit a few months later in August 1953.

The search for nuclear energy and weapons has not been confined to the two superpowers. The balance of terror has been expanded by the decisions of others to develop nuclear weapons of their own, decisions which have produced the so-called proliferation problem. Proliferation refers to the probability that more and more nations will seek to become members of the "nuclear club". The increase in the number of nuclear states is commonly called as the *N*th nation problem. The increase in the number of states possessing nuclear weapons is known as "horizontal" proliferation, in contrast to increase in the capabilities of an existing nuclear state. The latter is often referred to as "vertical" proliferation.

The assumption is that the decision of one nation to develop nuclear capability will encourage others to do the same. The consequence will be, it is apprehended, a global environment populated by many states possessing nuclear weapons, with more likelihood of one or more of them would prefer to use the weapons. The fact that American acquisition of nuclear capabilities was followed by the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, China, India and Pakistan gives credit to the contention that further proliferation is likely if not inevitable. Many observers believe that Israel has already produced nuclear weapons. Estimates differ, but most observers acknowledge that many other nations have the resources to develop nuclear weapons— and that they may be inclined to do so in future. About thirty nations[3] have sufficiently advanced technology to easily produce nuclear weapons. If seven countries officially possess these weapons, it is possible that unofficially the number might be a bit more. Despite international pressure on North Korea, the Communist Government appears as determined as ever to become a nuclear military power. President Kim Il Sung is generally assumed to be pursuing a nuclear programme in an effort to preserve its legitimacy. Disintegration of the Soviet Union gave new dimension to the problem of proliferation

as now four republics—Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belorussia—have also become nuclear powers.

As for the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, the hazards of proliferation have increased manifold that some nations already feel that their security is threatened. The dangers due to nuclear proliferation are alarming. These hazards are caused by the use of atom for war purposes as well as by considerable proliferation of nuclear power stations meant for producing energy that yields "wastes" and that can also be utilised for military purposes. The use of nuclear energy for electrical generation enhances this danger further.

The two super-powers, aware of the dangers of nuclear proliferation, have made an effort in their own way to check this tendency. They have even signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Despite the NPT the accessibility of nuclear know-how has further aggravated the situation. For example, India and Pakistan exploded nuclear devices in 1998 and it is probable this would trigger off "a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan, two traditional enemies in an already volatile area of the world. The feared chain reaction that would induce other nations to engage in the nuclear game might then be set off"[4].

Alongwith the well-known dangers of governmental nuclear proliferation, there are also the risks of non-governmental nuclear proliferation. It relates to the use of nuclear matter by individuals or private groups who have loathsome, terrorist or political intentions or even psychopathic reasons. Though difficult to even measure the extent of these dangers, one must at least acknowledge their existence.

These developments prove beyond doubt the earlier view of scholars that small states would soon be able to produce nuclear weapons and would thereby be able to make aggression costly for even the most powerful state. A good number of nations now have the capability to split the atom that the pattern of the industrial revolution will not be repeated. Such states as India, Sweden and Norway are now challenging the right of the leading nuclear powers to dominate the world of nuclear reactors. This is the Nth-nation problem, that creates the risk of the dispersion of nuclear weapons among many new nations. Palmer and Perkins observe: "nuclear proliferation is one of the real threats in the international scene today, and efforts to prevent it may well prove to be abortive. The impact of the nuclear proliferation treaty cannot yet be adequately assessed. Some spokesmen of non-nuclear states argue that their countries should develop an independent nuclear capability, and that the members of the 'nuclear club' have no right to try to confine its membership to the present select group"[5].

Arms Race

When in 1949 the Soviet Union broke the US monopoly over nuclear weapons by manufacturing nuclear bomb, an arms race started between the two super powers. Since that time till 1990-91 competition between the United States and the USSR continued for inventing more and sophisticated weapons and nuclear warheads. Having acquired the mastery over the production of nuclear weapons, both the super powers engaged themselves in gravitating international politics in their favour. Both quantitative and qualitative arms race was mainly owing to the virtual monopoly of these powers in developing of advanced military technology, to their overwhelmingly large share of world production and world export of advanced weaponry and to the global character of their interests, politically and militarily. The super-powers competition became more intense than was suggested by the immense size and the rapid expansion of their arsenals, because it had taken place primarily in a qualitative rather than a quantitative dimension, each new generation of weapons being more sophisticated and more destructive than the system it replaced. After

reaching unacceptable levels of destruction the basic strategic concern of superpowers had been whether one side might acquire the forces to deny the other this equality.

Arms race had both its vertical and horizontal aspects.

Vertical Arms Race. The most outstanding aspect of the vertical arms race in the sixties was the development and the full scale deployment of the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Sub-marine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and the associated deployment of satellite surveillance and communication systems. In the late sixties and early seventies a new arms race spiral resulted from the development of antiballistic missile systems (ABMs) and from counter-measures in the form of increasing number of launchers and more particularly in the increasing numbers of war-heads per launcher to saturate 'ABM system. SALT-I succeeded in halting the deployment of ABM system. But its improvement through vigorous research and development (R and D) programme continued. Moreover, the technical form for the development of the ABM system is multiple and independently targettable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). Thus a quantitative check only led the arms race in strategic nuclear weapons to take qualitative direction. A major post-MIRV innovation is a manoeuverable re-entry vehicle (MARVs) which can change direction in the terminal stages of its trajectory. Development in terminal guidance system has further provided perfection in accuracy to MARVed missiles to such an extent that the silos now protecting the land-based ICBM can be destroyed with near certainty. As a consequence it is feasible to consider using 'strategic' nuclear weapons in a new way in 'counter force' roles to gain military advantage at the out-set of a war by striking at the weapons and military installations of the opponent, or to use them to conduct supposedly "limited" nuclear war. The adoption of doctrines of this kind could greatly increase the probability of nuclear war. In the eighties arms race was aggravated when US President Reagan talked of his ambitious Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) or Star War programme.

The highly manoeuverable, low-flying pilotless long-range cruise missiles can be equipped with a nuclear as well as conventional war-head. Their accuracy is independent of a range and they are small and concealable vehicles. As their cost is also comparatively low, it will be well within the means of smaller nuclear powers and of many other countries as well. The expanding nature of arms race is also reflected in its proliferation into ocean and into space.

The vertical aspect of arms race can be gauged by the fact that 95 per cent of all nuclear weapons are in the hands of the two super-powers[6]. The significance of the changes underwent in the sphere of nuclear armaments and their carriers is not that their performance in missions traditionally assigned to them is improving year by year, but that essentially new kinds of missions are becoming possible. New technologies open the way for new doctrines. These in turn give an appearance of rationality to the deployment of weaponry embodying these technologies. At the same time they enhance the possibility of war and alter the terms of disarmament equation, rendering it more complex and more intractable.

In the US the latest effort in this regard is to build and deploy a national missile defense (NMD) system. The US Senates' rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in October 1999 was really part of a larger political conflict about the future of the non-proliferation regime.

In this way, quantitative improvements in the nuclear weapons system have led to a greater increase in the strategic capability of the super-powers than straight forward numerical increases. The strategic capability was thus enhanced by the increased number coupled with the qualitative improvements in the nuclear weapons system.

Horizontal Arms Race. The six main military spenders not only accounted for three-fourths of world military spending but, for particularly all military research and development (R & D) and for practically all exports of weapons and military equipments originated here and spread from here to the rest of the world, with greater or lesser time lags. For many forms of conventional weaponry these time lag seem to have diminished in recent years. Meanwhile, as these weapons are being assimilated in the countries at the periphery of the arms race, new generations are under development at the centre to supersede them, preparing the ground for a new round of transfer and emulation. Outside of this small number of producing countries, arms race or competitions are substantially and often wholly dependent on external supplies of arms, technicians and instructors. For example, in the Middle East, the competition is both quantitative and qualitative. In every major region and in the majority of countries the process of expanding and improving military forces is going on.

Amidst this general phenomenon of ever-expanding trend of arms race from centre to periphery under the technological and political compulsions, there is growing concern over the possible increase in the number of states that overtly and covertly may acquire nuclear weapons. A small nuclear weapons capability could be derived from a major civilian nuclear programme and even without being demonstrated in a nuclear explosion. Civilian nuclear programmes, the technical expertise and the fissile material required for military programme have spread all over the world. As far as the most industrialised and several developing countries are concerned, there are no longer serious technological or economic barrier against initiating a nuclear weapon programme. It is, of course, the ongoing nuclear arms race, not by itself the spread of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, that works against peace. Stocks of nuclear weapons and the persisting nuclear arms race were factors which promoted nuclear weapons proliferation[7].

Arms Trade

At the international level, a growing minority of countries produces arms: and an expanding majority engaged in importing them. On the exporters side, two countries that remained in the lead were the United States and the USSR. They sold about 71 per cent of all the weapons in the world. France takes third place having overtaken the United Kingdom contributing 10.8 per cent. The UK has fifth place (3.7 per cent) after Italy (4 per cent)[8].

There are many factors that make a country an exporter of arms. The two super powers do it for purely political or strategic reasons. The medium powers, on the other hand, are compelled by economic factors. The domestic market is often not large enough to absorb a high technology production. It also enables to restore the balance of foreign trade while at the same time employing a large staff.

The motives of the importers of arms are not so easily visible. It may be owing to the desire of a country to ensure relative hegemony in a certain area on her own account, or as a relayer of a super-power. It may also be a matter of prestige and security. It may be due to the desire to become powerful vis-a-vis one's neighbouring or regional enemy. Since the oil crisis of 1973-74, certain oil-exporting countries have become so rich that they now spend a huge amount of their income on the purchase of arms. The recent spurt in terrorist and subversive activities in many countries have also boosted covert and overt import of arms.

The arms trade depends obviously on demand. Also it is not difficult for some exporters to realise that whatever gaps they would leave in this field would be immediately filled by other suppliers who would eventually replace them. However, the question does arise as to whether this demand is not mainly created by the exporters themselves, especially if they are motivated by economic factors and gains.

The arms trade with the passage of time, has undergone a revolution. It has progressed quantitatively as well as qualitatively. Many conflicts and wars stood testimony to these developments. For example, Vietnam war, Arab-Israel war and American military operation in Gulf against Iraq have provided opportunity for 'in-the-field' experimentation of some particularly sophisticated weaponry. Many recent wars have encouraged different countries to quickly replace their ruined or out-dated arms. The success of American "Patriotic" missile in gulf war (1991) has lured many countries to purchase and acquire the same to equip their defences with such effective and sophisticated missiles. They have made a bee line to the US company manufacturing these missiles to book their order.

Till recently, the exporting countries did not sell certain types of arms on account of their being too sophisticated and too modern. There is no denying the fact that the exporters sold what was no longer of use to their own countries. Now, on the contrary, the importers, even those belonging to the Third World, purchase conventional weapons equipped with latest technical perfections[9]. Many Third World or non-nuclear countries are making frantic efforts to acquire nuclear know-how or obtain nuclear warheads. It is alleged that some have succeeded in acquiring the same in a clandestine manner.

Impact on Third World

Many Third World developing nations are devoting substantial portions of their national resources to the acquisition of arms, often passing ahead industrialised nations in arms race. As a consequence, the weapons of war are no longer concentrated in selected areas of the world. The global drive for military power has led to the diffusion of arms and large standing armies throughout the world.

Kegley and Wittkopf observe: "The data show that the most rapid spending increases occurred in the Middle East, but Africa and Latin America, both of which spent considerably less in 1968 than nations in the Middle East or East Asia, have shown substantial increases in military expenditures."[10]

As the qualitative growth was combined with a quantitative one, a rapid increase in advanced technology followed. It also led to the necessity of finding new buyers. That is the cause of the ever-growing increase in the sale of weapons to Third World countries. More so, since the USSR and the US endeavoured to eschew direct confrontation, local conflicts involved only the Third World countries, ostensibly either with or without the support of one of the super-powers. Examples of Vietnam-Cambodia, Iran-Iraq conflicts, Afghanistan and Gulf crises can be cited in this regard.

Important to note is the extent to which developing nations have become recipients of arms transfers. In the early 1960s, when data on arms transfers first began to be collected the developed nations (mainly NATO and Warsaw Pact countries) were responsible for half of world arms imports. But by 1976, the Third World accounted for 78 per cent of all arms purchases. Worth mentioning is the steep rise in arms imports by countries of the Middle East. This increase coincided with two other developments. *First*, the decision of the chief arms supplier— the US to shift from military assistance in the form of grants to other countries to outright sales of weapons. Among other things, the Nixon Doctrine stressed the need of developing nations assuming a greater share of their own defence burden. Arms sales, as opposed to grants, were assumed to be in accordance with this approach. *Second*, the increase in Middle Eastern arms imports was due to

the OPEC oil price in 1973- 74. This enabled several Middle Eastern nations to pay for the sophisticated weapons they desired.

The spectacular militarisation of the world has been augmented by the increasing willingness and capacity of Third World countries to enter into their own weapons production programs. These countries are manufacturing their own arms rather than buying them from others, even though that manufacturing is usually more expensive initially than importing would be. This fact reduces significantly the endeavours to reverse the universal armament race.

Through a number of ways many Third World nations have substantially increased their military capability by imitating the techniques of their military superiors but none rivals the military might of the two superpowers, the ability of the United States and the Russia to manage strategic nuclear weapons systems remained a chief characteristic of international politics.

Arms trade and transfer have made the Third World countries dependent upon the suppliers of arms in different ways and forms. The bills of sale also contain certain clauses regarding the use of the spare parts and "after-sales service". "It is already quite extensive even in peace time and it compels the importer to be heavily dependent on the exporting nation for a number of years, or also the importer would have to change its supplier alongwith the complete range of arms already in use"[11]. Besides, such sale deeds also provide for training often long, of the personnel who would use the equipment. The conventions of technical military assistance are in most cases a natural corollary of this sale of arms.

Many Third World countries are interested to amass huge stockpiles of conventional and nuclear weapons even at the cost of basic industrial and agricultural development. Their desire for the thermo nuclear energy is so strong that they become oblivious of super power's encroachments in their domestic policies. This tendency is a matter of grave concern as these developing nations, lacking the political maturity and stable democratic institutions may precipitate a crisis of catastrophic consequences. The checks imposed by the nuclear powers on the acquisition of nuclear technology are inadequate and ineffective. The mutual hostility and distrust of the states have encouraged the secret channels to operate for the smuggling of the instruments and technical know-how. Increase in the activities of terrorist organisations and lack of strict security check on the nuclear technology and weapons are some of the alarming developments having serious repercussions for the Third World.

Socio-economic Impacts of the Arms Race

It is pertinent to mention social and economic consequences of the arms race. *Firstly*, the resources spent on armaments necessarily preclude that sum from being spent on other welfare measures like health, education, housing, administration etc. This situation is bad for both poor and rich countries. Military expenditure has largely contributed to the worsening of the world economy. The Vietnam war caused the imbalance in the American balance of payments that one shudders to think of it. The collapse of Soviet economic system was also due to over-spending on military and arms production. This situation is even more damaging for the developing nations that are compelled to spend a large part of their foreign exchange on arms expenditure.

Secondly, even manpower is kept away from more productive work. A large number of research workers in the world (40 per cent) are engaged in the military service instead of productive civilian services. This research might have proved more beneficial if it had been used in a different sphere as agriculture, medicine and demography. There is no denying the fact that this kind of rechannelling of funds would come up against the wrath of those manufacturers of the

weapons who are naturally in favour of letting things stay where they are in the conditions favourable to themselves.

Lastly, international tensions and the arms race are interconnected. Arms race aggravates all international tensions; over-armed protagonists of armament often resort to the threat or use of force instead of peaceful methods for solving their differences.

Destructive Effects of Nuclear Weapons

It is very difficult to imagine what would ensue in case of an actual nuclear conflict. Some have predicted a "rate" of one million dead per megaton, but only in the case of an isolated explosion. In the event of an average nuclear conflict, roughly estimated at a few hundred nuclear warheads, it is worthless to attempt an estimate, as it would be almost impossible to provide aid. However, in terms of destruction it is pointed out that one single nuclear weapon is enough to level the larger part of almost any major city in the world. A small number of nuclear weapons aimed at important targets could cause tremendous destruction. In a nuclear war, it is technically possible for the two sides to eradicate each others forces at a rate never seen before. Civilian victims would be greater in number than military ones, even if sincere efforts were made to avoid such collateral damage. In any case, a strategic nuclear war is likely to cripple both belligerents economically, socially and morally, to cost tens of millions of lives in each of the countries involved and to leave the survivors in a desperate race with time to secure their long-time survival and the recovery of their societies.

In any nuclear duel, the nuclear powers themselves may suffer the heaviest casualties and the most extensive damage. However, all nations in the world would suffer physical losses. Radio active fall-out could be a serious problem in countries adjacent to the belligerent countries, and during the decades after a major nuclear war, fall out would take a toll of millions worldwide, both in present and future generations. M. Zuberi explains the destructive capability of the nuclear weapons in these words: "One modern strategic weapon has between a hundred to a thousand times the yield of the Hiroshima or Nagasaki bombs. A single B-52 strategic nuclear bomber can deliver more explosive power than that used in all wars in history. A Poseidon submarine has 160 independently targetable warheads with an explosive yield of 6.4 megatons and can destroy 160 cities—more than the total number of German and Japanese cities subjected to strategic bombing during the Second World War."[12]

Besides, radio-active fall-out, the global consequences of a large nuclear war on world economy and on vital functions of the international community would be immense. The food situation would also be most precarious, to say nothing of the medium or long- term ecological consequences. Wide-spread famines could occur, those starving to deaths may eventually outnumber the direct fatalities in the belligerent countries. Even non-belligerent countries might enter a downward spiral leading to utter misery for their people, and most would suffer a loss of standard corresponding to many decades of progress. Economic conditions such as these, in conjunction with the sudden impotency of the powers which dominated pre-war politics, might lead to latent political instabilities, causing upheavals— civil and regional wars.[13]

Threat to the World Peace and Peace Movements

After the proliferation of nuclear weapons, threat to world peace increased considerably, and the future of world became uncertain and gloomy. The very idea of devastating effects of the nuclear weapons shudders the world. During cold war days, nuclear parity between the two sides ensured the absence of direct confrontation between them. But this nuclear peace was very vulnerable and fraught with dangerous potential.

Though there was no direct super power confrontation yet there has occurred considerable increase in the incidence of conflicts in peripheral areas. The small countries are used as pawns on the chessboard of the latter. In the interest of peace and prosperity of the Big Powers, their conflicts are transferred to peripheral areas. With the progress of the nuclear age this propensity has greatly increased.

Devastating effects of nuclear weapons have frightened the people of both big and small countries. Threat to world peace "has made many people in the West restless, alienated, mentally sick and tormented. To put an end to this agony and pain, they have been agitating hard to make their voices felt at the power centres of the North",[14] observes Baral. In many Western countries there are several groups who are opposing nuclear weapons by launching peace movements. Through these movements they launched strong and widespread agitations against the deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles by the US in some West European countries. They were able to move the conscience of many people and made them aware of the potential grave danger that these weapons posed to them and the rest of the world.

Nuclear Deterrence

Proliferation of nuclear weapons prevented the nuclear powers from coming into open armed confrontation with one another as each power was conscious of the fact that use of nuclear weapons would spell disaster for both of them. The wars of Korea, Suez, Vietnam, Cuba, Gulf (Iraq) bear an ample testimony to the fact that the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons prevented the big powers from taking extreme acts of aggression and using nuclear weapons. Some scholars have referred it as "nuclear deterrence", others have dubbed it as "concept of dissuasion" and still others termed it as "balance of terror'. It was due to this concept that nuclear weapons were never used in any war after the Second World War despite quantitative and qualitative proliferation of these weapons.

In the words of Holsti, "The awesome destructive capacity of nuclear weapons has rendered the cost of their use prohibitive.... Because few, if any, political ends can be gained through nuclear war, the primary function of these weapons is that of posing a threat to potential enemies. Deterrence, by which decision-makers in one nation seek to prevent certain actions by potential adversaries by threatening them with military retaliation, can be considered one of the means by which nations attempt to influence others"[15].

Keeping in view the devastating effects of a nuclear conflict, the basic principle of dissuasion bewares to prohibit the beginning of such a war. In this connection, the principle of taking hostages has been put forth, which in this case has been elevated to the status of an institution. The hostages are nothing else but the population of each antagonist. This is called as mutual assured destruction (MAD).

Martin explains the meaning of dissuasion in the form of the following four conditions: (1) Either faction is incapable of stopping the other from destroying it; in other words, both populations serve as hostage. (2) Both sides have approximately the same capability resulting in strategic equilibrium. (3) Nuclear war would be possible only if one of the nuclear powers were to think it certain to win, dissuasion is based on the definite assumption that in the event of a war, "there would neither be a conqueror nor a conquered, but the two losers." (4) Finally, dissuasion believes that both sides would have reasonable and humane leaders who would not cruelly expose their state and people to massive reprisals.[16]

The "critical stability" achieved by the above four conditions is also known as "the balance of terror". Lerche and Said explain: "Probably the most important consideration affecting foreign policy decisions by both large and small states is the so-called 'balance of terror'. This situation stems from the present distribution of military capability in the world: two great states have built up arsenals of new weapons that far outclass all other states, yet each remains incapable of mounting adequate superiority over the other. This allocation of military power inhibits everyone to the same extent, if not in exactly the same way".[17] As each of the great powers could not think of waging war against the other, both had a vested interest in avoiding war. "There is little philanthropy or charity in this self-restraint, only elementary calculations of the prospects for survival on the cost/risk scale".[18]

Thus, in the post-Second World War period, there was no direct war between the two super powers due to this nuclear balance or deterrence. Deterrence would continue so long as each side believes that, if it begins an aggression, the opponent has a definite capability of inflicting unacceptable damage on it as well. Each side endeavours to accomplish the first strike capability, and at the same time, to prevent the opponent from achieving it. If either faction succeeds in this respect, it would quickly lead to disturbance in the nuclear balance and may cause immeasurable damage for the humanity. Thus, observes Baral, "peace resulting from deterrence is unstable, precarious and pregnant with calamitous possibilities".[19] The deterrence is efficacious only if both the opponents think that they have the power to checkmate and contain each other, and neither side deems it fit to put its nuclear weapons to actual use. Holsti clarifies, an effective deterrent must be both threatening (sufficiently credible that adversaries are not tempted to undertake prohibited actions), and stable (reassuring enough to reduce any incentives to launch a pre-emptive strike out of fear).[20] Deterrence is a psychological concept. That is why it must be communicated in a convincing way to the potential adversary so that it does not ignore the impending threat as a mere hoax.

Deterrence resulted in an uneasy but nonetheless continuing era of peace between the super powers. Kegley and Wittkopf rightly observe: "In fact, *mutual deterrence* based on the principle of *mutual assured destruction* (MAD) has come to characterise superpower relations today. The term *balance of terror* accurately describes the essential military stalemate between the superpowers, for mutual deterrence is based on the military potential for, and psychological expectations of, widespread death and destruction for both combatants in the event of nuclear exchange".[21] Peace, thus is the byproduct of "mutual vulnerability".

The deterrence theory has been discussed in detail in the chapter 11 of this book.

Nuclear Categorisation of the States

On the basis of the use and development of the nuclear energy countries of the world can be divided into different categories. Broadly, there are two classes of states, namely, nuclear powers and non-nuclear powers. Further, these two are also subdivided into two and three classes respectively. Of the five nuclear powers, the US and the Russia are called superpowers. Their nuclear stockpile is greater than the other three. The break up of the Soviet Union has given birth to four more nuclear powers—Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belorussia.

Though five nuclear weapons powers have not formally admitted India and Pakistan in their exclusive nuclear club yet these two are also nuclear weapon states if not nuclear powers since 1998.

All countries other than nuclear powers are divided into three categories. The first category includes a few countries like South Africa, North Korea and Israel which are suspected to have already made nuclear weapons. These are known as *clandestine nuclear powers*. In the second

category there are a few more states which are in an advanced stage of nuclear research and which are expected, if they want and try, to acquire nuclear weapon capability in near future. Australia, Brazil, Germany, Netherlands, Italy etc. belong to this category. These are called *threshold powers*. Remaining countries belong to the last category of *nuclear have nots*. They have either no nuclear programme or they have made little headway in nuclear research. A large number of third world nations are included in this category. They may also be dubbed as nuclear backward.

Impact on Military Science

With the growth of nuclear weapons there was gradual demise of the quest for territorial acquisition. The goal of territorial expansion *per se* no longer remains an objective of atleast most of the industrialised countries. Recent world history has been the history of the cession of territory, not its acquisition. The colonial system was abolished by choice. The choice was made because the costs associated with controlling lands and peoples exceeded the benefits. Moreover, colonies failed to enhance the security of states possessing them, as nuclear and other sophisticated weapons rendered meaningless the protection traditionally provided by the buffer of territory.

In the pre-nuclear age, the outcome of the war was being decided on the battlefield. It was difficult to destroy the territory, industrial capacity and population of the enemy without first defeating its armed forces. But that is not so in nuclear age. A few nuclear bombs are enough for the purpose.

In this age, full-time preparedness on the part of each nuclear power is required. The decision time to counter a nuclear attack is very small. In conventional war, one day delay in preparing oneself to encounter the enemy may be bad, but not necessarily a fatal mistake. The unpreparedness of a few minutes on the part of one nuclear power during which its rival makes first nuclear strike would be disastrous. Space and time, which in the past provided protection against dangerous surprise attack have greatly lost their relevance in the nuclear age. Regular military preparedness became the price of durable peace. It stimulated the arms race. There was a tendency among big powers to pursue an arms race and arms control simultaneously, the endeavour of each to seek peace while preparing for war, and the inclination of each to assume that national security can be purchased.

Improved nuclear weapons technology also has its impact on the conventional weapons. Some technologies, either unaltered or with slight modifications, are used in nuclear as well as conventional weapons. For instance, the radar technology which provides advance information about incoming nuclear missiles would also enable the concerned country to defend itself against war planes like F-16s. Consequently, there has been significant increase in the lethality and sophistication of conventional weapons.

Impact on Alliances

Nuclear weapons as well as modern military technology have rendered military alliances somewhat irrelevant. In pre-nuclear age, states threatened by a common enemy agreed to support one another in the event of war so that the *status quo* was maintained and the interests of the smaller states were not jeopardised. But in thermo-nuclear age, the support to a state threatened by a nuclear power may mean total destruction. Owing to the great risk involved in coming to the aid of the threatened state the belief is generally expressed on peace through universal deterrence. The military alliances in different part of the world faced this dilemma and became irrelevant one by one.

Moreover, the advent of long-range ballistic missiles have further eroded the importance of

these alliances. Due to the range, speed and destructive power of these weapons the uniformed national policies and centralised and unified command and control become essential pre-requisites for the useful functioning of the alliances. This expected too much from the resources of the alliance partners and their political systems refused to bear the pressure of these external factors. These stresses and strains compelled the alliance partners to give up such pervasive institutions.

The internal bickerings within the NATO,—especially the French opposition to the American "hegemony over the NATO—resulted in the production and deployment of nuclear weapons by Britain and France, particularly the latter. When France also became a nuclear power, its courage to challenge America within NATO and on other international issues tended to increase. In 1964, China successfully tested a nuclear blast and since then the Sino-Soviet rivalry was intensified. Gone are the days of the military alliances formed during the cold war. These are being replaced by economic groupings.

Impact on the Concept of National Power

The nuclear capabilities have also diffused and diluted the importance of the traditional basis of state power. The traditional factors like population, territory, industrial capacity etc. are no more regarded as the chief components of national power. Contrary to the pre-nuclear age when these traditional factors greatly contributed towards the power of a state, now the nuclear energy has come to be considered as a chief factor of national power and the traditional factors have been rendered less significant. A small state having nuclear weapons is in a position to dominate and inflict enormous damage on a large state.

Nuclear weapons effected the concept of national power in another respect also. To a grea extent, power ratios are products, not of objective measurements, but of how those concret factors are *perceived*. Thus, a political confrontation between the states is likely to be influenced not only by actual but also by perceived capability. And not only must capabilities be perceived; threats to use them must be credible—a nation must believe that its opponent can and will use its strength to influence the outcome of a conflict. Mere possession of a weapon does not enhance a nation's power if a rival believes that it will not be used.

It has been observed that those with the greatest nuclear arsenals do not necessarily win in political conflicts. This fact is even more clear if one analyzes the relations between strong and weak nations as measured by their relative military capabilities. Weaker states have often gotten their way politically against their military superiors. A Vietnam that was weak in the conventional military sense succeeded against a vastly more militarised France, and later America, in getting what it wanted, notwithstanding the weapons preponderance of its adversaries. Nuclear giant like the United States could not prevent the emergence of a communist government in Cuba, only 90 miles from its shores. Likewise, sophisticated military power did not prevent seizure of the USS *Pueblo* by North Korea in 1968 or the incarceration of American diplomatic personnel by Iran a decade later. The obvious helplessness of the Soviet Union to influence the course of events in Afghanistan without using military force also suggests that the malaise of military power is not peculiar to the United States. In these and other important cases, so-called second and third-rate military powers appear at times to have exerted more influence over the superpowers than the superpowers over them. In fact, at times strong military powers seem to have little diplomatic leverage. Kegley and Wittkopf rightly observe: "One of the major lessons of contemporary world politics, in short, is that the power to destroy is *not* the power to control. If ever military capabilities were a significant contributing part of national power, that contribution appears to have declined, perhaps irreversibly".[22]

Nuclear Diplomacy and Disarmament

A kind of nuclear diplomacy has taken place in international relations. In some cases, nuclear threat has enabled the parties in managing or resolving international crises. It seems that China agreed to the ceasefire in Korea in 1953 only after it was threatened by the US that unless China gave its consent to the ceasefire proposal, it would be attacked with atomic bombs. Similar Soviet threat during Anglo-French action against Egypt (1956) resolved the crisis that was erupted in the wake of nationalisation of Suez canal. Whenever the states feel that some irrational demands are being forced on them and there is no centralised agency to check the onslaughts of the strong adversaries they are left with only alternative for successful resistance through the threat to retaliate. Thus, arms are not only used for creating better bargaining positions but also for resisting a potential adversary and inflicting irrevocable damage. Owing to the fear of nuclear holocaust, the adversaries are subjected to tremendous pressure to move towards resolution as early as possible. The decision-making process of both sides get activated. These weapons have added a very dangerous element into international politics. Any miscalculation or error on the part of one or both sides would drag them towards the nuclear brink resulting in a nuclear disaster for whole world.

Another aspect of nuclear diplomacy is related with disarmament and arms control negotiations. The nuclear powers are fully aware of the socio-economic consequences and devastating effects of nuclear proliferation and have, therefore, been making consistent efforts not only to check their growth but also to ensure that the existing one are either destroyed or not used. After the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the super powers began to take concrete steps to lessen the likelihood of nuclear war. They tried to avoid confrontation and started negotiations for arms control. Nuclear weapons became the common topic for discussion in all international conferences and talks. In and outside the UN there began a serious discussion between Western Nations and the Soviet Union regarding control and limitation of nuclear warheads, disarmament, European security problem etc. Discussions and diplomatic parleys are still continuing on these problems.

Significant achievements in respect of disarmament and arms control are Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963), Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT, 1968), SALT-I (1972), SALT-II (1979), INF Treaty (1987), START (1991), START-II (1993), NPT review and extension (1995) and CTBT (1996). These measures will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

Thus the advent of nuclear weapons caused lot of changes in the long-standing traditional international relations. From time to time the pattern of international relations was influenced by these weapons. They played their role in the origin and later intensification of cold war. So long as the US had the monopoly over these weapons, it followed the policy of containment, brinkmanship and massive retaliation. Later on, when the USSR and some other countries succeeded in making the nuclear weapons the problem of nuclear proliferation cropped up. This gave rise to arms race and arms trade with the accompanying bad effects on Third World countries. On account of these weapons the Sino-Soviet rift deepened. Initially nuclear weapons encouraged bipolarisation and cold war but with their proliferation the world again became multipolar ushering in the process of détente and de-polarisation. Fear of nuclear holocaust on the one hand gave birth to the concept of nuclear deterrence and on the other to the policy of peaceful coexistence. The world witnessed the coincidence of dual trend of arms race and efforts towards disarmament. In this way, nuclear weapons dominated the international scenario in the post-World War II era.

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2

Realism

INTRODUCTION

Realism has been the most important approach of international relations over the years. It has been the dominant way of explaining international behaviour. Realism emphasizes relations among nations, as they have been and as they are. It is not concerned with the ideal world. It is the international interpretation of human behaviour. Individuals are essentially selfish, and they seek power to serve their interests and to prevail over others. As Morgenthau wrote in the 20th century, power is the control of men over the minds and actions of other men. And, there is constant strife leading to conflicts and clashes between individuals having divergent interests and seeking to acquire power. Thus, there is an ever-present struggle for power in the society. The same is the tone of nations that are guided by the same considerations as individuals.

Realism, or political realism, as an approach of international relations has evolved over the centuries. Prominent among its earlier advocates were Indian scholar Kautilya, Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, and Greek scholar Thucydides. Much later, Italian scholar Nicolo Machiavelli and English philosopher Thomas Hobbes also contributed to the evolution of realism. Their ideas may be called *classical realism*, though Morgenthau is now considered the principal classical realist. However, according to the view expressed by Robert Jackson and George Sorensen (1999) and many others, Morgenthau's theory may be described as *neo-classical realism*. But, Morgenthau was the most systematic advocate of realism. However, British Professor E H Carr, who wrote *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (1919–39) had prepared the ground on which Morgenthau developed his theory of realism. Carr criticized democracies like the UK and France for their failure in defeating the designs of dictators. He blamed the democratic countries for failing to

recognize the power realities in the world. Carr divided the scholars of international relations into two groups. These were the 'utopians', or the 'idealists', and the 'realists'. He described the utopians as optimists—children of enlightenment and liberalism. The liberals held the view that reason and morality could structure international behaviour of the states towards peace. Wilson and (his) League of Nations were cited as main examples of utopians. Carr, who himself was a realist, described realists as pessimists, or children of darkness, who emphasize power and national interest. Commenting on Carr's views on power, Michael G Roskin and Nicholas O Berry wrote, 'This does not necessarily mean perpetual war, for if statesmen are clever and willing to build and apply power, both economic and military, they can make the aggressors back down...'

The world is, according to the realists, a dangerous and insecure place where violence is regrettable, yet unavoidable. In their account of the conflictual nature of international politics, realists give high priority to the centrality of the nation-state, acknowledging it as the supreme political authority. Realists are united in their pessimism about the extent to which international political system can be made more peaceful and just. As Scott Burchill wrote, 'International realism is characterized by conflict, suspicion, and competition between nation-states.' He also stated, 'Realism is a pessimistic theoretical tradition. Fundamental changes to the structure of the international system are unlikely, even if they are needed. The apparent immutability of the international system means that it will not come to resemble domestic liberal orders, however desirable the analogue may be.' It is argued that, for realists, international politics is a world of recurrence and repetition, not reform or radical change.

Realism is a school of thought that explains international relations in terms of power. The exercise of power by states towards each other is often called *realpolitik*, or just *power politics*. Realism developed in reaction to a liberal tradition that realists called idealism, though idealists (or liberals) do not consider their approach unrealistic. Idealism (liberalism) emphasizes international law, morality and international organization, rather than power. Idealists think human nature is basically good. They suggest that with good habits, education and effective international organization, human nature can become the basis of peaceful and cooperative international relationship. For them, the principles of international relations must flow from morality. Idealism presents a picture of future international society free from power politics.

Realism emerged as a reaction to idealism both in the classical period and in the 20th century, after the First World War, and again during the Cold War. It derives its name from its advocates' belief that they are realistic and look at the world as it is. However much one may deplore it, the fact remains that the reality of world politics is the search and struggle for power, existence of conflict more than cooperation and frequent occurrence of wars. Realists insist on studying world politics as it is and as it has been.

Realists argue that states are the most important actors in the international system. They would exclude all other actors. The security of the state is the primary motivation for a government's actions. An unguarded state would certainly become the victim of aggression and even assimilations. Realism has been described as a beguiling and reductive theory, though pessimistic in both its assumptions and conclusions. Pessimism was best reflected in the theory of Thomas Hobbes in the 17th century. He refers to anarchy in international system due to search for power and security by states. According to him, life would be 'nasty, brutish and short' because of the constant fear of aggression and the need to prevent it.

ANCIENT REALISTS

A number of scholars and statesmen contributed to the evolution of realism in ancient times. These include Kautilya, Sun Tzu and Thucydides.

Kautilya

The ancient Indian scholar–statesman Kautilya contributed to the origin of realism by making power the focal point of his theoretical framework. Writing in the 4th century BC, Kautilya probably made the first systematic effort to formulate the rules of statecraft. He concentrated on the concept of power in terms of goal attainment, leading to the development of intricate set of rules whereby a 'conqueror' could maintain and expand his domain. Propaganda, espionage and assassinations were said to be prescribed techniques of control at home, and of subversion abroad. These ideas may appear cynical, but Kautilya would argue that he merely accepted the reality of uncontrolled anarchy in international relations. Kautilya defined power derived from three elements: knowledge, military strength and valour. Morgenthau, who has been described by Couloumbis and Wolfe as Kautilya's realist descendent, developed the concept of power completely divorced from morality. Such power is the focal point of Morgenthau's classical realism.

Sun Tzu

The Chinese strategist realist Sun Tzu, who lived some two thousand years ago (at the time of idealist Mo Ti), advised the rulers of states on how to survive in an era when war had become a systematic instrument of power. Sun Tzu argued that moral reasoning was not very useful to the rulers of states that were faced with armed and dangerous neighbours. He showed rulers how to use power to both advance and protect their interests and to survive.

Thucydides

The famous Greek thinker Thucydides saw the inevitable competitions and conflicts between Greek city-states (together known as Hellas) and between Hellas and non-Greek empires, such as Persia and Macadamia. Neither the Greek city-states (Hellas) nor their neighbours were, in any sense, equal. This inequality was natural and unavoidable. Aristotle had said that 'man is a political animal'. But, according to Thucydides, political animals are highly unequal in their power, and they conduct themselves accordingly. If states do that they will survive. But if they fail to do that, they may be destroyed.

In his famous study of the Peloponnesian War (437-404 BC), Thucydides put his realist philosophy in the mouths of leaders of Athens, a great power, in dialogue with leaders of a minor power, Melos, during a conflict between the two. Thucydides stated that justice has special meaning in international relations. It is not about equal treatment for all; it is all about knowing your proper place, about adapting to the reality of unequal power.

Thucydides further stated that before any decision is made, a decision-maker should carefully think about the likely consequences, both bad, as well as good. He emphasized the ethics of caution and prudence in the conduct of foreign policy in a world of great inequality, of restricted foreign policy choices and ever present dangers and opportunities. Thus, foresight, prudence, caution and judgment are all features of classical realism. Thucydides, like most other realists, was at pains to distinguish between private morality and the principle of justice.

For realists, the reality of international relations is the anarchy of separate states that have no real choice but to operate according to the principles and practices of power politics in which security and survival are primary values and war is the final arbiter. Thucydides concluded that 'the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.'

REALIST OF RENAISSANCE PERIOD: MACHIAVELLI

Italian realist scholar Niccolò Machiavelli of the Renaissance period (around AD 1500) asked the princes (rulers) to concentrate on an expedient action to *stay in power* and to pay *attention to war* more than anything else. His classical realist theory is, according to Jackson and Sorensen, 'primarily a theory of survival'. Machiavelli wrote that power (the lion) and deception (the fox) are the two essential means for the conduct of foreign policy. The leaders of states should be both lions and foxes. The supreme political value is national freedom. The main responsibility of rulers is always to seek the advantages and to defend the interests of the state and thus ensure its survival. That requires strength. Therefore, the ruler must be a lion. That also requires cunning and ruthlessness in the pursuit of self interest. Thus, the ruler must be a fox. If rulers are not crafty and adroit, they cannot bring benefits to themselves and to their states. The ruler must anticipate a menace and act to check and defeat it. As Jackson and Sorensen opine, the Machiavellian assumption is that the world is at the same time a dangerous place and an opportune place, too. The conduct of foreign policy should be based on the intelligent calculation of one's own power and interests as against the power and interests of rivals and competitors. This is also the thrust of 20th century realist Hans J Morgenthau.

Machiavelli's advice to the prince, or ruler, would be: 'Be aware of what is happening, do not wait for things to happen. A prudent leader acts to ward off any thrust to the state's interests and survival. Do not wait for others to act; act before they do.' In other words, the leader should be proactive rather than reactive. The prince should be prepared to engage in pre-emptive war and similar initiatives. Machiavelli totally rejects the idealists' faith in Christian values. These values are 'love thy neighbour', 'be peaceful' and 'avoid war except only in self-defence'. For Machiavelli, these values or maxims are the height of political irresponsibility and may lead to loss and grief.

Explaining the obligations of the prince (ruler) Machiavelli wrote, 'A prince cannot observe all those things for which men are considered good, for, in order to maintain the state, he is often obliged to act against his promise, against charity, against humanity, and against religion. And, therefore, it is necessary that he have a mind ready to turn itself to the way the winds of fortune and the changeability of political affairs require. As long as it is possible, he should not stray from the good, but he should know how to enter into evil when necessity commands.'

To conclude, Machiavelli's realist writings are manuals on how to thrive in a completely chaotic and immoral world. Rulers have to be both lions and foxes because people depend upon them for their survival and prosperity.

CLASSICAL REALISM AND THOMAS HOBBES

English philosopher Thomas Hobbes made an important contribution to the theory of realism in the 17th century. Hobbes is popularly known as a 'contractualist' for the pioneer of the theory of social contract of origin of the state. He discussed the free-for-all situation that exists when government is absent and people seek their own self interest. In the process, they violently clash among themselves. He called this state of perpetual warfare as a 'state of nature'. Today, we may call it the 'state of jungle', where there is no rule of law. Hobbes advocated that an all-powerful monarchy alone could prevent the chaos. Thus, power would be the sole weapon of orderly behaviour. In his state of nature, people live in extremely advance and insecure condition in which every man is against every man. In this condition of perpetual war, every man, woman and child is endangered by everyone else. Nobody is sure of his or her survival for any reasonable length of time. To get out of the miserable state of nature, people enter into a contract and make a leviathan sovereign in a civil society. This act of instituting a sovereign state to come out of the fearful state of nature results in making another state of nature among the states themselves.

Unlike men and women who gave up their individual rights to set up a sovereign state, modern states are not willing to give up their independence for the sake of any global security arrangement. The international state of nature of modern times is anarchy based on sovereign states. The main point about the international state of nature (state of anarchy) is that it is a condition of actual or potential war. As a last resort, war is necessary for resolving disputes. Hobbes was of the opinion that states could also enter into contracts or treaties to provide for legal basis for their relations, that is, international law could moderate the international state of nature.

Thus, classical realism of Hobbes emphasizes both military power and international law. For Hobbes, as for Thucydides and Machiavelli, security and survival are values of fundamental importance. But, the core value of Hobbesian realism is domestic peace—peace within the framework of sovereign states.

All the classical realists of pre-20th century period believed that the modern nation-state (which is sovereign) is organized and equipped for war in order to provide domestic peace for its people.

In the 19th century, the German military strategist Karl Von Clausewitz, had said, 'War is a continuation of politics by other means.' And US admiral Alfred Mahan promoted naval power as the key means of achieving national political and economic interests. Thus, Joshua S Goldstein says, 'Realists see in these historical figures evidence that the importance of power politics is timeless and cross-cultural.'

CLASSICAL REALISM OF THE 20th CENTURY

E H Carr and Hans J Morgenthau are the two most prominent realists of 20th century. In contemporary literature, Morgenthau is described as a classical realist, though there is a view that all scholars before Morgenthau were together classical realists, and the most widely accepted realist Morgenthau should be put in the category of neo-classical realism. Avoiding this controversy, this book will deal with Carr and Morgenthau as classical or 20th century realists. The term 'realism' in common parlance is associated exclusively with Morgenthau.

E H Carr

Carr's work, *The Twenty Year's Crisis*, was published in 1939 on the eve of the Second World War. It was a response to the failed belief of post-First World War idealists led by US President Woodrow Wilson. Carr called the idealists 'utopians', or 'utopian liberals'. Carr could be easily described as the forerunner of the great realist Hans J Morgenthau. A brief discussion of utopianism and Carr's realist approach will be appropriate at this stage.

In response to the horrors of the First World War, liberal internationalists, or 'utopians' as Carr called them, sought to abolish war as an instrument of statecraft. Liberals were convinced that the forms of international diplomacy could be restructured to make them more peaceful. Self-determination and statehood would be available to all national groups. Secret diplomacy would be abolished and replaced by public consent in the conduct of foreign policy. The balance of power principle would give way to a system of collective security, where individual acts of aggression would be met by the collective force of world opinion and military power. Finally, international fora, such as the League of Nations, would be established to mediate the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Idealism presented a picture of future international society free from power politics, immorality and violence.

Carr is believed to have based the study of international politics on an imaginary desire of how we would like the world to be. According to Carr, 'The teleological aspect of the science of international politics has been conspicuous from the outset... the passionate desire to prevent war determined the whole initial course and direction of the study', which, consequently, made it 'markedly and frankly utopian'. As a result of its preoccupation with the 'end to be achieved (international peace), international relations in its initial stage was a discipline 'in which wishing prevailed over thinking, generalization over observation, and in which little attempt was made at a critical analysis of existing facts or available means'. Until the 1930s, international relation was, according to Carr, a discipline in which teleology preceded analysis.

The failure of the League of Nations to prevent Japan's invasion of Manchuria and Italy's occupation of Abyssinia had dashed the hopes of many liberals who believed the world could be made peaceful simply by wishing it to be so. And when Hitler began destroying the Versailles Treaty and playing havoc with European nation-states, the collective security system of the League totally collapsed. What was needed, according to Carr, was a more rigorous approach which emphasized the realities of power in international politics rather than one which took as its starting point, an image of how the world could be, in other words, what is rather than what *ought* to be.

Carr believed that realism was 'a necessary corrective to the exuberance of utopianism' which had ignored the central element of power in its consideration of international politics. Until the unequal distribution of power in the international system became the central focus of a dispassionate analysis, the root causes of conflict and war would not be properly understood. Carr believed the liberal utopians were so concerned with eradicating the scourge of war they had completely neglected its underlying rationale.

According to Carr, 'just as the ruling class in a community prays for domestic peace, which guarantees its own security and predominance, and denounces class war, which might threaten them, so international peace becomes a vested interest of predominant powers.' For a state which wishes to revise its territorial boundaries or its economic and strategic power, 'international peace' is an oppressive tyranny masquerading as universal harmony. It is the slogan of those players powerful enough to impose their will on subordinate societies. For

realists, the liberal idea that every international conflict is unnecessary, if not immoral, is nothing more than attempt to enshrine an existing economic and political order which is favourable to ruling classes within dominant states. There is no natural harmony of interests between states in the international system, only a temporary and transient reflection of a particular configuration of global power. War may, in fact, be the only way in which power can be recalibrated in the international system.

The liberal utopians had wanted to eliminate power as a consideration for states in the international system. Realists, on the other hand, believed the pursuit of national power was a natural drive which states neglected at their peril. Nation-states that eschewed the pursuit of power on principle simply endangered their own security. For Carr, the pursuit of power by individual states took the form of promoting 'national interests', a term later to be more broadly defined as the foreign policy goals of the nation but understood by realists specifically to mean strategic power. Clashes of national interests were inevitable: it was futile and dangerous to suggest otherwise. The only way to minimize such clashes, and, therefore, the incidence of war, was to ensure that a rough balance of power existed between the states in the international system.

Both liberalism and realism have their place in 'sound political thought'—realism to expose the fact that utopianism serves the interests of the privileged and powerful, and utopianism to deny that 'altruism is an illusion' and demonstrate that 'pure realism can offer nothing but a naked struggle for power which makes any kind of international society impossible'. The 'science of international politics' requires a blend of both forms of thinking. Its reputation for sterility, pessimism and resistance to change are not entirely well deserved.

Whatever may be its final form, Carr was convinced that a new international order would be shaped by the realities of global power rather than by morality. He was not arguing that morality was an irrelevant consideration. In fact, he believed that international peace was most likely when the dominant power was generally accepted as tolerant and non-oppressive or at any rate, as preferable to any practical alternative. But this was the closest he came to conceding that there might be a moral basis for international order. He preferred to stress that 'power is a necessary ingredient of every political order'. This conviction exposed Carr to critics who claimed he was privileging power and its pursuit by states above all other factors.

Carr's work should be understood as primarily a critique of liberal internationalism, or what he called 'Utopian thinking'. It was not put forward as a meta-theory of international relations. It is not a comprehensive theoretical account. It is the kind of explanation one could expect from a historian who believed that history was a sequence of cause and effect which could only be properly appreciated by intellectual effort. Carr believed that the theory of international relations would emerge from the ways in which those relations were practised, and not the other way around. It is not surprising that he thought it was important to defend realism and highlight its relevance in explaining the drift towards another global conflagration. In neglecting the importance of power as a consideration in international relations, Carr was convinced that the architects of the Versailles peace had set the world on an inevitable course to further conflict.

Hans J Morgenthau (1904–1980)

Morgenthau, a German by birth, could not tolerate the arbitrary rule and brutalities of Hitler's Nazi regime. He fled to the United States as a refugee. He taught the Americans about national

interest, and founded the 'realist school of international relations'. He described politics as a struggle for power. Many Americans, immersed in legalism and moralism, did not relish Morgenthau's emphasis on national interest, which, according to them, smacked of the old and evil 'power politics'. But, for Morgenthau national interest alone made sense in international relations. He believed, 'once you understand a country's national interest, you can easily predict its foreign policy moves'. He reasoned that no nation had 'God on its side', which means that there was no universal morality. Any action of the states should be based on prudence and practicability.

Morgenthau defined national interest in terms of power. Therefore, it was largely objective and rational. He said, 'International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power'. 'Therefore', he argued, 'when facing authoritarian and aggressive rulers like Germany's Hitler and Japan's Tojo, America needed power, not legalism and moralism'. According to Morgenthau, 'men and women are, by nature, political animals. They are born to pursue power.' Morgenthau wrote in 1948 about *animus dominandi*, or the human lust for power. The craving for power dictates a search not only for relative advantage but also for a secure political space within which to maintain and enjoy oneself free from the political dictates of the other. The ultimate political space within which security can be arranged and enjoyed is, of course, the independent state. Security beyond the state is impossible.

Lust for power inevitably brings men and women into conflict with each other. That creates conditions for power politics, which is at the heart of classical and neo-realist writings. Politics is struggle for power over men, and whatever its ultimate aim may be, power is its immediate goal.

Morgenthau identifies himself with the view he calls 'realism'. It believes that the imperfections of the world are 'the result of forces inherent in human nature'.

According to this approach, to improve the world one must work with those forces, not against them. In a world where conflicts are perpetual, moral principles can never be fully realized. They can only be approximated through a temporary balancing of interests. Absolute good can never be achieved, but a system of checks and balances can be deduced from historical experience rather than abstract moral or ethical codes.

Like E H Carr, Morgenthau began his approach by defining his position in opposition to what he sees as the influence, if not the dominance, of the liberal Utopian principles. Morgenthau listed six principles of political realism, which, when taken together summarize his theoretical approach to the study of international relations. In the first chapter of his famous book *Politics Among Nations* (1948), Morgenthau states that his theory is called realism because it is concerned 'with human nature as it actually is and with the historical processes as they actually take place'. Thus, realism revolves around power politics, which is real and not the utopian idea of world peace through morality and education.

Morgenthau did not endorse the view of American President Wilson who believed that it was necessary for political ethics to be brought in line with private ethics. In a famous address to the U S Congress in 1917, President Wilson had said that he could discern the beginning of an age in which it would be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong be observed among nations and their governments as are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states. Morgenthau considered that outlook to be not only ill-advised but also irresponsible. 'On the other hand', as Morgenthau wrote, 'Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of the states in their abstract

universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place. The individual may so far himself *hot justitia, pereot, mundus* (let justice be done even if the world perish), but the state has no right to say so in the name of those who are in its cave.'

Morgenthau's six principles of realism Morgenthau's six principles of realism, in brief, are as under:

1. Politics is governed by objective laws which have their root in human nature. These laws do not change over time and are impervious to human preference. A rational theory of politics and international relations can be based on these laws; in fact any such theory should reflect these objective laws. Following this approach it is possible to distinguish between truth (facts) on one hand and opinion on the other. These laws provide us with certainty and confidence in predicting rational political behaviour.
2. The key to understanding international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. Reference to this concept enables us to see politics as an autonomous sphere of action. It imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible. The idea of interest defined in terms of power reveals the true behaviour of politicians and guards us against two popular misconceptions about the determination of a state's foreign policy—the motives of statesmen and ideological preferences. Whilst political leaders will cast their policies in ideological terms (defense of democracy and so on) they are inevitably confronted by the distinction between what is desirable and what is actually possible. There is no room for moral or ethical concerns, prejudice, political philosophy or individual preference in the determination of foreign policy because actions are constrained by the relative power of the state. The 'national interest', which ought to be the sole pursuit of statesmen, is always defined in terms of strategic and economic capability.
3. The forms and nature of state power will vary in time, place and context but the concept of interest remains consistent. The political, cultural and strategic environment will largely determine the forms of power a state chooses to exercise, just as the types of power which feature in human relationships change over time. In addition, realists ought not to be wedded to a perennial connection between interest and the nation-state which is 'a product of history, and, therefore, bound to disappear'. There is no reason why 'the present division of the political world into nation-states will (not) be replaced by larger units of quite different character, more in keeping with the intellectual potentialities and moral requirements of the contemporary world'. Change in the international system, however, will only occur 'through the workmanlike manipulation of the perennial forces that have shaped the past as they will the future'.
4. Universal 'moral principles' do not guide state behaviour, though state behaviour will certainly have moral and ethical implications. Individuals are influenced by moral codes but states are not moral agents. Any attempt to explain the international behaviour of states should not, therefore, concentrate on the stated moral principles which are said to underpin the conduct of foreign policy. Whereas ethical behaviour is judged according to whether it conforms to a set of moral principles, political behaviour is evaluated according to the political consequences which ensue: there is a tension between moral action and the expedient requirements of political action. Prudential behaviour based on a judicious assessment of the consequences arising out of alternative political choices is the guiding law for realists.
5. There is no 'universally agreed set of moral principles'. Though states from time to time will endeavour to clothe their behaviour in ethical terms (human rights advocacy), the use of moral language to justify external behaviour is designed to confer advantage, legitimacy and further the national interests of the state. It ought not to be mistaken for political motives which, in reality, are restricted to the pursuit of interest defined in terms of power. Universal moral principles are not a reliable guide to state behaviour. When states proclaim these universal principles they are merely projecting their particular national or cultural codes onto the world as a whole. 'Interest is the perennial standard by which political action must be judged and directed'.
6. Intellectually, the political sphere is 'autonomous' from every other sphere of human concern, whether legal, moral or economic. This enables us to see the international domain as analytically distinct from other fields of intellectual inquiry, with its own standards of thought and criteria for the analysis and evaluation of state behaviour (interest defined in terms of power). Key questions such as 'How does this policy affect the power of the nation?' are central to the concerns of this autonomous sphere of intellectual analysis.

Scott Burchill wrote that Morgenthau's principles of realism '... were designed as an antidote to liberal utopianism, which was widely held to be responsible for shaping the intellectual climate as Europe drifted towards the Second World War.' For Morgenthau, international politics was a struggle for power between states, and the pursuit of national interest was a normal, unavoidable and desirable activity. He was opposed to the idea of any state's attempt to universalize its own morality and ethical principles. His emphasis was on human nature, which is fixed and should be accepted for what it is rather than what it might be. Peace can only be ensured when the rational pursuit of power by statesman acting to the laws of politics is understood. Realism insists that politics is governed by immutable laws deriving from human nature. It provides the ideas about how the states will behave. 'For Morgenthau' wrote Scott Burchill, 'national interests are permanent conditions which provide policy makers with a rational guide to action: they are fixed, politically bipartisan and always transcend changes in the government'. They are a fact to be discovered rather than a matter of contingent and constructed preferences. Thus, national interest is not determined by the whims of a leader. It is objective and permanent. Peace, on the other hand, is never a permanent feature of international system. 'It is merely a temporary truce based on a rough equilibrium of state power.'

Speaking in the Indian Parliament, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had, on a number of occasions, emphasized the need to protect India's national interests even as he insisted on application of moral principles in the conduct of all policies. Highlighting national interest, Kissinger quoted US President Nixon (1970), 'Our objective...is to support our interests over the long run with a sound foreign policy, the more that policy is based on a realistic assessment of our and others' interests, the more effective our role in the world can be. We are not involved in the world because we have commitments; we have commitments because we are involved. Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way round.'

Identifying himself with realism, Morgenthau said that he believed the world'simperfections were 'the result of forces inherent in human nature'. He added, 'to improve the world one must work with those forces, not against them'.

REALISM: STUDY OF REALITIES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The doctrine of realism, as evident from the views of various thinkers beginning with Kautilya, is based on the belief that international relations must study the world as it is. It was generally accepted as the study of struggle for power till the beginning of the 20th century. Balance of power was regarded as the expression of realistic politics. After the First World War, there was some disenchantment with realism. Until the early 20th century, states were governed by people who followed realist principles. This caused the World War of 1914–18. 'If the war was a sequence of realism', wrote Michael Nicholson, 'it was clearly a disastrous doctrine'. The idealists (led by Wilson) then became more influential.

Even the idealists believed that states would continue to be central actors, yet peace would be possible through the League of Nations. However, this view was rejected with the rise of Hitler's Nazi Germany during the inter-war years. Idealism could not last long. The Second World War put realism back as the dominant way of looking at international events.

The realists' concern with the state comes from the concern with security and issues of power. States are the only organizations that can direct military power on any significant scale. The emphasis on security and potential violence derives from a pessimistic argument. The situation is aggravated when states acquire armaments in anticipation of threats. Even when their intentions are sincerely peaceful, suspicious neighbours might mistake their behaviour as preparation for offensive rather than defensive war. Nicholson thus comments, 'Unfortunately there is no clear distinction between offensive and defensive weapons, so this suspicion is hard to allay and the neighbour may itself increase the weapons thus creating further suspicious in the system'. This pattern of interaction is known as the 'security dilemma'. This can be easily illustrated by the Indo-Pak security rivalry.

Commenting on the security dilemma, Kenneth Waltz had said that in the course of providing for one's own security, the state concerned would automatically be fuelling the insecurity of other states. Security dilemma is the term used for the spiral of in-security. According to Wheeler and Booth, security dilemma exists when the military preparations of one state create an irresolvable uncertainty in the mind of another as to whether those preparations are for 'defensive' purposes only or whether they are for offensive purposes.

Basic Tenets

The basic tenets of realism can be summed up as follows:

- States are the dominant actors in the international system;
- States pursue power; they do this both in the sense of trying to get more powerful positions at the cost of opponents and by defending themselves against the encroachments of those rivals; and
- As the relationships of the states with each other are dependent entirely on their power relationships, they have nothing to do with the internal structure of the state or the type of regime.

However, several studies have shown that there is comparative cooperation and less possibility of conflict among democratic regimes.

Major Elements of Realism

In an article on realism in *The Globalization of World Politics* by John Baylis and Steve Smith, Timothy Dunne highlights statism and survival as two major elements of realism. These are briefly discussed in this section.

Statism Realism is state-centric, and state is the embodiment of power. As Donelan had said, 'every state is fundamentally a *machstaat*', which means a power-state. And state, in the words of Max Weber, is 'the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory'. The state possesses and manages power and ensures security of its borders and of its people. However, externally the states coexist in an anarchic system. Thus, a state is organized power internally and seeks to accumulate power internationally. Power is the monopoly of the state. For realists, states are the 'only actors that really count'. Transnational corporations, international organizations and religious groups do possess influence, but they lack power. These groups, MNCs and agencies like UN sponsored bodies rise and fall but the state is one permanent feature in the modern global politics. As Timothy Dunne wrote, 'The extent to which non-state actors bear the imprint of a statist identity is further endorsed by the fact that these actors have to make their way in an international system whose rules are made by states'. Drawing inspiration from Hegel and others, realists like Morgenthau and Nicholson identified the state as the guardian of the political community. Dunne concludes, 'In order to fulfil this function, the state must pursue the national interest'.

Survival All realists agree that in international politics the most important goal is security. Survival is a precondition for attaining all other goals, whether these involve conquest or welfare of the people and nations' development. It is essential for leaders of states to distance themselves from traditional morality. For Machiavelli, the principles of morality were positively harmful if observed by the leaders of a state, who, according to him, must aim at power not only to protect but, if necessary, even to conquer others. It was imperative that the statesmen learned a different kind of morality which 'accorded not to traditional Christian values, but to political necessity'. As Morgenthau had insisted, 'prudence is the most important virtue'. Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (described as an academic realist) had said, 'a nation's survival is its first and ultimate responsibility, it cannot be compromised or put to risk'. Power is the tool for ensuring security.

To sum up, the primary objective of all states is the supreme national interest to which all political leaders must adhere. All other goals, such as economic prosperity, are considered secondary or 'low positions'. The leaders must adopt an ethical code which judges actions according to the outcome, and not in terms of judgment about whether the individual act is right or wrong, or whether it is moral or immoral.

OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE REALISM

It was argued by Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven E Miller that realism has two forms, or strands. These are 'offensive or aggressive realism' and 'defensive realism'. The differences between the two define the differences in the policies of the states.

1. The primary attention of aggressive realism is centred on security. It believes that states generally do, and should, ensure their security and expand their resources by coercive means. If a state fails to do so, then other states would use coercive means and expand their power. The country that loses this opportunity has its security threatened and

endangered and may often lose its resources. In case of aggressive realism, offensive military activities are increased, and international rivalry is encouraged.

2. On the other hand, states that believe infinite security exists in the international system adopt defensive strategy in their policies. The countries that believe in defensive realism emphasize on maintaining their security and do not adopt coercive means for enlargement of their resources. The defensive realist countries try to maintain only as much military capability as to ensure their minimum credible deterrent power. The aggressive or offensive realist countries thus, on the other hand, adopt the strategy that would continue to maximize their military capability.

Scholars who study foreign policies and examine crisis situations conclude that the behaviour of aggressive realists generally creates new crisis and often helps increase crisis situations. Their attitude can be termed proactive. The defensive realist states, on the other hand, adopt only reactive strategies.

Both strands of realism accept the reality of international relations being influenced by human nature. They believe that each state gives highest priority to the protection and promotion of its national interests. They also believe that national interests are protected only through power. Realism believes that conflict among states is an eternal truth and each state tries to turn the balance of power in its favour or, in other words, to acquire preponderance of power. But the basic difference between aggressive and defensive realism is that aggressive realist countries seek to enhance their power with the help of coercive means at their own initiative and adopt aggressive policies for the increase in their military strength and economic prosperity. The defensive realist state, on the other hand, is happy and content if its territorial integrity and sovereignty is well protected. It feels that there is no need to increase its military potential and power. The defensive realist state is satisfied with minimum credible deterrent, as is the case with India's nuclear policy. But aggressive realism does not hesitate in making use of force on its own initiative, as was evident in America's Iraq policy pursued by President George W Bush.

Kenneth Waltz is considered the pioneer of neo-realism. His views (1979) may be described as defensive realism. Waltz argues that different countries compete with each other because they seek to increase their power for their security. According to Waltz, competition among states is only for their security. They do not seek greater relative advantage because if they do so, other countries may enter into alliances against them and harm their national interests. As against defensive realism of Waltz, aggressive realism was advocated by Mearsheimer (2001). His argument is that the structure of the world is such that powerful nations are encouraged to take initiative to enhance their relative power, and, if necessary, to use force to achieve their objective. The difference between defensive and aggressive realism is further highlighted by Waltz' argument that 'primary objective of nations is only survival', and Mearsheimer's argument that 'powerful nations are not satisfied only by survival, they seek to establish their hegemony in the international system'.

CONCLUSION

Realism has had a long history. Whether one likes it or not, it is a reality of world politics. Power is the core of realist politics which operates through states. Struggle for power could be either military conflict, including war, or an attempt to secure acceptance of one nation's

views by others. Failure to secure compliance by other states is failure of the power of the state. It disturbs the balance of power. Realism has had periods of setback as during the inter-war period when Wilsonian idealism put faith in the League of Nations, which failed miserably. As mentioned above, after the Second World War, Morgenthau argued that international politics is governed by objective universal laws based on national interest and defined as power. He reasoned that no nation had 'God on its side', meaning there was no universal morality. He concluded that all national interests had to base their actions on prudence and practicability. Goldstein concluded, 'Realists tend to treat political power as separate from, and predominant over, morality, ideology and other social and economic aspects of life. For realists, ideologies do not matter much, nor do religious or other cultural factors with which states may explain their actions.'

Michael Nicholson summed up, '... for the realist, international relations is the analysis of states pursuing power. The achievement of comparative peace is the result of the manipulation of power. All other issues are subordinate to it.'

Some objections to realism are based on the picture that it paints of a world perpetually on the edge of war. It presumes that national interest involves ready use of violence. Besides, liberals have always been against realists' emphasis on struggle for power. They champion the use of realism, law and organizations as means of achieving peace and avoidance of conflict. Morgenthau has been criticized for his assumptions about human nature. His views about humans seeking self-interest leading to struggle for power cannot be accepted as valid. Burchill says, 'He makes a number of claims about the biological basis of the human drive for power and domination, without explaining other aspects of the human condition which are not as egoistic'. These claims are found to be flawed and do not necessarily conform to any reality. From the Marxist' point of view, Morgenthau largely ignores economic consideration in the formulation of foreign policy and says little about the nature of capitalism and its effects on international order. Finally, the neo-realists question the wisdom of traditional realism and its emphasis on human nature to the exclusion of the structure of global order.

Some liberals criticizing realism argue that changes in the way international relations work have made realist assumptions absolute. Unlike the period of balance of power when kings and queens of Europe played war and traded territories as property, we live today in a globalized world in which states are interconnected. Borders are becoming fluid and the norms regarding the way in which military force contributes to international power have substantially changed. Human nature is no more accepted as the gospel truth of world politics. New realist thinkers pay far more attention to structure of the world, which is anarchic, and the strategies adopted in foreign policy decision-making.

3

Neo-Realism

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1970s, scholars like Kenneth Waltz and Thomas Schelling have given new interpretations of realism. The 'Neo-realist Theory' of Waltz and the 'Strategic Theory' of Schelling together sought to modify the traditional realism as explained by writers such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Morgenthau. According to the views expressed by Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, traditional realism may be divided into classical realism of earlier thinkers and neo-classical realism of Morgenthau. However, it would be better to avoid this distinction and put traditional or classical realism in one category, and neo-realism (and strategic realism) in another category. Power remains the focal point of all variants of realism, yet there are different approaches adopted by 20th century realists. Power is understood to be not only a fact of political life but also a matter of political responsibility. Balance of power is not only a fact of world politics, but it is also a basic value. For classical realists, the balance of power is a desirable institution and a good thing to strive for because it prevents hegemonic domination by any one great power. For all realists, it upholds the basic values of international peace and security.

New realist thinkers have adopted, with modifications, the basic tenets of orthodox or traditional realism. In this chapter, we will discuss two strands of realism that evolved since the 1970s. These are the strategic realism of Thomas Schelling and the structural or neo-realism of Kenneth Waltz.

Kenneth Waltz: Neo-realism

Neo-realism, advocated mainly by Kenneth Waltz in his book *Theory of International Politics* (1979), is also known as 'structural realism'. Waltz' theory focuses centrally on the structure of international system, on its interacting units and the continuities and changes of the system. Waltz takes some elements of traditional or classical realism as the starting point of his theory. But he departs and, unlike Morgenthau, gives no account of human nature. He ignores the ethics of statecraft. He has tried to present a scientific theory of international relations. In neo-realism, the structure of the system, in particular the relative distribution of power is the central focus of analysis. Actors (states) are less important because structures compel them to act in certain ways. The structures, more or less, determine actions of the states and their leaders. Waltz insists on anarchical international system, which is decentralized. In the anarchical world, several transnational economic actors threaten to undermine the authority of the states.

According to Stephen Kragner, realism is a theory about international politics. It is an effort to explain both the behaviour of individual states and the characteristics of the system as a whole. The ontological argument given for realism is that sovereign states are the constitutive components of the international system. Sovereignty is a political order based on territorial control. The international system is anarchical. It is a self-help system. There is no higher authority that can constrain or channel the behaviour of the states. Sovereign states are rational self-seeking actors resolutely, if not exclusively, concerned with relative gains because they must function in an anarchical environment in which their security and well-being ultimately rest on their ability to mobilize their own resources against external threats.

Kragner, thus, gives a brief yet accurate description of neo-realism. Burchill calls it a 'modern variant of realist tradition', which had been pioneered by Carr and Morgenthau (see Chapter 2). It was a response partly to the challenges posed by the interdisciplinary approach and partly as 'a restatement of the importance of bipolarity and systematic factors in international politics'. Robert Gilpin and Stephen Krasner had sought to reclaim a role for the state in a world that was increasingly coming under the impact of bodies like religious groups, multinational corporations and international governmental and non-government organizations (IGOs and NGOs). Neo-realism of Kenneth Waltz is both a critique of traditional realism and a substantial intellectual extension of a theoretical tradition which was in danger of being outflanked by rapid changes in world politics.

Kenneth Waltz insists that in order to understand the behaviour of the international system, we have to start with the system and then move down to individual actors rather than the other way round. This is in contrast to realists like Morgenthau who laid emphasis on innate human nature and then proceeded to build the classical realist theory. Waltz based his argument explicitly on the economists' analysis of individual markets and their interactions with the economy as such. The argument is that we can only study the price and the behaviour of individual actors in the market through analyzing the system as a whole. Structural realists like Waltz argue that, in effect, states are in a similar situation. They have to react to the system as it is given, although it is the commutation of their reactions that determines the system. As Michael Nicholson sums up, 'structural realists argue that states, power and security are central as with classical realism, although they also recognize the importance of economic actors'. However, these economic actors are ultimately subordinate to states. Thus, to quote Nicholson, '... all states are pursuing power. The situation in which any given state is placed broadly

determines the sort of policy it must follow. It has very little freedom of choice and this applies to big, powerful states as well as small ones.'

Waltz presented a radically revised realist theory. This neo-realist theory is based on the assumption that international system is essentially anarchical and that, in such anarchical system, states are primarily interested in their survival. In order to ensure their survival the states have to maximize power, particularly their military capability. Hence, the will of the states to maximize their power to the point of securing a dominant position becomes an enduring feature of international relations and conflict endemic. In such a world, cooperation between states is precarious, if not non-existent. Kenneth Waltz reinvigorated realism, giving it a new identity and a new confidence. But, this new identity was soon challenged by neo-liberal institutionalists led by Robert Keohane.

Waltz differs from classical realists in some fundamental ways. There is no discussion on human nature such as the one given by Morgenthau. As Jackson and Sorenson wrote, 'The focus is on the structure of the system and not on the human beings who create the system or operate the system. State leaders are prisoners of the system and its determinist logic, which dictates what they must do in their conduct of foreign policy. There is no room in Waltz's theory for foreign policy making that is independent of the structure of the system.' Commenting on the importance of structure, Waltz had written in 1979 that, 'the ruler's, annulated the state's, interest provides the spring of action; the necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states, circulation based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve the state's interests; success is the ultimate list of policy, and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state, ... structural constraints explain why the methods are repeatedly used despite differences in the persons and states that use them'.

Waltz's neo-realism makes far less provision for statecraft and diplomacy than Schelling's strategic realism (see below). For Waltz, structure determines policy. In Waltz's theory there is an implied recognition of the ethical dimension of international politics. Waltz operates with a concept of state sovereignty. But, for him, all states are equal only in a formal-legal sense. Actually, they are unequal in a substantive or material sense. Waltz also assumes that states are worth fighting for. That too indicates that neo-realism is all for security and survival.

Waltz operates with the concept of national interest. This is in conformity with the classical realism of Morgenthau. Waltz wrote, '... each state plots the course it thinks will best serve its interests'. For classical realists, national interest is the basic guide of responsible foreign policy. It is a moral idea that must be defended and promoted by state leaders. However, for Waltz, the national interest seems to operate like 'an automatic sign commanding state leaders when and where to move'. Here, the difference is that, for Morgenthau, statesmen are duty bound to conduct their foreign policy guidelines provided by the national interest, while, for Waltz, leaders will always do that more or less automatically. To sum up this point in the words of Jackson and Sorensen, 'Morgenthau sees states as organizations guided by leaders whose foreign policies are successful or unsuccessful, depending on the astuteness and wisdom of their decisions. Waltz sees states as structures that respond to the impersonal constraints and dictates of the international system.' Waltz tried to present a scientific explanation of international politics. Reiterating that international relations may be thought of as a system with a precisely defined structure, Waltz argued that classical realism was unable to conceptualize the international system in this way because it was limited by its behaviourist methodology which 'explains

political outcomes through examining the constituent parts of political system'. By this logic the characteristics and the interactions of behavioural units are taken to be the direct cause of political events.

Waltz argued that classical realists fail to conceive of structure as a force that shapes and shoves the units. To conclude, as Scott Burchill wrote, '...Morgenthau argued that power is rooted in the nature of humankind, neo-realists such as Waltz point to the anarchical condition of the international realm, which imposes the accumulation of power as systematic requirement of the states'. 'And', Burchill continues, 'the former account relies on a particular understanding of human nature to explain conflict in international politics, always a difficult approach to substantiate. The latter (neo-realism) abandons such reliance on reductionism, preferring to treat the international system as a separate domain which conditions the behaviour of all states within it.'

So, what is 'new' in neo-realism? It is the shift of emphasis from human nature of unalterable nature to that of the international system. Reality perceived under neo-realism is not the persisting reality of human nature being selfish and lustful (as under Morgenthau's classical realism), but the reality of compulsions of the nature of international system. But, as Mahendra Kumar wrote, 'the relevant lesson to be learnt is the same, namely that international politics is essentially an arena full of inevitable and unavoidable conflicts.' If classical realism considered human nature as the main source of this inevitability of conflict, neo-realism looks for it in the very nature of the manner in which the international society is constituted. But, except for this shift of emphasis, the overall approach remains more or less the same. The basic principles of orthodox or traditional realism, like supremacy of national interest, inevitability of conflict, power as an instrument of policy and irrelevance of morality, retain their importance of neo-realism also. It may be mere coincidence but both realism of Morgenthau and neo-realism of Waltz had one common background, Morgenthau's theory propounded after the commencement of Cold War and Waltz's neo-realism written in 1979 at the beginning of the new Cold War (Afghan crisis), both called for vigorous involvement of the United States as a super power to turn the balance of power in its focus. Neo-realism is often regarded as an updated enrichment of classical realism rather than marking a new theoretical breakthrough.

Thomas Schelling: Strategic Realism

Strategic realism, like neo-realism, is a product of the behavioural revolution of the 1950s and 1960s. Many contemporary realists seek to provide an empirical analysis of world politics. But they avoid normative analysis of international politics because that is considered subjective and, thus, unscientific. Strategic realism is associated with the name of Thomas Schelling who propagated his views in 1980.

Schelling's strategic realism focuses its attention on foreign policy decision-making. Leaders of states are obliged to think strategically when they confront basic diplomatic and military issues. They have to think strategically, i.e., instrumentally, if they hope to be successful. Schelling views diplomacy and foreign policy as a rational instrumental activity that can be more clearly understood by the application of game theory. As Schelling says, 'diplomacy is bargaining'. It seeks outcomes that, though not ideal for either of the parties, are better for both as compared to some of the alternatives. He wrote, 'Bargaining can be politics

or can be rude, entail threats as well as offers, assume a status quo or ignore all rights and privileges, and assume mistrust rather than trust.' But Schelling says that there must be some common interest, if only avoidance of mutual damage.

The central concept that Schelling employs is that of a 'threat'. He analyses how state leaders can deal with the threat and dangers of nuclear war. He wrote, 'the efficiency of ... (a nuclear) threat may depend on what alternatives are available to the political enemy, who, if he is not to react like a trapped lion, must be left some tolerable recourse. We have come to realize that a threat of all-out retaliation ... eliminates lesser course of action and forces him to choose between enemies ... may induce him to strike first.' Strategic realists are basically concerned with how to employ power intelligently in order to get the adversary to do what we desire and, more importantly, to avoid doing what we fear. This is a simple explanation of the concept of power in the context of strategies that political leaders adopt. In the words of Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, 'For Schelling, the activity of foreign policy is technically instrumental and thus free from moral choice. It is not primarily concerned about what is good or what is right. It is primarily concerned with the question: what is required for our policy to be successful.' These views are clearly in accordance with Morgenthau's emphasis on prudence, and not moral principle of right or wrong. Schelling suggests various mechanisms, strategies and moves which can enable state actors to generate collaboration and avoid disaster in a conflict ridden world of nuclear weapon states.

One of the crucial instruments of foreign policy for a major power is that of armed forces. Thus, strategic realism highlights the use of armed might in foreign policy. Schelling makes an important distinction between brute force and coercion, between 'taking' what you want (by brute force) and making someone give it to you (by coercion). He says that brute force succeeds when it is used, whereas the power to hurt is most successful when held in reserve. It is the threat of damage that can make the opponent yield or comply. One must know what the adversary's possessions are, and what scares him.

Making a basic realist point, Schelling says that for coercion to be effective, our interest and our opponent's interests should not be totally opposed. 'Coercion requires finding a bargain'. Schelling wrote in 1996, 'Coercion is a method of bringing an adversary into a bargaining relationship and getting the adversary to do what we want him or her to do without having to compel, i.e., use brute force, which is usually far more difficult, far less efficient, and far more dangerous'.

A reference may be made here to fundamental difference between traditional (classical) and contemporary realism, which accepts the basic value of national interest and the concept of power. Contemporary realists do not go into the nature of man which, according to Morgenthau, is selfish and lustful. They find the structure of international system anarchical, where power is sought to be used for meeting selfish ends. For strategic realists, the emphasis is on strategy that state leaders adopt while formulating foreign policy and conducting diplomacy. They use power (brute force or coercion) to achieve what they want either by taking it, or making the opponent give what they desire.

4

Liberalism and Neo-Liberalism

INTRODUCTION

The most keenly debated issue in international relations has been the pessimistic view of realism and optimistic view of liberalism. Realism is regarded as the dominant theory of international relations, while liberalism has a strong claim to being the historic alternative. Comparing the two to the main political parties in a democracy, Timothy Dunne wrote, 'Rather like political parties, realism is the natural party of the government, and liberalism is the leader of the opposition'.

The previous two chapters were devoted to traditional (classical) and contemporary (neo-liberalism) realism. This chapter focuses on liberalism in international relations in its different formulations and manifestations. The liberal tradition in international relations is closely connected with the emergence of the modern liberal state. The focus of liberalism has been on freedom, cooperation, peace and progress. It has often been identified with individualism, as it insists on freedom of the individual, his rights and property. It is also closely associated, mainly by its critics, with capitalism. Liberalism is sometimes associated with the views of Mo Ti, who was a contemporary of realist Chinese scholar Sun Tzu. Both gave their opposing views more than 2,000 years ago. Liberal philosophers, beginning with John Locke in the 17th century, saw great potential for human progress in modern civil society and capitalist economy, both of which could flourish in states which ensured liberty of the individual. And, as Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen emphasize, 'Modernity projects a new and better life, free of authoritarian government and with a much higher level of material welfare'.

6

Feminist Approaches

INTRODUCTION

The feminist approach to international relations is a phenomenon of the post-Cold War period. In the 1980s, feminist scholars began research in various academic disciplines, from literature to psychology to history. In recent years, this has made inroads in international relations. Until recently, international relations was considered out of the scope of feminist scholarship. In the post-Cold War era, there has been rapid growth in feminist literature. Some of the prominent feminist scholars include Joshua S Goldstein (*War and Gender*, 2001), Peterson Spike and Anne Sisson Runyan (*Global Gender Issues*, 1999), Ann Tickner (*Gendering World Politics*, 2001) and Jill Streans (*Gender and International Relations*, 1998).

Feminism is the advocacy of the rights of women. It explains that women have been disadvantaged as compared to men and are subordinated to men because of a system of patriarchy. 'Patriarchy' is a system of social structures and practices through which men dominate and exploit women. It should be clear that it is a social, not biological characteristic. For feminism, the point of reference is the question of gender and not of sex. Feminism analyses equations of masculinity and feminity. It has nothing to do with the biological male-female differences. 'Masculinity' is associated with autonomy, sovereignty and the capacity for reason and objectivity, whereas feminity is associated with the absence of these characteristics. These are called gender identities. Under gender construction, military services are viewed as the natural domain of masculinity.

Feminism, as mentioned above, is not a concern of biological characteristics. It is the social systems that are at the root of gender inequality. Secondly, every individual man is not

necessarily in a position of domination, and every woman is not in a position of subordination. The feminist movement involves struggle for political and legal rights and equal opportunities for women.

FEMINISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In order to be able to appreciate the feminist approach, one has to be familiar with the nature of international studies as they evolved during the 20th century. Those studies concentrated on the causes of war and conflict, the development of international law and diplomacy, and the global expansion of trade and commerce. These studies made no reference to people as such.

Feminists argue that the boundaries of state have historically excluded women from domestic and international political life, and have treated international relations as the exclusive preserve of men, where masculinity thrives through domination 'over' women. According to feminists, the phenomenon of family subordination and male domination has always remained unchanged, whether from the absolute to the modern state, or from feudalism to capitalism, or from nature-state to global governance.

You have studied about realism and neo-realism which emphasize power in terms of national interest. You have read about these theories in chapters 2 and 3. The idea is that all politics is struggle for power. Some feminists argue that the core assumptions of realism—power, sovereignty and anarchy reflect the ways in which males tend to interact and to see the world. In this view of feminists, realism simply assumes male participant when discussing foreign policy decision-making, state sovereignty or the use of military force. Feminist scholars like Rosemary Grant argue that the realist theory endorses patriarchy, because, for it, patriarchy is necessary for maintaining social order and the state. It is for this reason that women are excluded from many prevailing definitions of the state. The international relations theory favours men and excludes women because it is 'man' who is identified with the state. Feminist writers find fault with this approach. Further, it is argued that international relations have exclusively focused on conflict and anarchy, as also on fear and competition, precisely because women's lives and experiences have not been properly researched.

Feminism is an outgrowth of the belief that since attributes like humility, peace, tenderness, compassion and forgiveness are associated with women who have been traditionally ignored, the study of IR has always remained focused on strife and anarchy. Thus, elements of emancipatory politics, namely, global peace and justice, are entirely missing in it. This shortcoming will have to be overcome and peace and justice will have to be emphasized in the theory of IR.

THREE STRANDS OF FEMINISM

While all feminist scholars agree on the basic postulate that gender is important, there is no single feminist approach to international relations. There are several such approaches or 'strands' of the theory of IR. They are generally interwoven, yet they often run in different directions. 'On some core issues,' says Goldstein, 'the different strands of feminism have conflicting views, creating interesting debates within feminism.' We will briefly refer to the three strands as highlighted by Goldstein.

1. Difference Feminism

This strand of feminism tries to value the unique contribution of women as women. These feminists do not think that women do all things as well as men do. The opposite is also true in certain other activities. Thus, because of their greater experience with nurturing and human relations, women are seen as potentially more effective than men in resolving conflicts and in group decision-making. Some of these feminists believe that it is not just social construction, but there is also core biological essence to being male or female. This view is sometimes called **essentialism**. However, majority of them think that the difference in women is determined more culturally than biologically. In any case, all difference feminists find fault with traditional perspective on international relations.

2. Liberal Feminism

The arguments of difference feminists are rejected by liberal feminists as being based on stereotyped gender roles. They see 'essential distinctions' in the abilities of men and women as trivial or non-existent. For liberals, 'men and women are equal'. They condemn the exclusion of women from positions of power, but 'do not' believe that including women would change the nature of the international system. Liberal feminists would rather like the inclusion of women more often as subjects of study such as the study of women as political leaders, as women soldiers and other women operating outside the traditional role. (Traditionally women's role was as school teachers, doctors and nurses). So, for liberal feminists, the study of women's role is more significant than their inclusion in the position of power.

Liberal feminists are doubtful about difference feminists' views regarding realism. The liberals believe that when women are allowed to participate in international relations, 'they play the game the same way as men do, with similar results. They think that women can practice realism, based on autonomy, sovereignty, anarchy, ... and all the rest, just as well as men can.' They, therefore, reject the critique of realism as masculine. Liberal feminism focuses on the integration of women into the overwhelmingly male preserves of military service and foreign policy making.

3. Postmodern Feminism

Postmodern feminists have tried to deconstruct the language of realism, especially as it reflects influences of gender and sex. For example, the first atom bombs were male. They were named as 'Fat Man' and 'Little Boy'. The coded telegram sent to US authorities about the hydrogen bomb simply said, 'It is a boy'. But the aircraft that dropped the atom bomb on Hiroshima was called 'Enola Gay', a female gender. It was named after the pilot's mother. These efforts find sex and gender throughout the sub-text of realism.

WOMEN, POWER AND STATE

Power is the capacity to influence the behaviour of others; to get others to do what they would otherwise not have done, and to ensure that they do not do what they would normally do. Power is the central theme of realism. The state as an institution is the symbol of power, and the struggle for power is the essence of politics. Feminist scholars are of the view that power relations are organized on the basis of gender. The concept of power is given a masculine trait.

Those who are unable to exercise power in a war or conflict are often termed as 'impotent', which is associated with feminity. In South Asian countries it is quite common to ask those who fail to use power, or refuse to participate in conflict, to wear bangles. Thus, power is masculine, and its absence is treated as feminine.

The state ensures the organization of power relations on the basis of gender. The states (exceptions apart) have formalized gender power relations by retaining male domination at the top level. Even where a woman (like Indira Gandhi or Margaret Thatcher) is chief executive, gender differentiation is evident as men dominate the state structure in its executive, police and the armed forces. Despite the fact that the state has substantial amount of autonomy, it is structural in a patriarchal way. Its actions are often in men's interest, though substantial changes are rapidly taking place in regard to protection of women and their human rights. The United Nations is taking concrete steps to promote women's interest, and several countries, including India, have set up commissions for women that seek to promote the cause of women in a male-dominated state.

GENDER IN WAR AND PEACE

A reference was made in an earlier section to men and women in war in the context of post-modern feminism. In the present section a discussion will be attempted with reference to war and peace in the context of feminists in general.

Feminists view war as a gendering activity. Realism has been equated with masculinity. Besides its emphasis on autonomy, sovereignty and anarchy, realism lays stress on military force as a tool of power. Here too, many feminists see a hidden assumption of masculinity. They consider war as a male occupation. In their view, men are the more war-loving gender and women are more peaceful. A possible link between the male sex hormone and war, according to biologists, is the aggressive behaviour in male animals. Even some feminists who consider gender differences as strictly cultural, and not biological at all, view war as a masculine construction. It is argued by some that war is in the nature of men (to fill the gap) because of their inability to give birth. Thus, according to Nancy Hartsock, war provides a meaning to life and gives men an opportunity through heroism... opportunities that women potentially get through child birth. By contrast, women are portrayed as more peaceful than men—whether because of biology, culture, or both. Some feminists emphasize women's unique abilities and contributions as peace makers. They stress women's role as mothers or potential mothers. Because of such caring roles, women are presumed to be more likely than men to oppose war and more likely to find alternatives to violence in resolving conflicts.

Men and women suffer war but as unequals. Military training and casualties in wars have been men. Women too are victims (or casualties) of war, but in a different way. In the post-Second World War period, wars are being increasingly carried out in civilian areas, and up to 75 per cent of the casualties are civilians, which include a large number of women and children. Women are victims of war in several other ways. The loss of family members, which include husbands, brothers and children, has long-term psychological impact on women. The loss is not purely psychological. It is economic for women who have to look after the family. The loss of male member(s) of the family is more irreparable when women are illiterate and unemployed. For women, destruction follows quickly after war. Yet, their role in the war efforts, 'to give their sons or husbands to the nation' remains a gendered role.

Wartime sexual violence against women has been a common phenomenon in all wars, inter-community conflicts, as well as ethnic and sectarian conflicts. It is used against innocent women of the enemy in war, or of the other community, or ethnic group in civil strife. Crimes against women are the worst aspects of war or civil conflicts. But critics argue that biologically and anthropologically there is no firm evidence connecting women's care-giving functions (pregnancy, childbirth and nursing) with any kind of behaviour such as reconciliation or non-violence. The role of women varies from one society to another. Although they seldom take part in actual fighting, women sometimes provide logistical support to male warriors and sometimes help to drive men into a war frenzy by dancing, singing patriotic songs and other such activities supportive of war. In some other situations and cultures, women discourage men from war or play a special role as mediators in bringing war to an end.

Commenting on the views of feminists, Professor Mahendra Kumar wrote, 'Women are also providers of a whole range of supportive services for militarization and they are also a kind of reserve armies in home industries. They are soldiers, peace activists and revolutionary actors in national liberation struggles and civil wars.' He added, 'Women are now increasingly finding themselves in combat roles and as managers of peacekeeping operations. They also suffer as refugees in large numbers.' This was so evident after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the Bosnian conflict and the US attack on Iraq.

It has been reported by independent bodies such as the United Nations Commission for Human Rights (UNCHR) that 70 to 80 per cent of the world's refugees are women and children. In such situations, women are the only caretakers of children. They support the family (often extended family), play a central economic role, and take care of traumatized children and families.

WOMEN AND DEVELOPMENT IN IR

One of the major concerns of feminist scholars is that the scholars of international relations (IR) should devote greater attention to women's role in development. Feminism questions the wisdom behind the gender-blind multilateral agencies like the World Bank, which take men as agents and distributors of development, but have failed to take into consideration the basic needs of developing countries. Besides, according to the feminist perspective, globalization has intensified social and economic division (polarization) of the society. This has resulted in increased level of inequality between men and women. The two most important manifestations of this polarization are poverty and gendered international division of labour. Moreover, national and international economic policies have increasingly been governed by global imperatives of export earnings, financial matters and comparative labour costs. But, states have failed to deliver social welfare services and keep their commitments to provide near full employment.

Feminists are of the view that women have received the benefits of empowerment generated by structural changes. Therefore, feminist scholars are concerned with the analysis of the subtle forms of empowerment of women. Women's empowerment is seen particularly with reference to the fact that women now occupy high positions, such as foreign ministers, ambassadors and heads of large number of organizations. They have served as prime ministers, for example, Indira Gandhi (India), Margret Thatcher (UK), Srimavo Bandaranaike (Sri Lanka), and Golda Meir (Israel). Vijaylakshmi Pandit was the first woman president of the UN General Assembly. In 2006, the General Assembly elected a fourth woman as its president—Sheikha Haya of Bahrain. The British House of Commons had Betty Boothroyd as its first woman speaker and the US House of Representatives chose Nancy Pelosi as its first woman Speaker (2007). All this indicates a breakdown of male domination of high political positions and of major offices in international affairs. This has necessitated a study of the role of women in policy-making and policy implementation. It is believed that women are likely to oppose the use of force in international relations and will be more supportive of humanitarian intervention.

CONCLUSION

The primary concern of feminism is to emphasize that women should be recognized as fundamental players in economic and political processes. It is only then that they will share an equal role in social decision making. By redressing the neglect of women and gender injustice, the feminist scholars of international relations will improve the understanding of global politics and put women's voices, concerns and contributions on the global agenda.

A concern of scholars advocating the cause of women is that the entire field of international relations has been gender biased. Thus, the notions of power, sovereignty, autonomy, anarchy, security, the state and international system suffer from gender bias because they are all identified with men's experiences and on the exclusion of women and feminine attributes. So much so that even theories like realism and neo-realism (see Chapters 2 and 3), which claim to explain the world reality as it is, do in fact justify the reality as shaped by the males. These theories are also responsible for the global hierarchies engendered by gender bias. Based on the contentions of various feminist scholars, several postulates follow.

- The actual practice of international politics has suffered from a serious neglect of the feminist perspective.
- Mainstream visions which feminists regard as 'malestream' vision distort our knowledge of both the existing relations and the ongoing transformation of international relations.
- These 'malestream' perspectives define power as 'power over others', autonomy as reactive rather than as 'relational', international politics as the absence of women and negation of domestic politics and the objectivity as the lack of feminized subjectivity.
- Lastly, feminists argue that the male-dominated perspectives render women invisible because they fail to see the political significance of fundamentally gendered divisions of institutions by the state system.

In so far as feminist approach condemns the neglect of the contribution of women, it can, at best, be regarded as an emotional upsurge providing inspiration to the feminist critique of the global socio-political system. It is argued that feminism can be viewed only as a movement, but not a theory.

are (usually short-term) conveniences for states to protect and enhance their own security. They will break from such arrangements at the drop of a hat if doing so will improve their security. From this perspective, neorealism makes three key claims about international politics:

1. A **balance of power** between states is stabilizing, and an imbalance is destabilizing, leading to war or other means by which security may be altered. Having a **probability** of victory in war that is greater than 0.50 is a necessary, although not a sufficient, condition for war in neorealist logic (Niou et al 1989; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992), providing the foundation for the expectation that imbalance, or mutual optimism (i.e., when both sides to a dispute think their chance of victory is greater than 0.50) are precursors to war (Blainey 1988; but see Fey and Ramsay 2007).
2. A **bipolar** international system, in which just about all states are associated with either of two blocs of states, each led by a dominant power, contains little **uncertainty** about how states will align in the event of war. Therefore, a bipolar international system is more predictable and hence more secure and more stable than a multipolar system. When there are more than two poles, or blocs, then the international system is filled with uncertainty. Uncertainty about the actions of others makes states more likely to miscalculate, misjudge, and misperceive their situation (Waltz 1964, 1979; Deutsch and Singer 1964).
3. **Alliances** are short lived, and trade relations must be carefully balanced or else they can result in asymmetric gains that can jeopardize the security of the state getting the short end of the stick (Gowa 1989, 1994; Gowa and Mansfield 1993, but see Morrow, Siverson and Tabares, 1998).

There are, of course, other implications from neorealism's assumptions, but these are the main themes. As we will see in chapters 5 and 6, the record of history does not support neorealism's expectations regarding any of these hypotheses.

Liberalism

Liberal theories emerged as a counterweight to the neorealist perspective. Unlike realist approaches, liberalism draws attention to the frequent and often long-standing occurrences of international cooperation. Indeed, a desire to explain such cooperation is its first point of departure from neorealism. Furthermore, for liberal theories, structural **hierarchy** is the central organizing principle of international politics. Structural hierarchy implies the presence of an actor that can authoritatively enforce agreements between states rather than anarchy—a system in which states must be able to help themselves because they cannot count on anyone else. The presence of a **hegemonic** state (an overwhelmingly dominant power) is argued to help enforce norms of conduct, maintain regimes and international peace and **stability** (Organski 1958; Keohane and Nye 1977; Gilpin 1981). Because liberal theories emphasize cooperation, they are interested in everyone's chance and hope for absolute gains rather than relative gains.

Norms play a central role in liberal and neoliberal thought. Norms are broadly respected patterns of conduct. For example, most nations most of the time respect the territorial boundaries of their neighbors. They do so, according to liberal theorists (and constructivists too, as explained next), because this is an accepted mode of conduct. Thus, even though territorial integrity cannot be enforced easily as a matter of law, it is generally enforced as a matter of shared values, or norms. These shared values and norms are the counterpoint to neorealist claims that anarchy, rather than hierarchy, is the central organizing principle of international politics. Regimes, in the liberal or neoliberal view, are sets of international laws, rules, and organizations designed to promote **coordination** among nations with shared interests (Krasner 1983; Organski 1958). Norms and regimes combine to provide the behavioral basis by which the international system's hierarchical structure promotes cooperation and supports the assumed natural inclination of nations to maximize their wealth.

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's (1977) theory of interdependence is the most prominent liberal theory. It draws attention to the international political economy rather than focusing exclusively on problems related to security. Liberalism and neorealism quite naturally focus on different **variables.** For liberalism, power distributions are not as important as distributions of shared interests produced, for instance, by trade regimes or cultural norms. Trade regimes are agreements and relevant institutions or organizations designed to regulate and enforce specific trade policies. Their function is to promote cooperation among participants and, in fact, they are often successful in doing so regardless of asymmetries in relative gains or in relative power.

Cultural norms, or shared values, may also promote cooperation by making clear what sorts of behavior are unacceptable and open to punishment. Of course, the logical feasibility of punishment for violating norms or regime expectations depends on the reliability of the assumption that the international system is hierarchical rather than anarchic. Theories that share the liberal perspective are likely to treat international law as a serious constraint on national action even when the law is contrary to a nation's short-term self-interest. Theories, like neorealism, that subscribe to anarchy are more likely to view international law as a convenience when it works to enhance a state's security and as a nuisance to be ignored when it doesn't. Thus, neoliberal perspectives take a broader, longer-term strategic view of state behavior than does neorealism in which state interactions are more influenced by their short-term consequences.

Constructivism

Neorealism and liberalism assume state objectives and believe that state interactions are strategic and therefore amenable to game theoretic analysis. In the former case, security is the assumed objective; in the latter case, it is wealth and cooperation. Constructivism, in contrast, is a theoretical perspective that focuses on explaining how certain types of objectives come into being or change. Constructivism introduces a natural connection between domestic

culture, the domestic power hierarchy, and personal values or preferences, but except under limited conditions, it does not regard action in the international arena as strategic.

Constructivism aims to theorize about the formation of identity—that is, how we see ourselves (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse-Kappen, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Wendt 1999). For constructivists, individual preferences and identity are formed or altered by three processes: (1) **legitimation**, (2) **role redefinition**, and (3) **reflection**.

To see how constructivist logic works, let's consider the enforcement of human rights, a topic we explore in greater depth in chapter 9. A nation's leaders might agree to an international treaty on human rights even though they routinely violate the human rights of their subjects (Cherif 2010). By doing so, constructivists hypothesize that the leadership seeks to legitimate itself in the eyes of the international community. Thus, this early stage and only this early stage is thought by constructivists to be strategically motivated. Constructivists go on to argue that as these leaders engage in the rhetorical endorsement of human rights, they may find themselves under international pressure to participate in the shared norms of conduct implied by the treaty they ratified (Risse-Kappen et al. 1999). Eventually, faced with a contradiction between their own **rhetoric** and behavior and confronted with international pressure to abide by the norm of conduct to which they give rhetorical support, the leaders become persuaded to change their behavior and respect the norm of conduct to which they agreed. That is, they engage in role redefinition and reflection, resulting in the internalization of the rules and norms that they originally subscribed to merely to escape criticism.

Thus, we see that constructivism does not view decision makers as primarily strategic. Rather, leaders are thought initially to adopt a course of action for strategic reasons—to obtain legitimacy—but then to become caught up in socially accepted norms of conduct, reinforced by external pressure and persuasion until they have altered their own sense of self and their own subjective view of their interests. They become socialized to a new way of behaving even if the changed behavior jeopardizes their own political welfare.

Unfortunately, much of the empirical research to evaluate this theory's conjectures is poorly designed to do so. Thus far, constructivists have tended to select cases based on prior knowledge of how the **dependent variable**—the thing to be explained—turned out rather than drawing cases at random to see whether their **independent variables**—related to norms, pressure, and persuasion—tend to produce systematically the predicted effect (i.e., altered international values and improved behavior). Such research designs, as explained in chapter 1, tend unintentionally to contain a bias against contradicting their theoretical claims.

Efforts to evaluate constructivism in a manner more consistent with the **scientific method** have generally not found much support for constructivist hypotheses. For that matter, common sense forces us to question some rather optimistic constructivist expectations. The UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for instance, commits the parties to it to respect a host of human rights, including the right to life, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and due process. Approved in December 1966, the treaty has been in force since 1976. Almost all governments are parties to this treaty, including, for instance, Belarus (ratified in 1973), China (signed in 1998), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea, ratified in 1981), the Islamic Republic of Iran (ratified 1975), Syria (ratified 1969), and Zimbabwe (ratified 1991). None of these countries in fact respect the rights they agreed to although they have accepted the treaty's terms and conditions for two to four decades. Apparently they, and many, many others, have yet to move beyond the legitimation stage despite the passage of very long periods of time and turnover in leaders.

Looking systematically at behavior, Thomas König (2007) has investigated the legislative decision-making process within the European Union with the specific intent of comparing the quite different empirical expectations from constructivist theory and a form of rational actor models called **spatial models** (see chapter 3). The study focuses on the constructivist expectation of convergent policy positions among member states of the European Union and the spatial modeling expectation of divergent policy positions over time. The study is important not only for its test of constructivist **hypotheses** but also because the empirical results carry important implications about the EU legislative expectations as its membership expands. König reports that "against the constructivist claims, neither the explorative nor the statistical analysis detects convergent effects of Member State positions" (2007, 419). The newspaper headlines throughout the EU euro crisis reinforce König's basic message that the member states are not converging in their views or actions on fundamental policy questions that may influence the very survival of the European Union.

While König's large-sample statistical analysis contradicts constructivist expectations, it is noteworthy that constructivists successfully identify **case studies** that support convergence. Checkel (2003), for instance, reported case analyses that support policy convergence among member state representatives. König (2007) attributes this to **selection effects** that reflect unintentional anti-falsification bias. Similarly, Feryal Cherif (2010), contrary to constructivist expectations, finds little evidence that human rights behavior in authoritarian regimes improves over time in response to signing international treaties and being subjected to international pressure that obliges the member states to adhere to specific rules of conduct with regard to women's rights. Constructivists generally argue that the metamorphosis of preferences and behaviors takes time, as external pressure and personal redefinition gradually take hold. But Cherif's study—which surveys a fifteen-year period—shows that this has not proven to be true, at least with regard to women's political participation.

We might even just examine the events of the Arab Spring and notice that dictators like Egypt's Hosni Mubarak or Syria's Bashar al-Assad did not step down peacefully in the face of mass protests and demands for democracy. Mubarak and Assad had long promised such reforms, and both were participants in the human rights treaty mentioned earlier. Constructivism notwithstanding, neither seems to have moved on from the legitimation stage to role redefinition or reflection despite years—even decades—of opportunity in Mubarak's case to do so. No less we might note that Fidel Castro, despite promising democratic elections and facing international pressure to hold such elections for nearly fifty years never got around

Egyptians celebrate after President Hosni Mubarak resigned and handed power to the military in Cairo in February 2011. Cries of "Egypt is free" rang out, and fireworks lit up the sky as hundreds of thousands danced, wept, and prayed in joyful pandemonium after eighteen days of peaceful prodemocracy protests forced Mubarak to surrender power to the military. Whether this was the end of three decades of authoritarian rule remains uncertain.

to allowing competitive parties. Whatever legitimacy he hoped to gain from proclaiming his support for elections when he first came to power never translated into concrete action.

Although several empirical studies raise questions about the accuracy of the constructivist account, there is still too little systematic research to reach a firm conclusion, so constructivism remains a troubled but still plausible alternative (or complementary) explanation of at least some facets of international affairs, especially in the domain of international law and international organizations. Therefore, we return to a consideration of constructivism when we take up these topics in section III.

A First Look at the Strategic Perspective

Like the constructivist viewpoint and unlike neorealism or liberalism, the strategic perspective is firmly rooted in the interplay between domestic and international interests and influence. Unlike the constructivist approach, however, the strategic perspective assumes all parties to international affairs are strategic, hence the name of the perspective. By strategic I mean that each decision maker and each individual or group trying to influence decisions looks ahead, contemplating what the likely responses are if they choose this action or that action. Then they choose the action that they believe, based on looking ahead and working back to the current situation, will give them the best result. In other words, everyone in the strategic perspective is a chess player in a very complicated, many-sided, many-player chess game.

Three principles guide the strategic perspective and its specific application, the **selectorate theory**, on which we will focus much of our attention. The three core principles are as follows:

1. The actions that leaders take to influence events in the international arena are motivated by their personal welfare and, especially, by a desire to stay in office. Leaders define the national interest to coincide with their personal interests.
2. International relations cannot be separated from domestic politics. Every foreign policy action is undertaken in the shadow of the domestic political consequences the action is expected to produce. Therefore, if a foreign policy is expected to achieve beneficial consequences for a nation in the long term but in the short term will result in the ouster of the leader, then that policy will not be pursued.
3. Relations between nations and between leaders are driven by strategic considerations.

As such, foreign policy decisions are designed to influence international affairs and the leader's well-being. To be effective in this, foreign policies must be chosen with an eye toward the reaction they will create among friends and adversaries. The reaction expected from a policy choice is compared with the reaction anticipated from other policy options. Leaders pick the policy they believe will produce the best outcome for them, knowing that, at the same time, domestic and foreign rivals are choosing policies to enhance their own well-being.

These three principles indicate that international affairs are best understood through the use of game theory. Game theory is a means to evaluate strategic interactions in which the choices of any individual are contingent on expectations about the choices of other individuals or groups. When used rigorously, rather than just metaphorically, it provides an explicit, logically consistent, straightforward way to understand how people make choices, knowing that they must anticipate as best as they can how others will react and knowing also that others are trying to anticipate everyone else's actions.

The first principle of this book draws attention to leaders; leadership; and domestic social, political, and economic circumstances. The most important aspect of international affairs is the way in which national leaders translate their self-interest into foreign policy decisions and actions. The focus on leadership forces us to think about why seemingly successful and effective leaders get turned out of office, whereas some manifestly terrible leaders keep their jobs for a very long time. Take, for example, Winston Churchill. As Britain's prime minister during World War II, he sustained Britain as one of the last bastions of democracy in Europe during the darkest days of the war before ultimately guiding it to a valiant victory against Nazi Germany. Yet, in the final days of the war, the British electorate voted Churchill out of office. In contrast, such dictators as Nursultan Abishuly Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, Fidel Castro in Cuba, Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, and the late Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, and countless others past and present manage to remain in office for decades as they impoverish and even murder many of their citizens. Even defeat in war, it seems, is not sufficient reason to overthrow some dictators (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Chiozza and Goemans 2004). This certainly is a puzzle that raises questions about leadership, morality, and the motives behind foreign policy.

The second principle also deviates from current thinking about international affairs. The dominant view today tends to see international politics as shaped by structural elements that define the international system; that is, the pattern of interactions among all states that are determined by factors such as how balanced or skewed the **distribution** of power is. Those nations endowed with great wealth and weaponry are thought by many to shape international affairs for all by influencing who does what to whom and when. Henry Kissinger, President Richard Nixon's noted national security adviser and later his and President Gerald Ford's secretary of state, for example, argues the following:

> History so far has shown us only two roads to international stability: domination or equilibrium. We do not have the resources for domination, nor is such a course compatible with our values. So we are brought back to a concept maligned in much of America's intellectual history—the balance of power. (Kissinger 1992, 239)

SUMMARY

- Human rights are supposedly universal, fundamental, indivisible and absolute. Distinctions are nevertheless drawn between civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights, and solidarity rights. Human rights imply that national governments have significant foreign domestic obligations, and that justice has acquired a cosmopolitan character.
- Human rights are protected by an elaborate regime that involves an expanding array of international human rights documents, with supporting UN bodies, a wide range of human rights NGOs and states committed to advancing human rights. Nevertheless, states are also the greatest human rights abusers, reflecting an inherent tension between human rights and states' rights.
- Since the 1970s, the universalist assumptions that underpin human rights have come under growing pressure. Communitarians and postmodernists argue that human rights are philosophically unsound because morality is always relative. Postcolonial theorists often view the doctrine of human rights as an example of western cultural imperialism, even though they may accept the broad notion.
- Humanitarian intervention is military intervention carried out in pursuit of humanitarian rather than strategic objectives. It flourished in the 1990s due to the liberal expectations linked to the prospect of a 'new world order' and the (temporary) hegemony of the USA. However, deep concerns have been thrown up about humanitarian intervention by US military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq.
- The R2P has laid down conditions for humanitarian intervention, based on a large-scale loss of life, possibly due to ethnic cleansing, where the state in question is unwilling or unable to act itself. Such thinking has often involved attempts to reconceptualize sovereignty, particularly through the idea of 'responsible sovereignty'.
- Humanitarian intervention works when its benefits exceed its costs, in terms of lives lost and human suffering. Although this calculation is difficult to make in objective terms, there have clearly been examples of successful intervention. Other interventions, however, have possibly done more harm than good, sometimes because of the intractable nature of underlying economic and political problems.

Questions for discussion

- How do human rights differ from other kinds of rights?
- Are economic and social rights genuine human rights?
- To what extent have NGOs been effective in ensuring the protection of human rights?
- Is the tension between states' rights and human rights irresolvable?
- Are human rights simply a form of western cultural imperialism?
- Why did humanitarian interventions increase so markedly in the 1990s?
- Is military intervention ever truly 'humanitarian'?
- Can humanitarian intervention ever be reconciled with the norm of state sovereignty?
- Does humanitarian intervention merely reinforce global power asymmetries?

Further reading

Donnelly, J. *Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice* (2003). A wide-ranging examination of human rights which considers their significance in the light of key post-Cold War issues.

Dunne, T. and N. J. Wheeler (eds) *Human Rights in Global Politics* (1999). An excellent collection of essays that explore the philosophical basis for, and the political implications of, the doctrine of universal human rights.

Hehir, A. *Humanitarian Intervention: An Introduction* (2009). An accessible and comprehensive overview of the history, theory and practice of humanitarian intervention.

Weiss, T. G. *Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action* (2007). A wide-ranging account of the issue of humanitarian intervention that defends the 'restrictive' criteria established by the R2P.

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Companion Website

Links to relevant web resources can be found on the *Global Politics* website

CHAPTER 14

International Law

'Whenever law ends, tyranny begins.'
JOHN LOCKE, *Second Treatise on Government* (1690)

PREVIEW

International law is an unusual phenomenon. As traditionally understood, law consists of a set of compulsory and enforceable rules; it reflects the will of a sovereign power. And yet, no central authority exists in international politics that is capable of enforcing rules, legal or otherwise. Some, therefore, dismiss the very idea of international law. Nevertheless, international law has greater substance and significance than first appearances suggest. In particular, more often than not, international law is obeyed and respected, meaning that it provides an important – and, indeed, an increasingly important – framework within which states and other international actors interact. However, what is the nature of international law, and where does it come from? Also, if international law is rarely enforceable in a conventional sense, why do states comply with it? The growing significance of international law is reflected in changes in its scope, purpose and operation since the early twentieth century. These include a shift from 'international' law, which merely determines relations between and among states, to 'world' or 'supranational' law, which treats individuals, groups and private organizations also as subjects of international law. This has drawn international law into the controversial area of humanitarian standard-setting, especially in relation to the so-called 'laws of war'. It has also, particularly since the end of the Cold War, led to attempts to make political and military leaders at all levels personally responsible for human rights violations through a framework of international criminal tribunals and courts. To what extent has 'international' law been transformed into 'world' law? How have the laws of war been developed into international humanitarian law? And have international criminal tribunals and courts proved to be an effective way of upholding order and global justice?

KEY ISSUES

- How does international law differ from domestic law?
- What are the sources of international law?
- Why is international law obeyed?
- How and why has international law changed in recent years?
- What are the implications of holding individuals responsible for violating international humanitarian law?

CONCEPT

International law

International law is the law that governs states and other international actors. There are two branches of international law: private and public. Private international law refers to the regulation of international activities carried out by individuals, companies and other non-state actors. As such, private international law relates to the overlapping jurisdictions of domestic legal systems, and so is sometimes called 'conflict of laws'. Public international law applies to states, which are viewed as legal 'persons'. As such, it deals with government-to-government relations as well as those between states and international organizations or other actors. International law nevertheless differs from domestic law, in that it operates in the absence of an international legislative body and a system of enforcement.

NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

What is law?

Law is found in all modern societies, and is usually regarded as the bedrock of civilized existence. But what distinguishes law from other social rules, and in what sense does law operate at an international or even global level? Is there such a thing as 'international law'? In the case of domestic law, it is relatively easy to identify a series of distinguishing characteristics. First, law is made by the government and so applies throughout society. Not only does this mean that law reflects the will of the state and therefore takes precedence over all other norms and social rules, but it also gives domestic law universal jurisdiction within a particular political society. Second, law is compulsory; citizens are not allowed to choose which laws to obey and which to ignore, because law is backed up by a system of coercion and punishment. Law thus requires the existence of a legal system, a set of norms and institutions through which legal rules are created, interpreted and enforced. Third, law has a 'public' quality in that it consists of codified, published and recognized rules. This is, in part, achieved by enacting law through a formal, and usually public, legislative process. Moreover, punishments handed down for law-breaking are predictable and can be anticipated, whereas arbitrary arrest or imprisonment has a random and dictatorial character. Fourth, law is usually recognized as binding on those to whom it applies, even if particular laws may be regarded as unjust or unfair. Law is therefore more than simply a set of enforceable commands; it also embodies moral claims, implying that legal rules *should* be obeyed.

Although the term 'international law' came into common use only in the nineteenth century, the idea of international law is much older and can be traced back at least as far as to ancient Rome. Nevertheless, the origins of international law as an **institution** are usually located in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe and the passage of a series of treaties that, in establishing the rules of the emerging state-system, laid down the foundations of international public law. These treaties included the following:

- The Peace of Augsburg, 1555 – this consisted of a series of treaties that, amongst other things, reaffirmed the independence of German principalities from the Holy Roman Empire, and allowed them to choose their own religion.
- The Peace of Westphalia, 1648 – consisting of the Treaties of Osnabrück and Münster, this initiated a new political order in central Europe based on the principle of state sovereignty (see p. 3) and the right of monarchs to maintain standing armies, build fortifications and levy taxes.
- The Treaties of Utrecht, 1713 – these established the Peace of Utrecht, which consolidated the principle of sovereignty by linking sovereign authority to a fixed territorial boundary.

Ideas and theories of international law also emerged against this backdrop, not least through the writings of Hugo Grotius (see p. 334), an important early figure in the emergence of international law. Much of this early theorizing focused on the conditions of the just war (see p. 257). Nevertheless, it was evident from the outset that international law differs from domestic law in a number of important respects. Most importantly, international law cannot be enforced in the same way as domestic law. There is, for example, no supreme legislative authority to enact international law and no world government or international police force to compel states to uphold their legal obligations. The closest we have come to this is through the establishment in 1945 of the United Nations (see p. 449), which is endowed, at least in theory, with certain supranational powers, and through its principal judicial organ, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (see p. 342). However, the ICJ has no enforcement powers, and even the UN Security Council, which has the ability to impose military and economic sanctions, possesses no independent mechanism for ensuring compliance with its resolutions, even though its decisions are technically binding on all UN members. International law is thus 'soft' law rather than 'hard' law. On the other hand, levels of compliance with international law, particularly, but not only, international private law, are surprisingly high, even by domestic standards. This is sometimes referred to as the paradox of international law, as it reflects the extent to which a system of international law can operate effectively despite the absence of conventional compliance mechanisms. To some extent this was acknowledged by Grotius, for whom the enforcement of international law was largely based on a sense of solidarity, or potential solidarity, amongst states.

However, as law has developed, two quite different accounts of its nature, and especially its relationship to morality, have emerged. Those thinkers who insist that law is, or should be, rooted in a moral system subscribe to some kind of theory of **natural law**. The central theme of all conceptions of natural law is the idea that law should conform to a set of prior ethical standards, implying that the purpose of law is to enforce morality. Medieval thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas (see p. 255) thus took it for granted that human laws have a moral basis. Natural law, he argued, could be penetrated through God-given natural reason and guides us towards the attainment of the good life on Earth. However, this notion came under attack from the nineteenth century onwards through the rise of the 'science of **positive law**'.

The idea of positive law sought to free the understanding of law from moral, religious and mystical assumptions. Many have seen its roots in Thomas Hobbes' (see p. 14) command theory of law: 'law is the word of him that by right hath command over others'. By the nineteenth century, such thinking had been developed into the theory of 'legal positivism', in which the defining feature of the law is not its conformity to higher moral or religious principles, but the fact that it is established and enforced by a political superior, a 'sovereign person or body'. This boils down to the belief that law is law because it is obeyed. One of the implications of this is that the notion of international law is highly questionable. If, for example, treaties and UN resolutions cannot be enforced, they should be regarded as a collection of moral principles and ideals, and not as law. Although the rise of legal positivism made natural law theories distinctly unfashionable in the nineteenth century, interest in them revived significantly during the twentieth century. This occurred, in part, through unease about the cloak of legality behind which Nazi and Stalinist terror had taken place. The desire to establish a higher set of moral values against which national law could be judged was, for

• **Institution:** A body of norms, rules and practices that shape behaviour and expectations, without necessarily having the physical character of an international organization (see p. 433).

• **Soft law:** Law that is not binding and cannot be enforced; quasi-legal instruments that impose only moral obligations.

• **Hard law:** Law that is enforceable and so establishes legally binding obligations.

• **Natural law:** A moral system to which human laws do, or should, conform; natural law lays down universal standards of conduct derived from nature, reason or God.

• **Positive law:** A system of enforceable commands that operates irrespective of their moral content.

Hugo Grotius (1583–1645)

Dutch jurist, philosopher and writer. Born in Delft into a family of professional lawyers, Grotius became a diplomat and political adviser and held a number of political offices. In *On the Law of War and Peace* (1625), he developed a secular basis for international law, arguing that it is grounded not in theology but in reason. This was largely accomplished by constructing a theory of the just war, based on natural rights. For Grotius there were four causes of a just war: (1) self-defence, (2) to enforce rights, (3) to seek reparations for injury and (4) to punish a wrong-doer. By restricting the right of states to go to war for political purposes, Grotius emphasized the common purposes of the international community and helped to found the idea of international society (see p. 10), as developed by the 'neo-Grotian' English School.

example, one of the problems which the Nuremberg Trials (1945–49) and Tokyo Trials (1946–48), sought to address. This was made possible by reference to the notion of natural law, albeit dressed up in the modern language of human rights (see p. 304). Indeed, it is now widely accepted that both domestic and international law should conform to the higher moral principles set out in the doctrine of human rights. As far as international law is concerned, this has been reflected in a substantial expansion of **international humanitarian law**, as discussed later in the chapter.

Sources of international law

Where does international law come from? In the absence of world government and an international legislative body, the sources of international law are various. As defined by the Statute of the International Court of Justice, there are four sources of international law:

- International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states.
- International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.
- The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
- Judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified legal scholars of the various nations.

The most common form of international convention, and the most important source of international law, is **treaties**, formal, written documents through which states agree to engage in, or refrain from, specified behaviours. Treaties may be either bilateral or multilateral. Bilateral treaties are concluded between two states, such as the START treaties through which the USA (see p. 46) and Russia (see p. 177) have agreed to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Most treaties are nevertheless multilateral treaties, in that they are concluded by three or more states. Some multilateral treaties have specific provisions, such as the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), while others are broad and far-reaching, such as the Charter of the United Nations. Treaties, nevertheless, are

● **International humanitarian law**: A body of international law, often identified as the laws of war, that seeks to protect combatants and non-combatants in conflict situations.

● **Treaty**: A formal agreement between two or more states that is considered binding in international law.

GLOBAL POLITICS IN ACTION . . .

The Nuremberg Trials

Events: The Nuremberg Trials were a series of military tribunals that took place 1945–49, which were used by the victorious Allied forces of WWII to prosecute prominent figures from the defeated Nazi regime. They were convened largely as a reaction to the shocking cruelties of the Nazi regime, and in a brief flurry of legal activity that took place after the end of WWII, but before the Cold War really took grip. The military tribunals themselves were composed of US, UK, French and Russian judges, and key defendants included Hermann Göring, Martin Bormann, Rudolph Hess and Joachim von Ribbentrop. Four charges were laid against these and other Nazi leaders: conspiracy against peace, crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. In the first, most famous trial (1945–46), 22 of the most senior captured Nazi leaders faced prosecution; twelve of them were sentenced to death, seven received long prison sentences and three were acquitted. This trial was followed by twelve further trials of 177 people altogether, of whom 24 were sentenced to death.

Significance: The Nuremberg Trials were significant for a wide range of reasons. These include that the trials brought to light many details about Nazi atrocities, that they appeared to ignore the responsibility of countries other than Germany for waging aggressive war, and that, in highlighting the personal responsibility of individual Nazi leaders, they appeared to exonerate German society at large for the WWII and other atrocities. However, from the perspective of global politics, the Nuremberg Trials had their greatest influence on the development of international criminal law, in particular by extending international law into the areas of human rights and humanitarian standard-setting. The Nuremberg Trials thus marked a watershed in international jurisprudence, emphasizing the individual responsibility of leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices for perpetrating mass atrocities. It was also at these trials that the concept of 'crimes against humanity' first found formal expression and codification, in a language that has shaped interpretations ever since. In so doing, the principles applied at Nuremberg, formulated by the UN International Law Commission in 1950 into the Nuremberg Principles, filled a void in international law, namely, the failure adequately to address atrocious policies which in many cases did not fit the technical definition of war crimes (for example, inhumane acts against civilians who are not enemy nationals) and yet were contrary to the 'dictates of the public conscience and general principles of law recognized by the community of nations'. The Nuremberg Principles helped to shape the provisions of, and the thinking behind, documents such as the Genocide Convention and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, both introduced in 1948. The Nuremberg Trials went a long way to preparing the ground for the later establishment of international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and Bosnia and the creation of the International Criminal Court, which came into operation in 2002.

However, the Nuremberg Trials have also been controversial in terms of their impact on international law. Some, for example, have argued that concepts such as 'crimes against peace' or 'crimes against humanity' were ill-defined and, perhaps, inherently vague. Others have viewed the Nuremberg Trials as an example of 'victors' justice', the punishment of a defeated country and its leaders that has little or no basis in law. The principles applied at Nuremberg have therefore been seen as an example of *ex post facto* law: the defendants were prosecuted for actions that were only defined as crimes after they had been committed. A wider criticism is that the Nuremberg Trials drew international law into questionable areas. By emphasizing issues of human rights and humanitarian considerations, the trials created, at minimum, confusion about the proper role and scope of international law and, more seriously, created circumstances in which international law might be used to challenge, rather than uphold, state sovereignty.

a distinctive form of international law in two key respects. First, with the possible exception of the UN Charter, they violate one of the usual characteristics of law, which is that law applies automatically and unconditionally to all members of a political community. Treaties, by contrast, only apply to states that are party to the agreement in question, although it is sometimes argued that certain treaties, such as the NPT, are so widely respected that they impose customary obligations even on states that have not signed them. Second, the legal obligations that arise from treaties are very clearly rooted in **consent**, in that states enter into treaties freely and voluntarily. Once treaties are signed and ratified, they must be obeyed, as expressed in the principle of ***pacta sunt servanda***. This consent is nevertheless conditional in that states can contract out of treaties on the grounds that significant changes have occurred in the conditions existing at the time the agreement was originally entered into. In these cases, the notion of ***rebus sic stantibus*** can be invoked. The contractual nature of treaties and conventions places them clearly within the tradition of positive law, as international law in these cases is a product for negotiations between sovereign states, not the command of God or the dictates of higher morality. International law has therefore come to assume the character of reciprocal accord.

International **custom**, or what is often called customary international law, is the second most important source of international law, although until the rapid expansion of treaties during the twentieth century, it was the most important. Customary international law derives from the actual practice of states, in that practices among states that are common and well-established come, over time, to be viewed as legally binding. Customary obligations thus arise from the expectation that states should carry out their affairs consistently with past accepted conduct. Unlike treaties, customary law does not require explicit consent; rather, consent is inferred from the behaviour of states themselves. On the other hand, unlike treaties, customary international law is often assumed to have universal jurisdiction, particularly when it is grounded in deeply held norms and moral principles, in which case it is closely associated with the natural law tradition. Examples of customary law include many of the laws regarding how diplomacy is carried out, which developed over time as rules of conduct shaped by the mutual convenience of the states concerned. These, for instance, include the practice of granting **diplomatic immunity** to foreign diplomats.

The weakness of customary law is that, being based on practice rather than formal, written agreements, it may be difficult to define, and it may be difficult to decide when and how common practices have acquired the force of law. For this reason, there has been a growing tendency to translate customs into treaties and conventions. The Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations (1961, 1963) thus gave many of the norms related to the conduct of diplomacy the status of written law, while the 1926 Slavery Convention gave formal recognition to long established customs prohibiting slavery and the slave trade. However, in circumstances in which customary law reflects deeply held moral understandings, it may appear to be more powerful than treaty-based law. For example, it is usually accepted that the custom-based prohibition on genocide (see p. 326) would apply regardless of whether a state had signed up to the 1948 Genocide Convention, making it a universal moral imperative.

The final two sources of international law are of less significance than treaties or customs. The rather vague notion of the 'general principles of law' and the

- **Consent**: Assent or permission; a voluntary agreement to be subject to binding obligations or a higher authority.
- ***Pacta sunt servanda***: (Latin) The principle that treaties are binding on the parties to them and must be executed in good faith.
- ***Rebus sic stantibus***: The doctrine that states can terminate their obligations under a treaty if a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred.
- **Custom**: A practice that is so long established and widely accepted that it has come to have the force of law.
- **Diplomatic immunity**: A collection of rights and dispensations that accredited diplomats enjoy in foreign countries, usually including freedom from arrest and trial on criminal charges and privileged travel and communication arrangements.

idea of 'legal scholarship' tend to be invoked when no clear rights or obligations can be identified through formal agreements between and amongst states or through custom and practice. The former is usually used to imply that actions that are recognized as crimes in most domestic legal systems should be treated as crimes if they occur in an international context. Thus, although the invasion of another country's territory and the attempt to annex it by force may breach treaty obligations and ignore the customary expectation that sovereign states should live in peace, it can also be seen as a violation of international law on the grounds that it offends what could be viewed as the general principles of civilized conduct. In the case of legal scholarship, the ICJ recognizes that the sum of written arguments of the most highly qualified and respected judges and lawyers can be used to resolve points of international law when these are not resolved by reference to the first three sources.

Why is international law obeyed?

Those who dismiss the very idea of international law tend to view law strictly in terms of command. This implies that enforcement is the only reliable means of bringing about compliance. However, if compliance were seen as the core feature of an effective legal system, few, if any, domestic legal arrangements would qualify as such. Rape, theft and murder continue to occur in all countries of the world despite being legally prohibited. Indeed, if laws were never violated, there would be little need for them in the first place. Nevertheless, it is difficult to view widespread non-compliance, reflected in a wholesale breakdown of social order and the routine use of intimidation and violence, as compatible with a functioning system of law. In all legal systems, then, there is a balance between compliance and violation, and international law is no exception. However, the remarkable thing about international law is just how high levels of compliance with it tend to be, even though violations have often been grotesque and highly publicized (Franck 1990). Even a noted realist such as Hans Morgenthau (1948) acknowledged that, 'during the 400 years of its existence international law has in most instances been scrupulously observed'. But how can this level of compliance be explained if enforcement, in the conventional sense of the punishment of transgressors, is the exception rather than the rule? Countries tend to obey international law for a variety of reasons, including the following:

- Self-interest and reciprocity
- Fear of disorder
- Fear of isolation
- Fear of punishment
- Identification with international norms

The main reason why states comply with international law is that it is in their interests to do so. States do not need to be forced to comply with the rules that they have, in the main, either made themselves or explicitly consented to. This is sometimes called utilitarian compliance, because states abide by laws because they calculate that in the long run doing so will bring benefit or reduce harm. The key to this benefit is reciprocity (see p. 338), a relationship of mutual exchange between or amongst states that ensures that favours are returned for

CONCEPT

Reciprocity

Reciprocity refers to exchanges between two or more parties in which the actions of each party are contingent on the actions of the others. Good is thus returned for good, and bad for bad, with a rough equivalence applying in terms of reciprocal benefits and rewards. Positive reciprocity ('you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours') explains how and why states are able to cooperate in the absence of an enforcing central authority, as occurs through compliance with international law, the establishment of international regimes or multilateralism (see p. 460). Negative reciprocity ('an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth') helps to explain tit-for-tat escalations of conflict and arms races (see p. 266).

favours or that punishment is returned for punishment (Keohane 1986). For example, although diplomatic immunity may at times mean that immoral or even flagrantly criminal actions by foreign diplomats in one's own country go unpunished, states around the world recognize that this is a price worth paying to ensure that their own diplomats in foreign lands can live and work in safety and security. Similarly, the World Trade Organization's (see p. 511) rules about free trade and the abandonment of tariff and non-tariff barriers are usually upheld by states on the grounds that they will benefit from reciprocal action taken by other states.

A second, and related, reason why states tend to comply with international law is out of a general preference for order over disorder. On one level, this is reflected in the ability of international law to create a set of common understandings, through which states become aware of the 'rules of the game'. The framework of rules that international law helps to establish and publicize thus reduces uncertainty and confusion in the relations among states, each of them benefiting from shared expectations and enhanced predictability thus established. States, in other words, have a better sense of how other states will behave. At a deeper level, however, there is a fear of chaos and disorder. This may occur through negative reciprocity, as initial, and perhaps relatively minor, violations of international law lead to an escalating series of **reprisals** that threaten to unravel the entire system of international order and stability. Such considerations may be particularly emphasized by defensive realists, who, like all realists, believe that international order is inherently fragile, but who argue that the primary motivation of states is to maintain security rather than to maximize power (see Offensive or defensive realism p. 234).

Third, a state's level of conformity to international law is a key determinant of its membership of international society (see p. 10). International law is therefore one of the chief institutions through which cultural cohesion and social integration among states are achieved, facilitating cooperation and mutual support. A record of compliance with international law can therefore enhance the standing and reputation of a state, giving it greater 'soft' power and encouraging other members of the international community to work with it rather than against it. Such considerations can influence even the most powerful of states. For example, after the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the USA and a 'coalition of the willing', which was criticized as a breach of international law by, amongst others, the then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, the USA came under considerable pressure to demonstrate conformity with international law. In order to build wider support for its 'war on terror' (see p. 223), the USA was increasingly forced to work within a framework of UN resolutions. States that routinely defy international law run the risk of isolation and may even be treated as international pariahs, sometimes paying a high price for this in diplomatic and economic terms. This applied, for instance, to Libya, which suffered decades of isolation from the international community due to its links with terrorism (see p. 284) and attempts to develop weapons of mass destruction. This isolation forced Libya, in 2003, to make a clean break with its past and acknowledge its obligations under international law.

Fourth, although international law is not routinely enforceable, there are circumstances in which obedience to international law is brought about through a fear of punishment. Punishment in these cases is not dispensed by a world police

● **Reprisal:** An act of retaliation designed either to punish a wrongdoer or redress an injury; reprisal suggests proportionality and usually stops short of war.

force but by states themselves, acting individually or collectively. International law, indeed, recognizes a right of reprisal or retaliation, which makes actions that would otherwise be impermissible acceptable if they occur in response to a state's violation of established norms and principles. Article 51 of the UN Charter thus stipulates that states have a right to self-defence in the event of an armed attack by another state. Israel therefore justified its June 1967 destruction of the Egyptian airforce, at the beginning of the Six Day War, on the grounds that it was a reprisal for an attack launched by Egypt and Syria. Similarly, the 1991 Gulf War could be seen as a form of legally ordained punishment carried out against Iraq for its attempt to forcibly annex Kuwait. Indeed, one of the features of the supposed 'new world order' was the idea that in the post-Cold War world, collective security (see p. 440) would be used to punish military adventurism.

Finally, it would be a mistake to assume that international law is only respected because of considerations that, in their various ways, boil down to concerns about short- or long-term self-interest. In a large proportion of cases, international law is upheld not because of calculations related to the consequences of violating it, but because international law is considered to be rightful and morally binding (Buchanan 2007). This, after all, applies in relation to domestic law, where most citizens, most of the time, refrain from theft, physical attacks and murder not because of the existence of a criminal justice system, but because they view these acts as distasteful or immoral. The same applies to international law, especially when international law embodies norms of behaviour that enjoy widespread popular support, such as prohibitions on slavery, unprovoked attack or genocide (see p. 326). Liberals, who believe that human beings are rational and moral creatures, are likely to place a greater emphasis on moral motivation for state compliance with international law than do realists. However, many would agree that state behaviour in such matters is shaped by mixed motives, as practical considerations, linked to self-interest and possibly a fear of punishment, are entangled with ethical considerations of various kinds. Constructivists, for their part, highlight the extent to which both state interests and a sense of what is morally right in the international sphere are socially constructed, which means that they are shaped, in part, by international law itself.

INTERNATIONAL LAW IN FLUX

Since the early twentieth century, international law has become not only increasingly prominent but also more politically controversial. The scope, purpose and, indeed, nature of international law has changed in a variety of ways. These include the following:

- A shift from 'international' law to 'world' or 'supranational' law
- The development in the laws of war into international humanitarian law
- The wider use of international criminal tribunals and courts

From international law to world law?

In its classical tradition, international law has been firmly state-centric. This is the sense in which it is properly called 'international' law: it is a form of law that governs states and determines the relations amongst states, its primary purpose

APPROACHES TO . . .

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Realist view

Realists are generally sceptical about international law and its value, usually drawing a sharp distinction between domestic law and international law. While domestic law derives from the existence of a sovereign authority responsible for enacting and enforcing law, the absence of a central political authority in the international realm means that what is called 'international law' is perhaps nothing more than a collection of moral principles and ideals. As Thomas Hobbes (see p. 14), put it, 'where there is no common power, there is no law'. For Morgenthau (see p. 58), international law amounted to a form of 'primitive law', similar to the behavioural codes established in pre-modern societies. However, only ultra-realists go as far as dismissing international law altogether. Most realists accept that international law plays a key role in the international system, albeit one that is, and should be, limited. International law is limited by the fact that states, and particularly powerful states, are the primary actors on the world stage, meaning that international law largely reflects, and is circumscribed by, state interests. Realists also believe that the proper, and perhaps only legitimate, purpose of international law is to uphold the principle of state sovereignty. This makes them deeply suspicious of the trend towards 'supranational' or 'world' law, in which international law becomes entangled with the idea of global justice and is used to protect individual rights rather than states' rights.

Liberal view

Liberals have a clearly positive assessment of the role and importance of international law. This stems from the belief that human beings are imbued with rights and guided by reason. As the international sphere is a moral sphere, core ethical principles should be codified within a framework of international law. For idealists, such thinking implied that in international politics, as in domestic politics, the only solution to the disorder and chaos of anarchy is the establishment of a supreme legal authority, creating an international rule of law. This doctrine of 'peace through law' was expressed, for example, in the establishment of the League of Nations and in the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, which in effect banned war. Although modern liberals and particularly neoliberals have long since abandoned such idealism, they nevertheless continue to believe that international law plays an important and constructive role in world affairs. For them, regimes of international law reflect the common interests and common rationality that bind statesmen together. By translating agreements among states into authoritative principles and by strengthening levels of trust and mutual confidence, international law deepens interdependence (see p. 8) and promotes cooperation. The idea that there is a tendency for interdependence to be consolidated through formal rules of international behaviour is reflected in the functionalist theory of integration, as discussed in Chapter 20.

Critical views

The three main critical perspectives on international law have emerged from social constructivism, critical legal studies and postcolonialism. Although there is no developed or coherent constructivist account of the nature of international law, the assertion that political practice is crucially shaped by norms and perceptions emphasizes the extent to which norms embodied in international law structure the identities of states as well as the interests they pursue. This helps to explain why and how state behaviour changes over time, as, for instance, once accepted practices such as slavery, the use of foreign mercenaries and the ill-treatment of prisoners of war become less common. Influenced by poststructuralist analysis, critical legal studies highlights the inherently indeterminate nature of international law, based on the fact that legal language is capable of multiple and competing meanings. Such insights have, for instance, been used by feminists to suggest that international law embodies patriarchal biases, either because the legal 'person' (whether the individual or the state) is constructed on the basis of masculine norms, or because international law perpetuates the image of women as victims. Postcolonialists, for their part, have viewed international law as an expression, in various ways, of western global dominance (Grovogui 1996; Antony 2005). From this perspective, international law developed out of Christian and Eurocentric thinking about the nature of legal and political order, is tainted by the inheritance of colonialism and possibly racism, and operates through institutions, such as the International Court of Justice, that are wedded to the interests of the industrialized West.

being to facilitate international order. In this view, state sovereignty is the foundational principle of international law. States thus relate to one another legally in a purely *horizontal* sense, recognizing the principle of **sovereign equality**. Not only is there no world government, international community or public interest that can impose its higher authority on the state-system, but legal obligations, determined by treaties and conventions, are entirely an expression of the will of states.

This classical view can be broken down into four features. First, states are the primary *subjects* of international law. Indeed, in this view, the state is a meta-juridical fact: international law merely recognizes the consequence of the establishment of states; it is not able to constitute states in the first place. The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States therefore acknowledged that a state should be admitted into the international legal community so long as it fulfils three criteria: it possesses a stable government, controls a definite territory and enjoys the acquiescence of the population. Second, states are the primary *agents* of international law. In other words, they are the only actors empowered to formulate, enact and enforce international law. Third, the *purpose* of international law is to regulate inter-state relations, which means, in practice, upholding the cardinal principle of sovereignty. Sovereignty not only defines the terms of legitimate statehood, but it also implies the norms of **self-determination** and **non-intervention**. Finally, the *scope* of international law should be strictly confined to issues of order, rather than issues of justice. International law therefore exists to maintain peace and stability, and it should not be used for wider purposes. If humanitarian issues or questions of distributive, environmental or gender justice are to be incorporated into the framework of law, this should happen only at the domestic level, where states, as sovereign entities, are able to address moral concerns in the light of the distinctive values, culture and traditions of their own society. This classical view of international law is exemplified by the role and powers of the International Court of Justice.

However, the classical conception of international law has increasingly been challenged by attempts to use international law to found a world constitutional order, a process described by Habermas (2006) as the 'constitutionalization of international law'. This 'constitutionalist' conception of international law has become, over time, the dominant mainstream approach to international **jurisprudence**. It is constitutional in the sense that it aims to enmesh states within a framework of rules and norms that have a higher and binding authority, in the manner of a **constitution**. This establishes a *horizontal* relationship between states and international law, transforming international law into what is sometimes called 'supranational' law or 'world' law (Corbett 1956). Stemming probably from the impact of WWI on western consciousness, this trend has been closely related to the emergence of a system of global governance (see p. 455) and is evident in four main developments.

First, individuals, groups and private organizations have increasingly been recognized as *subjects* of international law. States, in other words, are no longer the only legal 'persons'. This has been particularly evident in the focus within modern international law on individual rights, giving rise to an ever-expanding body of international human rights law and a substantial broadening of the 'laws of war', as considered in the next section. Second, non-state actors have become important *agents* of international law, in the sense that civil society organizations

● **Sovereign equality**: The principle that, regardless of other differences, states are equal in the rights, entitlements and protections they enjoy under international law.

● **Self-determination**: The principle that the state should be a self-governing entity, enjoying sovereign independence and autonomy within the international system.

● **Non-intervention**: The principle that states should not interfere in the internal affairs of other states.

● **Jurisprudence**: The science or philosophy of law, or a system or body of law.

● **Constitution**: A set of rules, written or unwritten, that define the duties, powers and functions of the various institutions of government, define the relations between them and also the relations between the state and the individual.

GLOBAL ACTORS . . .

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

Type: International court • Established: 1945 • Location: The Hague, Netherlands

The International Court of Justice (commonly referred to as the World Court or the ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It was established in June 1945 by the Charter of the UN and began work in April 1946. The role of the ICJ is to settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by states and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by authorized UN organs and specialized agencies. The ICJ is composed of 15 judges elected to 9-year terms of office by the UN General Assembly and the Security Council voting separately. One-third of the Court is elected every three years. Permanent members of the Security Council always have a sitting judge, but if a state appearing before the Court does not have a judge of its own on the Court, it may appoint an *ad hoc* judge. A President (since 2009, Hisashi Owada (Japan)) and a Vice-President are elected by the members of the Court every three years by secret ballot. The President presides at all meetings of the Court, directs its work and the work of its various committees, and has a casting vote in the event of votes being equally divided.

Significance: The ICJ is the most far-reaching attempt to date to apply the rule of law to international disputes. The Court, indeed, has had many successes in laying down principles by which disputes may be judged. It has, for example, drawn baselines concerning issues such as territorial waters, fishing rights and methods of calculating the continental shelf beneath the sea. The Court has also had a number of notable successes in settling international disputes, including the border dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, which led to the so-called 'soccer war' of 1969, and the violent dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria over the ownership of an oil-rich peninsula, which was settled in 2002. In addition, the Court has handed down a number of 'advisory opinions', which have helped set the tone for post-conflict international affairs. These include the decision in 1971 to declare that South Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal, which helped to prepare the ground for South Africa's eventual acceptance of Namibian independence in 1989.

However, the ICJ has a number of significant weaknesses. In the first place, the jurisdiction of the Court is strictly limited to states. Individuals, corporations, NGOs and other non-state bodies are excluded from direct participation in cases. This prevents the Court from taking action over a wide range of human rights and humanitarian issues, meaning that other tribunals and courts (such as the international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Court) have had to be established, with the ICJ not being able to establish umbrella responsibility for these thematic courts. Second, the greatest weakness of the ICJ is that it lacks compulsory jurisdiction and has no mechanism for enforcing its judgements. States that have signed the treaty creating the ICJ are allowed to choose whether they want to be subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court by signing the optional clause (the clause that gives countries the option of agreeing or not agreeing in advance to be bound by the decisions of the Court), and only about one-third of states have agreed to do so. Moreover, states are able to revoke their commitments under the optional clause, as the USA did in 1984 when Nicaragua asked the ICJ to determine whether the mining of Nicaraguan harbours by the CIA constituted a violation of international law. In theory, the Court can appeal to the Security Council to enforce its judgements; however, this has never happened. Finally, the Court, especially in its early days, was widely criticized by developing countries for operating in the interests of western states and interests, in part because of their preponderant representation on the Security Council, and therefore on the Court itself. Nevertheless, this criticism has been advanced less frequently since the end of the Cold War, as the number of cases brought before the ICJ annually has more than doubled with the parties appearing before the Court also becoming more diverse.

and particularly NGOs (see p. 6) have increasingly helped to shape, and even to draft, international treaties and conventions. The Rome Statute, which led to the establishment of the International Criminal Court(ICC) in 2002, was thus drafted by some 250 NGOs working alongside representatives from 160 countries. Third, the *purpose* of international law has widened substantially beyond attempts to manage inter-state relations, particularly as it has been drawn into regulating the behaviour of states with their own territories. For instance, the World Trade Organization, the foremost legal body in the area of international trade, has substantial powers to order states to dismantle tariff and non-tariff barriers in the process of resolving trade disputes. Finally, the *scope* of international law has come to extend well beyond the maintenance of international order and now includes the maintenance of at least minimum standards of global justice. This is evident not only in attempts to establish international standards in areas such as women's rights, environmental protection and the treatment of refugees, but also moves to enforce international criminal law though the use of *ad hoc* international tribunals and the International Criminal Court.

The existence of rival conceptions of international law has nevertheless thrown up disagreements, tensions and confusions. These disagreements are largely between realists, on the one hand, and liberals and cosmopolitans, on the other. For realists, any attempt to construct a world constitutional order, based on 'world' law, threatens to weaken sovereignty and put international order at risk (Rabkin 2005). In this view, once international law ceases to be rooted in a commitment to state sovereignty, it ceases to be legitimate. Liberals and cosmopolitans, for their part, have always had concerns about untrammelled state sovereignty, and have often been eager to use international law to give global politics an ethical dimension (Brown 2008). The tensions and confusion have resulted from the fact that 'world' law, if it exists at all, incorporates and extends 'international' law; it has not replaced it. International law thus continues to acknowledge the cornerstone importance of state sovereignty, while, at the same time, embracing the doctrine of human rights and the need for humanitarian standard-setting. In that sense, the 'international' conception continues to enjoy political ascendancy over the 'world' conception. The future development of international law is nevertheless bound to be shaped by how, and how successfully, the tensions between these opposing norms and principles can be managed.

This can be illustrated by the contentious issue of the legality of humanitarian intervention (see p. 319). The international law dealing with humanitarian intervention has evolved significantly since the early 1990s, but a consensus has yet to emerge on what these laws mean. On the face of it, intervention, for whatever purpose, is usually judged to be a violation of international law. For example, Article 2 of the UN Charter states that, 'All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations'. Article 7 states that, 'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state'. The General Assembly Resolution 2131, adopted in 1965, expresses this even more clearly: 'no State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of another State.' However,

at the same time, a variety of legal instruments have also come into existence that affirm the protection of civil, political, social and economic rights, which, at minimum, call the principle of sovereignty, and therefore the norm of non-intervention, into question. These include the Genocide Convention and the two UN Covenants on Human Rights, drafted in 1966. Although there exists no clearly defined and legally binding treaty justifying humanitarian intervention, it may nevertheless be understood as a form of customary international law.

Such confusions were evident in relation to the 1999 Kosovo intervention. In this case, once it became apparent that the UN Security Council would not authorize military action against Serb forces, the USA and its allies turned to NATO (see p. 253) as a regional organization through which they could undertake such action. The then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, recognized that the intervention was clearly not legal, but nevertheless suggested that it was morally justified. This led him to suggest that the principle of state sovereignty should be revised to mean 'responsible sovereignty', in which a state's entitlement to sovereign jurisdiction is conditional on carrying out its responsibility to protect its own citizens. As discussed in Chapter 13, the idea of a 'responsibility to protect', or R2P, has been widely used by those who wish to provide a legal basis for humanitarian intervention. However, such thinking is by no means universally accepted, humanitarian intervention seeming destined to continue to have an uncertain status in international law, hovering somewhere between its broad but perhaps ill-defined acceptance in customary international law and its clear prohibition in treaty-based law.

Developments in the laws of war

One of the clearest examples of the shift from 'international' law to 'world' law has been the evolution of the laws of war into a body of international humanitarian law. The advent of industrialized warfare, and the experience of the two world wars of the twentieth century, altered thinking about both aspects of just war theory: the idea of *jus ad bellum*, or a just recourse to war, and the idea of *jus in bello*, or the just conduct of war. In the case of the former, there was a backlash against the belief that had become established during the nineteenth century that a state's right to wage war is a fundamental sovereign right. In this view, sovereignty stemmed primarily from the *ability* of a state to establish control over a territory and its people, meaning that claims to rightful authority could result from conquest and expansion. The consequences of such thinking were evident in the European imperialism of the late nineteenth century that provided the backdrop for WWI, and in German, Italian and Japanese expansionism in the run-up to WWII. In effect, might was right. However, the 1945 UN Charter significantly narrowed the scope of legally justified warfare. It laid down only two circumstances in which force could be legitimately used: self-defence, in which states have an unqualified sovereign right to use force if subjected to a physical attack by another state (Article 51), and when the use of force has been sanctioned by the Security Council as part of a peace enforcement action (Article 42). The Nuremberg Principles extended such thinking into international criminal law by establishing the idea of 'crimes against peace', allowing individuals to be prosecuted for 'planning, preparing, initiating or waging a war of aggression, or conspiring to do so'.

In the case of just war thinking related to the conduct of war, rather than the justifications for war, the principal development has been the idea of war **crimes**. There is nothing new about war crimes prosecutions, however. Examples of legal proceedings that stem from misconduct or abuses that occur during war can be traced back to Ancient Greece. The trial of Peter von Hagenbach in 1474 is sometimes thought of as the first war crimes trial. Hagenbach was convicted and beheaded on the authority of an *ad hoc* tribunal of the Holy Roman Empire, having been accused of carrying out wartime atrocities committed in Austria. Modern thinking about war crimes nevertheless stems from the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, which established a permanent court of arbitration for states in dispute wishing to use its services, and also formulated a series of conventions designed to limit the horrors of war. Creating the basis for the modern laws of war, the Hague Conventions prohibited, among other things, the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons and the use of 'dum dum', or explosive, bullets, and set out rules related to the treatment of prisoners of war and the rights of neutral powers. The war crimes that were recognized by the Nuremberg Principles included the murder or ill-treatment of civilian populations, hostages and prisoners of war. The four Geneva Conventions, adopted in 1949, with two additional protocols in 1977 and a third one in 2005, marked the widest and most detailed attempt to codify war crimes, providing one of the foundations for international humanitarian law. Amongst the war crimes they identified are the following:

- Wilful killing
- Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments
- Wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health
- Compelling civilians or prisoners of war to serve a hostile power
- Wilfully depriving civilians or prisoners of war of a fair trial
- The taking of hostages
- Unlawful deportation, transfer of confinement
- Wanton destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity.

One of the most significant, if controversial, developments in the laws of war is the development of the idea of '**crimes against humanity**'. The earliest notion of a crime against humanity (even though the terminology was not used) surfaced during the campaign to abolish the slave trade. The 1815 Declaration on the Abolition of the Slave Trade, for instance, condemned the slave trade for offending against the 'principles of humanity and universal morality'. The idea that such actions might be considered crimes first emerged in response to what later became known as the 'Armenian genocide', a series of massacres carried out against Armenians, Greeks and Assyrians living in the Ottoman Empire, which peaked between 1915 and 1917. The Triple Entente, an alliance of Russia, France and the UK, declared that the massacres amounted to 'crimes against humanity and civilization'. The 1945 Nuremberg Charter nevertheless took the matter further by drawing a formal distinction between war crimes and crimes of humanity, which has guided international jurisprudence ever since. Whereas war crimes are 'violations of the laws and customs of war', crimes against humanity have the following three characteristics:

- **War crime**: A violation of the laws or customs of war, for which individuals can be held to be criminally responsible.

- **Crimes against humanity**: Intentionally committed acts that form part of a widespread, systematic and repeated attack against a civilian population.

- The crimes must target civilians.
- They must be widespread or systematic, and repeated.
- They must be intentionally committed.

The most detailed and ambitious attempt to codify the crimes that can be categorized as crimes against humanity is found in the 1998 Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court. This highlights crimes including murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, torture, rape or sexual slavery, racial and other forms of persecution, and the crime of apartheid. Although genocide is clearly a crime against humanity in a general sense, it is treated as a separate category of crime, indeed as the 'crime of crimes', by the Genocide Convention and in the Rome Statute. The virtue of incorporating the concepts of crimes against humanity and genocide into international law is that they attempt to deal with the issue of widespread atrocities by establishing individual responsibility for actions that may not conform to the conventional notion of a war crime. The concept of crimes against humanity in particular is underpinned by a form of moral cosmopolitanism (see p. 21) that holds that the proper stance towards humanity is one of respect, protection and succour, humanity being morally indivisible. Critics of the concept have nevertheless questioned whether such a broad category of crime can ever be meaningful, and have also raised doubts about the supposedly universal moral principles on which it is based. These and other concerns about international humanitarian law have become more acute as a result of steps to anchor individual responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide through the establishment of international criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court.

International tribunals and the International Criminal Court

After the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, superpower disagreement precluded the use of international criminal tribunals for the remainder of the Cold War. Such prosecutions as took place, occurred in national courts. For instance, in 1971 Lieutenant William Calley was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment by a US court for ordering the My Lai massacre in 1968, during the Vietnam War. Calley served less than four years before his release in 1974 on the orders of President Nixon. However, the end of the Cold War and the breaking of the logjam in the UN Security Council created circumstances in which international tribunals could once again be established. Reports of massacres and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia led in 1993 to the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), located in The Hague, the Netherlands, the first genuinely international tribunal convened since Nuremberg and Tokyo. The ICTY was also the first tribunal to invoke the Genocide Convention. The Tribunal was mandated to prosecute crimes against humanity, violations of the laws of war, and genocide committed in the various Yugoslav wars. The most prominent figure indicted by the ICTY was Slobodan Miloševic, the former head of state of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Miloševic was the first head of state to be prosecuted under international humanitarian law. He was arrested in 2001, and his trial on 66 counts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes began the following year. However, the proceedings were cut short by Miloševic's death in 2006. By May 2010, 135 people had been tried and convicted by the ICTY, receiving sentences of up to life imprisonment. The Tribunal aims to complete all trials by 2011 and all appeals by 2013, although an exception has been made for Radovan Karadžic, the former Bosnia Serb politician, who is accused of committing war crimes against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, including the Srebrenica massacre.

The UN authorized a second international tribunal following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, which had led to the murder of about 800,000 Rwandan Tutsis and moderate Hutus. The new tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), was located in Arusha, Tanzania, and held its first trial in 1997. By May 2010, 50 trials had been completed, leading to the conviction of 34 people with 8 cases on appeal. In the most significant of these trials, Jean Kambanda, the former prime minister of Rwanda, became the first, and so far the only, head of state to plead guilty to genocide, when he was convicted in 1998 and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2002, the Special Court for Sierra Leone was set up jointly by the UN and the government of Sierra Leone, to consider serious violations of international humanitarian law that had occurred during Sierra Leone's ten-year civil war. This involved the indictment in 2003 of the former president of Liberia, Charles Taylor, for his alleged role in supporting rebel forces that used amputations and rape to gain control of Sierra Leone's diamond mines. After living in exile in Nigeria, Taylor was arrested once he crossed the border into Cameroon and transferred to a specially convened tribunal of the ICTR in The Hague, where his war crimes trial started in 2006. In 2003, the UN reached an agreement with the Cambodian government to bring to trial the surviving leaders of the Khmer Rouge, who had presided over the deaths of over a million people in Cambodia during a four-year rule of terror in the late 1970s.

In other cases, criminal tribunals have been set up at a national level. These have included the East Timor Tribunal, established in 2002 to investigate human rights violations carried out during the period of Indonesian occupation and control, and the war crimes tribunal in Iraq, which in 2006 found Saddam Hussein guilty of the 1982 massacre that took place in Dujail, north of Baghdad, and sentenced him to death. In the case of General Augusto Pinochet, he was indicted in 1998 by a court in Spain for human rights violations committed while he was the dictator of Chile, 1973–90. However, although he was arrested in London on an international arrest warrant, he was released in 2000 on the grounds that he was too ill to face trial and allowed to return to Chile, where he enjoyed immunity from prosecution as part of the agreement under which he had left office.

These various tribunals and courts, and especially those set up to examine atrocities committed in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, influenced the development of international criminal law in a number of important ways. In the first place, they re-focused attention on large-scale human rights violations, particularly through high-profile trials of senior political figures. Apart from anything else, this strengthened the idea that establishing personal culpability for war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide may reduce the incidence of mass

atrocities, as leaders recognize they are no longer able to act as if they are above international law. Second, whereas previous war crimes trials had been concerned with acts that took place in the context of inter-state war, the ICTY and the ICTR recognized that crimes against humanity may take place during an internal armed conflict or even during periods of peace, thereby expanding the remit of international humanitarian law. Third, the tribunals nevertheless highlighted the enormous cost and often inefficiency of dealing with crimes against international humanitarian law through the mechanism of *ad hoc* UN-backed tribunals. For instance, it took over two years to begin trying cases in the ICTY and the ICTR, and many trials lasted for months and, in some cases, years. During 2000, these tribunals accounted for over 10 per cent of the UN's regular budget, with their total cost by 2009 being estimated at $1.6 billion. Such concerns led to pressure for the replacement of *ad hoc* tribunals by a permanent institution with global jurisdiction, in the form of the International Criminal Court (ICC).

In 1998, delegates from 160 countries, 33 international organizations and a coalition of NGOs met in Rome to draft the Statute of the ICC. The Rome Statute established the ICC as a 'court of last resort', exercising jurisdiction only when national courts are unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute. The ICC, which came into being in 2002, has broad-ranging powers to prosecute acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and, potentially, aggression (a decision on crimes of aggression was reserved to a later date, but its inclusion is now highly unlikely). Although the ICC, like the ICJ, is located in The Hague, Netherlands, it is an independent international organization and not part of the UN system. However, the ICC's relationship with the UN Security Council has been particularly significant and controversial. The USA, an early and enthusiastic supporter of the idea of an international criminal court, had proposed that the Security Council act as the court's gatekeeper, reflecting Security Council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. But this proposal was rejected at Rome, on the grounds that it would have given the USA and other permanent members of the Security Council (the P-5) the ability to prevent the ICC from hearing cases in which their citizens were accused of human rights violations by using their veto powers. Instead, under the so-called 'Singapore compromise', the Rome conference allowed the Security Council to delay a prosecution for twelve months if it believes that the ICC would interfere with the Council's efforts to further international peace and security. However, as the Security Council must do this by passing a resolution requesting the Court not to proceed, this effectively prevents any P-5 country from blocking an investigation simply by exercising its veto.

The controversial nature of the ICC was apparent from the outset. Although 120 states voted in favour of the Rome Statute, 21 abstained, including India and a range of Arab and Caribbean states, and 7 voted against. It is widely believed that the states which voted against the Statute were the USA, China (see p. 251), Israel, Libya, Iraq, Qatar and Yemen (although the states were not formally identified). As of May 2010, 111 countries were members of the Court and a further 37 countries have signed but not ratified the Rome Statute. Non-member states include China, India, Russia and the USA, which significantly reduces the scope of the ICC's jurisdiction and threatens its international credibility, perhaps in a way that is reminiscent of the League of Nations. Only two permanent members

Debating . . .

Is the International Criminal Court an effective means of upholding order and justice?

The ICC has proved to be a highly controversial international organization. While it has been hailed by some as an essential guarantee for justice and human rights, others view it as a deeply flawed body, even, sometimes, as a threat to international order and peace.

YES

Strengthening international humanitarian law. The ICC has codified norms and principles of international humanitarian law that have been widely accepted since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, in the process providing the most authoritative and detailed definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes currently available. By comparison with the system of *ad hoc* tribunals, the ICC brings a much needed coherence to the process of enforcement, and also, by keeping Security Council interference to a minimum, (potentially) prevents the P-5 from exempting themselves from their responsibilities.

Tackling the global justice gap. The global justice gap condemns millions of people to abuse and oppression either because of the repressive policies of their own governments or because of their government's unwillingness or inability to prevent gross human rights violations. The ICC has been designed specifically to address this problem, providing the basis for external intervention when internal remedies are unavailable. This task is nevertheless being put in jeopardy by a collection of powerful countries that are unwilling fully to sign up to the ICC, either because they want to protect their own military freedom of manoeuvre, or in order to shield allies from criticism. This amounts to a serious failure of global leadership.

Deterring future atrocities. The aim of the ICC is not merely to prosecute crimes that have been committed since its inception in 2002, but also to shape the future behaviour of political and military leaders throughout the world. In this view, atrocities occur, in part, because leaders believe that their actions will go unpunished. The significance of the trials of heads of government is that they demonstrate that this may not be the case in future. No leader is now above international humanitarian law. The fear of possible legal proceedings by the ICC may, indeed, have been instrumental in persuading leaders of the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda to attend peace talks in 2007.

NO

Threat to sovereignty and national security. The most common criticism of the Court is that it is a recipe for intrusions into the affairs of sovereign states. The ICC threatens state sovereignty because its jurisdiction extends, potentially, to citizens of states that have not ratified the Rome Statute. This happens if their alleged crime was committed in a state that has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, or when a situation has been referred to the ICC by the UN Security Council. This issue is of particular concern in the USA, because, as the world's sole remaining superpower, the USA deploys its military to 'hot spots' more often than other countries.

Unhelpful obsession with individual culpability. By highlighting the criminal responsibilities of individuals rather than states, the ICC contributes to a worrying trend to use international law to further moral campaigns of various kinds. Not only are questions of personal culpability for humanitarian crimes highly complex, but once international law is used as a vehicle for advancing global justice, its parameters become potentially unlimited. Moreover, by prioritizing individual culpability and criminal prosecution over wider concerns, the ICC may damage the prospects of peace and political settlement, as, arguably, occurred over the indictment of President Bashir of Sudan.

A political tool of the West. The ICC has been criticized for having a western or Eurocentric bias. In the first place, it is based on western values and legal traditions that are grounded in ideas of human rights, which are rejected in parts of Asia and the Muslim world, thus demonstrating the absence of a global moral consensus. Second, the ICC is sometimes seen to be disproportionately influenced by EU member states, all of whom have ratified the Rome Statute. Third, the cases brought before the ICC overwhelmingly relate to events that have occurred in the developing world. The ICC is therefore seen to perpetuate an image of poor countries as chaotic and barbaric.

of the P-5 – the UK and France, its least powerful members – have ratified the Rome Statute. Not one of the nuclear powers outside Europe has ratified the treaty, meaning that the ICC is dominated by European, Latin-American and African states. The opposition of the USA to the ICC has been particularly damaging. President Clinton signed the Rome Statute on his final day in office in 2000, but stated that, as the treaty was fundamentally flawed, it would not be forwarded to the US Senate for ratification. The Bush administration effectively 'unsigned' the treaty in 2002, and took concerted steps to reduce the USA's exposure to ICC jurisdiction. It did this by negotiating bilateral immunity agreements (BIAs), sometimes called 'Article 98' agreements, with as many countries as possible, under which neither party would transfer citizens of the other country to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Over 100 BIAs have been negotiated, even though their legal status is unclear. The Obama administration's shift towards multilateralism has certainly modified the Bush administration's implacable hostility towards the ICC, but this has yet to produce a clear commitment to 're-sign' the Rome Statute and press ahead with ratification. Nevertheless, opinion is divided on the extent to which the reservations expressed by the USA and other states about the ICC have been based on pragmatism and self-interest, and the extent to which they have been based on principle.

SUMMARY

- International law is law that governs states and other international actors, although it is widely considered to be 'soft' law, because it cannot, in most circumstances, be enforced. The two most important sources of international law are treaties and international custom. In the former, legal obligations are clearly rooted in consent, while in the latter obligations arise from long-established practices and moral norms.
- International law is largely obeyed because states calculate that in the long run abiding by laws will bring them benefit or reduce harm. Other reasons for obedience include a fear of disorder, a fear of isolation, a fear, in some cases, of punishment and the wider belief that international law is rightful and morally binding.
- In its classical tradition, international law has been firmly state-centric, being based on the cornerstone principle of state sovereignty However, this conception has increasingly been challenged by a 'constitutionalist' conception of international law, sometimes called 'supranational' law or 'world' law, whose scope includes the maintenance of at least minimum standards of global justice.
- One of the clearest examples of the shift from 'international' law to 'world' law has been the evolution of the laws of war into a body of international humanitarian law. This has largely happened through the development of the idea of war crimes, which allows individuals to be held to be criminally responsible for violations of the customs of war, and through the notion of crimes against humanity.
- The end of the Cold War allowed international humanitarian law to be implemented more widely through international tribunals and courts. This happened through ad hoc tribunals set up to examine reports of atrocities carried out in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in particular, but the most significant development was the establishment of the International Criminal Court, which came into operation in 2002. However, the Court has sometimes been seen as a threat to international order and peace.

Questions for discussion

- Is international law really law?
- How and why have treaties become the most important source of international law?
- Why is it in the interest of states to obey international law?
- How strong is the moral motivation for states' compliance with international law?
- What are the implications of the 'constitutionalist' conception of international law for international jurisprudence?
- To what extent are 'international' and 'world' law compatible?
- Is humanitarian intervention justifiable in international law?
- Is a state's right to sovereignty conditional, and if so, on what?
- Is the notion of crimes against humanity too vague and confused to be legally meaningful?
- Should political leaders be held individually culpable for breaching international humanitarian law?

Further reading

Byers, M. (ed.) *The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law* (2000). An excellent collection of essays that explore the political implications of international law in an age of globalization.

Gray, C. *International Law and the Use of Force* (2008). A useful and up-to-date discussion of the implications of the use of force for international law.

Koskenniemi, M. *From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument* (2006). A key work outlining the critical approach to international law.

Shaw, M. *International Law* (2003). A clear, authoritative and comprehensive introduction to the study of international law.

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cooperation. It is imperative that mutual distrust between India and Pakistan, between India and Sri Lanka in regard to Tamil problem, or between any other two countries must be replaced by mutual understanding and cooperation. There is ample scope of regional cooperation in South Asia which, if achieved, can go a long way in promoting peace and progress in the entire world. If SAARC has to succeed, it is necessary that policy-makers in all the seven countries encourage development of the entire region, discourage tensions and promote understanding.

As India became a full dialogue partner with ASEAN, her role in the economic development of South as well as South-East Asia is expanding. Both ASEAN and SAARC require greater cooperation, but ASEAN has already become (despite bilateral problems) a more successful arrangement as compared to SAARC. The continued India-Pakistan conflict is a major cause of slow economic cooperation in South Asia. But, as J N Dixit suggests, 'If we speed up the process of cooperation within SAARC, it would help the establishment of a strong and stable relationship with ASEAN.'

The SAARC Council of Ministers as well as Foreign Secretaries of the seven countries met in December 1995 in New Delhi to complete formalities regarding South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement, SAPTA. The ratification documents were submitted. It was hoped that discussions would soon begin so that SAPTA may be replaced by South Asia Free Trade Area, SAFTA, by the first decade of 21st century. That will mean that trading among the South Asian countries (as in NAFTA and EFTA) will become free from custom duties. But, so long as SAPTA exists there will be preferential trading in South Asia. In December 1995 meeting, all participant countries exchanged lists of commodities for preferential trading. But, SAARC Members are faced with at least two problems. First, most of the items in most of the lists, exchanged for preferential trading, either do not have a demand in the potential importing countries of the region, or the items are such that they do not have exportable surplus which could be traded within SAPTA, after domestic needs are met and after exports to the developed countries generating hard currencies have been made.

The second problem being faced mainly by India is a demand by Pakistan and Bangladesh that political disputes with them may be resolved before any meaningful economic cooperation can take place. Pakistan Foreign Minister Sardar Asif Ali and his Bangla counterpart Mustafizur Rehman, both argued that despite their obligations under World Trade Organization (WTO) they would not be able to respond to India till the Kashmir and Farraka disputes were resolved. The SAARC Charter prohibits discussion on bilateral issues, but surprisingly in 1995 even Nepal and Maldives supported Pakistan's demand that Heads of Government or State should examine the possibility of setting in a consultative machinery at the official level to regularly discuss pending bilateral issues and to evolve possible solutions. This linking up of such disputes as Kashmir with economic cooperation may eventually weaken SAARC rather than promote regional cooperation.

The decision to convert preferential trading (SAPTA) by free trading (SAFTA) was given a concrete shape when the Male Summit in 1997 (India was represented by Mr I K Gujral) decided to establish SAFTA in the year 2001. This gave just four years to prepare. President Gayoom of Maldives denied that it was too ambitious to hope for SAARC free trading by 2001 by saying that SAPTA had made considerable progress since its inception in December 1995. Prime Minister Gujral later told the Lok Sabha that the decision on SAFTA was an important step reflecting the growing sentiment among the member countries to consolidate economic interaction at a fast pace. The hope of free trading by 2001 was dashed to the ground in view of high tension between India and Pakistan after the latter occupied Kargil Heights on the Indian side of Line of

Control in the summer of 1998, though the aggression was repulsed by the Indian army. Later, when the civilian government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan was overthrown in October 1999 by the Army Chief General Parvez Musharraf the Indo-Pak relations were further frozen. So much so that no SAARC Summit took place after the Colombo meet of 199 8. India was not willing to attend a Summit in which democratic government of Pakistan was not represented. Therefore, no SAARC Summit took place either in 1999 or in 2000. This caused a serious setback to the regional economic cooperation in South Asia. In early 2001 there was no hope of any progress is activating the South Asia Association of Regional Cooperation. Therefore, introduction of SAFTA was out of the question.

After a gap of nearly three years, the SAARC Summit was held in Kathmandu in early 2002. In view of the acute tension between India and Pakistan, hardly any worthwhile progress was made at Kathmandu, except the expression of hope of renewed efforts for reduction of tariff barriers and increased trade within SAARC. However, no progress was made either in the direction of free trade or SAFTA. Even the scheduled next Summit to be held at Islamabad could not take place in early 2003 due to India's reluctance to participate because of lack of progress on the trade front, and because of continued terrorism against India from across the borders. Meanwhile, senior officials from SAARC countries met in Kathmandu in November 2002 to prepare a draft treaty for South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), but their efforts were wasted. As K K Katyal wrote in an article in January 2003, progress was slow from the start, but it became jinxed from the time of the military *coup* in Pakistan in October 1999. SAARC appeared in 2003 to have run out of whatever little steam it had. It will be unrealistic now to count on it for promoting concrete action programme or for collective action in core areas such as trade and economy, people-to-people contacts, transport and communications. At the following SAARC meet in Islamabad in January 2004, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistan President Musharraf met in a cordinal atmosphere.

THE EUROPEAN UNION

Origin and Growth of the European Union

The European Union comprises 15 Member-States. It was decided in 2002 to admit 10 more members, who formally joined in 2004. It is the pioneer of regional economic cooperation. Founded by six countries—Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands in 1952 as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), it evolved into a large European Community. The EC later developed into the European Union (EU) in accordance with the Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992. The Maastricht Treaty, after ratification, entered into force on 1 November 1993 establishing the European Union in its present form. The original Community of six was enlarged with &e accession of Britain, Ireland and Denmark in 1973. Greece joined in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986. With the unification of East and West Germany in 1990 the area of EC (as it was then known) was extended. The EC, which became the European Union in 1993, was further enlarged on 1 January 1995 with the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden.

Europe in 1945 was decimated by war. As Joshua S Goldstein wrote, 'Most of the next decade was spent getting back on its feet with help from the United States through the Marshal Plan.' But already a plan for Franco-German cooperation was being developed in order to implement the idea of functionalism in Europe. The Council of Europe earlier founded (1949) was to

bring about greater European unity and cooperation, and to stimulate democracy and human rights.

The first step was taken on 9 May 1950, when French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman put forward a plan, worked out by him and Jean Monnet, for France and Germany to pool all their coal and steel production under a joint High Authority. The vision of Schuman and Monnet was that Europe could be saved from future wars by creating crosscutting economic linkages that would eventually bind states together. The first modest step that was proposed was aimed at merger of the French and German steel (iron) and coal industries into a single framework that could most efficiently use the coal resources and steel mills of the two countries. Goal and steel were considered as key to European recovery and growth. Before Second World War, Europe's richest iron deposits were found on the French side of Franco-German border in Lorraine, while its largest coal deposits were found on the German side in Ruhr and Saar. The two countries had often come in clash with each other over the issue of control over these deposits. The idea, perhaps, was to bind Germany politically and economically into a group of European States, so that she would no more be a threat to peace. Robert Schuman had picked up the idea put forward by Winston Churchill (then leader of the Opposition in Britain) in 1946, for the creation of a United States of Europe, emphasizing the need for Franco German cooperation. The idea of a united States of Europe had been first mooted as early as 1923 by the Austrian leader of Pan-European Movement, Count Coudenhove Kalergi. Later in 1929, the then French Foreign Minister Briand, with the backing of his German counterpart Stresemann, had suggested the creation of a European Union, but these suggestions were turned down at that time. Now, after the Second World War the Schuman Plan was seriously pursued, and on 18 April 1951, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands signed the treaty for setting up of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Thus, the Schuman Plan became a reality when ECSC was constituted in 1952. The new Community's founding fathers had rightly hoped that it would be the seed from which further European political integration would grow.

The six countries, which included three Benelux states, worked through the ECSC to reduce trade barriers in coal and steel to coordinate their policies in this respect. 'For a French factory, it no longer mattered whether the coal it burned came from France, Germany or Italy.' (Goldstein). The High Authority of ESCS could, to some extent, bypass governments and deal directly with companies, labour unions, and individuals. To quote Goldstein again, 'If coal and steel sound fairly boring topics, that was exactly the idea of functionalists. The issues involved were matters for engineers and technical experts and did not threaten politicians.'

Meanwhile in October 1950, the French launched the idea of European Defence Community. In view of the Korean War, such a community (EDC) was expected to be a necessary guarantee against communism. However, in 1954 the French National Assembly refused to endorse EDC. This was a blow to the efforts for political integration in Europe. By June 1955 fresh initiative was taken for 'the erection of a United Europe.' It was realized that EDC plan was over-ambitious, So, the new move for greater economic cooperation which was more modest, and realistic was made. A committee headed by Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak was appointed, which proposed setting up of two organisations. This was duly approved and March 1957 treaties of Rome were signed by the six members of ECSC. The treaties which came into force on January 1,1958, established the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community (EEC). Once again in 1961–62, unsuccessful attempts were made for closer political integration.

For nearly a decade, the EEC remained the six-nation community which relaxed trade restrictions between them and worked only in economic sphere. However, in the early 1970s new moves began to be made for 'closer union among the peoples of Europe.' The call was renewed at the Hague Summit of EEC in 1969, and efforts were continued by the 1972 and 1974 summits. Belgian Prime Minister Tindemans was asked to prepare a plan for greater cooperation an institutional framework. The Tindemans Report envisaged completion of the Union by 1980 through the establishment of economic foreign policy, and common regional and social policies. Once again the plan proved to be too ambitious and it failed. There were sharp differences between the Member-States on the constitutional structure and institutional reforms.

Despite failure of the Tindemans Plan, some progress was made during 1970s, which widened the scope of coordination of national policies. In 1970, European Political Cooperation (EPC) was set up as an instrument of voluntary foreign policy coordination among the Member-States. In 1979, the European Monetary System (EMS) came into being, in order to create a zone of monetary stability, as free as possible from wile currency fluctuations.

Several proposals for greater economic cooperation and creation of 'a people's Europe' were made and discussed in 1980s. Two ad hoc committees were set up—one under the Chairmanship of Irish Senator Dooge, and the other under the leadership of Pietro Adonnino. Their reports were discussed in Milan Summit in June 1985. Meanwhile, the number of Member-States had gone up to 10. An important step was taken when the Single European Act came into force on 1 July 1987. Its preamble included the aim of the creation of a European Union. Detailed framework for setting up of single market by 1992 was laid down. Single market enabled free movement of goods, capital, services and labour across national frontiers by 1992. A closer policy cooperation on environment, research and technology was also envisaged. *Secondly,* a number of amendments and additions were made to the treaties establishing the Community. *Finally,* the Single Act dealt with foreign policy cooperation under EPC. The single Market was formally launched on 1 January 1993 removing internal frontiers for separate national markets.

Two inter-governmental conferences were convened by the leaders of the Community in December 1990. The outcome was the famous Maastricht Treaty—the Treaty on European Union, signed at Maastricht (The Netherlands) on 7 February 1992. It was entered into force on 1 November 1993. It created the European Union, to replace the European Community. It includes the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the Euratom and the EEC. According to Dr Klaus-Dieter Brochardt (European Integration), the major innovation of the EC, as compared to other international bodies is 'that its members have given up part of their national sovereignty with the goal of forming a, cohesive, indissoluble organizational and political unit.' The European Union is in the most advanced stage so far, in the creation of an integrated Europe. The objectives of EU include a common European currency by 1999, and new powers for EU in areas such as consumer protection, public health, visa policy, telecommunication, etc.

The ECSC, when founded in 1952, had only six Member-States. The treaties concluded in 1957 and entered into force in 1-958 (see above), created EEC and Euratom. Even before these treaties were ratified, British Government initiated a debate regarding the best approach to European integration. The British ideal was to set up a European free trade area which would not involve sacrifice of national sovereignty/The idea was to dismantle tariffs between countries, yet their freedom of action in respect of trade with non-members to be retained. The idea was rejected by six original members of ECSC who had already signed treaty for EEC. The British proposal did not materialize. However, in 1959, a separate treaty created the European Free Trade Area

(EFTA) comprising the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Portugal, Iceland and Switzerland. Finland became an associate member. Thus, none of the then six EEC members joined the EFTA.

The British Government was quite impressed by the success of EEC. The objectives of EFTA were purely economic so it was not a suitable medium for playing effective role in political affairs of Europe. It was soon realized that Britain would be politically isolated by remaining out of the European Community. So in 1961, Britain made its first application for entry into the Community. Three other countries, Denmark and Norway (from EFTA) and Ireland from outside EFTA, applied for membership. But, French President Charles de Gaulle had deep mistrust of British intentions. He opposed British application resulting in an abrupt break off in the negotiations. The second application of Britain (and of Ireland, Denmark and Norway) met with the same fate. After de Gaulle left office in 1969, efforts for British entry were renewed. After prolonged negotiations, treaties were signed in January 1972, and after their ratification Britain, Ireland and Denmark joined the EC on 1 January 1973. However, 53.49 per cent voters in Norway rejected the treaties in a referendum.

During the negotiations for accession, a question came up regarding the status of those EFTA members who were not joining the Community. These were Austria, Portugal, Finland, Iceland, Sweden and Switzerland. Some could not join EC due to their neutral status, others could not be admitted as they did not have democratic governments. A way out was found as they, and also Norway, concluded free trade agreements with the Community.

Greece, having restored democracy, applied for membership in 1975. Spain and Portugal applied in 1977, Greece wanted to stabilize democracy, and she hoped that, through EC, she would be able to modernize her agriculture and industry. Greece was made the tenth Member of EC on 1 January 1981. The accession of Spain and Portugal had raised many difficulties. Treaties for their accession were signed in June 1985. After ratification of these treaties by the Parliaments of 10 existing Members as well as Spain and Portugal, they became Members in 1986. Franco of Spain and Salazar of Portugal were no more in power. This enabled their accession. Both of them expected to benefit from economic cooperation as Members of EC, With the unification of Germany in October 1990, the erstwhile East Germany was naturally united in EC as part of Germany.

The attraction of the EC had been boosted by single market and move towards political union. As mentioned above, the establishment of European Union with effect from 1 November 1993, in accordance with Maastricht Treaty, had put the European integration on top priority. Thus, Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway opened negotiations for accession. These were successfully completed in 1994. Referendums were held in all the four countries. While Norway again voted against the accession by 52.4 per cent vote, the other three—Austria, Finland and Sweden—joined the EU on 1 January 1995.

By 2012 membership of the European Union had reached 27. Croatia had applied for membership of the EU. The proposal was approved by the Croatian people in a referendum held in early 2012. It then required the consent of all existing EU members. It was expected that Croatia would join the European Union on 1 July 2013. It would then be the 28th member. Some other countries are also seeking membership of the EU. These include Iceland, San Marino and the Vatican.

Institutions of the European Union

The directly elected European Parliament is the representative body of the peoples of 15 Member-States. It is directly elected since 1979. The European Parliament consisted of 626 members (before the admission of 10 new members in 2004): there were 99 members from Germany, 87 each from Britain (United Kingdom), France and Italy, 64 from Spain, 31 from the Netherlands, 25 each from Belgium, Greece and Portugal, 22 from Sweden, 21 from Austria, 16 each from Denmark and Finland, 15 from Ireland and 6 from Luxembourg. The European Parliament, representing 370 million people, is the political driving force, generating various initiatives for the development of Community policies. It approves the appointment of European Commission and can dismiss it by a censure motion adopted by 2/3 majority. The Parliament approves of the Commission's programmes and monitors day-to-day management of European policies. It also approves of the Council's decisions regarding international agreements, accession of new member, and uniform procedure for elections to Parliament, etc. The number of members has since gone up.

At present the European Parliament acts as a watchdog over the Commission, with little powers to legislate. The Parliament approves the Commission's budget, but cannot control it item by item. The European Parliament serves mainly as a debating forum and a symbol of European unity. Within the Parliament political parties are organized across national lines, with all the Christian Democrats (for example) from all the member-countries sitting together. However, many of the most heated debates are between national delegations within a party —'reflecting the continuing influence of nationalism.'

Secondly, there is the European Council, established in 1974, which is made up of Heads of State or Government and the President of the Commission. It ii assisted by Foreign Ministers of the Member-States and one member of the Commission. The Council's headquarter is in Brassies (Belgium). Each Member-State acts as President of the Council for six months by rotation. The Council normally meets twice a year, and coordinates the general economic policy, the Council defines common positions and adopts joint actions. In the case of justice and home affairs, the Council acts through joint actions, and by drawing up conventions which it recommends to, Member-States for adoption.

Thirdly, there is the European Commission which had 20 Members—till 2003 two each from France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Britain (UK), and one each from other Member- States. The Commission's tenure, like that of the Parliament, is five years. Members of the Commission are named by Member-States with prior approval of the European Parliament. Similarly, the Parliament is consulted before Member-States nominate the Commission President. Members of the Commission are expected to work independently from their national governments. The Commission is the guardian of treaties, and it sees to it that provisions of the treaties and decisions based on them are correctly applied. It can initiate proceedings against any Member-State, and impose fine on individuals or companies. The Commission is 'the catalyst of the Union.' It alone can initiate legislation, and ensure adoption of a new European law. Finally, the Commission is European Union's executive body. It issue rules for implementation of Treaty Articles, and administers the budget' allocation for Union operations. The Commission is assisted by administrative staff based in Brussels. The Commission selects one of its members as its President. The members of the Commission are supposed to represent the interests of Europe as a whole, and not of their own countries. But, in practice this is not always possible. They cannot easily forget that they belong to this country or that.

The European Commission lacks formal autonomous powers except in working out day-to-day EU operations. Formally, the Commission reports to, and implements the policies of the Council of Ministers. (This Council is different from the *European Council* mentioned above). The Council of Ministers is a meeting of relevant Ministers (Foreign, Finance, Agriculture, Defence, etc.). These are the political leaders who exercise control over the bureaucrats. It has been argued that this formal structure reflects member-countries' unwillingness to yielding their sovereignty. Very often the ministers vary from meeting to 'meeting, as changes of governments, or of ministers' portfolios keep taking place.

Fourthly, there are two courts: The Courts of Justice, and the Court of First Instance, The Court of Justice consists of 15 judges and 9 advocates-general. The Court of First Instance (Created in 1989) also has 15 judges. The seat of the Court is in Luxembourg. The judges are appointed by agreement between governments of Member-States. Their tenure is six years. Their independence is ensured. The Court of Justice ensures that the European Treaties are interpreted and applied in accordance with the law. The Court may impose a fine on a defiant member. It reviews the legality of measures taken by other institutions and gives preliminary rulings, on application by a national court, on the interpretation or validity of points of the Union laws. The Court of First Instance deals with actions brought by individuals and business. Appeals are disposed off by the Court of Justice.

Fifthly, the EU has a Court of Auditors consisting of 15 Members, appointed by unanimous decision of the Council after consultation with the Parliament. President of the Court is elected by members, and he is only first among equals. The Court is a body of Union auditors and checks that Union revenues are collected, and expenses incurred, in accordance with the law and that the financial management is sound.

In addition to the above institutions, there are a number of advisory bodies. There is an Economic and Social Committee of 222 members. They are divided into three groups: employers, workers and others including farmers and craftsmen. The Committee is consulted before socio-economic issues are decided. It delivers opinions on its own initiative—generally about 170 opinions are delivered every year. Matters relating to coal and steel and referred to ECSC Consultative Committee which is composed of 108 representatives of producers, workers, consumers and traders.

The European Commission is assisted by a staff of about 5,000 permanent employees, or civil servants. These bureaucrats are sometimes called *Eurocrats*. They are based at EU headquarters at Brussels, and enjoy the reputation of being 'colourless bureaucrats,' Most of the *Eurocrats* are coal and steel experts, joined also by experts on trade, agriculture and finance.

Objectives and Expectations

Economic integration and free trade have been the driving forces behind the moves towards European Union. The Treaties of the Community define the basic aims of economic integration as:

The harmonious development of economic activities; steady and balanced economic expansion; raising the standard of living; a high level of employment; and economic and monetary stability.

These objectives are applied by all the three Communities within the European Union.

1. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) is responsible for broad regulation of the two key sectors of coal and steel. Its activities include ensuring market supplies of coal and steel, regulating prices, improving conditions of work, and promoting trade and investment.

2. The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) deals with a limited sector of economy. It is responsible for joint research and actions on the use of nuclear energy.
3. The European Economic Community, renamed European Community under the Maastricht Treaty, takes a broader approach. It is expected to mould the Member-States into a single community embracing every sector of economy. It covers areas such as free movement of goods and workers, freedom of establishment and freedom of services, the free movement of capital, economic and monetary policy, agricultural policy, transport policy, environment policy and research and technology.

While political integration is the ultimate objective of the EU, the immediate goal is to introduce a common currency for the entire Union. The European common currency (ECU) played a central role in the European monetary system. The Maastricht Treaty provides for a new common currency to be known as Euro, which will eventually replace the national currencies. This will not be easy. The euro had been introduced in most of the Member-States by the end of the 20th century. However, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark decided not to adopt the euro for the time being. The British currency, pound sterling, being a very powerful currency, the UK was not likely to give it up easily. For some time, national currencies will co-exist with the common currency, but eventually, the euro will replace all the national currencies. The adoption of a common currency will not only facilitate single market and free trade, but will pave the way for political integration of Europe. While visa-free travel encourages tourism, common currency will make Europe one entity.

EU and India

India was among the first developing countries to have established diplomatic relations with the European Union. The Delegation of the EU Commission in New Delhi enjoys the status of an Embassy. In the field of commerce, the European Union in India is largest trading partner. India's two-way trade with the EU had risen to over 12 billion ECU (over ₹47,381 crore) by 1993. The development aid given by EC (now EU) has crossed 16 billion ECU (₹6324.8 crore). After liberalization of India's economy, with an outward-looking market, cooperation between India and the European Union has become a dynamic element.

The European Union has been cooperating with India in several development projects. These include alleviation of poverty in rural areas, environmental rehabilitation, agro-industry, primary education, and health care. 24 major projects were being funded by EU. By 1995, total EU funding had gone beyond 771 million ECU. Some of these projects are: Minor irrigation in Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and Orissa; Doon Valley Watershed Management; Rehabilitation of common lands of Aravali Hills in Haryana; Saline land reclamation in Maharashtra; and HIV prevention activities.

The first ever India-European Union Summit was held at Lisbon in June 2000. India was represented by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee who initiated the process for faster inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into India. On the eve of highly successful Summit, the Prime Minister interacted with nearly 250 Chief Executives of top European Companies. Earlier, India-EU Business Summit was held at Lisbon. India's Prime Minister announced the constitution of a joint government-industry group to look into all aspects of FDI in India. The group would confine itself to proposals from European Union.

Mr. Vajapyee realised that less than 25 per cent of total FDI approved for investment in India by EU had actually been invested. Till June 2000, total approvals of FDI from the EU

were worth 13 billion dollars, but actual inflows were less than 3 billion dollars. The likely investors from EU, were informed of the areas that India would give priority. These included the the National Highway Development Project, Power Sector, Telecommunications, Hydrocarbons, Coal, Civil Aviation and some of the public sectors which are being privatized. The Prime Minister told EU Chief Executives that, 'EU stands to benefit from cooperation in the rapidly expanding and equally fast evolving areas of the Indian economy like information technology, critical areas of infrastructure. Both sides stand to gain from sharing their experience and expertise...' At the Summit held in Lisbon, the EU appreciated the liberalization of the Indian economy and the stability of its democracy.

At the Lisbon Summit Vajpayee told the European Commission President Mr. Romano Prodi that, 'In an increasingly interdependent world, a plural security order alone can deal with the challenges of the new era. It is in this context that the development of our nuclear capability should be seen.' India supported the French concept of multi-polar world, 'where we have strategic space and autonomy in decision-making.' The EU endorsed India's concern at terrorism. The EU-India joint statement declared that the two partners 'share the conviction that terrorism remains a major threat to regional and international peace and security.' The Summit indeed made substantial progress on economic issues.

It was announced by the European Union in December 2000, after its half yearly meeting, that EU would provide Rs. 800 crore for a Primary Education Programme to be launched in India during 2001. The EU also promised a grant of Rs 150 crore for upgrading the facilities at the Indian Airports.

It was announced on behalf of the EU as a follow-up of India-EU Summit (of June 2000) held at Lisbon, that Indo-EU Roundtable would be launched during the visit of Mr. Chris Patten, EU External Relations Commissioner to India in January 2001. The Roundtable would comprise of experts from both sides and would function as a think tank to improve Indo-EU relations. In the light of decisions taken at Lisbon Summit, a broader framework of cooperation was envisaged by the EU so that it could work with India on crucial global issues such as reforms of the U.N. and the BrettonWoods institutions. Thus, serious efforts are being made for greater cooperation between India and the European Union.

On the eve of his visit to India in January 2001, Mr Chris Patten wrote in an article that, 'India always fascinated Europe; its culture, its diversity, its democratic tradition, its sheer size. Today, the European Union is India's top trading partner, and European companies are the leading investors in the country.' But, Mr. Patten emphasised that mere fascination was not enough. What was urgently needed was greater cooperation between India and Europe. Thus, it could be safely concluded that Indo-EU multifaceted cooperation was in the offing.

Further Expansion of the European Union

A number of East European countries wanted to join the EU when its Reforms Conference commenced early in 1996. Its agenda included 'revamp of EU housekeeping rules.' As Italian Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli said, the Conference was to draft changes in the way the EU runs its business and prepare it for enlargement. The Conference was likely to last over one year, and was expected to start membership talks. The front runners for accession to EU in 1997 were Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, in Eastern Europe, as well as Cyprus and Malta. The former communist countries (like Hungary) were expected to enter EU by 2000, but that did not happen.

As mentioned above 10 countries were to join EU in May 2004. The EU Conference was likely to introduce 'two-speed Europe,' in which a small number of nations around France and Germany would take a fast lane to further European integration. But, Britain and Denmark, described as 'mavericks', were likely to stick to cherished national sovereignty in certain areas. The British Government was facing strong opposition to greater integration. Britain was not very enthusiastic about common currency, whereas France and Germany were seeking faster economic and political integration. Tony Blair's Labour Government, which replaced the Conservatives in 1997, adopted a more positive attitude towards greater integration with Europe.

Turkey, a predominantly Muslim (secular) country, with a population of nearly 80 million, was keen to join the EU and steps for its initiation into the Union were taken in November 2000. The so-called 'Europeanization' of Turkey began. However, for many traditional and Christian European Turkey's proposed membership evoked controversy, if not outright racism. Turkey was denied entry into the European Union in 2002.

As Sweden took over the rotating presidency in January 2001, there were great expectations not only of early expansion of EU, but also of increased cooperation between European Union and Russia. Sweden is often seen as Western Europe's 'Northern Bridge' with Russia. Swedish Prime Minister Person emphasized the need for better ties with Russia.

Meanwhile, most Europeans were worried about the unfolding crisis-ridden economic scenario appearing on both sides of Atlantic. The essential task of Swedish presidency was to speed up negotiations with the future members of the EU. It was not clear in early 2001 as to who would join, and when, but an enlarged EU was priority with Sweden. Earlier EU had initiated study for a common policy on immigration, in the background of falling birth rate and increasing divorce rate in Europe, many of its members were keen to attract qualified manpower. This necessitated a common immigration policy, along with likelihood of enlarged membership of the European Union.

EU Expanded

After several years of efforts and prolonged negotiations, it was decided by the European Union at its Summit in Copenhagen in December 2002 to admit 10 new members in the Union. These ten were: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus. They were required to have this decision ratified by the peoples of the countries concerned, according to their constitutional provisions, and then they would be admitted as full members on 1 May 2004. Eight of these ten were earlier socialist countries, or parts of such countries. Thus, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were Republics of the former Soviet Union till they left in 1991. Poland and Hungary were communist and members of the Soviet Bloc, Czech Republic and Slovakia were Soviet Bloc country of Czechoslovakia till its two parts were voluntarily separated, and Slovenia was one of the regions of erstwhile (non-aligned) Yugoslavia. Only Malta and Cyprus were never in the Soviet Bloc. These two are island countries in the Mediterranean. By the end of 2003 all the ten countries had the approval of their peoples to join the European Union. It was expected in 2002-03 that two more countries on the borders at Russia, namely Bulgaria and Romania, were likely to be taken in by 2007. However, Turkey was denied admission. This disappointed the secular Muslim Republic.

It was emphasized at Brussels, after the Copenhagen decision, that the expanded EU of 'solidarity and unity' was being restructured on a common economic and political heritage, based on the key principles of multi-party democracy, rule of law, free market economy and border

tariff-free trade. Commenting on the development, the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi said that the 'accession of 10 new member states will bring an end to divisions of Europe.' Later in the EU leaders' meeting held in April 2003 at Athens (Greece), the ten countries to join in 2004 also attended and signed the accession treaty.

In another significant development, it was suggested that in order to revamp the executive wing of the European Union, the EU should have a directly elected President (in place of existing arrangement of having a President of the European Commission who is chosen by the Commission itself). With the accession of new members, the number of members of the European Commission would also go up from the existing 20. It was argued that the larger team of European Commission would work more effectively if there would be powerful President to organize and lead the restructured Commission.

Meanwhile, India-EU cooperation continued to grow, but at a very slow pace. At Copenhagen in October 2002 another India-EU Summit was held during Vajpayee's visit to Denmark. However, leaders of European business and industry were not very happy at India's economic reforms programme launched in 1991. They felt that the progress was slow, if not cumbersome, and hence, investment and trade flows were modest.

ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is one of the most effective regional organizations for economic cooperation. The APEC originally had 18 members, including Hong Kong, which was returned by the UK to China in 1997. Some more countries who were applicants for its membership joined it late in 1990s, raising its strength to 21. Today, with 21 members the APEC covers more than half of the humanity. The 21 countries who now constitute APEC are: Australia, Brunei-Darussalam, Canada, Chile, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, the United States of America and Vietnam. The APEC, thus, includes not only the United States and many of its allies, but also China, which represents an ideological fusion, rather than conflict. Hong Kong's separate status ceased after the Island's return to China in 1997. In this association of Asia-Pacific cooperation China co-exist with Taiwan whom the Communist giant refuses to accept as a separate state and seeks its union with the mainland. While pro-West South Korea is a member of APEC, its adversary North Korea has kept itself out of the arrangement. However, what is important is its geographical expansion, from China and Japan in the Far East to the US and Canada in North America, Chile and Peru in South America, Australia, New Zealand and Indonesia in Southern Pacific and Malaysia and Thailand in South-East Asia. It covers wide spectrum and seeks to transform the lives of the half of humanity.

APEC currently has 21 members countries with a coastline on the Pacific Ocean. However, the criterion is that each member should be a separate economy, rather than a state. As a result, APEC uses the term 'member-economies', rather than member countries. Thus, APEC is a regional association of 21 Pacific Rim economies. As such, India being out of the Pacific Rim, cannot hope to get membership of APEC.

APEC is a post-Cold War phenomenon. It was set up in 1993 and holds annual summits on the pattern of SAARC. In its 18-member Summit in November 1996, APEC pledged to transform the lives of vast population of its member-countries by creating the biggest free-trade zone on earth. The Summit agreed to 'substantially eliminate' barriers on information technology trade by the

end of 20th century. US President Bill Clinton had forcefully pleaded to reduce tariff on information technology trade to zero level by the time the 21st century began. APEC adopted the Manila Action Plan in 1996 to create a single Pacific Rim economy by 2020 AD With that aim in view, it decided to gradually remove trade barriers beginning 1997.

The 18-nation APEC Summit said in 1996 that they had 'deepened the spirit of community in the Asia-Pacific region and affirmed commitment to sustainable growth and equitable development.' The United States was in favour of freeing global trade in computers, semiconductors, software and telecommunications equipment. But, smaller countries led by Malaysia felt that their hi-tech market could be flooded by foreign imports. The APEC wants to give a' 'human face to development' by developing human capital, harnessing technologies of the future, promoting environmentally sustainable growth and encouraging small and medium business. APEC favours private sector investment in infrastructure, saying that 'public finance cannot fully meet the enormous requirements of the region.'.

In view of increasing importance of APEC, certain other countries were candidates for its membership in 1997. The issue of fresh membership was carefully examined, and its membership increased from 18 to 21. India's entry into APEC was not likely to be a smooth affair. But, Japan was in favour of granting observer status to India in the APEC Working Group on Science and Technology (S&T), which could eventually lead to India's accession to APEC. India was already included as a member of APEC Working Group on Power, headed by Australia as its convener, India was working for a similar status in the Science and Technology Group headed by Japan. While SAARC has failed to achieve much success due to Pakistan's frequent insistence on raising bilateral issues in its Summits, ASEAN and APEC could be important for India's all-round economic development. India had become by 1996 a full dialogue partner of ASEAN. India should seriously work for entry into APEC which could eventually strengthen even SAARC.

Vietnam, an enthusiastic supporter of India's candidature in the U.N. Security Council, openly backed India's entry into Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in November. 2000 during Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh's visit to that country. The support was reiterated during Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to that country. The support was reiterated during Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit in January 2001, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Mr Nien hailed India's efforts to strengthen ties with regional countries and upgrade the role of the Non-aligned Movement. It was well known that India had been trying to garner support for entering the APEC. It was believed by many, including Vietnam, that being one of the largest economies, APEC can hardly be complete without India's entry.

Women and APEC

APEC leaders have encouraged continuing growth in women's participation. Prime Minister Jenny Shipley of New Zealand said at the 1999 APEC leaders meeting at Auckland that, 'Women's role in Asia-Pacific economies is growing and APEC should seek to further increase their participation'. A Framework for the Integration of Women in APEC endorsed in 1999 incorporated three inter-related tools to integrate gender perspectives in the regional grouping. These were: (i) gender analysis—a way to examine differences in the lives of men and women; (ii) collection arid use of sex-disaggregated data —data presented separately for women and men so that differences can be examined; and (iii) involvement of women in APEC—increasing the participation of women in APEC fora. 'Business owned by women in APEC economies are

it has important relations with the ASEAN regional grouping. India has tried to match China and Japan by offering to move forward towards the creation of an ASEAN India free trade area. But, this proposal was likely to take quite some time to materialize. Bilaterally, however, India was already helping Malaysia in the railways sector, while Malaysia was involved in India's highway projects in matching fashion. Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong has been a great supporter of Indo-ASEAN cooperation. With growing friendship between India and Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam as well as Cambodia, both the ASEAN regional grouping as well as India were likely to be mutual beneficiaries, particularly in the background of SAARC almost on the verge of failure and collapse. India-ASEAN Summits have come to be known as ASEAN+one.

India is particularly interested in fighting international terrorism which has been a curse for this country since 1980s. Meanwhile, ASEAN has enhanced its cooperation with China, Japan and South Korea in the campaign against terrorism. India expects similar cooperation in its fight against terrorism.

SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION OF REGIONAL COOPERATION (SAARC)

The South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation is a group of 8 South Asian countries. It was established at the Dhaka Summit of seven countries of this region in December 1985. Initiative for such an association was taken by Bangladesh President Zia-Ur Rehman. SAARC was established by seven South Asian Countries: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Maldives. The idea was mooted by the Bangladesh President during 1977-80, for economic and culture cooperation among the peoples of South Asia. A working paper on 'Regional Cooperation in South Asia' was prepared by Bangladesh in November 1980 and circulated to the countries concerned. It pointed out the vast potential for regional cooperation that existed, and benefits that the countries of South Asia were likely to receive from such a cooperation. During subsequent negotiations it was agreed that SAARC would actively try for greater regional cooperation on the basis of sovereign equality of states, protection on the basis of territorial integrity, and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other. The cooperation was likely to grow in the economic, social and cultural spheres. Initially eleven areas of regional cooperation were identified. They were telecommunication, meteorology, transport, shipping, tourism, agricultural research, joint ventures, market promotion, scientific and technical cooperation, educational cooperation and cultural cooperation. These areas were quite vast to promote cooperation and seek regional unity.

Afghanistan joined SAARC in 2007 as its 8th member. This has been the only addition to the original group of 7 South Asian countries. SAARC has its headquarters in Kathmandu, Nepal.

The Charter of SAARC defines the following main objectives of the organization: (a) to promote the welfare of peoples in South Asian countries, and to improve their quality of life; (b) to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development; (c) to promote and strengthen collective self-reliance; (d) to contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another's problems; (e) to promote mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields; (f) to strengthen cooperation with other developing countries; (g) to strengthen cooperation among themselves in international fora; and (h) to cooperate with other regional and international organizations.

It was agreed that bilateral disputes between member-nations of SAARC would not be discussed in the Association. Generally, this has been adhered to. But, Pakistan has tried to

raise the question of Kashmir at SAARC conferences, just as she has been trying to bring up this problem in other fora such as Non-aligned Movement and the Commonwealth Heads of Government meetings. There are certain other regional organizations, like the African Union, which provide for settlement of bilateral disputes through conciliation and arbitration. But, in case of SAARC, bilateral matters have been kept out of its jurisdiction. During negotiation stage itself both India and Pakistan had insisted that controversial and bilateral issues would not be raised in SAARC, yet, Pakistan does not lose any opportunity to raise the Kashmir issue.

The institutional framework of SAARC includes the annual summit of heads of state or government of member-nations. After the establishment of SAARC at Dhaka, the next meeting was held in 19 86 at Bangalore. Thereafter such summits were held in different countries. The summit discusses and approves programmes and course of action for regional cooperation. The Foreign Secretaries constitute a Standing Committee which monitors coordination, mobilizes resources and identifies new areas of cooperation for the consideration of the Summit. Thus, there is direct involvement of Heads of Government, Foreign Ministers and Foreign Secretaries,

A number of technical committees are constituted for implementation of programmes. They are made up of representatives from various member-countries, and submit reports to the Standing Committee. In 1987, a permanent Secretariat was established by SAARC. It is based in Kathmandu and is headed by a Secretary-General. Its staff is recruited from member-countries. Financial resources are provided by the South Asian countries themselves.

SAARC has been struggling with itself to implement the programme of regional cooperation. After nearly a decade of its formation a concrete arrangement for easier trade was finalized. This is known as South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA). This was designed on the pattern of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Administration) for custom-free trade between Canada, Mexico and the United States). If SAPTA is sincerely implemented, trade in South Asia will have easier flow and the benefits will accrue to all the peoples. As Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao hoped (1995), zero-custom would facilitate regional commerce for the advantage of all states and their peoples. One area of cooperation that is seen by the common man is a TV presentation on the first of every month presented in turn by different member-countries depicting their culture with a view to promoting cultural cooperation.

SAARC was established with very good intentions. But, unfortunately frequent tensions come in the way of true and meaningful regional cooperation. There is some sort of hidden fear about India's position in the region. India alone has 72 per cent of South Asian territory and about 77 per cent of population. This enables her to a position of hegemony. India has no desire to impose its will on smaller neighbours, but it cannot help if a complex develops which has no relevance.

There are many causes of slow progress of regional cooperation. First, there are ethnic tensions, for example, between the Assamese and Bangladeshis, Tamils and Sinhalese, and Mohajirs and Sindhis in Pakistan. The tension is sought to be created within India between various communities. The attempts should be made for complete ethnic and religious harmony rather than allow tensions to develop. The issue of distribution of Ganga waters between India and Bangladesh had remained unresolved till 1996 when it was amicably settled so that Indo-Bangla cooperation could be accelerated. Indo-Pakistan conflicts, whether in regard to Kashmir or alleged support to international terrorism, has been dominating South-Asian politics. True spirit of regional cooperation demands fruitful bilateral dialogues so that two countries may mutually resolve differences and help peaceful development of social, economic and cultural

cooperation. It is imperative that mutual distrust between India and Pakistan, between India and Sri Lanka in regard to Tamil problem, or between any other two countries must be replaced by mutual understanding and cooperation. There is ample scope of regional cooperation in South Asia which, if achieved, can go a long way in promoting peace and progress in the entire world. If SAARC has to succeed, it is necessary that policy-makers in all the seven countries encourage development of the entire region, discourage tensions and promote understanding.

As India became a full dialogue partner with ASEAN, her role in the economic development of South as well as South-East Asia is expanding. Both ASEAN and SAARC require greater cooperation, but ASEAN has already become (despite bilateral problems) a more successful arrangement as compared to SAARC. The continued India-Pakistan conflict is a major cause of slow economic cooperation in South Asia. But, as J N Dixit suggests, 'If we speed up the process of cooperation within SAARC, it would help the establishment of a strong and stable relationship with ASEAN.'

The SAARC Council of Ministers as well as Foreign Secretaries of the seven countries met in December 1995 in New Delhi to complete formalities regarding South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement, SAPTA. The ratification documents were submitted. It was hoped that discussions would soon begin so that SAPTA may be replaced by South Asia Free Trade Area, SAFTA, by the first decade of 21st century. That will mean that trading among the South Asian countries (as in NAFTA and EFTA) will become free from custom duties. But, so long as SAPTA exists there will be preferential trading in South Asia. In December 1995 meeting, all participant countries exchanged lists of commodities for preferential trading. But, SAARC Members are faced with at least two problems. First, most of the items in most of the lists, exchanged for preferential trading, either do not have a demand in the potential importing countries of the region, or the items are such that they do not have exportable surplus which could be traded within SAPTA, after domestic needs are met and after exports to the developed countries generating hard currencies have been made.

The second problem being faced mainly by India is a demand by Pakistan and Bangladesh that political disputes with them may be resolved before any meaningful economic cooperation can take place. Pakistan Foreign Minister Sardar Asif Ali and his Bangla counterpart Mustafizur Rehman, both argued that despite their obligations under World Trade Organization (WTO) they would not be able to respond to India till the Kashmir and Farraka disputes were resolved. The SAARC Charter prohibits discussion on bilateral issues, but surprisingly in 1995 even Nepal and Maldives supported Pakistan's demand that Heads of Government or State should examine the possibility of setting in a consultative machinery at the official level to regularly discuss pending bilateral issues and to evolve possible solutions. This linking up of such disputes as Kashmir with economic cooperation may eventually weaken SAARC rather than promote regional cooperation.

The decision to convert preferential trading (SAPTA) by free trading (SAFTA) was given a concrete shape when the Male Summit in 1997 (India was represented by Mr I K Gujral) decided to establish SAFTA in the year 2001. This gave just four years to prepare. President Gayoom of Maldives denied that it was too ambitious to hope for SAARC free trading by 2001 by saying that SAPTA had made considerable progress since its inception in December 1995. Prime Minister Gujral later told the Lok Sabha that the decision on SAFTA was an important step reflecting the growing sentiment among the member countries to consolidate economic interaction at a fast pace. The hope of free trading by 2001 was dashed to the ground in view of high tension between India and Pakistan after the latter occupied Kargil Heights on the Indian side of Line of

Control in the summer of 1998, though the aggression was repulsed by the Indian army. Later, when the civilian government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan was overthrown in October 1999 by the Army Chief General Parvez Musharraf the Indo-Pak relations were further frozen. So much so that no SAARC Summit took place after the Colombo meet of 199 8. India was not willing to attend a Summit in which democratic government of Pakistan was not represented. Therefore, no SAARC Summit took place either in 1999 or in 2000. This caused a serious setback to the regional economic cooperation in South Asia. In early 2001 there was no hope of any progress is activating the South Asia Association of Regional Cooperation. Therefore, introduction of SAFTA was out of the question.

After a gap of nearly three years, the SAARC Summit was held in Kathmandu in early 2002. In view of the acute tension between India and Pakistan, hardly any worthwhile progress was made at Kathmandu, except the expression of hope of renewed efforts for reduction of tariff barriers and increased trade within SAARC. However, no progress was made either in the direction of free trade or SAFTA. Even the scheduled next Summit to be held at Islamabad could not take place in early 2003 due to India's reluctance to participate because of lack of progress on the trade front, and because of continued terrorism against India from across the borders. Meanwhile, senior officials from SAARC countries met in Kathmandu in November 2002 to prepare a draft treaty for South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), but their efforts were wasted. As K K Katyal wrote in an article in January 2003, progress was slow from the start, but it became jinxed from the time of the military *coup* in Pakistan in October 1999. SAARC appeared in 2003 to have run out of whatever little steam it had. It will be unrealistic now to count on it for promoting concrete action programme or for collective action in core areas such as trade and economy, people-to-people contacts, transport and communications. At the following SAARC meet in Islamabad in January 2004, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistan President Musharraf met in a cordinal atmosphere.

THE EUROPEAN UNION

Origin and Growth of the European Union

The European Union comprises 15 Member-States. It was decided in 2002 to admit 10 more members, who formally joined in 2004. It is the pioneer of regional economic cooperation. Founded by six countries—Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands in 1952 as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), it evolved into a large European Community. The EC later developed into the European Union (EU) in accordance with the Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992. The Maastricht Treaty, after ratification, entered into force on 1 November 1993 establishing the European Union in its present form. The original Community of six was enlarged with &e accession of Britain, Ireland and Denmark in 1973. Greece joined in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986. With the unification of East and West Germany in 1990 the area of EC (as it was then known) was extended. The EC, which became the European Union in 1993, was further enlarged on 1 January 1995 with the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden.

Europe in 1945 was decimated by war. As Joshua S Goldstein wrote, 'Most of the next decade was spent getting back on its feet with help from the United States through the Marshal Plan.' But already a plan for Franco-German cooperation was being developed in order to implement the idea of functionalism in Europe. The Council of Europe earlier founded (1949) was to

cooperation. It is imperative that mutual distrust between India and Pakistan, between India and Sri Lanka in regard to Tamil problem, or between any other two countries must be replaced by mutual understanding and cooperation. There is ample scope of regional cooperation in South Asia which, if achieved, can go a long way in promoting peace and progress in the entire world. If SAARC has to succeed, it is necessary that policy-makers in all the seven countries encourage development of the entire region, discourage tensions and promote understanding.

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SUMMARY

- Terrorism, broadly, refers to attempts to further political ends by using violence to create a climate of fear, apprehension and uncertainty. Terrorism is nevertheless a deeply controversial term, not least because it is highly pejorative and tends to be used as a political tool. Mainstream, radical and critical perspectives offer quite different views on the nature of terrorism and the value of the concept.
- Proponents of the idea of 'new' terrorism suggest that since the 1990s a more radical and devastating form of terrorism has emerged whose political character, motivations, strategies and organization differs from 'traditional' terrorism, particularly in the growing importance of religious motivation. But serious doubts have been cast on the value of this distinction.
- It is widely assumed that September 11 marked the emergence of a profoundly more significant form of terrorism, which can strike anywhere, any time. However, although many accept that there are important links between modern terrorism and the processes of globalization, many have questioned whether terrorism has genuinely gone global.
- The impact of terrorism has increased supposedly because of the advent of new terrorist tactics and because of easier access to, and a greater willingness to use, WMD. However, critical theorists argue that the threat of terrorism has been greatly overstated, usually through discourses linked to the 'war on terror' and often to promote the 'politics of fear'.
- Key counter-terrorism strategies include the strengthening of state security, the use of military repression and political deals. State security and military approaches have often been counter-productive and have provoked deep controversy about the proper balance between freedom and security.
- Effective solutions to terrorism have usually involved encouraging terrorists to abandon violence by drawing them into a process of negotiation and diplomacy. Although such an approach has sometimes worked in the case of nationalist terrorism, it has been seen as an example of appeasement and as inappropriate to dealing with Islamist terrorism.

Questions for discussion

- How can terrorism be distinguished from other forms of political violence?
- Is there such a thing as 'state terrorism'?
- Are there any circumstances in which terrorism can be justified?
- Has the growing importance of religious motivation transformed the nature of terrorism?
- Did September 11 mark the emergence of a truly global form of terrorism?
- Is nuclear terrorism an 'invented' fear?
- Why is terrorism so rarely effective, and in what circumstances does it work?
- Are restrictions on liberty merely the lesser evil compared with the threat of terrorism?
- Why are military approaches to dealing with terrorism so often counter-productive?
- Should political deals ever be done with terrorists?

Further reading

Bloom, M. *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (2007). A balanced and informative analysis of suicide terrorism and the motivations behind it.

Hoffman, B. *Inside Terrorism* (2006). An excellent general introduction to the nature and development of terrorism, which also considers the challenges facing counter-terrorism.

Jackson, R., M. Smyth, J. Gunning, and L. Jarvis *Terrorism: A Critical Introduction* (2011). An accessible assessment of terrorism and its study which rethinks mainstream assumptions and thinking.

Sageman, M. *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century* (2008). A thought-provoking study of Islamist terrorism, and particularly al-Qaeda, which emphasizes the need to understand the networks that allow modern terrorism to proliferate.

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Companion Website

Links to relevant web resources can be found on the *Global Politics* website

CHAPTER 13

Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention

'All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.'

UN Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Article 1

PREVIEW

Moral and ethical questions have always been important in international politics. However, since the end of the Cold War they have attracted intensified interest, as issues of global justice have come to vie with more traditional concerns, such as power, order and security. Moreover, when matters of justice and morality are raised, this is increasingly done through a doctrine of human rights that emphasizes that people everywhere enjoy the same moral status and entitlements. Human rights have come to compete with state sovereignty as the dominant normative language of international affairs and human development. This has created tension between human rights and states' rights, as the former implies that justice should extend *beyond*, as well as *within*, national borders. Difficult questions have nevertheless been raised about human rights. Not the least of these are about the nature of, and justifications for, human rights. In what sense are these rights 'human' rights, and which rights do they cover? Other debates concern the extent to which human rights are protected in practice, and whether they are genuinely universal, applying to all peoples and all societies. How far are human rights applied in practice, and how far should they be applied? Tensions between states' rights and human rights have become particularly acute since the 1990s through the growth of so-called 'humanitarian intervention'. Major states have assumed the right to intervene militarily in the affairs of other states to protect their citizens from abuse and possibly death, often at the hands of their own government. How, and to what extent, is such intervention linked to human rights? Can intervention ever be genuinely 'humanitarian'? And, regardless of its motives, does humanitarian intervention actually work?

KEY ISSUES

- What are human rights, and on what basis can they be claimed?
- How, and how effectively, have international human rights been protected?
- On what grounds has the doctrine of human rights been criticized?
- What explains the growth of humanitarian intervention, and its subsequent decline?
- Under what circumstances is it right to intervene in the affairs of another state?
- Why has humanitarian intervention been criticized?

CONCEPT

Human rights

Human rights are rights to which people are entitled by virtue of being human; they are a modern and secular version of 'natural rights'. Human rights are *universal* (in the sense that they belong to human beings everywhere, regardless of race, religion, gender and other differences), *fundamental* (in that a human being's entitlement to them cannot be removed), *indivisible* (in that civic and political rights, and economic, social and cultural rights are interrelated and co-equal in importance) and *absolute* (in that, as the basic grounds for living a genuinely human life, they cannot be qualified). 'International' human rights are set out in a collection of UN and other treaties and conventions (see p. 311).

HUMAN RIGHTS

Defining human rights

The individual in global politics

International politics has traditionally been thought of in terms of collective groups, especially states. Individual needs and interests have therefore generally been subsumed within the larger notion of the 'national interest'. As a result, international politics largely amounted to a struggle for power between and amongst states with little consideration being given to the implications of this for the individuals concerned. People, and therefore morality (in terms of the happiness, suffering and general wellbeing of individuals), were factored out of the picture. However, this divorce between state policy and the individual, and thus between power and morality, has gradually become more difficult to sustain.

Many cultures and civilizations have developed ideas about the intrinsic worth and dignity of individual human beings. However, these theories were traditionally rooted in religious belief, meaning that the moral worth of the individual was grounded in divine authority, human beings usually being seen as creatures of God. The prototype for the modern idea of human rights was developed in early modern Europe in the form of **'natural rights'**. Advanced by political philosophers such as Hugo Grotius (see p. 334), Thomas Hobbes (see p. 14) and John Locke (1632–1704), such rights were described as 'natural', in that they were thought to be God-given and therefore to be part of the very core of human nature. Natural rights did not exist simply as moral claims but were, rather, considered to reflect the most fundamental inner human drives; they were the basic conditions for leading a truly human existence. By the late eighteenth century, such ideas were expressed in the notion of the 'rights of man' (later extended by feminists to include the rights of women), which was used as a means of constraining government power by defining a sphere of autonomy that belongs to the citizen. The US Declaration of Independence (1776), which declared life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness to be inalienable rights, gave expression to such ideas, as did the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789).

Such thinking gradually acquired an international dimension during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries through attempts to set standards for international conduct, usually based on **humanitarianism**. For example, the growth of humanitarian ethics helped to inspire attempts to abolish the slave trade, a cause endorsed by the Congress of Vienna (1815) and was eventually achieved by the Brussels Convention (1890), with slavery itself being formally outlawed by the Slavery Convention (1926) (even though forms of slavery continue to exist in practices such as bonded labour, forced marriage, child labour and the trafficking of women). The Anti-Slavery Society, formed in 1837, can perhaps be seen as the world's first human rights NGO (see p. 6). Other humanitarian causes that were translated into a form of international standard setting included the regulation of the conduct of war, through the Hague Conventions (1907) and the Geneva Conventions (1926), and attempts to improve working conditions, spearheaded by the International Labour Office, formed in 1901, and its successor, the International Labour Organization, which was established in 1919 as part of the Treaty of Versailles and became, in 1946, the first specialized agency of the United Nations.

Such developments nevertheless remained piecemeal and largely marginal to the general thrust of international politics until the end of WWII. The adoption by the UN General Assembly of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), later supplemented by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (both in 1966), established the modern human rights agenda by outlining a comprehensive code for the internal government of its member states, which has arguably acquired the status of customary international law (see p. 332). Reflecting a major change in the general climate of thought, deeply influenced by the horrors of WWII (especially the so-called 'Final Solution', the murder of some six million Jews, Gypsies and Slavs in the extermination camps of Nazi Germany), the Declaration led to a burst of law-making and standard setting that sought to establish international protection for the full range of human rights. 1948 thus brought to an end a period of exactly 300 years since the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), during which state sovereignty (see p. 3) had stood unchallenged as the dominant norm of international politics. However, although the Declaration established the rival norm of human rights, tensions between states' rights and human rights were by no means resolved in 1948, as will be discussed later. In the meantime, it is necessary to examine the nature and implications of human rights. What are human rights, and why should they be respected?

Nature and types of human rights

A right is an entitlement to act or be treated in a particular way. As such, rights entail duties: the claim to have a right imposes obligations on others to act, or, perhaps, to refrain from acting in a particular way. Human rights are essentially moral claims or philosophical assertions, but they have gained, since 1948, a measure of legal substance. Human rights, most basically, are rights to which people are entitled by virtue of being human. They are therefore 'universal' rights, in the sense that they belong to all human beings rather than to members of any particular nation, race, religion, gender, social class or whatever. This **universalism** was clearly expressed in the words of the American Declaration of Independence, written by Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826), which proclaimed: 'We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights'. However, there have been very deep divisions about what rights human beings should enjoy. Indeed, thinking about the content of human rights has developed significantly over time, enabling three different types, or 'generations' of human rights to be identified (Vasak 1977) (see Table 13.1). These are:

- Civil and political rights
- Economic, social and cultural rights
- Solidarity rights

● **Natural rights**: God-given rights that are fundamental to human beings and are therefore inalienable (they cannot be taken away)

● **Humanitarianism**: A concern about the wellbeing of humanity as a whole, typically expressed through acts of compassion, charity or philanthropy

● **Universalism**: The belief that it is possible to uncover certain values and principles that are applicable to all people and all societies, regardless of historical, cultural and other differences.

Civil and political rights were the earliest form of natural or human rights. They were advanced through the English Revolution of the seventeenth century and the French and American Revolutions of the eighteenth century. The core civil and political rights are the rights to life, liberty and property, although they have been expanded to include, for example, freedom from discrimination, freedom from slavery, freedom from torture or other inhuman forms of punishment, freedom from arbitrary arrest, and so on. Civil and political rights are often typically seen as **negative rights**, or 'forbearance' rights: they can be enjoyed only if constraints are placed on others. Negative rights therefore define a private sphere within which the individual can enjoy independence from the encroachments of other individuals and, more particularly, from the interference of the state. Negative human rights thus correspond closely to classic civil **liberties**, such as the rights to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion and conscience, freedom of movement, and freedom of association. However, it would be misleading to suggest that all civil and political rights are 'negative' in this respect. The right to non-discrimination, for instance, can only be upheld through legislation and a framework of enforcement on the part of government, while the right to a free and fair trial requires the existence of a police force and a court system. Civil liberties are therefore often distinguished from **civil rights**, the latter involving positive action on the part of government rather than simply forbearance. The dual character of civil and political rights is evident in the complex relationship between human rights and democracy.

The struggle for *economic, social and cultural rights* gained greater prominence during the twentieth century, especially in the post-1945 period. By contrast with traditional 'liberal' rights, these so-called 'second-generation' rights often drew on socialist assumptions about the tendencies of capitalist development towards social injustice and unequal class power. Socio-economic rights – including the right to social security, the right to work, the right to paid holidays, the right to healthcare, the right to education and so on – were designed to counter-balance inequalities of market capitalism, protecting the working classes and colonial peoples from exploitation. These rights are **positive rights**, in that they imply a significant level of state intervention, usually in the form of welfare provision (welfare rights), the regulation of the labour market (workers' rights) and economic management generally.

However, deep controversy has surrounded economic and social rights. Supporters have argued that economic and social rights are, in a sense, the most basic of human rights, as their maintenance constitutes a precondition for the enjoyment of all other rights. In this view, human dignity is more severely threatened by poverty, disease, ignorance and other forms of social disadvantage than it is by the denial of 'liberal' rights. Nevertheless, economic and social rights have often been thought of, especially in the USA and other western states, as at best second-class human rights, if not as entirely bogus moral claims. Critics have alleged, first, that the maintenance of such rights requires material resources and political capabilities that many states simply do not possess. Economic and social rights can therefore only be viewed as aspirations rather than entitlements. Second, it is unclear who or what is responsible for upholding economic and social rights. If, through a lack of resources or capabilities, a national government cannot deliver economic and social rights, do these obligations then fall on other states (if so, which ones?), international organizations or, somehow, on the peoples of the world? Third, from the perspective of economic liberalism, economic and social rights may be counter-productive, in that higher levels of (albeit well-intentioned) state intervention may simply undermine the vigour and efficiency of capitalist economies.

Since 1945 a further set of rights have emerged in the form of *solidarity rights*, or so-called 'third-generation' rights. These encompass a broad spectrum of rights whose main characteristic is that they are attached to social groups or whole societies, as opposed to separate individuals. They are sometimes, therefore, seen as collective rights or people's rights. Whereas 'first-generation' rights were shaped by liberalism and 'second-generation' rights were shaped by socialism, 'third-generation' rights have been formed by the concerns of the global South. The right to self-determination was thus linked to the post-1945 process of decolonization and the rise of national liberation movements. Other such rights include the right to development, the right to peace, the right to environmental protection and multicultural rights. Solidarity rights have therefore been used to give issues such as development, environmental sustainability and cultural preservation a moral dimension. Nevertheless, critics of 'third-generation' rights have highlighted their inherent vagueness and, more seriously, questioned whether human rights can actually belong to peoples or groups as opposed to individuals. From this perspective, the very idea of human rights is based on a model of individual self-worth, which is in danger of being weakened whenever people are thought of in terms of group membership.

- **Negative rights**: Rights that are enjoyed by virtue of the inactivity of others, particularly government; often seen (somewhat misleadingly) as 'freedoms from'.
- **Civil liberties**: Rights and freedoms that define a 'private' sphere of existence that belongs to the citizen, not the state; freedoms from government.
- **Civil rights**: Rights of participation and access to power, typically voting and political rights and the right to non-discrimination.
- **Positive rights**: Rights that can only be enjoyed through positive intervention on the part of government, often linked to the idea of 'freedom to'.

Focus on . . .

Democracy as a human right?

In their earliest formulation, natural or human rights were profoundly anti-democratic. This is because their purpose was to empower individuals, and this implied limiting the authority of government, regardless of whether government was democratic or authoritarian. Democracy, indeed, threatened to transfer sovereignty from the individual to the people, creating a particular concern that democratic rule would lead to a 'tyranny of the majority', which may threaten minority rights and individual freedoms. So-called liberal democracies uphold human rights to the extent that they are 'liberal' (that is, they practise limited government) rather than to the extent that they are 'democratic' (that is, they ensure a system of government by the people). This implies that in liberal democracies human rights, sometimes seen as civil liberties, are given priority over democracy.

However, tensions between human rights and democracy have, over time, reduced, even to the point that many have come to view 'democracy promotion' (see p. 206) as a key element in the modern human rights agenda. This has happened for both practical and theoretical reasons. In practical terms, democratization has generally led to greater, if still imperfect, respect for human rights in post-communist or former authoritarian regimes, helping to establish a link between the two. In theoretical terms, the defence of traditional civil liberties has increasingly been seen as providing the preconditions for free and informed political participation. Similarly, there has been a greater stress on civil rights and an equal access to power as a means of upholding all other rights.

Table 13.1 Three generations of human rights

Generation	Type	Key theme	Rights	Key documents
First generation (eighteenth and nineteenth centuries)	Civic and political rights	Liberty	• Life, liberty and property • Non-discrimination • Freedom from arbitrary arrest • Freedom of thought	• UN Declaration, Articles 3 to 21 • International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Second generation (twentieth century)	Economic, social and cultural rights	Equality	• Work • Social security • Healthcare • Education • Paid holidays	• UN Declaration Articles 22 to 27 • International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Third generation (post-1945)	Solidarity rights	Fraternity	• Self-determination • Peace • Development • Environmental protection	• Stockholm Convention on the Human Environment, 1972 • Rio 'Earth Summit', 1992

Implications of human rights for global politics

Human rights, by their nature, have profound implications for global politics. Why is this? The first answer to this question is that, being universal and fundamental, human rights invest governments with powerful obligations, affecting their foreign as well as domestic policies. The protection and realization of human rights is thus a key role of government, and perhaps, according to liberals, its core purpose. Interactions between states should therefore have, at least, a human rights dimension. This, in theory at least, imposes major constraints on the behaviour of national governments, both in terms of how they treat their domestic population and in their dealings with other peoples and countries. This affects matters ranging from the recourse to, and conduct of, war (where a concern for human rights has generally been seen to be compatible with the requirements of a 'just war' (see p. 257)), to foreign aid and trade policies. More radically and controversially, these obligations may extend to taking action, perhaps military action, to prevent or discourage other countries from violating human rights within their own borders, what has come to be called 'humanitarian intervention' (see p. 319), discussed later in this chapter.

The second way in which human rights have implications for global politics is that they imply that the boundaries of moral concern extend beyond national borders; indeed, in principle, they disregard national borders. Human rights are nothing less than a demand *of* all humanity *on* all of humanity (Luban 1985). Growing acceptance of the doctrine of human rights therefore goes hand-in-hand with the growth of cosmopolitan sensibilities. For Pogge (2008), human rights fulfil each of the three elements of cosmopolitanism (see p. 21): individualism (an ultimate concern with human beings or persons, not groups), universality (a recognition of the equal moral worth of all individuals) and generality (the belief that persons are objects of concern for everyone, regardless of nationality and so on). The cosmopolitan implications of human rights are evident not

only in attempts to use international law, albeit usually 'soft' law, to set standards for the behaviour of states, but also in attempts to strengthen regional and global governance (see p. 455) and thereby constrain, or perhaps redefine the nature of, state sovereignty. However, despite the strengthening of human rights law and increased interest in cosmopolitan thinking in general and human rights thinking in particular, the theoretical implications of human rights are counterbalanced by powerful practical and sometimes moral considerations. This makes the protection of human rights a complex and often difficult process.

Protecting human rights

The human rights regime

Since 1948, an elaborate international regime (see p. 67) has developed to promote and protect human rights globally. At the heart of this regime continues to stand the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Although the 1945 UN Charter urged the promotion of 'universal respect for, and observation of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all', it failed to specify the human rights that states had to guarantee and respect. This defect was rectified by the UN Declaration. Although the UN Declaration is not a legally binding treaty, it is commonly seen as a form of customary international law that is used as a tool to apply diplomatic and moral pressure to governments that violate any of its articles. By establishing that states could no longer violate human rights without the risk that their actions would come onto the agenda of the principal organs of the UN, the Declaration challenged states' exclusive jurisdiction over their own citizens and weakened the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. The incorporation of the Declaration into a legally-binding codification of human rights – in effect, human rights law – was achieved through the adoption in 1966 of the international covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Collectively, the 1948 Declaration and the two covenants are commonly referred to as the 'International Bill of Human Rights'.

Until the mid-1960s, the UN concentrated almost exclusively on the generation of human rights norms and standards. Subsequently, it placed greater emphasis on their implementation. A major step in this direction was taken by the establishment of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, which had been one of the key proposals of the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. The role of the High Commissioner is to promote worldwide respect for the human rights enshrined in international laws by supporting the bodies created by human rights treaties. However, the Office of the High Commissioner has proved to be more effective in highlighting human rights violations than it has been in enforcing human rights law. As its main sanction remains the publication and denunciation of violations by individual states – that is, naming and shaming – the Office relies very largely on persuasion and observation to improve governments' human rights policies. The UN's 47-member Human Rights Council, which replaced the much criticized UN Human Rights Commission in 2006, also addresses situations of human rights violations. However, it has no authority other than to make recommendations to the General Assembly which, in turn, can only advise the Security Council. It has

APPROACHES TO . . .

HUMAN RIGHTS

Realist view

Realists have tended to view a concern with human rights as, at best, a 'soft' issue in international affairs, by contrast with 'hard', or 'core', concerns such as the pursuit of security and prosperity. Other realists go further and believe that human rights thinking in relation to international and global issues is entirely wrong-headed. This is because realists hold that it is impossible, and undesirable, to view international politics in moral terms. Morality and the national interest are two distinct things, and states fail adequately to serve their own citizens (and often those of other states) when they allow ethical considerations – particularly ones as inherently vague and confused as human rights – to affect their behaviour. Realist objections to the culture of human rights have at least three bases. In the first place, they take issue with the essentially optimistic model of human nature that underpins human rights, which emphasizes dignity, respect and rationality. Second, realists are primarily concerned about collective behaviour, and especially the capacity of the state to ensure order and stability for their citizens. The national interest should therefore take precedence over any individually-based conception of morality. Third, being based on positivism, realism is keen to uphold its scientific credentials. This implies a concern with what *is*, rather than with what *should be*.

Liberal view

The modern doctrine of human rights is very largely a product of liberal political philosophy. Indeed, so entangled with liberal assumptions are they that some doubt whether human rights can ever properly be described as 'above' ideological differences, bearing the cultural imprint of western liberalism. At a philosophical level, the image of humans as 'rights bearers' derives from liberal individualism. On a political level, liberals have long used the notion of natural or human rights to establish the basis of legitimacy. Social contract theorists thus argued that the central purpose of government is to protect a set of inalienable rights, variously described as 'life, liberty and property' (Locke), or as 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness' (Jefferson). If governments become tyrannical, by abusing or failing to protect such rights, they break an implicit contract between the people and government, entitling citizens to rebel. The English, American and French revolutions were all justified using such ideas. During the twentieth century, liberals increasingly used such thinking to outline the basis for international legitimacy, arguing that states should be bound, preferably legally, to uphold human rights in their dealings with their domestic population as well as with other states. The 1948 UN Declaration therefore has, for liberals, a near-religious significance. Nevertheless, liberals tend to regard only civil and political rights as fundamental rights, and sometimes view economic rights and any conception of group rights with grave suspicion.

Critical views

Critical approaches to human rights have either tended to revise or recast the traditional, liberal view of human rights, or they have been openly hostile to the idea itself. The global justice movement has used economic and social rights as the basis of calls for a radical redistribution of power and resources, both within countries and between them (Shue 1996; Pogge 2008). Human rights have thus been turned into a doctrine of global social justice, grounded in moral cosmopolitanism. Feminists, for their part, have demonstrated a growing interest in the cause of human rights. In particular, they have sought to transform the concept and practice of human rights to take better account of women's lives, highlighting the issues of 'women's human rights' (Friedman 1995). This marks a recognition by feminist activists of the power of the international human rights framework, and especially its capacity to place women's issues on mainstream agendas. Human rights have thus been redefined to include the degradation and violation of women. At the same time, however, feminists have taken a critical view of rights that men have designed to protect their entitlement to private commerce, free speech and cultural integrity, which have been used to legitimize practices such as child marriages, the trafficking of women and child pornography (see Cultural rights or women's rights? p. 196). The postcolonial critique of human rights is examined in the main body of the text, see pp. 316–18.

KEY EVENTS . . .

Major international human rights documents

1948	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
1949	Geneva Conventions on the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
1950	European Convention on Human Rights (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms)
1951	Genocide Convention (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide)
1954	Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
1966	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (came into force in 1976)
1966	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (came into force in 1976)
1969	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
1975	Declaration on Torture
1981	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
1984	Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment
1990	Convention on the Rights of the Child
1993	Vienna Convention on Human Rights (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties)
2000	Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

also, like its predecessor, been criticized for being biased and inconsistent in the exposure of human rights abuses. Not only does it include states that have themselves a dubious human rights record, but member states also tend to protect each other (and developing states generally) from criticism and they have, allegedly, been over-willing to highlight violations carried out by Israel.

One of the main features of the human rights regime is the prominent role played within it by a wide range of NGOs. For example, over 1,500 NGOs participated in the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, while the number of registered international NGOs reached 37,000 by 2000, most of them claiming to have some kind of human rights or humanitarian purpose. In the case of groups such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, Médecins Sans Frontières and Oxfam, operational NGOs work directly in the field to relieve suffering but also campaign on behalf of those they treat to promote the obser-

vance of human rights treaties and humanitarian law. The most prominent advocacy NGOs are Human Rights Watch (initially named Helsinki Watch, and set up to respond to the activities of East European dissidents' groups) and Amnesty International. They exert pressure by gaining media coverage, based, in part, on the high moral purpose that people customarily attach to their activities. In this way, NGOs have made a substantial contribution to the growth worldwide of a human rights culture, influencing not only governments but also transnational corporations (see p. 99), over matters such as pay and working conditions in overseas factories. The impact of NGOs within the human rights regime nevertheless goes far, particularly through behind-the-scenes lobbying of government delegations and experts, and the drafting of resolutions. A campaign by Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists during 1972–3 thus initiated the process that led to the 1975 Declaration on Torture. NGOs played a particularly prominent role in drafting the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child, and were highly influential in the establishment of the Land Mine Treaty of 1997. Nevertheless, NGOs also suffer from limitations. These include that human rights NGOs cannot *force* governments to change their ways, and that their impact within the UN is weakest in relation to the Security Council, the only body with the power to enforce UN decisions. Finally, NGOs have sometimes been criticized for adopting a 'bandwagon' approach, joining in on popular, or media-led, issues in the hope of enhancing their status or attracting funding.

The protection of human rights is generally seen to be most advanced in Europe. This largely reflects the widespread acceptance, and status, of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (1950), which was developed under the auspices of the Council of Europe and is based on the UN Declaration. By 2009, 48 states had signed the European Convention. The ECHR is enforced by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France. Complaints can be made to the Strasbourg court by signatory states or, much more commonly, by individual citizens. By the end of 2004, over 65,000 applications had been submitted to the European Court of Human Rights. This often creates a substantial backlog, meaning that cases commonly take three to five years before they are considered, added to the fact that they are also highly costly. Nevertheless, the almost total compliance with the Court's verdicts attests to the effectiveness of this mechanism for the protection of human rights. The rate of compliance within the time allowed for the Court is about 90 per cent. This makes the ECHR the nearest thing to human rights 'hard' law.

Human rights in a world of states

The key dilemma of human rights protection is that states are the only actors powerful enough to advance human rights, while also being the greatest human rights abusers. This reflects the inherent tension between human rights and foreign policy (see p. 129) to which Vincent (1986) drew attention (although he may well have included domestic policy as well). Nevertheless, the image of unavoidable antagonism between human rights and states' rights is misleading. In the first place, the trend for states to establish civil liberties and human rights in domestic law long pre-dates the advent of the international human rights regime. Second, international human rights standards have not been foisted on

GLOBAL ACTORS . . .

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

Type: NGO • Established: 1961 • Headquarters: London • Staff: About 500
Membership: 2.2 million

Amnesty International (commonly called Amnesty or AI) is an international NGO that draws attention to human rights abuses and campaigns for compliance with international standards, placing a special emphasis on the rights of political prisoners (the 'forgotten prisoners' or 'prisoners of conscience', in the words of Amnesty's founder and general secretary, 1961–66, Peter Benenson). From being a small group of writers, academics, lawyers and sympathetic journalists, AI has developed into a global organization with, in 2005, 52 sections worldwide and a presence in about 100 more. An International Council represents Amnesty's various sections, international networks and affiliated groups. It elects the International Executive Committee, which lays out the broad strategy of the organization. The International Secretariat, headed by a General Secretary, is responsible for the conduct and day-to-day affairs of the organization.

Significance: Amnesty primarily targets governments, seeking to free political and religious prisoners, ensure fair trials for those arrested, eliminate torture, the death penalty and other harsh punishments, and bring those who abuse human rights to justice. Its main weapons are publicity, education and political pressure. These are typically exerted by highlighting individual cases, in which Amnesty staff interview victims, encourage their 'adoption' by Amnesty members and supporters who engage in a letter-writing campaign, and publish detailed reports. Such activities are supported by wider campaigns, current ones including those on terrorism and security, human rights in China, refugees and asylum, arms control, stopping violence against women, poverty and human rights, and stopping Internet repression. Since the 1970s, Amnesty has been increasingly involved in proposing and drafting human rights legislation, such as the UN's 1975 Declaration on Torture.

Amnesty is widely considered to be the single dominant force in the field of human rights advocacy, being more influential than most of the other groups put together (Alston 1990). In 1974, Sean MacBride, chair of the International Executive Committee, was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize, with Amnesty itself being awarded a Nobel Peace Prize in 1977 for 'having contributed to securing the ground for freedom, for justice, and thereby also for peace in the world'. The organization was awarded the UN Prize in the Field of Human Rights in 1978. Amnesty's strengths include its global public profile as the organization with the longest history and the broadest name recognition in the field of human rights. Its reputation is bolstered by an emphasis on painstaking investigations and impartial report writing. The self-imposed limited mandate of Amnesty also has advantages. By focusing mainly on political prisoners, the organization has been able to build up a remarkable consensus about the justice of its cause as well as providing assistance to many victims. Amnesty therefore has a clear sense of purpose and, through success in individual cases, can bring a not infrequent sense of achievement to its members.

Amnesty has nevertheless been criticized on two main grounds. First, its self-acknowledged tendency to focus disproportionately on human rights abuses in relatively more democratic and open countries means that it has sometimes been condemned for giving too little attention to some of the world's worst human rights violations. Amnesty's justification for this bias is both that it is inclined to focus public pressure where it is most likely to make a difference and that it is concerned to build up credibility, and therefore influence, in the global South by ensuring that abuses in the North clearly receive attention. Second, Amnesty has been accused of ideological bias, sometimes linked to wider criticisms of the doctrine of human rights, by China, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Russia, South Korea, the USA (over Amnesty's campaigns against the death penalty and the Guantanamo Bay prison camp) and the Catholic Church (over its stance on abortion).

reluctant states – by, for instance, pressure from NGOs, citizens' campaigns or international bodies – rather, they have been the creation of states themselves, or, more precisely, of particular states. The USA and other western states took a leading role in the establishment of the post-1945 human rights regime, supported from the 1990s onwards by many post-communist states and a growing number of developing world states. The main reason why human rights protection is more effective in Europe than elsewhere is simply because of the high degree of consensus among European states about the importance of human rights.

Why, then, have states accepted, and sometimes championed, the cause of human rights? Virtually all states, for example, have signed the UN Declaration, with a large majority of them also having signed the two optional international covenants. From a liberal perspective, support for international human rights is merely an external expression of values and commitments that are basic to liberal-democratic states. In this view, foreign affairs can, and should, have a moral purpose; the pursuit of national interests should operate in tandem with the global promotion of freedom and democracy. A further reason for states to sign human rights conventions and at least support the rhetoric of human rights is that, since 1948, this has been seen as one of the preconditions for membership of the international community, bringing diplomatic and possibly trade and security benefits. Support for human rights is therefore one of the common norms that has transformed the international system into an international society (see 10). This, nevertheless, allows for, at times, a significant gulf between the international standards that a state supposedly supports and how it actually behaves towards its own citizens and towards other states. In other circumstances, states may make cynical use of the human rights agenda. Realists, for instance, argue that, behind the cloak of humanitarianism and moral purpose, human rights are often entangled with considerations about the national interest (see p. 130). This is reflected in the selective application of human rights, in which human rights failings on the part of one's enemies receive prominent attention but are conveniently ignored in the case of one's friends. The USA was therefore criticized in the 1970s for condemning human rights violations in Soviet bloc countries, while at the same time maintaining close diplomatic, economic and political ties with repressive regimes in Latin America and elsewhere. For radical theorists, such as Chomsky (see p. 228), the USA has used human rights as a moral cloak for its hegemonic ambitions.

If the success of international human rights is judged in terms of whether they have served to improve the behaviour of states and other bodies and, in particular, helped to prevent acts of barbarism and systematic repression, the record is often unimpressive. When they conflict, as they often do, state sovereignty usually trumps human rights. This is particularly true in the case of powerful states, which may either simply be immune to human rights criticism, whether expressed internally or externally, or their transgressions are not forcefully exposed by other governments, for fear of damaging diplomatic relations and economic interests. There is little evidence that the Soviet Union was affected by condemnation of its human rights record, and a fear of criticism on such grounds certainly did not prevent the Warsaw Pact invasion of Hungary in 1956, the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979,

or Russia's brutal suppression of the Chechen uprising in the 1990s. On the other hand, human rights activism both inside and outside the Soviet bloc may have contributed more subtly to the eventual collapse of the East European communist regimes. It did this by fostering a growing appetite for political freedom, thereby helping to undermine the legitimacy of these regimes, and contributing to the wave of popular protest that spread across eastern Europe in 1989. It is also notable that Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, 1985–91, used human rights rhetoric to justify his economic and political reforms as well as the realignment of the Soviet Union's relations with the rest of the world, arguing that human rights are principles that transcended the divide between capitalism and communism.

Since the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, China has been a frequent target of human rights criticism, from the USA and from groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Human rights controversies in China have focused on its suppression of political dissent, its widespread use of capital punishment, its treatment of religious minorities such as supporters of Falun Gong, political repression in the predominantly Muslim provinces of north-western China, such as Xinjiang, and, most particularly, its occupation of Tibet and the systematic subjugation of Tibetan culture, religion and national identity. It is notable that China's emergence as an economic superpower has not been matched by an appetite for political reform. If anything, China has become more uncompromising on human rights issues, both as an expression of growing national assertiveness and in order to contain the pressures that have been unleashed by economic reform. Condemnation by other governments has also become increasingly muted as China's economic resurgence has become more evident.

As far as the USA is concerned, its commitment to human rights and humanitarian law was called seriously into question by its conduct of the 'war on terror' (see Does the need to counter terrorism justify restricting human rights and basic freedoms?, p. 299). For many, September 11 marked the culmination of the period initiated by the end of the Cold War in which the growing acceptance of human rights norms appeared to be irresistible. If the state that had been largely responsible for constructing the post-1948 international human rights regime appeared to violate human rights so clearly, what hope was there that other states would be recruited to the cause?

Human rights have been particularly difficult to uphold in conflict situations. In part, this reflects the fact that power politics amongst the permanent members of the Security Council usually prevents the UN from taking a clear line on such matters. The world has therefore often appeared to stand by as gross violations of human rights have taken place. This happened particularly tragically in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, in which about 800,000 mainly ethnic Tutsis and some moderate Hutus were killed, and in the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in which an estimated 8,000 Bosnian men and boys were killed. However, from the 1990s onwards, greater emphasis has been placed on extending international law to ensure that those responsible for the gross breaches of rights involving genocide (see p. 326), crimes against humanity and war crimes are brought to account. The role and effectiveness of international criminal tribunals and, since 2002, of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in dealing with human rights violations is discussed in Chapter 14.

CONCEPT

Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is defined by the UN as 'a way to help countries torn by conflict create conditions for sustainable peace'. It is therefore essentially a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. 'Traditional' or classical peacekeeping amounts to monitoring and observing the peace process in post-conflict situations, with peacekeepers being deployed after a ceasefire has been negotiated and with no expectation of fighting except in the case of self-defence. This form of peacekeeping is consensual and requires the consent of the host state, its advantage being that the ability to report impartially on adherence to a ceasefire builds trust between previously warring states or groups.

From peacekeeping to peace-building

The term 'peacekeeping' is not found in the UN Charter. Nevertheless, over the years, peacekeeping has come to be the most significant way in which the UN has fulfilled its responsibility to maintain international peace and security. Falling somewhere between the UN's commitment to resolve disputes peacefully through means such as negotiation and mediation (Chapter Six) and more forceful actions to maintain security (Chapter Seven), peacekeeping was described by the second UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, as belonging to 'Chapter Six and a Half'. Between 1948 and 2009, the UN carried out 63 peacekeeping operations. In 2009, 16 of them remained active, involving 80,000 troops, almost 11,000 uniformed police and about 2,300 military observers, drawn from 117 countries. In addition, the UN's peacekeeping operations were supported by about 6,000 international civilian personnel, 13,000 local civilian personnel and over 2,000 volunteer workers. During 2008–09 the budget for UN peacekeeping operations was about $7.1 billion.

Classical or 'first generation' UN peacekeeping involved the establishment of a UN force placed between the parties to a dispute once a ceasefire had been implemented. In 1948, UN peacekeepers were used to monitor the truce after the first Arab–Israeli War, and the following year a UN military observer group was deployed to monitor the ceasefire in the Kashmir region following large-scale killings that had occurred in the aftermath of the partition of India and Pakistan. The despatching of a 6,000-strong multinational peacekeeping force to act as a physical barrier between Israel and Egypt following the Suez crisis of 1956, and to facilitate the withdrawal of UK and French forces from the area, is often viewed as the prototype of 'first generation' peacekeeping. The 'blue helmets' only remained with the agreement of host states, and their purpose was to provide a shield against future hostilities rather than to resolve the deeper sources of the conflict or enforce a permanent settlement. In a context of East–West rivalry, a strict reliance on neutrality and impartiality, monitoring post-conflict situations rather than influencing them, appeared to be the only way in which the UN could contribute to the maintenance of peace.

However, the traditional approach to peacekeeping became increasingly unsustainable in the post-Cold War period, especially as the number of UN peacekeeping operations increased significantly. This increase came about both as a result of an upsurge in civil strife and humanitarian crises of various kinds, a consequence, in part, of the fact that declining superpower influence allowed ethnic and other divisions to rise to the surface, and of a new-found unanimity on the Security Council that created a bias in favour of intervention. No less importantly, the task of peacekeeping became more complex and difficult due to the changing nature of violent conflict. As interstate war became less frequent and civil war became more common, more conflicts were entangled with ethnic and cultural rivalries and endemic socio-economic divisions. This was reflected in two developments from the 1990s onwards. First, as peacekeepers were increasingly being dispatched to conflict zones in which violence remained an ongoing threat, if not a reality, there was greater emphasis on 'robust' peacekeeping, sometimes portrayed as **peace enforcement**. Second, as conflict situations became more complex, there was a recognition, over time, that the design and focus of peacekeeping operations had to keep up. This led to the advent of

● **Peace enforcement.** Coercive measures, including the use of military force, used to restore peace and security in situations where acts of aggression have taken place.

CONCEPT

Peace-building

Peace-building is a long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Strictly speaking, peace-building is a phase in the peace process that occurs after peacemaking and peacekeeping have been completed. However, these activities invariably overlap to a greater or lesser degree, meaning that peace-building resembles what is often called multi-dimensional peacekeeping. Peace-building as long-term conflict resolution involves a wide range of strategies, economic, political and social as well as military. These include the following: economic reconstruction, repairing or improving the economic and social infrastructure, de-mining, the demobilization and retraining of former combatants, the reintegration of displaced peoples, establishing community organizations, and revising governmental arrangements or 'state-building'.

'multi-dimensional' peacekeeping, which includes, in addition to implementing a comprehensive peace agreement, the use of force to achieve humanitarian ends, the provision of emergency relief and steps towards political reconstruction. The emphasis therefore shifted from peacekeeping to peace-building.

Does UN peacekeeping work?

How successful has multidimensional peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period been? UN peacekeeping has been both effective and cost-effective when compared with the costs of conflict and the toll in lives and economic devastation (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). A study by the Rand Corporation in 2007 which analyzed eight UN-led peacekeeping operations determined that seven of them had succeeded in keeping the peace and six of them had helped to promote democracy (Dobbins 2007). These cases included the Congo, Cambodia, Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador, East Timor, Eastern Slavonia and Sierra Leone. However, there have been a number of peacekeeping failures, notably in Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia. UN peacekeepers were little more than spectators during the genocidal slaughter in Rwanda in 1994. UN-backed US intervention in Somalia led to humiliation and withdrawal in 1995, with warlord conflict continuing unabated. The Bosnian-Serb military in 1995 carried out the worst mass murder in Europe since WWII in the 'safe area' of Srebrenica, which had been under the protection of a UN battalion of Dutch peacekeepers. Some have seen such events as evidence of the pitfalls of intervention in alien places lacking civil order and legitimate political institutions. Others, nevertheless, argue that they highlight flaws and failings within the UN system. Failings on the ground have included the lack of a clear mission, and especially serious gaps between the mandate for intervention and the security challenges confronting peacekeepers, the varying quality of peacekeeping forces and a confused chain of command, and a general reliance on 'deterrence by presence', reflected in a reluctance to use force in the face of peace-breakers who use force freely and criminally. Failings at a higher level have been associated with a lack of political will, and conflicting priorities and agendas, in the Security Council and amongst other member states.

However, there is also evidence that the UN has learned lessons. Ever since the 1992 UN report, *An Agenda for Peace*, there has been an acknowledgement that peacekeeping alone is not enough to ensure lasting peace. The growing emphasis on peace-building reflects a desire to identify and support structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict, helping to establish 'positive' peace. Although the military remain the backbone of most peacekeeping operations, the many faces of peacekeeping now include administrators and economists, police officers and legal experts, de-miners and electoral observers, and human rights monitors and specialists in civil affairs and governance. In 2005, the UN Peacebuilding Commission was established as an advisory subsidiary body of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Its purpose is to support peace efforts in countries emerging from conflict, by bringing together all relevant actors (including international donors, the international financial institutions, national governments and troop-contributing countries), marshalling resources, and advising on and proposing integrated strategies for post-conflict peace-building and recovery.

Although, being advisory, the Peacebuilding Commission can accomplish little through its own efforts, the greater emphasis within the UN on peace-building is an acknowledgement that classical peacekeeping is effectively obsolete and that peace enforcement is always difficult and may only be possible under specific conditions (see Is humanitarian intervention justified? p. 328). Peace-building, however, is a holistic exercise that straddles the UN 'harder' and 'softer' sides, its concern with promoting peace and security fusing with its commitment to economic and social development.

Promoting economic and social development

From the outset, the architects of the UN recognized the interconnectedness of economic and political issues. This largely reflected an awareness of the links between the economic turmoil of the Great Depression and the rise of political extremism and the growth of international conflict The UN Charter thus committed the organization to promoting 'social progress and better standards of life'. However, in its early phase, the UN's concerns with economic and social issues extended little beyond post-war reconstruction and recovery, in Western Europe and Japan in particular. A major shift in favour of the promotion of economic and social development was nevertheless evident from the 1960s onwards. This was a consequence of three factors. First, and most importantly, the process of decolonization and the growing influence of developing states within the ever-expanding UN focused more attention on the unequal distribution of wealth worldwide. The North–South divide (see p. 360) thus came to rival the significance of East–West rivalry within the UN. Second, a greater awareness of interdependence and the impact of globalization from the 1980s onwards meant that there was both an increased acceptance that economic and social problems in one part of the world have implications for other parts of the world, and that patterns of poverty and inequality are linked to the structure of the global economy. Third, as acknowledged by the transition from peacemaking to peace-building, the rise of civil war and ethnic strife underlined the fact that peace and security, on the one hand, and development, justice and human rights (see p. 304) on the other, are not separate agendas.

The UN's economic and social responsibilities are discharged by a sprawling and, seemingly, ever-enlarging array of programmes, funds and specialized agencies, supposedly coordinated by ECOSOC. Its main areas are human rights (discussed in Chapter 13), development and poverty reduction (discussed in Chapter 15) and the environment (discussed in Chapter 16). As far as development is concerned, the principal vehicle responsible for global development policy is the UN Development Programme (UNDP), created in 1965. The UNDP has a presence in some 166 countries, working with them on their own solutions to global and national development challenges; it also helps developing countries attract and use aid effectively. Annual Human Development Reports (HDRs) focus the global debate on key development issues, providing new measurement tools (such as the Human Development Index or HDI), undertaking innovative analysis and often advancing controversial policy proposals. By focusing on the notions of 'human development' (see p. 356) and 'human security' (see p. 423), the UNDP has also fostered innovative thinking about poverty and deprivation, moving away from a narrowly economic defini-

KEY EVENTS . . .

History of the United Nations

1944	Dumbarton Oaks conference (the USA, the Soviet Union, the UK and China) sets down the general aims and structure of the future UN.
1945	UN Charter approved in San Francisco by 50 states (Poland was not represented but signed the Charter later to become one of UN's 51 original members).
1946	Trygve Lie (Norway) appointed Secretary-General.
1948	Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted.
1950	Security Council approves military action in Korea.
1950	UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) established.
1953	Dag Hammarskjöld (Sweden) appointed Secretary-General.
1956	First UN peacekeeping force sent to the Suez Canal.
1960	UN operation in the Congo established to oversee the transition from Belgian rule to independence.
1961	U Thant (Burma) appointed Secretary-General.
1964	UN peacekeepers sent to Cyprus.
1965	UN Development Programme (UNDP) founded.
1968	General Assembly approves the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
1971	People's Republic of China replaces the Republic of China (Taiwan) at the UN Security Council.
1972	First UN environment conference is held in Stockholm, leading to the establishment of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP).
1972	First UN conference on women in Mexico City, inaugurates International Women's Year.
1972	Kurt Waldheim (Austria) appointed Secretary-General
1982	Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (Peru) appointed Secretary-General
1990	UNICEF convenes the World Summit for Children.
1992	Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Egypt) appointed Secretary-General
1992	The 'Earth Summit' in Rio approves a comprehensive plan to promote sustainable development.
1992	Security Council issues 'An Agenda for Peace', highlighting new approaches to peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building.
1997	Kofi Annan (Ghana) appointed Secretary-General
2000	General Assembly adopts the Millennium Development Goals.
2002	International Criminal Court (ICC) established.
2005	UN Peacekeeping Commission is established.
2007	Ban Ki-moon (South Korea) appointed Secretary-General.

Council fairly constant as individual states come and go. Major regional actors, including those mentioned as candidates for possible new permanent seats (shown in Table 7.1), tend to rotate onto the Council more often than do less important states.

Peacekeeping Forces

Peacekeeping Forces

Peacekeeping forces are not mentioned in the UN Charter. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld in the 1960s joked that they were allowed under "Chapter Six and a Half"—somewhere between the nonviolent dispute resolution called for in Chapter 6 of the Charter and the authorization of force provided for in Chapter 7. The Charter requires member states to place military forces at the disposal of the UN, but such forces were envisioned as being used in response to aggression (under collective security). In practice, when the UN has authorized force to reverse aggression—as in the Gulf War in 1990—the forces involved have been *national* forces not under UN command.

The UN's *own* forces—borrowed from armies of member states but under the flag and command of the UN—have been *peacekeeping* forces to calm regional conflicts, playing a neutral role between warring forces.[7] These forces won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988 in recognition of their growing importance and success. As was learned in Bosnia, however, such neutral forces do not succeed well in a situation in which the Security Council has identified one side as the aggressor.

Peacekeeping Missions The secretary-general assembles a peacekeeping force for each mission, usually from a few states totally uninvolved in the conflict, and puts it under a single commander. The soldiers are commonly called *blue helmets*. Peacekeeping forces serve at the invitation of a host government and must leave if that government orders them out often.

Authority for peacekeeping forces is granted by the Security Council, usually for a period of three to six months that may be renewed—in some cases for decades. In one early case, the Suez crisis in 1956, the General Assembly authorized the forces under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, which allowed the General Assembly to take up security matters when the Security Council was deadlocked. In the Congo in 1960, the secretary-general took the initiative. But today the Security Council controls peacekeeping operations.

Funds must be voted on by the General Assembly, and lack of funds is today the single greatest constraint on the use of peacekeeping forces. Special assessments against member states pay for peacekeeping operations. With the expansion of peacekeeping since 1988, the expenses of these forces (about $5 billion in 2006) are several times larger than the regular UN budget.

Recent Missions In early 2007, the UN maintained 80,000 troops (including some police) in 16 separate peacekeeping or observing missions, using military personnel from more than a hundred countries, spanning five world regions (see Table 7.2).

The largest peacekeeping mission in early 2007 was in Democratic Congo, where 19,000 peacekeepers monitored a cease-fire and protected civilians after a civil war. In

[7] Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*. Princeton, 2006. Whitworth, Sandra. *Men, Militarism and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis*. Rienner, 2004. Findlay, Trevor. *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*. Oxford, 2002. James Mayall, ed. *The New Interventionism, 1991–1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia, and Somalia*. Cambridge, 1996. Ratner, Steven R. *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War*. St. Martin's, 1995.

TABLE 7.2 UN Peacekeeping Missions as of March 2007

Location	Region	Size	Annual Cost (million $)	Role	Since
Democratic Congo	Africa	19,000	$1,100	Observe cease-fire; protect civilians	1999
Liberia	Africa	15,600	715	Assist transitional govt.	2003
Sudan	Africa	10,000	1,100	Support agreement; monitor war	2005
Ivory Coast	Africa	9,000	475	Help implement peace agreement	2004
Ethiopia/Eritrea	Africa	2,500	140	Monitor postwar border	2000
Western Sahara	Africa	350	45	Organize referendum in territory	1991
India/Pakistan	South Asia	60	8	Observe India-Pakistan cease-fire	1949
Kosovo	Russia/E. Eur.	2,500	220	Civil administration; relief	1999
Georgia	Russia/E. Eur.	250	33	Observe cease-fire in civil war	1993
Lebanon	Middle East	12,000	350	Monitor cease-fire on Israeli border	1978
Syria (Golan Heights)	Middle East	1,200	40	Monitor Israel-Syria cease-fire	1974
Cyprus	Middle East	1,000	50	Monitor Greek-Turkish cease-fire	1964
Israel	Middle East	250	30	Observe Arab-Israeli truce	1948
Haiti	Latin America	8,800	500	Assist transitional govt.	2004
East Timor	Asia/Pacific	1,100	170	Observe cease-fire; policing	2006
Total		83,610	4,976		

Note: Size indicates total international personnel (mostly troops but some civilian administrators and police).

UN Aid in Darfur, Sudan

2005, the Security Council approved a 10,000-troop peacekeeping force for the Darfur region in Sudan at a cost of nearly $1 billion, but Sudan refused to allow it, and smaller, ineffective African Union forces remained the only peacekeepers there as violence escalated in 2006 and 2007. The UN's other largest peacekeeping operations were in Liberia (maintaining a cease-fire after a civil war), Ivory Coast (stabilizing a peace agreement), Lebanon (following the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war), and Haiti (trying to maintain stability after a military coup). The largest recent missions reflect the resurgence of UN peacekeeping after the shakeout of the mid-1990s. UN leaders expect a surge to more than 100,000 peacekeepers and $6 billion in 2007.

NATO-led forces largely replaced UN peacekeepers in Bosnia in the late 1990s (and later took military control of Kosovo). UN operations in these countries focus on civilian governmental functions, leaving security matters largely to UN-authorized but independently commanded international forces. The same approach was used in East Timor with an Australian-led force.

At its peak in the early 1990s, the UN ran several large peacekeeping operations in addition to those in the former Yugoslavia and in Lebanon. One of the most important was in Cambodia. There, 15,000 peacekeepers were coupled with a large force of UN administrators who took over substantial control of the Cambodian government under a fragile pact that ended (for the most part) a long and devastating civil war. Despite difficulty in obtaining the cooperation of the Khmer Rouge faction (which refused to disarm as it had agreed), the UN pressed forward to hold elections in 1993 that chose a Cambodian government (though not a stable one).

The lessons learned in Cambodia helped the UN accomplish a similar mission more easily in Mozambique. A peace agreement ended a long and devastating civil war there, setting up mechanisms for disarmament, the integration of military forces, and the holding of internationally supervised elections for a new government. In 1992, the UN had tried to accomplish a similar mission in Angola with only 500 personnel. The peace process was on track until the government won the elections; the rebels refused to accept the results and resumed an even more destructive civil war. At the next opportunity, the UN sent a force to Angola ten times as large as before. Results improved, but the war started again and the UN Security Council ended the mission in 1999. These experiences helped the UN respond more effectively after civil wars in Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, and Liberia in 2002–2003.

The Security Council passed Resolution 1325 in 2000, mandating greater inclusion of women and attention to gender issues in UN peacekeeping and reconstruction. But problems developed in several locations when UN peacekeepers participated in local prostitution, rape, and even sex trafficking. In 2004, Secretary-General Annan called "shameful" the reported behavior of UN troops from several countries serving in Democratic Congo. Investigators there found hundreds of cases of sexual crimes by UN personnel.

In an effort to provide longer-term support after wars, in 2005 the UN created a Peacebuilding Commission to coordinate reconstruction, institution-building, and economic recovery efforts in postwar societies after peacekeeping missions end.

Observing and Peacekeeping "Peacekeepers" actually perform two different functions—observing and peacekeeping. *Observers* are unarmed military officers sent to a conflict area in small numbers simply to watch what happens and report back to the UN. With the UN watching, the parties to a conflict are often less likely to break a cease-fire. Observers can monitor various aspects of a country's situation—cease-fires, elections, respect for human rights, and other areas.

The function of *peacekeeping* is carried out by lightly armed soldiers (in armored vehicles with automatic rifles but without artillery, tanks, and other heavy weapons). Such forces play several roles. They can *interpose* themselves physically between warring parties to keep them apart (more accurately, to make them attack the UN forces in order to get to their enemy). UN peacekeepers often try to *negotiate* with military officers on both sides. This channel of communication can bring about tactical actions and understandings that support a cease-fire. But the UN forces in a war zone cannot easily get from one side's positions to those of the other to conduct negotiations.

Peacekeeping is much more difficult if one side sees the UN forces as being biased toward the other side. Israel feels this way about UN forces in southern Lebanon, for example. On occasion, Israeli forces have broken through UN lines to attack enemies, and they allegedly have targeted UN outposts on occasion. In Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, one party deliberately attacked UN forces many times, causing a number of deaths. In general, when cease-fires break down, UN troops get caught in the middle. More than 2,200 have been killed over the years.

In some conflicts, peacekeepers organized outside the UN framework have been used instead of UN-commanded forces. Nearly 5,000 French peacekeepers—not under UN command—serve in Ivory Coast alongside a similar number of UN peacekeepers from other countries, monitoring a 2003 cease-fire between the rebel-held north of the country and the government-held south. When government air strikes killed nine French soldiers in 2004, the French forces retaliated robustly, destroying the government's air force.

Peacekeeping forces have generally been unable to make peace, only to keep it. To go into a shooting war and suppress hostilities requires military forces far beyond those of past UN peacekeeping missions. Thus, peacekeepers are usually not sent until a cease-fire has been arranged, has taken effect, and has held up for some time. Often dozens of cease-fires are broken before one sticks. Wars may simmer along for years, taking a terrible toll, before the UN gets its chance.

To address this problem, the secretary-general in 1992 proposed to create UN *peacemaking* (or *peace enforcement*) units that would not only monitor a cease-fire but enforce it if it broke down.[8] The secretary-general called for member states to make available, on a rapid deployment basis, 1,000 soldiers each—specially trained volunteers—to create a standby UN army that could respond quickly to crises. Not only did the member states refuse the request for soldiers, they shot down the idea of peacemaking altogether. Since then the UN has authorized member states to provide real military forces, not peacekeepers, when fighting may be required. In an exception that may or may not indicate a trend, the Security Council broadened the mandate of UN peacekeepers in Democratic Congo to let them protect civilians. In 2005, Pakistani peacekeepers killed 50 militia fighters after 9 peacekeepers from Bangladesh were killed in an ambush.

In the late 1990s, seven countries—Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Poland, the Netherlands, Austria, and Canada—formed a 4,000-troop UN Standby High Readiness Brigade. Headquartered in Denmark and available to deploy to conflict areas in two to four weeks rather than months, the brigade is controlled by the Security Council. It participated in the UN mission to Ethiopia-Eritrea in 2000–2001. In early 2005, the brigade deployed to Sudan to support a peace agreement between northern and southern regions after a long civil war that killed millions. Currently, 16 countries participate in the brigade, which will probably deploy to Darfur, Sudan, if the Sudanese government approves a UN force there.

FULL PLATE

The UN secretary-general has a lofty mission but limited power and resources. Ban Ki-moon, here getting lunch at the UN cafeteria on his first day as secretary-general in 2007, will face a daunting agenda serving multiple bosses (the member states) with a tight budget.

The Secretariat

The secretary-general of the UN is the closest thing to a "president of the world" that exists. But the secretary-general represents member states—not the world's six billion

[8] Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*. United Nations, 1992. Woodhouse, Tom, Robert Bruce, and Malcolm Dando, eds. *Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Towards Effective Intervention in Post–Cold War Conflicts*. St. Martin's, 1998.